TWO BATTLES...TWO ATTACKS...Memories of a General Staff officer...

….. And in the morning the attack was coming. I decided to observe how the 122nd Infantry Regiment, which was the first to arrive at the concentration site, operated. He was supposed to advance in the area of ​​the village of Elagino, in the zone of the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, which had been drained of blood in previous battles.

As soon as dawn broke and the stars dimmed, the regiment commander and I climbed to the attic of a country house among tall fir trees on the edge of the forest. Unit commanders scurried along the edge of the forest, pulling out chains of fighters. People in camouflage suits over sheepskin coats were still barely visible. But then the edge of the sun appeared in the frosty fog.

The chains moved and moved: behind each fighter there was a stripe in the deep snow. And the snow was bluish-white, pristine, and the field was flat, flat, without bushes, without hillocks, without shelters. In the distance one could see high-rise hills covered with young birch forest. The enemy is there. Behind the hills, inaccessible to view, stretched the railway connecting the Germans in Naro-Fominsk with their rear. The Latvians, that is, excuse me, the units of the Latvian division, had to cut this road. I understood what the regiment commander probably had not yet realized: the Nazis would spare nothing to preserve this vital artery for themselves.

Meanwhile, the fighters walked, as if in a training exercise, in several long chains that spanned the entire field, managing to maintain even some alignment. The enemy was silent. Complete silence. The tension was growing. Here are the chains in the middle of the field. What are the fascists waiting for? Have they really left the line?!

And then explosions occurred. No shots, only explosions. Black lumps, shrouded in gray smoke, shot up. The attackers found themselves in a minefield. Traffic slowed down, especially in the center. Some fighters stopped and lay down, others got out on the tracks of the commanders who had gone ahead, the chains opened, transforming into short chain columns.

I sharply asked whether reconnaissance had been carried out, to which the regiment commander answered sadly: only on the left flank, there was no more time. There was no point in reproaching him.

The white field was covered with black craters like sores, and large red spots were visible in the snow through binoculars. And lying people. You won't understand who is alive and who is dead. And the Germans, waiting until ours were drawn into the minefield, struck with mortars and rifles. Fortunately for us, they had few machine guns. But the mortars hit with precision, shooting those who tried to move. People buried themselves in the snow. They died without benefit. Mines around, on the ground. Mines with a characteristic meowing sound fell from above. A terrible situation for the soldiers frozen in the snow. As the front-line poet said:

The snow is full of mines all around

And turned black from mine dust.

Breakup - and a friend dies,

And death passes by again.

Now it's my turn

I'm the only one being hunted.

Forty-one be damned

And infantry frozen in the snow.

Yes, damn this year with its terrible front-line winter! And forever and ever, let our warriors who won the great battle be glorified!

The regiment commander no longer controlled the battle and lost contact with the lying units. But there, in chains, under fire, there were courageous commanders, experienced fighters who made the right decision. And it could only be one thing: if you want to live, rush forward, get closer to the enemy, in order to get out from under fire, so that with hatred - a bayonet in the throat! And the soldiers went and ran up the slopes of the heights; The first, thinned wave swept over the German trenches and disappeared from view, but after the first wave a second wave rolled in, and the third wave was approaching, which did not suffer losses from the mortars.

Signal flares flew over the birch forest, showing that the hills were in our hands. The nature of the battle has changed. The Germans were now hitting the abandoned positions, preparing a counterattack. Their artillery joined in. Large-caliber shells exploded at the edge of the forest and deeper, in our rear. The regiment commander had nothing to oppose the Nazis; all the artillery of the Latvian division was still on the way. I advised that the machine gun companies that did not participate in the attack (there were eighteen machine operators in the three pulrots of the regiment) be withdrawn into the captured trenches in order to reliably gain a foothold on the heights. And push the infantry further - to the railway embankment, to the track structures. There she will suffer less from enemy fire. The regiment commander did not understand me, I had to explain: the Germans will certainly counterattack, but they will not throw shells and mines on the railway track. They need it intact. In Naro-Fominsk they have trains with ammunition, equipment, and wagons with the wounded.

Later I found out that this was so. That day, the narrow strip near the railway passed from one to the other twelve (!) times. The regiment lost a third of its personnel, most in the first attack through a minefield. The commander of the Latvian division was wounded and out of action. The division commissar died. That battle was difficult, but the people stood the test. Soon the division will be transformed into a guards division...

....I thought that I had not been on the front line for a long time, I was following events from high headquarters and had somehow lost the feeling of a real war. He asked me to be dropped off at the front line, without warning anyone, without preparing anything, so that everything would be as it was. At that time there were local battles. The regiment in which we arrived advanced several kilometers day after day. And again there was an attic - in a brick house under a red-tiled roof, but not on the edge of the forest, but on the outskirts of a small broken town. And there was a spacious snow-covered field, behind which some buildings could be seen, a half-collapsed factory chimney. The Germans fired from there.

The battalion commander, a captain of about twenty-five, who had settled in the attic, was not very happy when his superiors showed up - the regiment commander and three other officers were with me. It has long been known: the more leaders, the worse. The captain felt embarrassed. He dryly reported the situation. Here we are - there are Germans. By twenty-four it was ordered to take the creamery. An infantry company with three guns is defending. On its flanks are the Volkssturm. In the morning, reinforcements of an unknown number arrived to the Germans. In front of the plant itself, where the pipe is, there is a minefield. Having identified me as the main figure, a visiting guest (due to my too neat, “metropolitan” uniform, due to my advanced age), the captain politely but decisively asked those who “don’t have to be here” to leave the attic, otherwise so many would be covered with one random shell... He was right, and I demanded that those accompanying me go down to the safe basement of a neighboring house, and the regiment commander go about his business. He left, leaving a squad of machine gunners on the ground floor just in case. And in the attic with me are the battalion commander, telephone operators, artillery observers and a shy young lieutenant, commander of an attached tank platoon.

The “owners” took care of me. They offered us a place by the dormer window on a sofa brought from the rooms. Cover your knees with a warm rug. They asked if anything else was needed, with a certain hint. I answered: a stack after the battle, and now only good binoculars. And let them not pay attention, do what they would do without me. That's what they did. The captain was checking with some foreman how much ammunition he would deliver tomorrow. The artillerymen determined landmarks and coordinated them by telephone with the batteries. The telephone operator, muffled his voice and looking sideways at me, complained to someone that again, for the third time in a row, he had not received the “People’s Commissar” hundred grams. Meanwhile, the day was ending and twilight was approaching. I asked the captain: will he have time to take the plant before midnight?

“Where will he go,” answered the battalion commander. - Yesterday a farm, today this establishment, tomorrow a railway station... We’ll work. - I looked at my watch. - Mine have rested. They'll be coming soon.

A few minutes later, in fact, in three groups, three companies, fighters approached. In overcoats, in quilted jackets, some had already acquired a white camouflage coat. Two companies, as usual, without commands, disappeared at the line, among the ruins, in basements, in houses. The third lingered behind the wall of a large brick house that had burned out from the inside. The soldiers took a smoke break, checked their shoes and weapons. They scattered into a thin chain, about fifteen meters from each other, and went out into the field. The officers, dressed the same as the privates and in a common line, cannot be distinguished, cannot be knocked out.

German mortars started firing. But it is difficult to inflict damage on such a liquid chain, and besides, our gunners immediately found the mortars and struck to suppress them. The enemy battery responded. Tank guns boomed. The machine-gun crackle was loud. The fighters moved in short bursts. Many lay motionless. There was an impression that the Germans had mowed down the company and would only cover and save the survivors in the deepening twilight. The flashes of shots became brighter and brighter, and this made it seem as if there were more and more of them. And the captain seemed to have forgotten about his slaughtered company, he was checking with the tanker where to move the vehicles, and he was planning routes for the artillerymen to accompany the infantry with wheels and hit them with direct fire. He did everything correctly, but I could not stand it and advised me to save the remnants of the company that was dying under fire. “What remnants?!” the captain was surprised. “They called fire on themselves, exposed the German defenses, and now they’re lying there, smoking in their fists. They’re waiting for the firing points to be suppressed and the whole battalion to go on the attack. It’s not cold today, they won’t catch a cold.”

That's it, not forty-one. We thought about a cold.

Then everything was businesslike and simple. The German machine guns were destroyed by our artillerymen at the very beginning of the attack. The same fate befell the enemy battery and two tanks that ended up with the Germans. The battalion walked around the minefield in front of the plant to the right and left and knocked the Nazis out of their line. The battle lasted only an hour and a half. Our losses: three killed, two sent to the hospital, two “light” remained in service. The rushing lieutenant sprained his leg while running. And the Germans still managed to knock out one tank. But in general, this attack was in no way comparable to the attacks near Naro-Fominsk. And the German was not the same, and, most importantly, ours were completely different. In the full sense, they won not by numbers, but by skill. But in my memory both battles are inextricably linked. By contrast, perhaps...

January 25 marked the 251st anniversary of the creation of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. On the eve of this date, the Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces Army General Valery GERASIMOV gave an exclusive interview to the executive editor of the Independent Military Review Viktor LITOVKIN.

– Before starting our conversation, Valery Vasilyevich, I cannot help but mention the holiday - the Day of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. This year, without exaggeration, our leading military command body, as defined by Marshal of the Soviet Union Boris Shaposhnikov as “the brain of the army,” turns 251 years old.

Yes. With the emergence of the General Staff service in the Russian Empire, this most important element of the military organization of the state immediately began to play a noticeable, and over time, the most important role in the life of the army. The General Staff has always been with the troops in the days of defeats and victories, establishing and strengthening traditions that allow the current generation of our officers to worthily fulfill all assigned tasks to ensure the military security of our country.

– What is the General Staff like today? What are its main functions?

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is the central body of military command of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the main body of operational management of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. In accordance with the new Regulations on the General Staff, which was approved by the President of the Russian Federation in July 2013, the powers of the General Staff are not limited only to the tasks facing the Armed Forces, but also cover issues of ensuring military security and defense of the state as a whole.

Today, along with the management of the daily activities of the Armed Forces, the daily solution of military development issues, The main functions of the General Staff also include:
— organization of defense planning of the Russian Federation;
— development of plans for strategic operations;
— management of the activities of military intelligence agencies;
— organization of planning for mobilization preparation and mobilization in the Russian Federation within the powers of the Russian Ministry of Defense;
— coordination of the activities of other troops, military formations and bodies in the field of defense.

In addition, the General Staff organizes the development of proposals for the formation and implementation of state defense policy and takes part in its implementation. As the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation said at an extended meeting of the board of the Ministry of Defense, held in December 2013:

«… Understanding all the difficulties and prospects for the development of new types of weapons and methods of conducting armed struggle, everyone in their place must not just do their job, but approach it creatively, always think about how to take the next step towards improving our large military machine. In carrying out this task, headquarters at various levels, and above all the General Staff, are of great importance. These are not just people who count, transfer and file pieces of paper into cases, but first of all an analytical center. Today this is more important than ever…»

Obviously, there is no better answer to the question of what results the country’s leadership expects from us.

– How are military specialists selected for service in the General Staff, where they undergo training? What qualities should they have?

Being an officer of the General Staff is not only an honor for any officer of the Russian Army, it is, first of all, a difficult and responsible job.

The most trained officers from the main headquarters of the branches and branches of the Armed Forces, as well as the best representatives of the headquarters of military districts, are selected to serve on the General Staff. Officers and generals who have achieved a high level of coherence among the command and control bodies and troops subordinate to them, as well as those who possess the necessary individual qualities, are selected for senior military positions. The last condition can be considered the main one.

Analytical thinking, broad outlook, internal need and the habit of improving one’s professional level are just some of the traits that a candidate for service in the General Staff must have.

During selection, all officers undergo an interview and check the level of professional preparedness directly in the structural units of the General Staff. First of all, the ability of officers to take a creative and innovative approach to solving any given task is assessed. Flexibility of thinking on a wide range of issues of ensuring the military security of the state is valued.

An officer of the General Staff, using the example of Russian history, must have an idea of ​​the place and role of the army in the state and society, the role of Russia in the past, present and future world, and be familiar with issues of geopolitics, geo-economics, and the processes of globalization of society.

An effective tool for high-quality staffing of military positions in the General Staff is the federal and departmental personnel reserve of the Armed Forces. In 2013, at meetings of the Central Attestation Commission of the Ministry of Defense, a method was introduced for considering candidates for military positions on an alternative basis - at least three candidates are presented for one vacant military position.

The main and basic university for training General Staff officers is the Military Academy of the General Staff, which has been training military personnel for the strategic command level for more than 180 years. It is the successor to the Imperial Military Academy, founded in 1832 on the initiative of Emperor Nicholas I of Russia. On December 8, 2013, the Academy celebrated its 181st anniversary.

On the basis of the Military Academy of the General Staff, officers are trained under a two-year program of higher military education, as well as professional retraining and advanced training under additional professional education programs. In their specialized specialties and areas of activity, officers undergo training at military academies of the branches and branches of the Armed Forces.

Military thought does not stand still. Weapons are being improved, forms and methods of warfare are changing. All this needs to be known and taken into account daily when performing tasks and making management decisions. The broad outlook of an officer of the General Staff should cover the sphere of political and economic relations both within the country and abroad. It is necessary to have complete information on a daily basis about everything that is happening in Russia and abroad in the field of military construction and development of the armed forces, military and public administration, in the field of training and use of troops and forces.

But, of course, it is not possible to cover all spectrums of activities of the Armed Forces with the training programs of military academies. Therefore, the professional training of any officer in the Armed Forces is a daily and continuous process. Generals and officers of the General Staff are no exception. In addition to all that has been said, an officer of the General Staff must be an unconditional patriot of Russia, a spiritual, moral and in all respects healthy citizen of the Fatherland.

– The National Center for State Defense Management is being created. What functions will it perform, including in relation to the Armed Forces? What will be the role of the General Staff here? What will change?

At the suggestion of the Minister of Defense S.K. Shoigu, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation decided to create a National Defense Management Center of the Russian Federation within the Ministry of Defense. On January 20, 2014, as you know, the first stone was laid for the Center building on Frunzenskaya Embankment.

The created National Center will cover all levels of leadership of the Armed Forces, and will also allow coordinating the efforts of 49 ministries and departments involved in the implementation of the National Defense Plan. For the first time, a vertically integrated multi-level automated control system will be created in the Russian Ministry of Defense and a unified information and control space will be created to ensure joint actions of diverse forces and assets. In addition, the National Center will become the main instrument for managing the mobilization of the country.

When implementing this project, only breakthrough technologies and the most modern software solutions will be used. Equipping them will allow you to quickly display the situation from any region, as well as the area of ​​operations of troops (forces), including those located at significant distances from permanent deployment points.

The construction of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is carried out by the Ministry of Defense in accordance with the Plan for the Construction and Development of the Armed Forces. The plan is developed for five years and approved by the President of the Russian Federation. If necessary, by decision of the President of the Russian Federation, measures for the construction and development of the Armed Forces may be specified.

The Plan for the Construction and Development of the Armed Forces reflects the issues of manning the types and arms of the armed forces that comprise them, arming them with military and special equipment, modernizing its existing models and developing promising ones, developing military infrastructure, and all types of support. In addition, in order to implement the tasks set by the president and synchronize all activities, programs and plans for the construction of the Armed Forces, a detailed Action Plan of the Ministry of Defense for the period until 2020 has been developed.

It covers all areas of the Armed Forces’ activities – from maintaining the combat effectiveness of troops to increasing the attractiveness of military service. All activities are detailed on a monthly basis in plans and schedules, which are developed from the Deputy Minister of Defense to the formation and military unit inclusive. A strict system for monitoring the implementation of the plan has been organized.

It consists of closed and open parts. The open part of the plan can be found on the official website of the Ministry of Defense. And changes and additions to it are made only by decision of the board of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. This allows the Ministry of Defense, in close cooperation with other federal executive authorities, to carry out stable and focused work on the construction, development and use of the Armed Forces.

– I know that the General Staff is actively involved in international military cooperation. What tasks does he face here?

The General Staff takes an active part in the preparation and conduct of international military cooperation events on a bilateral and multilateral basis. There are many tasks. The priority areas of international military cooperation for us are:
— development of the military component of the CSTO;
— strengthening the military organization of the Union State with the Republic of Belarus;
— ensuring the selective military presence of the Russian Federation in various regions of the Commonwealth and in the world to strengthen regional and global security;
— strengthening the security system in the Central Asian region, taking into account the withdrawal of international security assistance forces from it;
— preventing the emergence of new nuclear missile threats along the perimeter of Russian borders;
— continued cooperation in the military field with the United States and NATO on issues of arms control, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ensuring regional and global security;
— implementation of decisions of the political leadership of the state to promote Russian approaches in the field of missile defense, fulfillment of the requirements of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms;
— fulfillment of Russian obligations in the field of military-technical cooperation for the supply of weapons and military equipment from the availability of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Currently, international military cooperation is diverse, dynamic and focused on solving the tasks set by the country's leadership to the Russian Ministry of Defense. Since issues of international military cooperation are directly related to issues of ensuring the military security of the state, they are the subject of constant concern of the General Staff.

a closed privileged corporation within the Russian officer corps. K.o.GSh finally took shape in the 90s of the 19th century. The officers of the General Staff were graduates of the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff (Imperial Nikolaev Military Academy), assigned to the General Staff and transferred to it. Graduating from the General Staff Academy opened up wide career opportunities. General staff officers received the rank of captain in the 10th-12th year of service, while army infantry officers received the rank of captain in the 12th-18th. A general staff officer could become a lieutenant colonel in his 13th year of service, and an infantry officer in his 20th year. General Staff officers became colonels after 18-20 years of service, while the majority of army men never reached this rank. As a result, it was the General Staff officers who occupied a significant part of all senior command posts. Despite the imperfect training of General Staff personnel, according to data for 1912, General Staff officers, who made up about 2% of the Russian officer corps, occupied 62% of the positions of corps commanders, 68% of positions of commanders of infantry divisions, 77% of positions of commanders of cavalry divisions. According to the calculations of the American historian D. Steinberg, on the eve of the First World War, General Staff officers made up 34% of the total Russian generals. In peacetime, a General Staff officer received command of a regiment after 15-17 years of service (according to other estimates - after 20-25 years of service), while officers without an academic education - only after 25. Comparison based on the “List of the General Staff for 1914” terms of appointment of General Staff officers as regimental commanders at the beginning of the 20th century. and the second half of the 19th century. indicates an increase in length of service for receiving regiments. At the beginning of the twentieth century. General Staff officers often received regiments after 27-28 years of service and, as a rule, no earlier than 23 years of service, whereas in the second half of the 19th century. this was possible, sometimes, even after 13-14 years of service. According to data for 1903, General Staff officers occupied 21% of the positions of regimental commanders. Service in the central military administration made it possible to reach the ranks of general 4-6 years earlier. If guards officers on average reached the positions of corps commanders in the 42nd year of service, then the General Staff officers - in the 36th; if guardsmen became district commanders in the 45th year of service, then the General Staff officers - in the 37th.

According to some estimates, in 1913, 63% of General Staff officers served outside the service of the General Staff. The question of the size of the General Staff officer corps on the eve of the First World War is ambiguous. At the beginning of the First World War, the General Staff staff included 852 positions. The “List of the General Staff,” with corrections as of July 18, 1914, lists 1,429 officers, including those assigned to the General Staff (202 officers) and those who left service. The same publication provides a short list of General Staff officers by seniority, which lists 1,135 people (82 generals, 115 lieutenant generals, 228 major generals, 354 colonels, 118 lieutenant colonels and 238 captains). However, there is also a schedule of General Staff officers by position, indicating 839 staff positions, which were occupied by only 817 officers and 152 officers, in addition, retained the General Staff uniform. In total, 969 General Staff officers are indicated. Close to this figure is the information from the official annual report on the state of the General Staff officer corps for 1914, according to which as of July 19, 1914, the General Staff consisted of 963 officers: 165 of them served in central institutions, 561 in district and combat headquarters and institutions; did not hold regular positions, but retained the General Staff uniform; 120 officers were in combat positions and 117 were in administrative positions. On the eve of the First World War, 45.3% of general staff officers came from the Guard. During the First World War, General Staff officers occupied 20 of the 22 positions of commanders-in-chief of the fronts (except for A.A. Brusilov and N.I. Ivanov). According to modern researchers, only the corps of General Staff officers could become the core of the professional military elite of Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century. The exclusivity of the position strengthened the casteism of the General Staff and entailed protectionism.

During the first year of the war, 64 General Staff officers received general appointments, 145 General Staff colonels became regiment commanders, and 40 officers were lost. General Staff officers served in the central military administration and in the troops. At Headquarters, according to the staff of the quartermaster general's department, there were 14 staff officer positions of the General Staff, according to the staff of the department of the general on duty - 3, in the remaining departments of Headquarters - another 3. At the front headquarters, according to the staff, there were 12 general staff positions (chief of staff, quartermaster general, assistant Quartermaster General, 4 heads of departments, 4 assistant heads of departments (at the headquarters of the Western and South-Western Fronts there are 6 heads of departments and their assistants each), a staff officer for aviation assignments). At the army headquarters there were 10 general staff positions (chief of army staff, quartermaster general, head of the operational department, 3 senior adjutants, 3 assistant senior adjutants, staff officer for aviation assignments). At the corps level, General Staff officers held 3 positions (chief of staff, senior adjutant and assignment officer). At the divisional level - 2 positions (chief of staff and senior adjutant). At the brigade level - the position of staff officer of the General Staff. 11 General Staff officers were in the rear districts and 8 in the Nikolaev Academy.

During the war, more than 90 General Staff officers (or 6.3% of the corps of General Staff officers in 1914) died in battle, died from wounds, were killed by soldiers or committed suicide; in total, they died in 1914-1918, excluding victims of the Civil War war, more than 200 General Staff officers. Compared to the overall colossal losses of career officers, the percentage of losses among the General Staff officers was negligible. This is due, first of all, to the specifics of the General Staff service, which did not always require the presence of officers at the forefront. The condition for General Staff officers to receive the rank of major general was qualified command of a regiment. Short-term business trips of strangers to regiments were assessed ambiguously by officers.

Such general staff officers as Ya.G. became known as incapable military leaders. Zhilinsky, A.N. Kuropatkin, P.K. Rennenkampf, N.V. Ruzsky, A.V. Samsonov, N.N. Yanushkevich. Academy graduates such as generals M.V. stood out as talented military leaders and military administrators. Alekseev, P.N. Wrangel, A.I. Denikin, A.M. Kaledin, V.I. Selivachev, V.E. Flug, N.N. Yudenich. The problem with the late Russian Empire was that practical experience did not become the basis for weeding out unfit elements of the military elite.

In connection with the termination in 1914 of the training of General Staff personnel at the Imperial Nicholas Military Academy, the deployment of the army, the promotion of ranks and the appointment of General Staff officers as regimental commanders, as well as losses, a serious shortage of General Staff personnel arose. In May 1916, about 50% of the positions of senior adjutants at divisional headquarters were filled by non-general staff officers; captains who had not spent enough time in the ranks of chief officers became division chiefs of staff. Gradually, there were no General Staff officers left in chief officer positions in the corps level. The shortage of General Staff officers was at least 210 people.

The shortage of General Staff officers in junior positions led to various attempts to overcome it, both through changes in the rules for the General Staff service and through the training of new General Staff personnel. In 1915, officers who had graduated from 1912-1914, who had previously been assigned to the General Staff, were transferred ahead of schedule to the General Staff; chief officers who graduated from the academy in the 2nd category in 1912-1914 were assigned and transferred to the General Staff; officers transferred to the General Staff were transferred to the General Staff. for an additional course at the academy in 1914 (they were considered the class of 1915). The mandatory two-year regiment command for General Staff officers has been reduced to one year.

Another way to eliminate the shortage of personnel was the opening at the end of 1916 of accelerated courses at the Imperial Nicholas Military Academy, where officers were trained for junior positions in the General Staff according to an abbreviated program. Students and graduates of the courses were called course students. The appearance of wartime general staff officers significantly changed the appearance of the General Staff corporation, introducing a democratic spirit into it and making the composition of the General Staff personnel more varied and diverse.

By the beginning of 1917, the army needed 1,329 General Staff officers, while there were only 765 General Staff officers and enlisted officers. The shortage was 564 officers or 42.4%. However, according to the table, more General Staff officers were required - 704 officers.

As of April 23, 1917, the army had 297 headquarters of divisions and brigades (243 headquarters of infantry divisions and brigades, 54 headquarters of cavalry divisions and brigades), 76 corps headquarters.

Outside the active army there were 17 military agents, 3 officers of the office of the War Ministry, 30 officers of the General Main Staff, 11 officers in the Nikolaev Military Academy, an officer in the air fleet department, 9 officers in the Moscow, Kazan, Irkutsk and Amur military districts. There were 140 positions of General Staff vacant and 77 positions that could be filled by General Staff officers. The Chief of the General Staff had 27 officers at his disposal due to illness or wounds, including 16 officers on duty. There were 5 officers awaiting appointment to the active army and 8 were in the reserve of the internal districts. In addition, General Staff officers and those who served in the General Staff held 12 positions as heads of schools, 2 positions as class inspectors, 4 positions as directors of cadet corps, 7 positions as surveyors, 8 officers were at the disposal Minister of War, 1 at the disposal of the Provisional Government, 4 as part of government bodies. In total, there were 1,071 positions for General Staff officers to fill in the active army and 159 positions in which they could be filled. At the same time, there were 807 General Staff officers and 460 course students in the army. Outside the active army, there were 126 General Staff officers, and there were 211 positions to be filled by them.

In 1917, 84 graduates of the senior class of the 1st stage of accelerated courses at the academy were assigned to the General Staff, 81 of them were then transferred to the General Staff. According to the calculations of A.G. Kavtaradze, by October 25, 1917, there should have been 1,494 officers in the K.O.GSh.

Training of officers at the Academy of the General Staff in Russia (1856-1914)

The organization of army control and foreign intelligence are the most important components of a strong state. The 19th century was no exception to this, with its constant confrontation between great powers in all corners of the world. One of these powers was the Russian Empire, with its vast territory and the desire to have its influence wherever possible. It was in the XIX - early XX centuries. in the empire there were constant changes in the direction of improving both the training of senior command personnel and the organization of army control in peacetime and war, as well as foreign intelligence, which by the beginning of the First World War, from an “embryonic” form at the beginning of the 19th century, turned into a powerful organized (albeit not without flaws) structure. The best prepared to serve in intelligence and higher military command in Russia were often officers who graduated from the Academy of the General Staff (hereinafter referred to as AGSH). ">

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This topic has not received sufficient development in the scientific literature. Among the pre-revolutionary authors, it is worth highlighting the study of N. Glinoetsky, which provides an outline of the development of AGS until the early 80s. XIX century During Soviet times, the range of research expanded. Articles appeared that studied various aspects of officer training (teaching history, topographical education, etc.). However, they did not always give objective assessments and downplayed the role of certain individuals in the history of the AGS. Russian publications of the 90s. XX - early XXI centuries. also have a significant drawback in the form of pathos in the presentation of the material, and often their authors are uncritical of the documents under study.

Published documents, memoirs of officers who graduated from the Army School, and documents from the Russian State Military Historical Archive (hereinafter referred to as RGVIA) were used as sources when writing this article.

Historically, in the Russian Empire, unlike, for example, Germany, for a long time there was no body called the General Staff (hereinafter referred to as the General Staff). The General Staff meant, first of all, a corps of officers specially trained to serve in the General Staff. The service required special knowledge and skills from the officers performing it. Therefore, in 1832, on the initiative of General A.-A. Jomini and with the approval of Emperor Nicholas I, the AGSH was founded, called the Imperial Military Academy. Its main task was “education of officers for the service of the General Staff” and the dissemination of military knowledge in the army. The AGSH was headed by Adjutant General I.O. Sukhozanet, who served as its director until 1854 and played a significant role in the fact that the institution under his control was not very popular among officers. Initially, the number of officers accepted into the AGSH was set at 25 people. ">

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Until the mid-50s. AGSH was in the process of its formation. The professors who taught there independently developed the courses they taught, testing them on students; forms of the educational process were established, with much attention paid to theory, often divorced from practice, which led to one-sided training of officers. The popularity of the AGSH was also not helped by the fact that upon completion, officers did not have any advantages in promotion. Enrollment in the General Staff was carried out only for opening vacancies of quartermasters at the headquarters of corps and armies, and it was possible to get into service in central military institutions immediately after completing training only with high-ranking patrons. In addition, General Staff officers were not given command of individual military units (only by promotion to major general could a General Staff officer receive command of a brigade), which often made them ordinary clerks, disconnected from the needs of the army. All this contributed to a decrease in the number of applicants to the General Staff, and, consequently, had a negative impact on the recruitment of the General Staff officer corps. Thus, during the period from 1832 to 1850, 410 people entered the General Staff, and only 271 graduated. 1851 became a clear indicator of the crisis both in the training of personnel in the General Staff and in the system of training and use of General Staff officers in the army as a whole . This year, only 10 officers were trained at the AGSH, and there were 7 new recruits for 25 vacancies. ">

Defeat in the Eastern War of 1853-1856. was largely a consequence of the poor preparedness of the corps of General Staff officers to perform their functions. Low practical training and insufficient knowledge of military realities by many General Staff officers and, finally, understaffing of headquarters with specially trained personnel negatively affected the actions of the Russian army. After the end of the war, in 1856, a series of reforms began aimed at qualitatively improving the training of General Staff officers and increasing their number. The first step was the reform of higher military education as a whole. Back in 1855, the AGSh was renamed the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff and became (along with the Artillery and Engineering Academies) part of the created Imperial Military Academy, and subordinated to the head of the General Staff of military educational institutions. In 1856, in order to attract officer personnel to the General Staff, the positions of chiefs of divisional staffs and their assistants were established, staffed by headquarters and chief officers of the General Staff. It was decided to staff the headquarters of divisions and corps exclusively with officers who had completed the AGSh course. All these measures expanded the possibilities of using General Staff graduates in the General Staff service and were intended to popularize the General Staff service among the officer corps in order to raise the educational level of the latter. An important decision was the abolition of restrictions on admission to the AGS. Already in 1856, 74 officers came to the reception - “a figure unheard of since the founding of the Academy.” ">

However, in the second half of the 50s. Teaching at the Academy of Schools continued to be of insufficient quality. Officers were required to memorize dogmatic provisions and schemes; they were not taught to think creatively when solving problems related to a real combat situation. According to a student at the Academy of Sciences in 1854-1856. M.I. Venyukov, under the name “topography,” for example, officers studied “only the art of using survey instruments in the field, but not the art of characterizing the terrain.” But much attention was paid to the external polish of the officers (uniform, bearing, knowledge of the parade parade of troops, etc.). An unhealthy moral atmosphere reigned in the AGSH itself, which was largely a legacy of both the “Nicholas era” in general and the management of I.O. Sukhozaneta, in particular. The main focus of the latter was on discipline, not science. According to him, “science itself in military affairs is nothing more than a button to a uniform; You cannot wear a uniform without a button, but a button does not make up the entire uniform.” In his activities, the director followed precisely this principle, paying main attention to discipline and despotically setting courses, while suppressing the initiative of the Council (the body in charge of the general direction of the course of training) and the ACSH Conference (it included professors and staff officers who were in charge of the students). “Service ( in AGSH – O.G.) in general,” wrote M.I. in his memoirs. Venyukov, “had the character of walking on its hind legs, and those who succeeded in this art were […] and more firmly established than others.” “Naturally,” continued the same author, “that we, the students, learned almost first of all the theory of staff intrigues […], and the senior class, naturally, surpassed the junior in the unceremoniousness of intrigues, so that the same people who were in in the junior class they became decent comrades, in the senior class they became decent scoundrels.” All these features were later transferred to work relationships. “It was a school of intriguers, all the more harmful because its students were always prepared to take and often took high positions in the public service […]. Intrigues, hypocrisy and treason were habits of army life.” Unfortunately, all these shortcomings were not completely eliminated even by the beginning of the twentieth century, which had a very negative impact on the corps of General Staff officers throughout the entire period under review. ">

The goal of the General Staff remained the same - the education of General Staff officers and the dissemination of military knowledge. At the same time, her tasks included: “a) to prepare officers for the service of the General Staff; b) to educate capable workers and subsequently managers of state geodetic work and surveys; c) teach a certain number of officers of the Mikhailovsky Artillery and Nikolaev Engineering Academies a course in higher tactics and strategy […]; d) disseminate military knowledge […]”.

With some exceptions, officers who were at least eighteen years old and “excellent in ability, hard work, diligence in science, morality and behavior” were allowed to enter the AGSH. At the same time, applicants were required to serve in the officer rank for at least two years. Those who wished to study at the AGSH first passed preliminary exams at corps (with the introduction in 1864 of the military-district system - at district) headquarters, after which those who passed the examination were sent to St. Petersburg to take entrance exams at the AGSH. The point system was cumbersome. Only those officers who received an average score of at least eight in all examination subjects (using a twelve-point system) were admitted to the AGSH. They were considered accepted into the Theoretical class or were allowed (if they expressed such a desire) to take the transfer exam to the Practical class. ">

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Classes at the AGSH lasted two years. All taught disciplines were divided into basic and auxiliary. The first included: elementary and higher tactics with drill regulations and practical exercises, strategy and military history, military administration, military statistics, geodesy and the Russian language. The second: field and long-term fortification with practical classes, artillery, political history, law, foreign languages. For the first year, officers studied in the Theoretical Class (department), listening to lectures on basic and auxiliary disciplines. During the summer months, officers were trained in topographical surveys of the area. The latter was especially necessary, since future General Staff officers had to be able to characterize the terrain even without special tools at hand. Here everything depended on the teachers and on the nature of the area where the filming took place. Unfortunately, most of the officers “remained underdeveloped in the sense of the ability to characterize the area being photographed in a few, more outstanding features, going into detail.” The same M.I. Venyukov gives the example of the head of the Military Topographical Department of the Turkestan Military District, S.I., as an example of the training of officers in the AGSH. Zhilinsky, who in 1873 published a map of Russian Turkestan, on which the rivers rose like mountains. At the end of filming, transfer exams to the Practical Class followed, and only officers who passed all the exams in the first class were transferred there (the average score in all main subjects was at least ten, and in auxiliary subjects at least nine, and “in none of the main subjects was at least nine points, and in none of the auxiliary ones no less than seven”) and the second (average score - no less than eight and six, respectively; in Russian language and tactics, no less than eight points) categories. Officers who had lower scores after passing the exams were transferred from the AGSH to their regiments.

In the Practical class, officers, under the guidance of professors, independently worked on the development of given topics in military sciences, compiled various types of military statistical descriptions, and practiced practical photography. At the end of the second year of training and passing the final exams, officers were divided into three categories. Those who graduated in the first category (the average score in the main subjects is at least ten, and in the auxiliary subjects - at least nine, and in each of the main subjects at least nine points, and in each of the auxiliary subjects at least seven points) upon graduation received the next rank and were enrolled in General Staff with the right to wear a special aiguillette. After a year of secondment to the General Staff, they could receive the next rank if, within six months from the date of their release from the General Staff, “their peers serving in regiments, battalions or batteries are promoted to vacancies in the rank that each of the above-mentioned officers ( GSH – O.G.) received for success in science.” This advantage was granted only to those officers who remained in service in the General Staff after graduating from the General Staff. Officers of the second category (the average score in the main disciplines is no less than eight, and in auxiliary disciplines - no less than six; at the same time, in the Russian language and tactics there must be at least eight points) were enrolled in the General Staff only at their own request. Promotion in rank was provided only for officers of the artillery and engineering troops. Guard officers acquired seniority in their previous rank. Finally, officers who graduated from the General Staff in the third category (average scores below eight and six, respectively) were transferred to their previous places of service and could not be enrolled in the General Staff. ">

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Special training of officers was carried out at the Geodetic Department of the AGSh. This department was opened in 1854, and in 1856 the Regulations on it were approved, according to which the department had the goal of “educating capable workers and subsequently leaders of state geodetic work and surveys and at the same time preparing them for service in the General Staff.” Officers were recruited every other year in groups of twelve. However, at first this rule was violated. In 1854, three officers entered the Geodetic Department, in 1856, three more immediately entered the second year, so in 1856, six officers completed a two-year course at the AGSh and were sent to the Pulkovo Observatory. Officers studying at the Geodetic Department were exempt from studying auxiliary sciences and attended the following courses: 1) in the Theoretical class: a) (together with other officers) tactics, military administration, higher geodesy, topography, and were engaged in drawing; b) (to a lesser extent) military history; c) (separately from other officers) a course in spherical and practical astronomy; 2) in the Practical class: a) (together with other officers) the history of the latest campaigns, strategy, military statistics; b) (to a lesser extent) solved problems on tactics and military administration; c) (separately) higher geodesy and were engaged in geodetic calculations, cartographic work and drawing. At the end of the two-year course at the General Staff, all officers of the Geodetic Department who graduated in the first and second categories (the rules for division into categories were the same as for other officers, with the only difference that astronomy was also among the main subjects for officers of the Geodetic Department ), were sent to the Nikolaev Main Observatory, retaining all the rights and benefits granted to General Staff officers upon graduation. At the observatory, officers studied for another two years, taking a course in higher geodesy and applying it in practice. At the end of the course at the observatory, instead of an exam, officers developed solutions to large geodetic or astronomical problems (in writing and through making observations). These tasks, with the certification of the professor and the conclusion of the director of the observatory, were then sent to the head of the General Staff for a report to the chief of the General Staff for military educational institutions. Officers who completed the full course of the Geodetic Branch were enrolled in a special category of officers of the Corps of Military Topographers (hereinafter referred to as KVT) - surveyors. Their main tasks were the production of geodetic and astronomical work, the organization and management of these works in the KVT. At the same time, surveyors were also listed under the General Staff. ">

In general, the main changes in the training of officers in the Army Staff until the beginning of the 60s were experimental in nature, but showed the need for their further implementation in order to train high-quality personnel of staff workers and military leaders. ">

With the assumption of the post of Minister of War in 1861, D.A. Milutin, among the military leadership of Russia, the prevailing point of view was that the AGSh should “become an application school,” in the likeness of the French one. It was assumed that the AGSh should produce officers who not only know the theory of military affairs well, but also know how to practically solve complex issues of troop control and think according to the prevailing circumstances. Therefore, new changes have occurred in the training system for General Staff officers. The beginning of a new era in the life of the AGSH was marked by the appointment in 1862 of Major General A.N. to the post of its chief. Leontyev. During the general reform of the General Staff in 1863, the Imperial Military Academy was liquidated. The AGSH was separated into an independent military educational institution and reassigned to the Quartermaster General of the Main Staff E.I.V. (with the liquidation of the latter in 1865 - to the Chief of the General Staff (hereinafter - GSH)). Its main task was to train officers for service in the General Staff. The requirements for admission to the Academy of Sciences have been increased. In particular, officers who wished to enter the academy had to have at least four years of military service, of which at least two years would have been in combat positions. Time spent by officers on leave, or while performing non-combatant positions or positions as personal adjutants, was excluded from the calculation. In addition, the heads of the units where officers who wanted to join the General Staff served had to submit to the General Staff characteristics about the morality of the officers, their diligence in service, etc. The Minister of War set the task of “giving General Staff officers more means to become more familiar with the service of the troops, their everyday life and needs, and on the other hand, to acquire in them well-trained figures in all parts of the military administration.” Thus, the AGSh was supposed to turn into a highly specialized military educational institution. This also caused a decrease in the number of officers accepted into it. By the Charter of 1868, their number was limited to fifty. In total, 100 people were supposed to study at the AGS (20 of them at the Geodetic Department). Subsequently, this number was revised upward, primarily due to the lack of General Staff officers, since the “Regulations for the General Staff”, published in 1865, expanded the scope of application of the latter, giving them the right to hold positions not only in the state and in the General Staff . If in the period from 1855 to 1860 268 people graduated from the Academy of Sciences (including those expelled for various reasons), then from 1861 to 1865 - 240, and from 1866 to 1875 - only 214. This understaffing had a negative impact before the war of 1877-1878. with Turkey, when the AGSH was forced to accelerate the release of officers to fill vacancies in the headquarters of military units and formations. ">

The focus of the General Staff on training exclusively General Staff officers also caused a revision of the teaching of basic disciplines. In 1865, tactics, strategy and military history were united within one department of military art. The division of tactics into lower and higher was eliminated, the number of hours for its teaching was increased, and much more attention was paid to issues of training troops. Read tactics in 1860-1869. M.I. Dragomirov placed the main emphasis not on students memorizing rules for action, but on research, developing their ability to think creatively. All disciplines studied were still divided into basic and auxiliary. The first included: tactics, strategy, military history, military administration, military statistics, geodesy, cartography and topography. To the second: information from artillery, engineering, political history and languages. At the same time, the number of professors was reduced from eighteen to fourteen. The course of the Geodetic Department was strengthened by physical and mathematical disciplines. Students were admitted here every other year, but not in groups of 12, but in groups of 10. A new course appeared in the program - cartography, and when studying it, preference was given to practical exercises. The officers were engaged in cartographic work in different parts of the empire and outside it (drawing up a map of Central Asia, European Turkey, orographic map of Russia, etc.). In general, graduates of the Geodetic Department of the post-reform period were better prepared than their predecessors. It was in the 60-80s. The department was graduated from such future famous researchers as A.A. Tillo, K.V. Scharngorst, I.I. Pomerantsev, D.D. Gedeonov and others. In 1866, a special badge in the form of the state coat of arms in a silver laurel wreath was introduced for officers who graduated from the General Staff. ">

The strengthening of the practical side of officer training at the AGSH was expressed in the introduction of an additional six-month course in the 1869-1870 academic year. Officers who completed two courses were transferred to the third, where in six months they had to independently develop and orally defend two topics on military history and the art of war, as well as in writing on strategy, statistics and administration. At the same time, in connection with the expansion of programs on strategy and tactics, a war game was included in the training course as a method of practical training for officers in how to lead troops in combat conditions. All of the above innovations contributed to improving the quality of training of future General Staff officers. At the same time, the number of AHS students remained small due to the strict attrition rate during entrance exams and during training. So, at the beginning of the 1869-1870 academic year, there were 70 officers in the AGSH, of whom 4 were expelled during the year, 27 completed an additional course, and 27 people re-entered in 1870, etc. by the beginning of the 1870-1871 academic year, the AGSH still consisted of 70 officers. And in August 1873, 43 officers appeared for the entrance exam, of which 13 did not pass it, thus limiting the number of applicants to 30. ">

In the early 70s. A number of other innovations were introduced to strengthen the practical training of officers for future service in the General Staff. Since 1873, field trips of General Staff officers began to be practiced, in which officers of the artillery and engineering troops also participated. Since in wartime a General Staff officer “must appear with the greatest possible skill in reconnaissance of various kinds, in assessing the terrain, orienting himself on it, then this is exactly what he should practice in peacetime,” the famous military historian N wrote in one of his works. .P. Glinoetsky. In addition to the above purposes, field trips were intended to collect information on the spot to compile reviews of Russian borders as the most likely theaters of military operations. Field training lasted about three weeks and was a good method of teaching young General Staff officers how to navigate the terrain, control the course of a proposed battle, and the interaction of individual branches of troops on the battlefield. The first such trip, consisting of five parties (from the General Staff, Warsaw, Vilna, Kiev and Caucasus military districts) took place in 1873. An important innovation that made it possible to bring future General Staff officers closer to the needs of the army and give them the opportunity to develop their tactical abilities was the order for military department dated August 14, 1872. By this order, each General Staff officer upon graduation from the General Staff was obliged to command a company or battalion, or a squadron or division in the cavalry for a year. Later, however, the execution of this order gave rise to difficulties. Many officers did not want to command a company (squadron), since the role of the commander here required active participation. Therefore, such officers waited for promotion to headquarters officers, occupying the positions of adjutants, after which they were immediately given command of a battalion (division), where the position of commander did not require large expenditures of energy. This situation could not suit the military leadership of the country. Order No. 236 of the military department for 1873 established that before being assigned to the positions of regimental commanders and chiefs of divisional headquarters, General Staff officers were required to command companies, squadrons or batteries for one year. Thus, those who wished to continue their officer career were forced to first become acquainted with the service of chief officer ranks of the army, which often had a positive effect on their preparation for occupying high command posts in the future. ">

Finally, in the 1871-1872 academic year, all academic course programs were finally revised and approved. The main subjects included: military history, strategy, tactics (theoretical and field (war games)), military statistics, geodesy and cartography, drawing and surveying. The auxiliary ones included: fortification, artillery, political history, physical geography, Russian language, foreign languages ​​(French, English, and from the new school year - German), horse riding. Classes in the additional course included oral answers to two topics (on the art of war and military history) and a written solution to a strategic problem. ">

Thus, the transformations of the mid-60s - early 70s. although they led to a reduction in the number of General Staff officers graduating from the AGSH, they significantly increased the quality of their training. In general, the era of D.A. Milyutin as Minister of War, and A.N. Leontyev - as head of the AGSH (1862-1878) is rightfully considered the era of the highest prosperity of the AGSH. At this time, it became the military-scientific center of the empire, as leading professors and scientists taught here. Thus, the work of professor of the department of military history and strategy N.S. Golitsin’s “General Military History” became the first scientific work of this kind not only in Russia, but also in Europe. Textbooks and works of ASSH professors G.A. Leera, M.I. Dragomirova, I.V. Levitsky on strategy and tactics, N.N. Obruchev on statistics, A.K. Puzyrevsky on military history, I.M. Zaitsev's military administration were exemplary for their time. The General Staff officers who were educated at the General Staff in the 60s and mid-70s were significantly different from their predecessors. Developed creative thinking, experience in commanding lower levels of the army, initiative - all this distinguished them favorably. It was these General Staff officers who were responsible for further improving the troops and preaching new views on the development of the army and military affairs in the press. “In peacetime,” said M.I. Dragomirov, “officers should be taught only what is needed for war.” In the 60s - 70s. The General Staff strictly adhered to this principle, and the best indicator of the results of such training of General Staff officers was the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, where the corps of General Staff officers showed their best abilities, largely ensuring the success of the Russian army. However, this war also revealed shortcomings in the training of General Staff officers. In particular, during mobilization, a shortage of officers for positions in the General Staff was discovered. Accelerated graduation from the AGSH made it possible to eliminate the deficiency, but already at the end of the war there was a tendency to increase the number of AGSH students and the admission of officers who participated in combat operations. This was the reason for the circular on the General Staff No. 42 of February 11, 1878, which recommended that in the current year, officers of the Active Army who had served in the officer ranks for at least four years (and a year in the war was counted as two), and the next the latter's superiors should assist their subordinates in everything.

In general, the change of leadership in the AGSH and in the Ministry of War in the late 70s - early 80s. led to a gradual change in priorities regarding AGS. In subsequent years there was a gradual return to the predominance of the principle that the AGS should be a center for the dissemination of military knowledge in the army. It is not surprising that in the 80-90s. there was an increase in the number of graduates (in 1876-1880 - 238 people, in 1881-1885 - 292, in 1886-1890 - 256). Admission to the AGSH was increased to 100 officers, while maintaining the old teaching staff, which led to a deterioration in the quality of practical training for students. In 1883, it was decided to accept into the AGSh officers who had served in the rank for at least three years, of which two years must be in service, and from 1884, officers with the rank of lieutenant of the guard and staff began to be allowed to enter the AGSh. army captain inclusive. However, the fact that there was no definite line in reforming teaching at the General Staff and in the training of General Staff officers is evidenced by the subsequent decrease in the number of people accepted in 1887 to 70 people. At the same time, the popularity of the AGSh among the army officer corps remained very high. First of all, because the General Staff service largely contributed to rapid career advancement. By the beginning of the 90s. the number of officers who passed the entrance exams at the AGSH exceeded the number of available vacancies. So, in 1890-1892. on average there were 150 officers per 70 places.

The year 1889 was a turning point in the history of the AGSH. The place of the chief, instead of M.I., who had held this post since 1878. Dragomirov, was occupied by Infantry General G.A. Leer - in the 60-70s. an outstanding military scientist in the field of strategy and philosophy of war. However, as A.I., who graduated from the Academy of Sciences in 1899, noted. Denikin, “the teacher was getting old, […] the techniques of military art, implanted by the Academy, were getting old and lagging behind life.”

Back in the late 60s. The AGSH conference, concerned about the decrease in the number of applicants, turned to the heads of military units and formations for clarification of the reasons for this situation. Most of them indicated that the main reason was the increase in the period of preliminary service to four years, “i.e. because these four years serve mainly to make officers weaned from studying science.” However, there was no change in the period of preliminary service in rank. Only in 1883 was the length of service in rank reduced to three years. Based on the Regulations of 1893, the goals of the AGSh were again swapped. The first priority was given to the spread of military education among army officers. Therefore, there have been changes in the rules for recruiting and training officers. Two classes of General Staff were intended to disseminate higher military knowledge in the army as a whole, and an additional course was designed specifically for the training of General Staff officers. The total number of officers in training was increased to 314 people (including 14 people at the Geodetic Department (accepting 7 people every other year)). Graduation from the Academy of Sciences was supposed to take place after completing two classes. The officers who graduated from them received a higher education, the right to wear a badge and the right to accelerated promotion to headquarters officers. The best graduates were transferred to the third grade, and after graduating and passing the qualifying command, they were enrolled in the General Staff.

At first, those wishing to enter the AGSH passed preliminary exams at the headquarters of the military district in which they served. Successful passing was followed by entrance exams at the Academy itself. The assessment was carried out according to the standard adopted back in the 50s. twelve-point system. The screening was very strict. According to A.I. Denikin, it was expressed approximately in the following figures: 1,500 officers took the exam in the districts, 400-500 were allowed to take the exam at the General Staff, 140-150 entered, 100 entered the third year, 50 of them were assigned to the General Staff. But this did not deter those entering. Graduation from the General Staff opened a wide path for service not only in the military department, but also in the department of internal affairs and even public education. The academic spirit described in the mid-50s. M.I. Venyukov, was largely preserved at the end of the century. “An extensive network of patronage, family ties, friendships, acquaintances, intrigues and outright meanness was associated with admission to the academy and studying there,” wrote in his memoirs, who studied at the Academy of Sciences in 1895-1898. A.A. Samoilo. “Here feelings blossomed and spread throughout the army that had nothing in common with strong comradely chemistry, trust and respect for the General Staff as the “brain” of the army.” A.I. also speaks about academic life as a struggle for existence in his memoirs. Denikin. Perhaps this is why many in the army treated the General Staff officers with almost contempt or poorly concealed envy. The nickname “moments” has firmly established behind them due to the predilection of many of them for expressions such as “you need to seize the moment”, “this is the moment to attack”, etc. Their second nickname - “pheasants” - took root, apparently, because bright ceremonial uniform.

The disciplines taught retained the previous division into basic and auxiliary. In 1898, the history of Russian military art was included among the first. The third course included independent development of three topics received by lot: one - on the theoretical development of some military issue; another - on independent study of a campaign; the third - on the independent development of any strategic operation in a given theater of military operations. On each topic, the officer gave a forty-five-minute report to a commission of AHS professors, using maps, drawings, tables, etc. that he had prepared in advance.

The main disadvantages of AGSh by the beginning of the twentieth century. were the academic nature of most of the main courses, their isolation from practice, as well as a complex system of knowledge assessment, in which even tenths and hundredths of points were taken into account when calculating the average score, which made it possible for individual teachers, by artificially lowering the grade in their subject, to ruin their fate with something an officer who did not please them even in the last year of training. The backwardness of the courses was manifested, for example, in the fact that while studying the military history of Russia, students had no idea about the last Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, since it was not included in the plan. Another “feature” of academic education was “a passion for beautiful finishing of drawings and diagrams, often without taking into account their inner meaning.” ">

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By the end of the 90s. There is an urgent need to transform academic courses and teaching in general at the Academy of Sciences. This prompted the creation of a Commission to determine the status of AGS. As a result of the work, the Commission came to the conclusion that it was necessary to increase special training in order to transform the General Staff into a school for General Staff officers with a limited number of students. The AGSH had to train the number of officers that were needed at the moment. ">

At the beginning of the twentieth century. In the AGSh, an average of 330-340 officers studied in all courses (including the Geodetic Department), and there was an extensive library. A complex of buildings was built for the AGSh on the Preobrazhensky parade ground in St. Petersburg. However, fluctuations among the military leadership of the empire in determining the status of the General Staff, frequent changes of commanders who sometimes professed completely opposite views, had a negative impact on the quality of training of General Staff officers. In addition, the atmosphere of the AGSH had a negative impact on the moral character of the officers who graduated from it, for whom “the intrigues and arrogance that corroded this environment were very characteristic.” The fact that people from noble families enjoyed (regardless of their professional qualities) concessions both during training and when enrolling in command posts also had a bad influence on the education of officers. In 1898, Lieutenant General N.N. was appointed to the post of head of the AGSH. Sukhotin. He tried to destroy the system of teaching military science, which for a long time produced General Staff theorists who were lost at the first contact with practice. He increased the number and importance of field trips in the summer and tactical missions in the winter. However, here he encountered hidden resistance from the old professors. In 1901 N.N. Sukhotin was replaced by Infantry General V.G. Glazov, who, following the instructions of the Minister of War to reduce the load on trained officers, essentially nullified all the positive initiatives of his predecessor, extremely reducing the volume of the practical course in the second year of training. Once again there was a reorientation of the General Staff to train officers primarily for service in the General Staff, while maintaining the academic nature of most courses. This is how a graduate of the Academy of Sciences assessed his academic education back under N.N. Sukhotin A.A. Ignatiev: “With all its shortcomings, the academy still trained undeniably qualified personnel of officers who were knowledgeable and trained in mental work. Undoubtedly, Sukhotin’s activities had an impact, and our graduation was, in any case, more prepared for combat work than the previous ones. We were ignorant about social issues. Militarily, our consciousness was poisoned by positional, passive-defensive tendencies. We were not fully oriented in modern technical means of war.” This lack of preparedness was not slow to manifest itself in the future during the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905. ">

War 1904-1905 became a “moment of truth” for AGS. Russia's defeat in it was largely due to shortcomings in the training of General Staff officers. The topographic maps of the theater of operations drawn up before the war caused especially a lot of criticism, and the unsatisfactory organization of military intelligence (both before and during the war) led to the fact that the army and military leadership had little reliable information about the enemy. After the war, two commissions were created (under the General Staff and the General Staff) to find out the reasons for the shortcomings and determine the forms and methods of officer training. Despite the fact that it was recognized that teaching preparation was overly theoretical, and that courses in strategy and tactics were clearly outdated, no measures were taken to correct the current situation. The only change was the introduction in 1907 of written exams for admission to the General Staff at the district headquarters. The reason for the inertia, apparently, was another change in the leadership of the AGSh. In January 1907, Infantry General N.P. Mikhnevich, who was actively trying to understand the causes of the crisis of the institution under his jurisdiction, was replaced as chief by Lieutenant General D.G. Shcherbachev. In addition, the position of another supporter of reforms, the head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff, Lieutenant General F.F., was unstable. Palitsina. Constant reshuffles and struggles for power among the top military leadership played a bad role in reforming the training of General Staff officers. ">

At the end of 1908 - beginning of 1909. Another series of changes occurred in the country's top military leadership. General V.A. became the new Minister of War. Sukhomlinov. A man not devoid of abilities, he was distinguished by his love of power and at the same time amazing frivolity, but with his cheerfulness and constant optimism, Emperor Nicholas II liked him. Having been independent from the War Ministry since 1905, the Main Directorate of the General Staff (which also included the General Staff) was again included in the latter in 1908, and the Chief of the General Staff was subordinate to the Minister of War. All this affected the AGSH. At the end of July 1909, a new regulation on the AGSh was approved by the highest authorities. It was renamed the Imperial Nicholas Military Academy. The name itself allows us to judge the main purpose of this higher military educational institution - to provide higher military education to officers of the Russian army. In addition, the AGSh was supposed to be staffed by officers who graduated from it in the first category. The corps of General Staff officers was supposed to develop military science through the works of professors, as well as disseminate military knowledge in the army through literary and scientific works (order of the military department No. 344 of July 31, 1909). The AGSH was subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff. The staff of students was determined to be 314 people, and the number of officers missing to the complete set was to be accepted annually. Admission to the Geodetic Department was carried out every other year, no more than seven officers. The training lasted two years and nine months: junior and senior year classes and an additional nine-month course. At the Geodetic Department, training lasted four years: a year each in the junior and senior classes and two years of practical training at the Nikolaev Main Observatory in Pulkovo. Those who graduated were seconded to the Topographical Directorate of the Main Directorate of the General Staff. This situation remained until 1912, when there was a change in the status of officers who graduated from the Geodetic Department. By Order No. 497 of September 10, upon completion of a full four-year course in the first category, they were enrolled in the Corps of Military Topographers, in the category of surveyors. Those who graduated in the second category were assigned to their units. At the same time, they all enjoyed the right to wear the General Staff embroidery on their uniforms and accelerated rank production. This measure was supposed to strengthen the Corps of Military Topographers with officers with higher military education. ">

The academic course of the AHS has been expanded. It included teaching the following subjects: strategy, tactics, General Staff service, military history, general history of military art in Russia, general military administration, military statistics, information on artillery and engineering, naval affairs, geodesy and cartography, surveying with drawing, political history and foreign languages. In addition, officers received horse riding training and field survey and tactical training during the summer months. At the Geodetic Department, astronomy (theoretical and practical), geodesy (higher and lower) and physical geography were added to the main subjects. Optional courses could also be taught at the Academy of Sciences. The rights of officers upon graduation were determined by ranks: first - for those who received a total of ten points and above; the second – less than ten points. The best of those who completed the course were awarded medals: gold, large and small silver, and their names were entered on honorary boards. Those who completed the full AGSh course acquired the rights: to wear a badge, to receive an annual salary, to a four-month leave with pay (except for guard officers), the right to transfer to other units and branches of the military and to the next orders (those who graduated from the AGSh in the second category could not be awarded orders). Officers who graduated in the first category had to serve camp training under the conditions of General Staff service, after which they were transferred to their units. Those who graduated from the second class were transferred to the unit immediately after graduating from the AGSh. For each year of training at the AGSH, officers were required to serve in the army for one and a half years. The direction of training, determination of the scope of teaching of certain subjects, etc. were entrusted to the ASSH Conference, which included all the ASSH teachers, its head and the head of the General Staff, who had the right to cast a decisive vote. The AGSH had an office, an economic committee, a riding arena, a library, a Suvorov church and a museum. In addition, at the AGSH there was a quartermaster course (in 1912 it was transformed into the Quartermaster Academy) and a course of oriental languages ​​(opened in 1883 under the course of oriental languages ​​of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the first graduation in 1886). For the period from 1900 to 1914. the number of students at the AHS ranged from 283 (in 1905) to 355 (in 1910). ">Despite all the shortcomings, the AGSh gave the officers who graduated from it a broad military education and a very solid basis for further improving the acquired knowledge. The popularity of the AGSh in the army remained at the beginning of the twentieth century. high, and the expansion of the admission of officers to the AGSH made it possible to supply the Russian armed forces with highly qualified officers. Thus, in 1908, among commanders of military districts, 70% graduated from the General Staff, among commanders of army corps - 53%, chiefs of infantry divisions - 51.7%, cavalry divisions - 36.4%, commanders of individual brigades - 33.7%, line brigades - 21.7%, commanders of infantry regiments - 27.2%, commanders of cavalry regiments - 13.7%, commanders of Cossack regiments - 3.5%. By the beginning of the First World War, out of 36 corps commanders, 29 had graduated from the Army Corps; out of 51 division chiefs with higher military education, 46 graduated from the Army School; Of the regiment commanders with higher military education, 59 people (or 39%) received it at the Army Staff. Thus, the AGSh coped successfully with one of the tasks - the dissemination of higher military education among army officers. ">

In general, we can say that the AGSh went through several stages of its existence from 1856 to 1914. At the same time, the view on the ASH profile changed. At first it was a higher school for training officers and personnel for the General Staff. In the 60-70s. The General Staff began to be considered exclusively as a source of replenishment of the corps of General Staff officers, which caused a decrease in the number of officers admitted to it, but increased the quality of graduates. In the late 80s-90s. AGSH is once again acquiring the status of a higher military educational institution intended primarily for the dissemination of higher military education in the army. However, the academic and theoretical nature of the courses taught in it, their lagging behind new trends in the art of war, as well as the struggle and intrigue among the country’s military leadership in the late 90s. XIX century - in the first years XX century led to the fact that graduates of the General Staff (especially those called upon to serve in the General Staff) often failed to meet the obligations assigned to them. The Russian-Japanese War became the impetus for new reforms that directly affected the AGSh. Its priorities were finally determined - the dissemination of higher military knowledge in the army and the training of General Staff officers. By the beginning of the First World War, the AGSh was the center of military-scientific life in Russia with a well-organized personnel training system. Many of its graduates proved themselves to be talented military leaders and statesmen. In conclusion, it is appropriate to quote here the words of one of these graduates of the ASSH - A.I. Denikina: “Often cluttering courses with the unimportant and unnecessary, sometimes lagging behind life in the applied arts, she (AGSh - O.G.) nevertheless expanded our horizons immeasurably, gave a method, a criterion for knowledge of military affairs, and very seriously armed those who wanted continue to work and learn in life. For the main teacher is still life.” "> ">

Canadian American Slavic Studies. – 2005. – Vol. 39. – No. 2-3. – R. 137-157

Notes

"> Glinoetsky N. Historical sketch of the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff, (St. Petersburg, 1882). "> Zayonchkovsky P.A., “Officer Corps of the Russian Army before the First World War” Questions of History, No. 4 (1981); Shibanov F.A., “Training of topographic personnel in Russia in the 19th and early 20th centuries.” Scientific notes of Leningrad State University, No. 226, series of geographical sciences (1958), no. 12. "> Kirillin A.V., “Revival of the traditions of officers of the General Staff”, Military History Journal, No. 4 (1994); Teterin G.N., “Geodetic education in Russia before 1917 (Brief essay)” Geodesy and Cartography, No. 4 (1996); Chechevatov V.S., “Military Academy of the General Staff: past and present,” Military History Journal, No. 11 (2002); Barynkin V.M., “School of military leadership. Improving the educational process at the academy in the first 70 years of its existence,” Military History Journal, No. 11 (2002); Zakharov A.N., “The main center of military-scientific thought in Russia,” Military Historical Journal, No. 11 (2002); Academy of the General Staff: History of the Military Order of Lenin, Red Banner Order of Suvorov, 1st degree, Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. 170 years, ed. V.S. Chechevatova, (M.: Defenders of the Fatherland, 2002). "> Beskrovny L.G., Russian Army and Navy in the 19th Century: Military-Economic Potential of Russia, (M.: Nauka, 1973), p. 135.

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OFFICER OF THE GENERAL STAFF (O. GSH)

1) in Russian armies and armies of a number of European countries. state in (Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, Germany, France) from the 2nd half. 18th century - officer who graduated from Acad. General Staff and assigned to the General Staff. O. GSH was replaced accordingly. positions in the center. military authorities ex. and lower headquarters. Made up separately. corps of officers stood out from the general order of military service. services, had features in the form of clothing, advantages in service, etc.; 2) in Kr. Armies in Vel. Otech. war - a representative of the General Staff in the troops. The functions included: informing the General Staff about the situation, checking the implementation of orders and directives, providing assistance to headquarters, etc. Until June 1943, there was independence. group O. GSh, until Jan. 1946 corps of officers - representatives of the General Staff (126 people); 3) in the RF Armed Forces - unofficial. the name of officers serving in the departments of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Sleeves installed. insignia for belonging to the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces and the insignia of the O.GSh.