MGB after the war. MGB USSR. Saraev Roman Nikolaevich

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Ministry of State Security was struck by massive corruption. The KGB officers stole carloads, opened underground workshops, and closed cases for bribes. The head of the MGB, Abakumov, was eventually arrested. This example clearly shows how important it is to have competition among law enforcement agencies.

(In the picture above: Abakumov, Merkulov and Beria)

In Russian public opinion (and earlier in Soviet) there is a strong opinion that “under Stalin there was order.” However, the archives show that even the “Order of the Sword” and the “cadre elite” - state security - were affected by corruption, arbitrariness, drunkenness and debauchery.

The Ministry of State Security (MGB) was headed in 1946 by Viktor Abakumov, who during the war headed SMERSH and worked as Deputy Minister of Defense (de jure - Stalin's deputy). KGB personnel Viktor Stepakov (the book “Apostle of SMERSH”), Anatoly Tereshchenko, Oleg Smyslov (the book “Viktor Abakumov: Executioner or Victim”) in their biographies of the head of the MGB Abakumov recall how he and his apparatus went towards everyday and official decay.

Viktor Abakumov came from a working-class family, with virtually no education (4th grade school). He was a product of the decomposition of the NEP system and the transition to a totalitarian state, combining in himself a passion for a beautiful life and at the same time a tough system. In the late 1930s - early 1940s, Stalin, seeing how dangerous it was to delegate power powers only to state security (the NKVD of the times of Yagoda and Yezhov, which actually became a state within a state), began to create a system of checks and balances. The NKVD was divided into two parts - actually the Commissariat of Internal Affairs itself and state security; a little later, SMERSH appeared - formally army counterintelligence, but in fact KGB control over the army. At the same time, the Party Control Committee was strengthened.

The MGB, which was headed by Abakumov, mainly recruited army personnel, as well as “jackets” - civilians who graduated from humanitarian universities. A significant percentage of the new ministry was occupied by partisans and security officers who were engaged in sabotage activities during the war. Stalin, who gave the go-ahead for such personnel in the MGB, was confident that the ministry, unlike the NKVD of the 1930s with such personnel, would be guaranteed against “degeneration.” However, reality presented the darkest lessons.

Stalin's new system of checks and balances in the second half of the 1940s led to the fact that the security forces were looking for dirt on each other with tripled energy. Abakumov’s MGB was the first to fall, plunging into the mud of “rebirth,” for which the minister himself was eventually arrested in 1951, and shot in 1954.

But at the same time, the new Stalinist system at that time clearly began to demonstrate both class degeneration and the introduction of class justice (as under the Tsar). The overwhelming majority of cases against KGB criminals ended with symbolic punishments, and even if prison sentences were applied to them, they were in no way comparable to what people from other classes received for similar crimes.

Dry reports from the archives given by the above-mentioned authors speak best.

Immediately after the Second World War, many cases of captured atrocities arose against high-ranking officials of the MGB, but most of them were let go. Thus, the head of the Counterintelligence Directorate of the USSR Navy in 1943-1946, Lieutenant General P.A. Gladkov, was removed for illegally spending large public funds, appropriating cars, rationed products and manufactured goods. He also transferred three cars into personal ownership to his deputies - generals Karandashev, Lebedev and Dukhovich, organized the purchase in thrift stores and from private individuals of property for employees of the Navy Counterintelligence Directorate for 2 million 35 thousand rubles (with the then average salary in the country being 600 rubles ). In 1947, Gladkov got off with an administrative penalty.

In March 1947, the head of the UMGB for the Arkhangelsk region, A.I. Brezgin, by decision of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was removed from his post and soon expelled from the party for the fact that, until the summer of 1945, he was the head of the counterintelligence department “Smersh” of the 48th Army in East Prussia, first organized the delivery of trophies (mainly furniture) to his Moscow apartment on three trucks with two trailers. Then Brezgin assembled a train of 28 cars with furniture, pianos, cars, bicycles, radios, carpets, etc., which arrived from Germany to Kazan, where the security officer received the post of head of the counterintelligence department of the Volga Military District. All this property was appropriated by Brezgin and his deputies - Pavlenko, Paliev and others. The security officers openly sold off the surplus. Years later, Paliev also had to answer for excesses: in May 1949, he lost his position.

“Trophy cases” were investigated for a long time, and those responsible were often repressed in connection with the struggle between the clans of Minister of State Security Abakumov and Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs I.A. Serov. Arrest in December 1952 of Lieutenant General N.S. Vlasik, in 1946-1952. who worked as the head of the Main Security Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security, led to the subsequent conviction of the head of Stalin’s security (in January 1955) for official misconduct to 10 years of exile, followed by a quick amnesty. In total, Vlasik was charged with theft of trophy property worth 2.2 million rubles. In 2000, he was completely rehabilitated (posthumously).

In the central apparatus of the MGB, not only ministers and their deputies could count on receiving large illegal profits. It was not difficult for foreign intelligence workers to hide the expenditure of operational funds for their own needs. A certificate from the Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR dated January 30, 1947 indicated that the former deputy head of the 4th Directorate of the MGB, Major General N.I. Eitingon (known for organizing the murders of Zhang Zulin and Leon Trotsky), “among other senior officials, allowed the possibility of using for the intended purpose of products and funds intended for operational purposes,” about which the leadership of the MGB “in relation to Eitingon limited itself to analysis and suggestion.” The indictment stated that Eitingon received 705 thousand rubles in “gifts” alone.

MGB officers abroad were also involved in plundering. The representative of the MGB task force on the Liaodong Peninsula, V.G. Sluchevsky, was expelled from the party in February 1949 for taking bribes from arrested Koreans from South Korea; The security officer got away with dismissal from the MGB. Advisor to the MGB in Czechoslovakia, Colonel V.A. Boyarsky, who had previously distinguished himself in robberies of the inhabitants of Manchuria, received a party reprimand in February 1952 for “excessive spending on personal services for himself and his staff” (about 500 thousand rubles). For Boyarsky, this episode had no consequences - in 1951 he was transferred to the apparatus of the MGB-MVD of Lithuania.

(Photo of Abakumov from the investigative file)

Some heads of local state security agencies were caught committing large speculative enterprises. K.O. Mikautadze, People's Commissar of State Security of the Adjarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, was sentenced to 8 years in prison for official crimes (released less than two years later due to an amnesty and illness). In 1944-1945, with the sanction of Mikautadze, his deputies - Skhirtladze and Berulava - together with other NKGB officers, through the speculator Akopyan, committed a number of frauds and speculative transactions.

Having provided Akopyan with a false ID of a state security officer, the security officers sent him to sell fruit, and he, under the guise of gifts for front-line soldiers and workers of the Leningrad automobile repair plant, exported 10 tons of tangerines and other fruits to other regions (at the same time, Akopyan took with him five more speculators, from whom he received for this trip 100 thousand rubles). Having sold the fruit, Hakobyan bought cars, motorcycles, clothes and other goods, which were then dismantled by employees of the Republican NKGB. Mikautadze’s wife received 50 thousand rubles from the resale of various goods.

In 1946, the newly appointed head of the MGB department, V.I. Moskalenko, took hams, sausages and other products from the warehouse, illegally organized a sewing workshop in the internal prison of the MGB, sewed four suits for free in this workshop and allowed other UMGB employees to sew suits for free. Moskalenko admitted his guilt only to using a prisoner tailor to sew suits. The Union MGB limited itself to Moskalenko’s explanation and, as “punishment,” appointed him Minister of State Security of the Estonian SSR.

It turned out that during 1943-1947, family members of a number of senior officials of the UMGB and the MVD, including the families of Borshchev and the head of the department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Major General I.G. Popkov, “... systematically stole from the Spetstorg base the best hard-to-find industrial goods (wool, silk and etc.), food products.”

A frequent occurrence was the misappropriation of secret amounts intended to pay for the services of agents. The head of the KRO UMGB for the Chita region, Z.S. Protasenko, was expelled by the regional committee from the party in June 1951 for illegal expenditure of public funds: KRO workers were drinking and wasting 9,000 rubles intended to pay agents. The head of the Transport Department of the Ashgabat Ministry of State Security, A.G. Kochetkov, was expelled from the party in July 1946 for embezzling state funds: he made 10 false receipts on behalf of informants and received 2,900 rubles for them. The punishment turned out to be light - three years probation.

A clear example of the low morality of the MGB communists were the frequent cases of theft of party contributions by party organizers of security agencies. Party organizer of the UMGB in the Kemerovo region I.P. Emelyanov, a former experienced counterintelligence officer of SMERSH, in 1947-1949, through forgery of documents, embezzled and squandered 63 thousand rubles. party contributions. Party organizer (in 1949-1951) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the same region B.I. Kholodenin was expelled from the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for embezzlement and drinking of 3,662 rubles of party contributions, removed from office and then sentenced to 8 years of labor camp (released after a year and a half under the amnesty of 1953 of the year). The party organizer of the Biysk city department of the UMGB for the Altai Territory, A.K. Savelkaev, was expelled from the party in May 1948 for embezzling 2,069 rubles. party contributions “for drinking” and was dismissed from the “authorities”. Party organizer and head of the investigative department of the ROC of the MGB of the East Siberian Military District V.I. Saprynsky in December 1951 received a severe party reprimand for embezzling 13 thousand rubles of party contributions and was demoted.

It came to very sophisticated methods of theft. Thus, party functionary A.I. Pulyakh in 1944-1951 worked as secretary of the Kemerovo Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and since 1951 - in the wake of the purge of the MGB from the Abakumov clan - he worked in a responsible position as deputy head of one of the Main Directorates of the USSR MGB. In June 1952, Pulyakh was expelled from the party for illegally receiving 42 thousand rubles in fees from the editor of the regional newspaper Kuzbass, both for unpublished articles and for materials from other authors and TASS. The criminal case against Pulyakh was dropped due to the 1953 amnesty.

Several bribe-takers and fraudsters from Abakumov’s inner circle received significant sentences. For example, the head of department “D” of the USSR Ministry of State Security, Colonel A.M. Palkin, received 15 years in camps for theft in October 1952 (although he was released early in 1956). Colonel P.S. Ilyashenko, who worked as the deputy head of one of the departments of the USSR Ministry of State Security, was sentenced to 10 years in prison in February 1953 for “theft of socialist property” (he was released in 1955). Other corrupt officials got off much easier. The head of the counterintelligence department of the Central Group of Forces, Lieutenant General M.I. Belkin, in the second half of the 40s, created a “black cash fund” and was engaged in speculation. In October 1951, he was arrested in connection with the defeat of Abakumov’s entourage and was released in 1953. However, Belkin was then dismissed from the “authorities” “due to facts of discredit.”

At the same time as Belkin, Lieutenant General P.V. Zelenin was arrested for embezzlement in Germany; in 1945-1947. worked as the head of the Smersh UCR - MGB UCR in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. In 1953, he was amnestied, but then stripped of his general rank. And the former Commissioner of the MGB in Germany, Lieutenant General N.K. Kovalchuk, promoted to the Minister of State Security of Ukraine, escaped repression, although in 1952 he was accused of “bringing two carriages of captured items and valuables from the front”; however, in 1954 he was stripped of his title and awards.

(In the picture: Head of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, Colonel General S.A. Goglidze, officer and foreman of the security units of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR in transport. An officer in the uniform of the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) is visible from behind. 1947-52)

The head of the personnel department of special workshops No. 4 of the USSR Ministry of State Security, Kuznetsov, was involved in the theft of materials from the workshop and took bribes. So, in 1948, he received two bribes from workers of the special workshops Vykhodtsev and Shevchuk in the amount of 850 rubles for issuing them documents on dismissal from the workshops. In the same year, for a bribe of 12 thousand rubles, Kuznetsov left the convicted Grinberg to serve his sentence in the Moscow region instead of deporting him to Vorkuta. In 1947, he received 4,800 rubles from a certain Bogomolova for the transfer of her convicted husband from prison to a camp, and then early release. Also, Kuznetsov, for 20 thousand rubles, contributed to the release from the camp to freedom “as disabled people” of two people convicted under Article 58 - certain Gorenshtein and Rivkin.

The arrest of MGB Minister Abakumov in July 1951 led to a large-scale purge of the leadership of the “authorities.” Data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Party Control Committee showed that up to 40% of the MGB personnel were subject to various types of punishment. This was the largest purge of the USSR security agencies for the entire period of their existence (except for the “political” purges in the late 1930s and after the arrest of Beria; but in the case of Abakumov, these were punishments of security officers for non-political articles).

What lesson can be learned from this story, except that it was at this time - in the late 1940s - early 1950s - that the formation of class justice in the country (which is still in effect today) was finally formalized? The system of checks and balances in law enforcement agencies is good for monitoring them and preventing the final degeneration of the “organs.” “War of all against all” - in the 2000s, almost the same system was created by Putin. Then the prosecutor's office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Drug Control Service and the FSB, the army and later the Investigative Committee restrained each other. We witnessed large-scale purges in the “authorities” that did not allow any department to gain the upper hand. Today in the system there is only one link that balances each other: the super agency Investigative Committee and the FSB. Outwardly, such a system looks monolithic, “stable”, but, as we know from the history of Russia, “stability” (stagnation) is the first step towards “perestroika”.

Also in the Interpreter’s Blog about the punitive system in the USSR.

Mikhail Dmitrievich Ryumin turned thirty-eight years old in September 1951. The arrogant, short, cruel, rude, stupid, bald, pot-bellied lieutenant colonel was not liked by many of his colleagues. What irritated them most was his pretentious arrogance. In the questionnaires, with an important look and without blinking an eye, he wrote down his unfinished higher education, and then could not explain what exams he took at the university. For example, this is how the operational secretary of the MGB, Major Burlaka, characterized Ryumin in a memo dated May 15, 1953:

“I got the impression that Ryumin was an illiterate person and often asked how this or that word was spelled or what punctuation marks should be used. He has a very small vocabulary. I haven't read a single book from start to finish. An addiction to alcoholic beverages, having a good and timely lunch - this, perhaps, is the whole range of Ryumin’s interests.”

Misha Ryumin was born in 1913 in the village of Kabanyem, Shadrinsky district, Perm province, into the family of a middle peasant. He graduated from eight grades of school. From May 1929, he worked first as a bookkeeper and then as an accountant at the Udarnik agricultural artel in the Ural region. From April to June 1930 - student of the Shadrinsky accounting courses of the regional Union of Consumer Societies. Since February 1931 - accountant-instructor of the Kabanievo district collective farm, district communications department. After completing the Shadrinsky communications courses (studied from June to September 1931) - accountant, senior accountant, accountant-instructor of the Ural Regional Communications Department (September 1931 - June 1933).

Ryumin’s personal file also records his studies at the Komsomol department of the Communist University named after V.I. Lenin in 1931–1932, 1934 (Sverdlovsk).

From May 1934 to September 1935, Ryumin was already the chief accountant of the Sverdlovsk Regional Communications Department.

In September 1935, Mikhail Dmitrievich was drafted into the army. But he didn’t disappear there either: he served as a private at the headquarters of the Ural Military District, then there as an accountant-economist. At the end of his service, in July 1937, Ryumin returned to his previous job - chief accountant of the Sverdlovsk Regional Communications Department.

But very soon the former defender of the Motherland was accused of improperly spending funds and of using the patronage of the head of the regional communications department, who had by that time been arrested as an “enemy of the people.” According to N. Petrov, not without humor of course, “Ryumin acted intelligently. He understood how to escape. He immediately took off and left for Moscow. Here, after a month of looking for work, on September 13, 1937, he got a job as an accountant-auditor of the Financial Sector of the Central Administration of River Routes of the People's Commissariat of Water of the USSR, and from September 1938 until the start of the war he worked as the chief accountant and head of the planning and financial department of the Moscow Canal Administration - Volga in Tushino. Here in 1939 he was accepted as a candidate member of the CPSU (b).

After the start of the war, Ryumin, given his “rare specialty,” was sent to study at the Higher School of the NKVD of the USSR in July 1941.

Since September 1941, Ryumin has been an investigator, senior investigator, deputy chief, head of the IV department of the Special Department of the NKVD - Counterintelligence Department of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the Arkhangelsk Military District.

On December 28, 1941, he was awarded the special rank of “junior lieutenant of state security”, on February 11, 1943 - “senior lieutenant of state security”, on June 18, 1943 - “captain”, on March 3, 1944 - “major”. In 1943, Ryumin was accepted as a candidate member of the party.

There was enough work in the Special Department of the NKVD, and then in the Counterintelligence Department SMERSH of the Arkhangelsk Military District. Among other things, Arkhangelsk hosted the British naval mission during the war, as well as the 126th Naval Base and Air Force Group. For example, in October 1943, the British naval mission in Arkhangelsk consisted of 52 people: 18 senior and middle officers, 34 junior officers and enlisted men. The apparatus of the English 126th port base consisted of 49 people: 10 senior and middle officers, 39 junior officers and privates. Moreover, the mission included many officers who certainly spoke Russian. Soon, counterintelligence officers established that the “military experts” sent by the British to work in the Arkhangelsk port for the most part did not correspond to their purpose, they did not know how to work in the specialties “assigned” to them, and therefore they tried to avoid participating in the repair of weapons and consulting on certain technical issues. dodge. In a word, real intelligence officers arrived who were engaged in military, economic and political intelligence, propaganda of anti-Soviet ideology, and the creation of a network of intelligence sources from among Soviet citizens. True, all intelligence and operational work on the British and Americans was concentrated in the counterintelligence department of the NKVD in the Arkhangelsk region. The special departments of the Arkhangelsk Military District and the White Sea Military Flotilla were ordered to transfer to the regional department all developments and agents for the British and Americans not related to the development of military personnel of the Red Army and Navy, and only in agreement with the KRO to carry out activities on relations between Soviet military personnel and foreigners. And this made a certain sense: according to counterintelligence data, as of September 1, 1943, of the 1,000 Soviet citizens whose contacts with foreigners were recorded by external surveillance, 90% were women.

Nevertheless, SMERSH counterintelligence work was carried out and it was built against British intelligence mainly in two directions: identifying British intelligence officers, their connections and suppressing their activities at army and naval facilities. At the same time, they took into account the fact that, due to the nature of their official activities and in everyday life, the British had extensive communication with military personnel and the civilian population. All points of contact between the British and our citizens were taken into account in the operational work of military counterintelligence.

In total, during the war years, counterintelligence officers identified 100 personnel employees of the allied intelligence services in the Soviet North, but only 6 of them were expelled from the country.

However, despite such a wide field of activity, SMERSH officer Ryumin mastered primarily the art of falsifying cases.

“In the end, to his misfortune, he was noticed by the chief army counterintelligence officer Abakumov, who was in dire need of professional extractors of testimony,” emphasizes N. Petrov. - After all, it’s not all about beating up the defendants yourself. We also need to raise a shift.

In Arkhangelsk, Ryumin led the investigation into the case of I. P. Ermolin, a photojournalist for the newspaper “Patriot of the Motherland,” arrested in December 1944, the reason for whose arrest was only a report from external surveillance that he had visited the English naval mission. Abakumov became interested in the case. As Ryumin later testified during interrogation: “When I arrived in Moscow with Ermolin’s case, the arrested man himself was taken to the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence. At the very first interrogation by Abakumov, Ermolin stated that he gave fictitious testimony as a result of beatings. Abakumov called me, and I told him how Ermolin’s case was falsified. Abakumov apparently liked my frankness, because when I answered his question: “Was Ermolin beaten hard?” - I answered: “They beat me as hard as I could,” he grinned and told me to report to the head of the investigative department of the Main Counterintelligence Directorate, Leonov, who told me that I would remain in the central office as a secondee.”

So Ryumin became a senior SMERSH investigator directly under Abakumov’s wing.”

It is worth noting one small touch to the biography of this “officer”. On July 31, 1944, he was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, II degree - “For exemplary performance of special tasks of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army,” and on September 13, 1945, the Order of the Red Star with the same wording. I think it’s not difficult to guess what was behind these beautiful words...

But let’s return to N. Petrov’s story: “Since May 1946, he took the position of deputy head of the 2nd department of the 6th (investigative) department of the 3rd Main Directorate of the MGB. In 1948, Ryumin participated in the investigation started by Abakumov on Stalin’s orders in the “Marshal” case - to prepare materials for the arrest of Georgy Zhukov. He led the case of the arrested Hero of the Soviet Union, Major P.E. Braiko, beating him and forcing him to sign a testimony against “one of the Marshals of the Soviet Union.” Also, seeking testimony against Zhukov and Serov, he burned the tongue of the arrested former storekeeper of the Berlin NKVD operative sector A.B. with a cigarette. Kuznetsov.

In general, he “worked with passion” and tried. On March 19, 1948, he was awarded the rank of lieutenant colonel. Living conditions have improved. And in a completely traditional way for that time. Around 1949, Ryumin moved to a more spacious apartment No. 4 in building No. 4 on Staropimenovsky Lane, which had previously been occupied by the deputy head of the investigative unit, Rhodes, who had been demoted to Crimea. In September 1949, Ryumin was transferred to the position of senior investigator in the investigative unit of the MGB, and he took part in the interrogations of those arrested in the Leningrad case. He beat the arrested Solovyov (the former chairman of the Leningrad City Executive Committee, and at the time of his arrest the secretary of the Crimean regional committee). In his exculpatory statements to the military board in 1954, Ryumin directly indicated that, as in a number of other cases, the command to “beat Solovyov” was given by Stalin himself, who was monitoring the progress of the investigation.

At the same time, Ryumin remained in the position of senior investigator. His career, despite all his efforts, somehow stalled. And in May 1951 it malfunctioned. As Ryumin testified during the investigation: “The Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of State Security became interested in the incorrect information that I gave about my relatives. They demanded an explanation from me as to why I was hiding the compromising information that I knew about them.” It turned out that Ryumin hid the true property status of his father (and he was very wealthy), in addition, the father of Ryumin’s wife served in Kolchak’s army. And finally, Ryumin lost his investigative file on the bus. In addition, he was reprimanded by the party for not recording the testimony of the arrested doctor, Professor Ya. G. Etinger, who died under investigation by Ryumin. In general, the situation is almost hopeless.”

Thus, he was clearly threatened with dismissal from the authorities. A few years later, Mikhail Dmitrievich will remember: “I carefully thought and weighed everything. The fact is that by the summer of 1951 I found myself in a rather unpleasant, precarious position.”

So what does a “shibzdik,” as Stalin called him, do? He turns to the reception room of the Central Committee to Comrade Malenkov’s assistant Sukhanov. As P. A. Sudoplatov wrote, “the result of this meeting was fatal for the fate of the Soviet Jewish intelligentsia.”

Lieutenant Colonel Ryumin rewrote his denunciation letter eleven times while in the waiting room for about six hours. This is evidenced by Sudoplatov, who adds: Sukhanov “himself negotiated the contents of the letter to Stalin with Malenkov.”

When the leader read Ryumin's statement, he said:

Now, a simple person, how deeply does he understand the tasks of the state security agencies? But the minister is not able to figure it out.

“To Comrade STALIN I.V.

From a senior investigator of the USSR MGB

Lieutenant Colonel Ryumin M.D.

In November 1950, I was assigned to conduct an investigation into the case of the arrested Doctor of Medical Sciences, Professor Etinger.

During interrogations, Etinger admitted that he was a convinced Jewish nationalist, and as a result, he harbored hatred for the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Soviet government.

Further, having spoken in detail about the ongoing enemy activities, Etinger also admitted that he, taking advantage of the fact that in 1945 he was entrusted with treating Comrade. Shcherbakov, did everything to shorten the latter’s life.

I reported Etinger’s testimony on this issue to the deputy head of the investigative unit, Comrade. Likhachev, and soon after that me and Comrade. Likhachev, along with the arrested Etinger, was summoned by Comrade. Abakumov.

During the “interrogation”, or rather the conversation with Etinger, comrade. Abakumov hinted to him several times that he should renounce his testimony about the villainous murder of Comrade. Shcherbakova. Then, when Etinger was taken from the office, Comrade. Abakumov forbade me to interrogate Etinger in the direction of revealing his practical activities and plans for terror, arguing that he - Etinger - would “lead us into the wilds.” Etinger understood Comrade's desire. Abakumov and, returning from him, during subsequent interrogations he renounced all his confessions, although his hostile attitude towards the CPSU (b) was irrefutably confirmed by secret eavesdropping materials and the testimony of his like-minded person, the arrested Brozolimsky, who, by the way, during the investigation also spoke about that Etinger expressed to him his hostile attitude towards Comrade. Shcherbakov.

Using these and other evidence, I continued to interrogate Etinger, and he gradually began to restore his previous testimony, about which I wrote daily reports for the management.

Around January 28–29, 1951, the head of the investigative unit for especially important cases, Comrade. Leonov and, referring to the instructions of Comrade. Abakumov, proposed to stop working with the arrested Etinger, and the case against him, as comrade put it. Leonov, “put it on the shelf.”

At the same time, I must note that after calling Comrade. Abakumov, who arrested Etinger, established a more severe regime for him, and he was transferred to Lefortovo prison, to the coldest and worst cell. Etinger had an advanced age - 64 years old, and he began to have attacks of angina pectoris, about which on January 20, 1951, the investigative unit received an official medical document, which indicated that “in the future, each subsequent attack of angina pectoris may lead to an unfavorable outcome.”

Considering this circumstance, I several times raised the question with the leadership of the investigative unit about being allowed to truly participate in further interrogations of the arrested Etinger, and I was refused. It all ended with Etinger suddenly dying in early March and his terrorist activities remained uninvestigated.

Meanwhile, Etinger had extensive connections, including his like-minded people among major medical specialists, and it is possible that some of them were related to Etinger’s terrorist activities.

I consider it my duty to inform you that Comrade. Abakumov, according to my observations, has a tendency to deceive government agencies by concealing serious shortcomings in the work of the MGB bodies.

So, I am currently working on an investigation against the former deputy general director of the Wismut joint-stock company in Germany, Salimanov, who fled to the Americans in May 1950, and then 3 months later returned to the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany, where he was detained and arrested.

Salimanov testified that in May 1950 he was fired from his job and was supposed to return to the USSR, but did not do this and, taking advantage of the lack of surveillance by the MGB, defected to the Americans.

Salimanov further said that, having betrayed his homeland, he fell into the hands of American intelligence officers and, communicating with them, established that American intelligence had detailed information about the activities of the Bismuth joint-stock company, which was engaged in the extraction of uranium ore.

These testimony of Salimanov indicate that the MGB organs poorly organized counterintelligence work in Germany.

Instead of informing government authorities about this and using the testimony of the arrested Salimanov to eliminate serious shortcomings in the work of the MGB in Germany, Comrade. Abakumov forbade recording Salimanov’s testimony in interrogation reports.

At various times, the Ministry of State Security arrested agents of American and British intelligence, and many of them, before their arrest, were secret employees of the MGB and double-dealed.

In his information on such matters, Comrade. Abakumov wrote: “We caught, we exposed,” although in reality: we were caught, we were exposed, and besides, we were led by the nose for a long time.

Along the way, a few words about investigative methods.

In the investigative part of particularly important cases, the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Soviet government on the work of the MGB bodies with regard to recording calls for interrogation of arrested persons with interrogation protocols is systematically and grossly violated, which, by the way, in almost all cases are drawn up irregularly and in some cases biased .

Along with this, Abakumov introduced the practice of violations of other Soviet laws, and also pursued a line as a result of which, especially in cases of interest to the government, the testimony of those arrested under duress was recorded with unacceptable generalizations, often distorting reality.

I do not cite specific facts, although there are a lot of them, since the most complete picture in this regard can be provided by a special audit of cases with re-interrogation of those arrested.

In conclusion, I allow myself to express my opinion that Comrade. Abakumov did not always strengthen his position in the state apparatus by honest means, and he is a dangerous person for the state, especially in such a sensitive area as the Ministry of State Security. He is also dangerous because within the ministry, in the most key positions and, in particular, in the investigative unit for particularly important cases, he placed “reliable”, from his point of view, people who, having received a career from his hands, gradually lose their party affiliation, turn into sycophants and obsequiously do everything that comrade wants. Abakumov.

“The beginning of the campaign of personnel purge of the MGB system, accompanied by the arrests of high-ranking employees, was initiated by a special decision of Stalin and the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks after considering the application of M.D. Ryumin, senior investigator of the investigative unit for especially important cases (OVD) of the USSR MGB,” comments letter from Ryumin N. Petrov. - It would be more accurate to say that Ryumin’s statement was more of a pretext, because the idea of ​​carrying out purges and arrests in the MGB... had been brewing for Stalin for a long time. After Stalin received Ryumin’s statement in his hands, the time came to act. What did this investigator write? Ryumin's letter, dated July 2, 1951, contained a number of accusations against Abakumov. Firstly, he “extinguished” a very promising, from the point of view of the author of the letter, case of the doctor Ya. G. Etinger, arrested by the MGB, who could give important testimony about “saboteur doctors.” Secondly, Abakumov hid from the Central Committee important information about shortcomings in counterintelligence work in Germany at the Vismuth enterprises where uranium ore was mined. And, finally, thirdly, he grossly violated the rules of investigation established by the decisions of the party and government. In the letter, Ryumin called Abakumov a “dangerous person” in an important government position.”

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Requisites

Abakumov’s arrest was like a bolt from the blue for me. For what, why? – they didn’t say a word about this to us, the staff workers. And there is no one to ask - the situation is not conducive. I was immediately removed from the post of the Secretariat and temporarily assigned to the reserve. The situation, you understand, is rotten. One day I came to collect my salary from the Personnel Department, and they said: “Go, Ivan Aleksandrovich, to Kazakhstan, you will be the head of the camp department in Karaganda.” I had to agree, but I refused - I wanted to go to the North to book a Moscow apartment. It was a pity to lose her: I had just settled in, she was the first in my life, I used to live in a communal apartment. I’m waiting for an appointment, but they call me to Pushkinskaya, to the Union Prosecutor’s Office, and arrest me. They brought me to Matrosskaya Tishina and took me for interrogation that same evening. When I heard that they were accusing me of enemy activity, I almost crushed a cut glass of water in my palm. Am I the enemy?!

I didn’t eat anything for nine days - no, I didn’t go on a hunger strike, I just couldn’t get a bite into my throat. I sit like an idol, and in confusion I think - what kind of enemy am I, what have I done against the workers’ and peasants’ government? I am of the most proletarian origin, I have been in the police since 1932, after the NKVD school I was on operational work. In 1936, he carried out an operation in China - it was necessary to deliver weapons through Mongolia for the military units of Mao Tse-Tung in Yan'an. And then the Japanese attacked China, Chiang Kai-Shek turned to us for help, Mao became close to the Kuomintang, and our work lost its meaning. Then Berzin filed a petition with Yezhov for my transfer to the RKKA Intelligence Department - that’s how I got there. Before the war, he was assistant to the head of the Special Operations Department at the General Staff, still working on China there, and in September 1941 he submitted a report to be sent to the active army.

They called me to the Directorate of Special Departments to see Abakumov. He looked at me point-blank and said: “You are behind the KGB life, you will be the deputy head of the department, we cannot give more.” And I hold the rank of senior battalion commissar, three sleepers in my buttonhole. But since there is a war, is it possible to refuse?

With the onset of cold weather, I moved to Lubyanka, a group of managers and a small part of the operational staff remained there - the main forces were evacuated to Kuibyshev. They worked day and night, slept when they had to, in fits and starts, and washed in the Inner Prison, where there was a shower. Oh, just to know that in ten years I will...

Less than six months later, I was made the head of the department, and in April 1943, shortly after the creation of the Smersh Main Directorate for the Defense of the Russian Federation, I was appointed head of the Secretariat. I denied it, explained that I liked operational work, but Abakumov was adamant: “I like it, I don’t like it - this is not a conversation!” To tell the truth, I was not drawn there because Broverman, who was previously in charge of the Secretariat, was left there as a deputy. He placed people in positions, was in their honor, but here he had to stoop lower. The person may be harboring a grudge, how to work with him? But nothing, they worked together, mainly, I think, for the reason that they did not overlap: he was minding his own business - preparing information for the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and I provided the rest.

From then on, I had to come into close contact with Abakumov. Although Viktor Semenovich was young, he enjoyed great authority; he was highly respected at the Smersh State Administration for the Protection of the Russian Federation. He paid most attention to investigative work, knew it well, and it was carried out actively. He kept a tight grip on the heads of departments in the center and at the fronts and did not give anyone any concessions. He was abrasive - yes, it happened in all sorts of ways, but there was no noticeable swagger behind him. On the contrary, if he happened to offend someone, he would then call them into his office and punish them back. I know from myself: sometimes he will start scolding in front of strangers so that they feel responsible, and at night he will take a moment and say - don’t pay attention, this was necessary for educational purposes.

The war ended, Abakumov was appointed Minister of State Security instead of Merkulov, and I remained in the Smersh State Security Administration. Seven months passed, I don’t remember exactly, I was getting ready to go on vacation then, received a ticket to Kislovodsk, and suddenly - a call to Abakumov. I show up, and he tells me: “Go to work as the head of the MGB Secretariat.” I stood at attention and - “I obey, Comrade Colonel General!” He got to work, and there again Broverman was cooking his “kitchen”, preparing memos to Stalin.

I had to work a lot, the document flow in the ministry was much greater than in the Smersh State Budgetary Institution. Abakumov - he is demanding, intolerant of any manifestations of negligence or illiteracy, and every day I reported to him mail: letters, government orders, encrypted messages, notes via HF. He usually received me at the end of the working day, at about 5 in the morning, and the report lasted about forty to fifty minutes. After that I went home to get some sleep, and at ten o’clock I was back at work. I worked until the evening, between nineteen and twenty-two I managed to take a nap for an hour or two, and at night I again prepared for the report. And so for five years...

Yes, I got distracted, it’s time to return to “Matrosskaya Tishina”. So, they noticed that I wasn’t eating anything, they called the prison doctor, and she gave me castor oil. I began to eat little by little, I don’t remember what, but there were no complaints about the food. They interrogated me politely, without rudeness or scuffles. Military prosecutors are educated, ceremonious people; with them you feel like a human being. And the questions were clear: what do I know about Abakumov, what are his habits, who did he talk to on the phone in front of me, what were these conversations about, did he appropriate trophy property, and so on. What is typical is that they wrote down in the protocol only what I said, and readily corrected the text if I disagreed with something. Then they asked tougher questions: did I take part in correcting the interrogation protocols of those arrested, what did this involve, were there any cases of misuse of funds intended for operational needs, what did Broverman report to me about his “kitchen”, why did I not send letters to the address? , written by prisoners of the Internal and Lefortovo prisons of the MGB?

During interrogations, I did not play around, I gave evidence to the best of what I knew. I had nothing to do with the Investigative Unit for Particularly Important Cases, I did not work with those arrested, I did not draw up or correct “generalized” interrogation protocols, I did not touch Broverman’s “kitchen” - he directly contacted the minister, and letters from prisoners were reported to Abakumov and passed on to him officials whom he named to me. This was the order established in the MGB before my arrival, and I strictly observed it.

And he didn’t hide anything about the operational amounts - he told everything that he heard from the guys from Abakumov’s personal security. It must be said that Viktor Semenovich did not like to drive a car, he preferred to walk, and on the streets he ordered those accompanying him to give one hundred rubles to beggars, mainly old women. He liked it when old women crossed themselves, thanking them for their alms. I also remembered that the guards brought Abakumov kebabs from “Aragvi” - he was partial to good kebabs. Investigators, it turns out, already knew about this - they interrogated the head of security Kuznetsov, bodyguard Agureev and the drivers who served the minister.

In February 1952, I was transferred to Lubyanka, and a few days later to Lefortovo, where MGB investigators replaced military prosecutors. There they interrogated me every night in order to deprive me of sleep and break my psyche, and when this did not work, they handcuffed me. The handcuffs used were “strict” - as you move your hands, they “jump” and squeeze even more tightly. Once they brought me to Ryumin. I didn’t know him before, I saw him briefly, but I didn’t have to talk. “You, Chernov, are not a stupid person,” he said. - You must understand that your fate is predetermined. Post everything you know. You have nowhere to go anyway. If you don’t testify, they will carry you out feet first. We don’t need small facts - talk about how Abakumov was preparing to seize power?” And then they started using threats, swearing and punching.

What they did to me is still hard to remember, although so much water has passed under the bridge. Konyakhin - the same one who had previously been the deputy head of the administrative department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and now took Komarov’s place - stuck to his throat like a knife: “Tell me, how Abakumov planned to distribute ministerial portfolios?” “What are you talking about,” I answer, “what kind of briefcases?!” “Oh, so,” Konyakhin muttered. “We’ll send you to room 65, you’ll start talking there!”

Then I didn’t know what was in room 65. I’m standing, waiting, my hands behind my back, handcuffed, incredibly swollen, and he looks at me like a cat at a mouse, his eyes sparkle - and calls for a convoy. They led me - there were two guards behind me, an officer next to me, holding me by the elbow, and I felt his hand trembling. They brought me to the door with the number “65”, pushed me in, and there was Mironov, the head of the Internal Prison, and with him three “executors”. “Are you going to testify, you bastard?!” - Mironov shouted and, without waiting for an answer, gave a sign to the three. They took up rubber sticks and began to treat me en masse. I don’t remember how long the torture lasted, my mind went beyond my mind, and it ended with rectal prolapse...

The regime in Lefortovo prison is worse than ever: they were deprived of walks, a kiosk, books, they were fed from hand to mouth, I was hungry all the time. And the cold was very tormenting - winter was outside, and in my cell the heating was turned off, the walls were covered with frost. And the fact that they did not allow me to sleep, I somehow coped with this, the long-standing habit of resting in fits and starts, wherever necessary and in any position, affected. I pull my head into my shoulders, wrap myself tightly in my jacket and doze off, and when I hear that the warden is creeping up to the door to look through the peephole, I begin to blink. I have a light sleep, and my hearing is normal, but it’s difficult to approach the cell in Lefortovo silently, there are galleries and stairs made of metal. God forbid, if they notice that you are sleeping, they will instantly throw you in a punishment cell for violating the rules. What to expect from them: all guards are service workers, especially women.

Investigator Sokolov was amazed: “How come you, Chernov, didn’t break down? Everyone breaks, but you hold on. Looks like you're sneaking around unnoticed during the day? We’ll have to set up a special post at your cell so that the warden won’t take his eyes off you.” But he didn’t expose me - either he forgot about the threat, or he felt sorry for me. You can’t fully understand them: either they swear and, baring their teeth, come at you with their fists, or they let you smoke. They light a cigarette and put it in my teeth - in handcuffs I’m helpless as a baby, I’m not even able to scratch myself.

They pressed hard, demanding that Abakumov’s conspiracy be exposed, and then they abruptly changed tactics - they decided to first dirty me from head to toe, so that there would be nothing to hope for. Confess, they say that you composed falsified letters from the “aviators” to the Leader of the Nations! I don’t care, this didn’t happen and that’s it, even if you cut it into pieces. Then they confronted Broverman, who muttered as if this was my job. “What are you weaving? – I shouted to Broverman in anger. – Are you settling scores with me for old things? Is it my fault that you were demoted?” Broverman is silent, looks away, and I’m shaking. “How long have you been beaten? – I ask him. “Third month,” he squeezed out. “What are you doing? - I turn to the investigators. “Are you using batons to force us to slander each other?!” But at least they drew up a protocol and didn’t include my words there.

The whole next day I didn’t sleep a wink – I thought and thought. Since something was investigated incorrectly in the Investigative Unit for particularly important cases, then they should answer, Ogoltsov as the first deputy minister who oversaw them, and, of course, Abakumov - he is responsible for everyone, but why do they need me? In my service, no violations were revealed, except perhaps for letters written by those arrested and not forwarded to the address... And Broverman - what is Broverman? He is for himself, I didn’t delve into his affairs!.. In general, I thought and thought and came up with nothing. How was I supposed to know that Ryumin didn’t have enough Jews in general’s and colonel’s uniform for the conspiracy, but fish and fish for nothing: I’m Russian, but my wife is Jewish!

After the confrontation, we were not interrogated for two weeks. I can’t imagine why. I then say to Zakharov, the deputy head of the Lefortovo prison: “If they don’t call you in for interrogation tomorrow, I’ll run away and break my head on the heating radiator!” They called me in and made me sign a protocol in which I admit that I edited those letters from the “aviators.” And when they saw that I wouldn’t sign, they took up their batons.

I held on for some days, and then... They had a well-established sadistic technique - they would turn you over on your back, take off your trousers, spread your legs and let them whip you with a rawhide whip. The pain is inexpressible, especially if they hit with a draw. After such torture, I drank a carafe of water, I was thirsty - everything inside was on fire. Here you can even sign that you strangled your own mother three years before you were born...

Since the summer of 1953, I have hardly been interrogated - so, sometimes they will call me to clarify some little thing, and that’s all. Thank God, they also stopped beating. I’m sitting in Lefortovo, month after month goes by, and when it’s all over, just guess. Of course, I don’t show curiosity - why? Once, back in the winter, I asked the investigator if there was enough material for a “tower”, he gestured to show what he was doing, so he didn’t ask any questions.

Spending two years in solitary confinement is a chore; you see only investigators and guards, and you can’t exchange a word with them. Once I asked to be transferred to a general cell, and the writer Lev Sheinin was assigned to me. He came up to me this way and that, asking who I was, why I was in prison, but I became so wild, unaccustomed to people, that I kept silent and even called myself by someone else’s name. And then, when we were transferred separately to the Inner Prison, we again ended up in the same cell and became friends. He, Lyova, is stingy, he won’t share anything from the prison stall for discharge, but nothing, he told different stories, consulted with me. “You know,” he says, “I’m not one of the last lawyers, after all, I’m a state counselor of justice of the 2nd class, in your opinion, a lieutenant general, but I can’t understand a damn thing about my business!” He listened to my opinion and praised me: “Well done, Ivan Aleksandrovich, you’re great at putting everything into order!”

From him I learned that Beria had been imprisoned. Sheinin, of course, was not told this, but Leva is smart - based on the nature of the entries in the interrogation protocol, he himself guessed everything and immediately wrote a letter to Khrushchev; they have known each other for a long time. The main thing was that there was a case when Lyova did him a favor: he was part of a commission that, on instructions from the Politburo, checked something in Ukraine, and drew up a certificate in favor of Khrushchev. And Rudenko was one of his friends, apparently he also put in a good word - in general, Lyova was soon released. At parting, he said: “Vanya, I understand, you are sitting in a position,” and promised to help through Rudenko: “You’ll see, Roman Andreevich is a man!”

1953 passed, 1954 came, and nothing became clearer in our case, it was a complete fog. There was, however, a surge - either in May or in June, I don’t remember exactly - incriminating material was presented for review in accordance with Article 206 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, and then everything died down again for a long time. Over the summer I got stronger, took up physical training, walked twenty thousand steps around the cell every day, and waited to see what would happen next. They announced to me that the trial would take place in Leningrad, only in December, before departure. They took me there on a regular train, in a docked carriage, without handcuffs, as if I was not under arrest, but on a business trip. As the train started moving, Talanov, the new head of the Internal Prison, who was responsible for our delivery, looked into the compartment and politely asked: “Chernov, how are things settled?” “Great,” I respond. “Why don’t you give us wine along the way?” Talanov was amused and said: “When we take you back, we’ll definitely give it to you!”

We were tried in the district House of Officers. I had never met my lawyer before; we met directly at the court hearing. To this day I still don’t understand why it was needed. We didn’t talk about anything, only once I asked in a whisper: “The trial is going on, but not a word is said about me - they don’t question me and almost don’t mention me?” And he responded: “Very good. Sit and keep quiet."

When it was my turn to speak at the trial, I refused the testimony extracted from me during the preliminary investigation, and firmly stated that I did not correct the “generalized” protocols of the “aviators” - such work was entrusted only to the masters of this matter. “Who do you consider masters?” - asked Rudenko, who supported the prosecution. “The Chief Master was Shvartsman, and the Master was Broverman,” I said without hesitation. “We know about you, Chernov,” Rudenko noted significantly. “You are a famous master of putting everything into order!” As he said this, I began to hope that there is truth on earth - I didn’t let you down, which means Lev Romanovich Sheinin kept his word!

At the trial, Broverman exposed everyone, especially me, and Abakumov behaved with great dignity. I won’t say anything about the others, I don’t remember, I had no time for that - I was waiting to see how everything would turn out. And when Rudenko demanded twenty-five years in prison for me, that’s when I realized what kind of benefactors I was dealing with. In my last word, I denied guilt before the Soviet authorities, and they gave me fifteen years, but not in prison, but in camps. Broverman grabbed a quarter, and the rest were shot. Abakumov, I remember, not a single vein in his face trembled, as if it wasn’t about him.

And then there were stages and camps - Petropavlovsk, Karaganda, Taishet, sunny Mordovia, Dubrovlag - all the political prisoners were eventually brought there. Everywhere the camp authorities asked me how everything had happened - they were interested, but of course you wouldn’t understand a damn thing from the newspapers. Either one of them spilled the beans, or else they found out about me, but the Benderaites passed me on “on the baton” and more than once made attempts on my life - they threw bricks from the roofs. It’s difficult for the Chekists to survive in the camps; everyone is against us.

I met Broverman in Yavaz. If I had come across him immediately after the verdict, I would have torn him to pieces, would have gnawed his throat, there was so much anger in me, but then we sat down on the logs and calmly talked. “If you have even a drop of conscience left in you,” I say, “write to the Supreme Court that you slandered me in order to save your life. Don’t drift, now they won’t shoot you.” He promised, but didn't write anything. And we never saw each other again. I heard a rumor that after serving his sentence he was sent to a mental hospital, but he did not show up there. In general, Broverman disappeared.

I was “re-educated” in the camps, and my loved ones were freed. They were given wolf passports, with which they were not allowed to do even the dirtiest work; they were driven from place to place, and tortured in every way. My mother, wife and eldest son died from grief and hardship... I sent complaints, many complaints, but under Khrushchev they were not allowed to go forward. It was later, already under Brezhnev, that prosecutor Rudenko relented and protested, admitting that I, Chernov, was not a traitor to the motherland, but only a saboteur and participant in a counter-revolutionary conspiracy. So it turned out that, for no reason at all, I spent only fourteen and a half behind barbed wire instead of fifteen years.

The Leningrad Affair is one of the largest actions in the series of post-war repressions. Its victims were more than two thousand people - Leningraders who bore on their shoulders all the hardships of the military blockade: party, Komsomol, trade union workers, military personnel, scientists, as well as their family members and relatives. More than two hundred of them were sentenced to long prison terms and execution. One of the victims of the Leningrad tragedy was General Petr Nikolaevich Kubatkin , former head of the MGB Directorate for Leningrad and the Leningrad Region. I had the opportunity to work with this extraordinary man, a real counterintelligence ace...

Peter Kubatkin born in 1907 in Donbass, into a large mining family. I met the revolution as a ten-year-old boy. In order not to be a burden to anyone, he went to work as a miner - a common thing in those places. His fate changed dramatically after he was called up for active military service in the border troops in 1929. When the time came for demobilization, Peter Kubatkin offered a job in state security agencies. He learned the basics of the KGB profession in Odessa, then he was appointed deputy head of the political department, and after some time the young, promising counterintelligence officer was sent to Moscow, to the Central School of the NKVD of the USSR. And soon he was sent to work in the central office of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. His predecessor, whose place in the apparatus he took, had by that time been shot for participating in a conspiracy in the NKVD.

While sorting through the papers he left behind, Kubatkin unexpectedly came across a selection of documents about the past of the famous prosecutor A.Ya. Vyshinsky, who, as a prosecutor of the USSR, raged at the Moscow trials of the 30s. These documents, once extracted from the archives of the police department, contained obvious dirt on the merciless prosecutor. It turned out that speaking at the Moscow trials, the formidable Vyshinsky accused the defendants of the same actions to which he was personally involved in 1917. Not only was he associated with the Mensheviks, he actively worked in prominent positions in the prosecutor's office of the Provisional Government, diligently prosecuting its opponents, but he was also involved in the action carried out by the authorities in the spring of 1917 to track down V.I., who was hiding underground, with the aim of arresting him. Lenin.

After reviewing the documents, Peter Kubatkin informed the then People's Commissar of Internal Affairs N.I. Yezhova. For this reason, Vyshinsky’s pre-revolutionary activities were not news. However, this time he decided to open the eyes of Stalin, who absolutely trusted Vyshinsky: let him know what kind of snake he had warmed on his chest. The People's Commissar subsequently shared what happened behind the closed doors of the leader's office with his inner circle. Stalin's reaction was unusual. After skimming through several pages of the certificate, which contained incriminating evidence on Vyshinsky, the leader, remaining outwardly absolutely calm, ordered that the prosecutor be summoned to him. The three of us continued the conversation. Yezhov felt wounded and tried to ask Vyshinsky several questions, but Stalin immediately intervened in the conversation and unexpectedly asked Vyshinsky if he would remind him of the time when both of them ended up in the same cell in the Butyrka prison in Baku. Vyshinskaya instantly named the date, as well as the number of days and nights spent together behind bars.

Tell me, please, for what special merits did the administration make you head of the prison then? You're younger than me, aren't you?

“That’s right, Comrade Stalin,” answered the mortally frightened prosecutor.

I am four years younger than you: you were born on December 21, 1879, and I was born on December 10, 1883. Well, I was appointed as a prefect, obviously, because of my appearance. If you remember, I grew a beard then and looked older than my years.

Well, let’s say, strictly speaking, there was no beard. But the beard, thin and rather sparse, existed,” Stalin grinned, enjoying the prosecutor’s confusion. - You can go.

Yezhov was disappointed: he realized that Stalin had not even thought of getting rid of Vyshinsky. The time for a helpful and cunning Prosecutor General has not yet come. Stalin only made it clear to Vyshinsky that nothing from his past had been forgotten and his fate was in the hands of the leader.

Oddly enough, this mistake did not affect Kubatkin in any way, although some of his colleagues predicted that his initiative would cost him dearly. Yezhov only demanded materials discrediting Vyshinsky.

And in December 1938, Yezhov was removed from his post as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs... For some time he continued to serve as People's Commissar of Water Transport, but was soon arrested. All responsibility for the mass unfounded arrests was shifted to Yezhov and his henchmen, turning them into scapegoats. Once at the beginning of the war, Stalin, having opened up over dinner with aircraft designer Alexander Yakovlev, said: “Yezhov is a bastard! He destroyed our best personnel, we shot him for it, a decomposed man. You call the Central Committee, they say: he left for work. You send him to house, - it turns out, he’s lying dead drunk in bed. He’s killed many innocents.”

The Kremlin leaders, who professed “higher wisdom,” publicly cursed Yezhov and allowed some people to be released (according to some sources, about three thousand people), but immediately slowed down the rehabilitation process. They say that reviewing cases takes up too much time from the NKVD authorities and distracts them from more important tasks.

With the arrival of L.P. in the NKVD. Beria, the number of those arrested sharply decreased, but political repressions and executions continued. Another, third in a row, purge of the KGB corps also took place. The entire generation of “Yezhov security officers”, who made up the leadership of the authorities, was almost completely exterminated. “Hedgehog gloves” suited Beria just right.

Many young employees of the central apparatus were sent to lead the local bodies of the NKVD, replacing those who were repressed and expelled from service. And senior detective Kubatkin, who was only 32 years old, in the spring of 1939 was included in the “nomenklatura” - he received a prominent post as head of the Moscow department of the NKVD.

By the time Kubatkin arrived, the situation in the Directorate was very difficult. The apparatus was freed from those who were spinning the flywheel of mass political repression in Moscow. Four heads of the Department were arrested, including Stalin’s brother-in-law, S. Redens. The fifth - V. Karutsky - committed suicide. Their deputies and heads of operational departments shared their fates. Among them were not only Yezhov’s associates and comrades-in-arms, but also unwanted witnesses to the dark deeds, those who, in the leader’s words, “knew too much.” Every day, coming to work, we learned about another disappearance of one of our bosses. Kubatkin did not find practically a single employee whose rank was higher than junior lieutenant. The majority had neither appropriate education, nor professional skills, nor experience.

Meanwhile, the new head of the Department inherited a lot of unfinished cases, mostly group ones. These were cases initiated mainly on the grounds of the notorious 58th Article of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, and on all its points: anti-Soviet agitation, sabotage, espionage, terrorism, membership in a counter-revolutionary organization and even... non-informalization. Moreover, evidence of the defendants’ guilt was limited, as a rule, to their own confessions obtained as a result of the use of physical force. The defendant's admission of guilt was officially elevated to the rank of "queen of evidence" and freed the investigation from the need to provide the court with any documentary or material evidence of the crime.

The overall flow of accusations was dominated by cases of anti-Soviet propaganda. Having examined some of these cases, Kubatkin quickly realized that they were opened without sufficient grounds. In more than 100 cases initiated under Article 58, he issued a reasoned conclusion on their termination, and all those arrested were released.

The first steps of the new leader, perceived by the team as a serious adjustment to Yezhov’s policy, saved the lives of many people, but did not receive support from the top. The fact is that a significant part of those arrested were shot, and, of course, it was not part of the Kremlin’s plans to make this fact public. In addition, the Stalinist leadership, not without reason, feared that when thousands of prisoners returned from the camps, the harsh truth about the lawlessness that was happening in the camps and prisons would emerge. But the main thing is that the Kremlin leadership was afraid to undermine the atmosphere of fear, which was considered by Stalinist ideologists as one of the most important pillars of the then regime. The Kremlin leadership decided to limit itself to general conversations about the campaign to review cases and some easing of the regime in places of detention; There was no talk of any far-reaching plans to correct the “mistakes” of the punitive policy.

Kubatkin was reprimanded by the People's Commissariat for his passion for the “liberal line” and his “easy approach” to reviewing cases. Unlike some other heads of local authorities, this did not frighten him: he was able to defend the validity of the decisions he made to return at least some of the people to their good name. For Kubatkin then everything turned out more or less well. And soon the young head of the NKVD Directorate was included in the presidium of the Moscow City Council and the bureau of the city party committee, and in 1939 he was elected as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Kubatkin immediately set about cleaning the Department’s apparatus from employees who falsified cases, extracting false testimony from those arrested. Some of these employees were convicted, others were simply expelled from the NKVD. They usually did not return to the cases themselves, fabricated by them, and most importantly - to the fate of those innocently convicted in them. The sentences remained in force, and those who managed to survive were released only after 15-18 years. Kubatkin was only able to put forward strict demands: not to limit himself to the arrestee’s admission of guilt, but to certainly support the charges brought with testimony of witnesses, expert reports, documentary and material evidence. He was firmly of the opinion that the final fate of those brought to criminal responsibility should be decided by the court.

In March 1941, when it became clear that war could not be avoided, the NKVD was reorganized: intelligence and counterintelligence were separated into independent bodies and the People's Commissariat of State Security was formed on their basis. Kubatkin becomes head of the NKGB Directorate for Moscow and the Moscow Region. The war found him in this high position. Kubatkin had to control the fight against crime in the capital and region. The result of his work was obvious: during this time, no serious crimes were committed in Moscow and the region. The presence of internal agents, recruited from the criminal environment or embedded in it, made it possible to timely solve, and most importantly, prevent many crimes.

In July 1941, the People's Commissariats of Internal Affairs and State Security merged. Kubatkin is entrusted with heading one of the important intelligence services. But he didn’t have to work there: at the end of August 1941 he was sent to Leningrad. There he remained throughout the war years - until May 1943 as the head of the NKVD Directorate, and after the re-division of the People's Commissariat - as the head of the NKGB-MGB Directorate.

In Leningrad Kubatkin found himself in the very whirlpool of terrible events. The SD and Abwehr are sending more and more of their spies into the city with the sole purpose of determining the location of food warehouses and bases in order to simplify the tasks of aviation and sabotage agents. Before NKVD Directorate the task arose - to ensure the protection of these warehouses and bases. It must be said that not everything was accomplished. On September 8, 1941, during the second massive air raid, the enemy managed to smash and set fire to the famous Badayevsky warehouses. It was a cruel blow: the fire destroyed 700 tons of sugar alone.

Surprise after surprise that the war presented required quick and extraordinary decisions; in a short time it was necessary to remove a significant part of the civilian population from the besieged city into the interior of the country. It was necessary to relocate industrial enterprises and unique equipment to the rear. Almost the entire city - one and a half million people, industrial enterprises, research institutes, educational institutions, museums, theaters - had to be evacuated to the east in a short time. Only in the first months of the war from Leningrad 961 thousand 79 people were evacuated, over 90 factories were removed. But in the besieged city itself, it was necessary to ensure uninterrupted operation and “camouflage cover” for enterprises engaged in the production of weapons, mines and shells.

In early September 1941, the formation of 150 worker battalions began at factories in case of street fighting; Many of them were headed by Department employees.

The Leningrad security officers did not remain aloof from the preservation of cultural and historical values: more than a million valuable works were sent to the East from the Hermitage alone.

But the main activity of the Directorate was related to the course of military operations. In 1941-1942, about 40 partisan detachments and 42 reconnaissance and sabotage groups were formed in enemy-occupied territory, continuously striking enemy troops.

In difficult military conditions, the staff of the Directorate, which traditionally consisted of excellent professionals in their field, ensured the security of the city from the actions of the subversive centers of the Abwehr and SD, whose headquarters were located in the vicinity of Leningrad - in Pskov and Novgorod.

Intensified preparations for a terrorist attack against Stalin were underway in Pskov at that time. In November 1943, there, along with other saboteurs, the terrorist Tavrin-Shilo, who was later exposed on the territory of the USSR, was trained and was to personally carry out the assassination attempt. The first information about the impending action and a tip on Tavrin-Shilo himself was received through agents of the Leningrad administration operating in Pskov.

Kubatkin firmly adhered to the principle: one cannot count on accidentally identifying enemy spies. It is necessary to send well-trained agents and proxies to the occupied areas of the region who are capable of infiltrating the Abwehr and SD organs. As a result, work efficiency has increased dramatically. The KGB apparatus began to receive information about the supposed deployment of enemy agents to Leningrad and points at which they would cross the front line in advance, although the capture of heavily armed enemy spies in itself was difficult and dangerous.

The main object of development of the Leningrad security officers was the German intelligence station - the Abwehrkommando-104 group; according to archival documents, only in the period from October 1942 to September 1943, she sent 150 groups of spies and saboteurs, each numbering from three to ten people, behind the lines of the Red Army. With the help of agents embedded in the intelligence network of the Abwehr and SD, the Leningrad Directorate managed not only to reveal its infiltrators, but also to a large extent neutralize them.

The years Kubatkin spent in the besieged city strengthened his reputation in the country's security corps. During the first post-war elections, he was again elected as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR - this time from the Smolninsky electoral district of Leningrad.

In March 1946, the post of Minister of State Security of the USSR, at the suggestion of Stalin, was given to Beria's confidant B.S. Abakumov. The usual “changing of the guard” occurs in such cases. Knowing Kubatkin from joint work in the central apparatus, the new minister instructs him to head the First Main Directorate of the MGB - foreign intelligence. Kubatkin refuses, citing a lack of foreign work experience and lack of knowledge of foreign languages. Abakumov, who has already agreed on Kubatkin’s appointment at the top, is trying to insist on his own. But he failed to convince the stubborn man. The minister harbored a grudge. In 1946, he relieved Kubatkin from the post of head of the First Main Directorate, where he had served for less than six months, and sent him to head the KGB Directorate for the Gorky Region.

And soon Abakumov dealt him a new cruel blow: in March 1949, Kubatkin was dismissed from the authorities with the wording: “due to the impossibility of further use and with transfer to general military registration.” The decision was confirmed by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. However, it was indecent to throw out a 40-year-old general with an impeccable track record and awarded many awards, and Kubatkin was appointed deputy chairman of the Saratov Regional Council.

Kubatkin's misadventures began in 1949, shortly after the death of Zhdanov, who knew him personally and treated him patronizingly. It was during this period that a sharp struggle unfolded in the highest echelons of power for the place of the second person in the party, who was to take the baton from the hands of the already decrepit leader. The Kremlin was wary of the growing authority and influence of Leningrad leaders. Always distinguished by his love of power, Malenkov, after disgrace that lasted from 1946 to 1948, moves to second place in the party and begins attacks on Zhdanov’s nominees. First of all, this affected the former leader of the Leningrad communists, A.A., who by this time had become the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Kuznetsov, in whom Malenkov saw a dangerous competitor in the struggle for power. Based on Malenkov’s slander, on February 15, 1949, a Politburo resolution was issued “On the anti-party actions of Kuznetsov, a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and candidates for membership of the Central Committee, Rodionov and Popkov.” At that time Rodionov held the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, Popkov was the secretary of the Leningrad Regional Party Committee. Soon Kuznetsov, Rodionov and Popkov received party penalties and were removed from their posts.

Minister of State Security Abakumov considered the situation suitable to curry favor with Stalin in the role of whistleblower of a new conspiracy in the party and present the removed Leningrad leaders as organizers of the counter-revolutionary underground. This is where, as the insidious minister believed, the disgraced Kubatkin could come in handy. Firstly, throughout the war he was close to the leaders of Leningrad, and if desired, some dirt on them could be squeezed out of him. Secondly, Kubatkin had a better understanding of the Leningrad archives of past years than others and could tell him where and what to look for. Thirdly, the calculation was based on the fact that, saving his own family from repression, the disgraced general would come to an agreement with his conscience and “remember the facts exposing the Leningrad leaders of “local separatism.”

IN Leningrad A group of responsible MGB officials is urgently equipped, pre-oriented to carefully rummage through all the archives of the MGB Directorate and party bodies and find the necessary materials there. An unseemly role in the Leningrad events of that time and, above all, in the fate of Kubatkin and Kapustin, who then held the post of second secretary of the Leningrad regional party committee, was played by the head of the MGB Directorate, General D.G. Rodionov, who replaced Kubatkin in this post. Rodionov presented Abakumov with a certificate, preserved in operational records, which stated that in 1935-1936, Kapustin, while in England, where he was sent to a company as an assistant to the head of the turbine blade workshop of the Putilov plant, allegedly entered into a close relationship with a local resident who taught him English. In the London residency of our foreign intelligence service, there was an assumption that this woman was an agent of British counterintelligence. This was reported to Zhdanov, but he assessed the message as doubtful, and it had no consequences. Rodionov’s message was silent about this. But he noted that in 1945, Kubatkin, having learned about these materials, ordered their destruction (which, by the way, was required by the instructions in force at that time).

Abakumov forwarded Rodionov's message to Stalin. The leader's reaction was immediate: he ordered the arrest of Kapustin, suspected of having connections with British intelligence, and Kubatkin, who committed a crime in office. Both of them - deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR - find themselves in prison on the same day without the sanction of the prosecutor. The arrest warrant for Kubatkin stated that “while working in leadership positions in Leningrad in 1941-1944, he maintained a criminal connection with a group of people hostile to the party and government.”

At first, Kubatkin did not feel alarmed about his fate. When he was arrested, he told his wife: “There was some kind of misunderstanding; everything will soon be cleared up, and I will return.” His demand for a meeting with the minister remained unanswered. Then the realization of hopelessness came to him: blackmail with a threat to repress his family, cruel torture showed how gloomy his prospects were. Although Kubatkin did not allow himself to lose heart. The preliminary investigation into the Kubatkin case progressed with difficulty and took a total of more than a year (from July 23 to September 1950). During this time, the investigation period was extended 15(!) times. In the end Kubatkin was sentenced to 20 years in prison for failure to report - “criminal omission.” But Abakumov’s command soon followed: to wait until the execution of the sentence. At this time, they managed to extort false testimony against Kubatkin as a member of an “anti-party group” from those arrested in the “Leningrad case.” And the investigation into his case was resumed.

There were no documents or material evidence of Kubatkin’s guilt, as well as the “anti-party group” as a whole, that appeared at the trial - they simply did not exist. In open court proceedings for " Leningrad cause"Kubatkin did not participate. He was tried separately from the main group. The fact of Kubatkin's arrest and trial was hushed up. On October 2, 1950, the Military Collegium, after a twenty-minute trial, pronounced a sentence: to shoot. And it was carried out on the same day. They were in a hurry, following the well-known Jesuit formula: no person - no problem. Together with Kubatkin, his wife and son, a student, were convicted, receiving 15 and 10 years in forced labor camps. Kubatkin's 80-year-old mother was expelled from Donbass as a socially dangerous element.

At the beginning of 1954, the USSR Prosecutor's Office checked the materials " Leningrad case"and established that it was falsified from beginning to end. The charges against A.A. Kuznetsov, N.A. Voznesensky, P.S. Popkov, M.M. Rodionov and others (including Kubatkin) were fabricated by the investigative apparatus MGB on command from above. As for the confession of the defendants, it was established: unable to withstand torture and torment, they incriminated themselves and others. At the protest of the Prosecutor's Office, the Military colleagues in the new composition dismissed the ridiculous charges, canceled the verdict, and stopped " Leningrad case"for the lack of corpus delicti in the actions of the convicted persons. Good name Peter Nikolaevich Kubatkin returned posthumously. The mother, wife, son and sister were able to return to their place of residence.

Sergey FEDOSEEV