General Pokrovsky is the story of the forgotten leader of the white movement. Literary and historical notes of a young technician. Wandering around Europe

In September-October 1918, after the occupation of the city of Maykop by the 1st Kuban Division of General Pokrovsky, almost 4,000 inhabitants, who, one way or another, were under suspicion of collaboration with the Soviet government. Even those who simply worked at the city’s enterprises nationalized by the Bolsheviks were slaughtered. The bloody massacre of the Maikopians lasted almost one and a half months without a break.

It all started with such an order from the white “hero”, Major General Pokrovsky, who became brutalized by his own impunity.

“For the fact that the population of the city of Maykop (Nikolaevskaya, Pokrovskaya and Troitskaya settlements) fired at volunteer troops, I impose an indemnity of one million rubles on the above-mentioned outskirts of the city.

The indemnity must be paid within three days.

If my demand is not met, the above-mentioned settlements will be burned to the ground. I entrust the collection of indemnities to the commandant of the city, Yesaul Razderishchin.

Head of the 1st Kuban Cossack Division, Major General Pokrovsky."

Local monk Ilidor testified:

“On the morning of September 21, in Maikop, near the station, on the side of the fields, I saw a mass of chopped up corpses. Afterwards they explained to me that 1,600 Bolsheviks were hacked to death at night, captured in the city garden and surrendered. I saw 26 people on the gallows.

I further saw how 33 young men were led from the tanning factory; were led because they worked in a nationalized factory. Everyone walked barefoot, wearing only underwear. They walked in a row linked by hands with each other. Officers and Cossacks walked behind and lashed them with whips. Three young men were hanged; the rest faced a terrible procedure. Thirty were tied up in twos and forced to their knees. One of the pair was ordered to tilt his head back, the other to tilt his head forward.

When the young men did this, they chopped off their necks and faces with sabers, saying:

Keep your head down! Raise your face higher!

With each blow, the crowd swayed in horror, and a sharp groan was heard. When all the couples were chopped up, the crowd was dispersed with whips.”

Agent report to the Special Counterintelligence Branch of the General Staff Department under the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia. November 1918:

“The basis for imposing an indemnity on the residents of the outskirts of the city of Maykop and cruel reprisals against them was for the general. Pokrovsky was inspired by rumors about the shooting of residents at the retreating troops of General Geiman on September 20 during the recapture of the city of Maikop by the Bolsheviks.

Upon examination of this issue, it was found that the fourth platoon of the officer company was the last to retreat from the city from the tannery (Nikolaevsky district), conducting a direct firefight with the chains of the enemy advancing from the eastern part of the city. Thus, in this case it is very difficult to establish the direct participation of residents of the Nikolaev region in the shooting at the troops of General Gaiman. The Pokrovsky district is so remote from the retreat route of the troops that physically, due to its location, it could not take part in the shelling of the troops, not excluding, of course, the possibility of isolated shootings during the start of the offensive on the city streets.

From the Trinity region, or rather, the so-called “Niza”, from the islands of the river and the banks, cases of shooting at fleeing residents of the city of Maikop crossing the river were established, but there were no killed or wounded. This to some extent indicates that the shooting was not intense and was random.

Before the Bolsheviks left Maikop, the outskirts were repeatedly subjected to general (Afipsky regiment of Voronov), individual (Eysky regiment of Abramov) searches. The outskirts were also searched after the occupation of Maykop by a detachment of General Gaiman. All this indicates that the population of the outskirts, as such, could not have weapons, and only individuals could have them. In addition, both the Bolsheviks and General Gaiman invited the population to surrender their existing weapons, which were demolished in significant quantities.

Meanwhile, when occupying the mountains. In the first days of Maikop, 2,500 Maikop inhabitants were killed directly after the occupation, a figure that General Pokrovsky himself announced at a public dinner.

Those to be executed lined up on their knees, the Cossacks, walking along the line, chopped off their heads and necks with sabers. There are many cases of execution of persons who were completely uninvolved in the Bolshevik movement. In some cases, even the certificate and petition of the institution did not help. For example, the petition of the teachers' council of a technical school for one worker and the teacher's institute for a student Sivokon.

Meanwhile, ordinary Cossacks mercilessly robbed the population of the outskirts, taking everything they could. The attached list of what the Cossacks took in the gardens (see Bozhkov’s testimony) and a copy of the complaint to the ataman of the region by the editor of the newspaper Rogachev sufficiently indicate the nature of the “searches” carried out by the Cossacks of the division of General. Pokrovsky.

The most terrible thing is that the searches were accompanied by widespread violence against women and girls. Even old women were not spared. The violence was accompanied by bullying and beatings. Randomly interviewed residents living at the end of Gogolevskaya Street, approximately two blocks down the street, testified about the rape of 17 people, including girls, one old woman and one pregnant woman (Ezerskaya’s testimony).

Violence was usually carried out “collectively” by several people alone. Two hold the legs, and the rest use it. A survey of people living on Polevaya Street confirms the massive nature of the violence. The number of victims in the city is believed to be in the hundreds.

It is interesting to note that the Cossacks, committing robberies and violence, were convinced of their rightness and impunity and said that “everything is allowed to them.”

From the memories of an emigrant. N.V. Voronovich. Between two fires // Archives of the Russian Revolution. T. 7. – Berlin, 1922:

“A peasant from the village of Izmailovka, Volchenko, who came running to Sochi, recounted even more nightmarish scenes that unfolded before his eyes during the occupation of Maykop by General Pokrovsky’s detachment.

Pokrovsky ordered the execution of all members of the local council and other prisoners who did not manage to escape from Maykop. To intimidate the population, the execution was public. At first it was planned to hang all those sentenced to death, but then it turned out that there were not enough gallows. Then the Cossacks, who had been feasting all night and were fairly tipsy, turned to the general with a request to allow them to chop off the heads of the convicts. The general allowed it. At the market, near the gallows on which the already executed Bolsheviks were hanging, several wooden blocks were placed, and the Cossacks, drunk with wine and blood, began to chop off the heads of the workers and Red Army soldiers with axes and swords. Very few were finished off immediately, but the majority of those executed after the first blow of the swords jumped up with gaping wounds on their heads, they were again thrown onto the block and began to be chopped a second time...

Volchenko, a young 25-year-old guy, became completely gray from his experience in Maykop.”

Monument to the victims of the Maykop massacre

From the memoirs of the white general, chief of staff of the 1st Army Volunteer Corps E.I. Dostavalov:

“The path of such generals as Wrangel, Kutepov, Pokrovsky is littered with those hanged and shot without any reason or trial... However, by general recognition in the army, General Pokrovsky was distinguished by the greatest bloodthirstiness.”

This is just one example of one small town captured by “their nobility” during the Civil War.

The civil war was full of atrocities on both sides, that’s why it’s a civil war.However, for some reason White still lost it. Why?Ask General Pokrovsky about this.

About Pokrovsky from his colleague:

“Pokrovsky moved the plastuns of both brigades to Nevinnomysskaya and captured it. From there I made a surprise raid on Temnolesskaya and took it. At the same time, a squadron of Reds was captured and some trophies were taken. General Pokrovsky, who arrived soon, ordered the hanging of all prisoners and even defectors. I had a clash with him about this, but he just laughed it off and laughed in response to my complaints. One day, when we were having breakfast, he suddenly opened the door to the courtyard, where several hanged people were already hanging on ropes. “This is to improve appetite,” he said.

Pokrovsky did not skimp on witticisms like: “nature loves man,” “the sight of a hanged man enlivens the landscape,” etc. This inhumanity of his, especially when applied extrajudicially, was disgusting to me. His favorite, the scoundrel and scoundrel Esaul Razderishin, tried in the role of an executioner to please the bloodthirsty instincts of his boss and corrupted the Cossacks, who were accustomed, in the end, not to value human life at all. This did not pass without a trace and was subsequently one of the reasons for the failure of the White movement.”

Shkuro A.G. "Notes of a White Partisan."

FIVE QUESTIONS ABOUT JUNE 1941

As Kozma Prutkov said, it is impossible to embrace the immensity. Especially in a sea of ​​information. Therefore, outside help in this matter will never be superfluous. So in November 2010, Oleg Kozinkin from the site “The Great Slandered War” told me that in VIZH in 1989 the answers of the generals who met the war on the western border of the USSR in June 1941 were published. There were five questions. They were asked by the head of the military-scientific department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky.

From his biography:

Alexander Petrovich Pokrovsky (1898 – 1979), born 10/21/1898 in Tambov. At the age of 17 he was drafted into the Russian Army, graduated from ensign school, served in reserve units and in the Novokievsky Infantry Regiment on the Western Front. In 1918 he joined the Red Army. During the Civil War he commanded a company, battalion and regiment. In 1926 he graduated from the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze, in 1932 – from the operational department of this academy, and in 1939 – from the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army. In between studies, he served in the headquarters of divisions and military districts. In 1935, he headed the headquarters of the 5th Rifle Corps, in 1938 he became deputy chief of staff of the Moscow Military District, and from October 1940 - adjutant, then adjutant general of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal Budyonny.

During the Great Patriotic War: Chief of Staff of the Main Command of the South-Western Direction (under Budyonny: July 10 - September 1941)). After Budyonny was removed and Timoshenko arrived there, he was appointed to the Northwestern Front as chief of staff of the 60th (from December 1941 - 3rd Shock) Army (October-December 1941), commanded by Purkaev. And from there he was transferred to the headquarters of the Western Front, where (later - on the Third Belorussian Front), he worked throughout the war. First in the role of chief of the operational department, then for some time as chief of staff of the 33rd Army, and then again in the operational department and deputy chief of staff of the front under Sokolovsky. And then (after Konev’s removal, when Sokolovsky became the front commander), he became the front’s chief of staff and remained in this position from the winter of ’43 until the end of the war.

After the war, chief of staff of the military district, since 1946 head of the Main Military Scientific Directorate - assistant chief of the General Staff, in 1946 - 1961 deputy chief of the General Staff.

At the headquarters of the 3rd Belorussian Front.
From left to right: Chief of Staff Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky,
front commander, Army General I. D. Chernyakhovsky,
Member of the Military Council, Lieutenant General V. E. Makarov
website: "The Great Patriotic War. Photos."

Moreover, General Pokrovsky asked his questions long before 1989 - about 40 years ago. And he received answers at the same time. However, they decided to publish them only at the end of the USSR. And then, they suspect, not all. But it took another 20 years before they began to be actively discussed on the Internet. In particular, on the site "The Great Slandered War". The questions and answers themselves were posted on it (http://liewar.ru/content/view/186/2/), as well as a commentary written by Oleg Kozinkin (http://liewar.ru/content/view/182/3) – so to speak, an attempt at comprehension and generalization. But an attempt with a clear bias in a certain direction is to find evidence that the top Soviet leadership acted correctly on the eve of the war. And the defeat of the summer of 1941 occurred due to the betrayal of some senior generals at the headquarters of the western districts. Although, not without the “help” of the general marshals from the General Staff. Moreover, some history buffs are actively trying to spread this hypothesis as widely as possible. Note: not professional historians, but amateurs. The professionals are silent. This is understandable - serious science must rely on serious documents. But the “defense plan” or “attack plan” signed personally by Stalin has not yet been found. And some of the published fragments allow for different interpretations. Here is one of the options that arose (“betrayal”). With an attempt to substantiate it with the very “answers” ​​to the “5 questions”.

Indeed, couldn’t the local performers have understood some commands “wrongly”? They could. Was there anything that prevented them from conspiring in a certain direction? How do accountants act now when faced with an incomprehensible situation? This includes calling another accountant for advice. And it is enough for the first one to indicate the wrong path, as if “the job is done” (in the wrong direction).

So on the topic of “the defeat of the summer of 1941.” the very fact of the existence of “Pokrovsky’s questions” from the General Staff seems to show that the General Staff issued the correct orders, but doubts arose about how timely they reached the executors and whether they were carried out correctly. On the one hand, the topic seems to make sense. But on the other hand, the situation looks strange.

To find out what orders the General Staff issued and when, it is enough to go to the archive once and make copies there. Instead of sending out letters and waiting for answers (and for several years). And how timely they were received and whether those orders were carried out correctly, it was necessary to find out during their execution. If the order is received on time and carried out correctly, the executor deserves gratitude and an order for a jacket. And if the order is not received; or received but not fulfilled; or received, but performed incorrectly (or incompletely), which led to losses of a certain severity, then there is no point in looking for the culprits after 10 years. If the culprit was not found and punished without delay, then what difference does it make?

Therefore, meaning is possible not only in the answers, but also in the very fact of the emergence of “5 questions”, which had the following form:

1. Has the plan for the defense of the state border been communicated to the troops, as far as they are concerned; when and what was done by the command and headquarters to ensure the implementation of this plan?

2. From what time and on the basis of what order did the covering troops begin to enter the state border and how many of them were deployed before the start of hostilities?

3. When was the order received to put troops on alert in connection with the expected attack by Nazi Germany on the morning of June 22...?

4. Why was most of the artillery located in training centers?

5. To what extent were the headquarters ready to control troops and to what extent did this affect the course of operations in the first days of the war?

And we can immediately say that the questions are strange.

Let's say the first one. Firstly, a “defense plan” cannot exist in one document. There should be a lot of them. And only a few people in the country’s top military-political leadership and among the top leadership of military districts should have known that they belonged to the “defense plan.” All other generals and officers receive specific orders. Whether they belong to the “defense plan” or not, the executors are not required to know. That is why there is a “military secret”. They will order the commander of the N regiment or division to prepare the defense in such and such a sector - so let him prepare in accordance with all the requirements of military science, which he managed to study and master earlier. And whether this order arose in connection with the situation or according to some old plan - let the General Staff sort it out. And is such an order required to have a reference to a more general “plan”?

Secondly, what does " communicated to the troops as far as they are concerned"? To what "troops"? Presumably - to headquarters? Which ones? Regiments, divisions, corps, armies, military districts? Or to the commanders of battalions, companies and platoons? Serious military plans at the strategic level are classified as secret. And not just " secret", but most likely: "top secret". And even "of special importance". But any secret document is sent not "just like that" (by regular mail), but according to certain rules of a specific "instruction". With careful consideration of each paper copy and where and when it was sent. Moreover, the names of secret documents cannot be publicly announced.

Under these conditions, a serious answer can only be obtained to a specific question. For example, like this: “Did you receive such and such a secret document (name) number such and such from such and such a date?” But in reality, any performer will just shrug his shoulders at him: they say, who are you to ask such questions? (Do you have clearance?) Secondly, if the document is secret, then go to the secret part of the office where this document was written, and look at the accompanying sheet, which indicates how many copies were published and to whom each was sent. What do I have to do with it?

Therefore, calling a set of little-known secret documents by some general name risks the fact that different people will understand its composition differently. Or there should already be a uniform description of this common name so that everyone understands it the same way. But this is only possible if the constituent documents are already declassified and known to those responsible. Moreover, they should be known even now – 40 years later. But if you consider that the concept of "defense plan of 1941" (and as part of it, the “plan for the defense of the state border”) is still not known in full, it is unlikely that those who responded understood it uniformly.

And in general, what does " state border defense plan"? Do you mean the now declassified "Plans for covering the border during mobilization..." (for each of the western military districts)? Or were there some other "defense plans"? Then why couldn't the first question be made more specifically? ( With the mention of “cover plans”)? And from here the assumption may arise that General Pokrovsky did not know anything about them (which is strange - he could not go to the archives of his own General Staff?). Or he knew, but for some reason did not want them mention. For what reason?

By the way, it is now discovered that those “cover” plans were in the development stage right up to June 22, 1941. Military units moved somewhere for some reason, and were stationed somewhere for some reason. But whether it was entirely in accordance with some yet-to-be-approved “cover plan” or whether that plan was “adjusted” to the actual deployment according to some other plans is not known. As it now turns out, the “cover plans” were not approved by 06/22/1941 and there was no specific order to begin their implementation.

If we are talking about “cover-up” plans, then intelligible answers could be obtained from the former chiefs of the former district headquarters. At other headquarters, the “troops” could only know about individual orders. But were they part of the “defense” plan - who knows? Maybe they were. But whether they turned out to be correct in connection with an enemy attack is another topic.

Therefore, you can immediately notice that the answers to an incorrectly posed question should be “vague” to varying degrees (“- Was there a defense plan?”, “- What defense plan?”, “- Yes, we received some orders.” , “-According to the cover plan? Something was being done,” etc.).

The second question also looks strange. Since it uses the term “cover troops,” a suspicion may arise that General Pokrovsky heard something about “cover plans.” But why didn't he mention them in the first question? But if there were such plans (under which those “troops” were formed), then it was probably necessary to voice quotes from the plans that talked about exits to the border. In addition, “deployment” is generally associated with the announcement of mobilization either in the country or in individual localities. And this is already the prerogative of the “center”, and not the “troops on the ground”.

The third question is no less strange than the first two. If the “defense plan” really existed and began to be implemented on time, then by 1950 this would have long been known and would have been studied in all educational institutions, starting from school. And since it was given, it means that for some reason they did not have time to put the troops on combat readiness in time. And then another assumption arises, that the “defense plan” was somehow incorrect.

The fourth question is even stranger. If the “defense plan” existed and began to be implemented on time, then why questions about deployment, which are the competence of the “center”? Where else should the artillery be located?

The fifth question makes sense to some extent, but one can immediately assume that if before the attack on June 22, 1941, the “defense plan” was carried out incorrectly, then what difference does it make how fully the headquarters were ready to control the troops?

* * *

If you start to read the answers of the generals, you will notice that to the first question They all answer the same way - that there was no serious “Defense Plan”. Accordingly, there was nothing to “ensure compliance” in this case. Some orders were received, but whether it was really within the framework of the ongoing “defense plan” or for some other reasons is unknown to those responsible. For example, Lieutenant General P.P. wrote about this openly. Sobennikov, former commander of the 8th Army PribOVO, (VIZH No. 3, 1989):

“I was appointed commander in March 1941. The position obligated me, first of all, to familiarize myself with the plan for the defense of the state border in order to understand the place and role of the army in the general plan. But unfortunately, neither at the General Staff, nor upon arrival in Riga at the headquarters of the PribOVO I was not informed about the existence of such a plan.In the documents of the army headquarters, which was located in Jelgava, I also did not find any instructions on this issue.

I get the impression that it is unlikely that such a plan existed at that time (March 1941). Only on May 28, 1941, I was summoned with the Chief of Staff, Major General G.A. Larionov and a member of the military council, divisional commissar S.I. Shabalov to the district headquarters, where the commander of the troops, Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov hastily briefed us on the defense plan. Here on this day I met the commanders of the 11th and 27th armies, Lieutenant General V.I. Morozov and Major General N.E. Berzarin, as well as the chiefs of staff and members of the military councils of these armies.

The commander of the district troops received us separately and, apparently, gave similar instructions - to urgently familiarize ourselves with the defense plan, make and report a decision to him.

All this happened in a great hurry and in a somewhat nervous atmosphere. The plan was received for review and study by the chief of staff. It was a rather voluminous, thick notebook, typed.

About 1.5-2 hours after receiving the plan, without even having time to familiarize myself with it, I was called to see Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov, who received me in a darkened room and dictated my decision face to face….

The commander of the 11th Army, who was received by Colonel General Kuznetsov first, was in a position similar to mine.

My records, as well as those of the chief of staff, were taken away. We received orders to leave for our duty station. At the same time, we were promised that instructions for drawing up a defense plan and our workbooks would be immediately sent to army headquarters. Unfortunately, we did not receive any orders or even our workbooks.

Thus, the defense plan was not communicated to the troops. However, the formations stationed on the border (10th, 125th, and from the spring of 1941, 90th rifle divisions) were engaged in preparing field fortifications on the border in the areas of fortified areas being built (Telshai and Siauliai), and were practically oriented towards their tasks and areas of defense. Possible options for action were played out during field trips (April-May 1941), as well as during training sessions with troops.

(The date of the document is not available.)"

Interesting confession!

General P.P. Sobennikov openly reports that there was no defense plan. But there was some other plan, which was kept a big secret. And it is quite logical that he was initiated into some small part of that plan at the end of May 1941. It is known that on May 24, Stalin held a meeting in the Kremlin with the commanders of the western districts. And it is quite logical that military plans for the near future should have been discussed there. While the commanders returned to their districts, while they wrote up the relevant documents, while they called their commanders, May 28 arrived.

Another example answer:

"Lieutenant General I.P. Shlemin (former chief of staff of the 11th Army). I have not seen such a document where the tasks of the 11th Army were outlined. In the spring of 1941, there was an operational game at the district headquarters, where each of the participants performed duties according to the position held. It seems that at this lesson the main issues of the state border defense plan were studied. After that, defensive lines were studied on the ground with the division commanders and their headquarters (5, 33, 28 Infantry Division). The basic requirements and their preparation were communicated to the troops. A reconnaissance of the area was carried out with the headquarters of divisions and regiments in order to select defense lines and their equipment. It seems that these decisions were communicated to subordinate commanders and headquarters. They prepared the defense with their own forces and means.

The former chief of staff of the 11th put it more diplomatically - “I think the issues were studied,” “I think these decisions were discussed…”. And if his hints are clarified, the conclusion is the following: there was no normal defense plan! Nobody saw him! Only “something was discussed” and some “frontiers” were studied. Possibly also defense. And perhaps as a starting area for an offensive.

Another example answer:

"Lieutenant General M.S. Shumilov (former commander of the 11th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army). The plan for the defense of the state border was not communicated to headquarters and me. The corps was planned to carry out separate tasks for field filling in the new fortified area under construction and in strip of the supposed forefield. These works were not completely completed by the beginning of the war, therefore, apparently, the decision was made for the corps to take up defense along the eastern bank of the Jura River, i.e. on the line of the fortified area under construction, and in the trenches of the forefield it was ordered to leave only a company from shelf.

(No date of compilation)."

And the former commander of the 28th Rifle Corps of the 4th Army of the ZapOVO, General Popov, answered briefly:

“The state border defense plan was not communicated to me, as the commander of the 28th Rifle Corps.

Etc. (similar).

So, before June 22, 1941, the troops either knew nothing about the “defense plan” or managed to receive some hints (and then at the level of army command). Accordingly, they were unable to do anything concrete to ensure its implementation. If you don’t know what to do, how can you ensure it?

But some orders were received and some measures were carried out, according to which the generals in the troops guessed that hostilities could soon begin. Example:

"Colonel A.S. Kislitsyn (former chief of staff of the 22nd Tank Division of the 14th Mechanized Corps). Around March - April 1941, the division commander, I, the head of the operational department and communications were called to the headquarters of the 4th Army (G Kobrin).

Within 2-3 days, we developed a plan for raising the division on combat alert, which included documents such as an order to march to the concentration area, radio and telephone communication diagrams, and instructions to the division duty officer in case of a combat alert. There were no plans to strengthen the division.

It was strictly forbidden to familiarize even commanders of regiments and divisional units with the contents of the developed documents. In addition, the installation of observation and command posts in the area where the formation was concentrated was not allowed, although this issue was raised by signalmen.

Or the answer of the former chief of staff of the 10th Army of the ZapOVO, Lieutenant General P.I. Lyapina:

“We repeatedly redid the 1941 state border defense plan from January until the very beginning of the war, but we never finished it. The last change to the operational directive of the district was received by me on May 14 in Minsk. It ordered the development of the plan to be completed by May 20 and submitted for approval to headquarters Zapovo. On May 20, I reported: “The plan is ready, approval is required from the commander of the district troops in order to begin developing executive documents." But the call did not arrive until the start of the war. In addition, the last report of May (shows that) the army was carrying out there are many training events, such as field trips, methodological training of command staff, etc. Therefore, no one could take up the development of executive documents on the state border defense plan. In addition, my deputy for logistics at the beginning of June brought a new directive on material support, which required significant revision of the entire plan...”

"...The presence of these documents fully ensured that the formations would carry out their assigned tasks. However, all orders of the ZaPOVO headquarters were aimed at creating a complacent atmosphere in the minds of their subordinates. "Bagpipes" with the approval of the state border defense plan we developed, on the one hand, is a clear preparation of the enemy to take decisive action, of which we were informed in detail through the intelligence agencies, - on the other hand, they completely disoriented us and set us up not to attach serious importance to the developing situation.

(The date of the document is missing)"

Here is another confirmation that the Soviet General Staff was not involved in preparing defense. And the People's Commissariat of Defense too. Together with the political commanders in chief. They were not interested in this task. “We didn’t see it point blank.”

Although, there are testimonies of two generals who seem to have clearly confirmed that there was supposedly a “defense plan” and that it was “disclosed to the troops” - the former chief of staff of the Kyiv OVO, General Purkaev, and his former subordinate, Marshal Bagramyan, wrote about this.

"Army General M.A. Purkaev (former chief of staff of the Kiev Special Military District). The plan for the defense of the state border was brought to the attention of the troops. Its development was carried out in April by the chief of staff of the district, the operational department and the commanders of the armies and operational groups of their headquarters. In the first ten days May, the army plans were approved by the military council of the district and transferred to the army headquarters.The army plans were developed according to administrative documents before the formations.

Their commanders and chiefs of staff were familiarized with the documents of the formations at the army headquarters, after which they were transferred to the chiefs of staff for storage in sealed packages until approximately June 1.

All units and formation headquarters had alert plans. The state border defense plan was to be put into action by a telegram from the military council of the district (with three signatures) addressed to the army commanders and the commander of the cavalry corps (commander of the 5th Cavalry Corps, Major General F.M. Kamkov V.K.). in formations and units, the action plan was to be carried out according to conditional telegrams from the military councils of the armies and the commander of the cavalry corps announcing the alarm.

Excuse me, but what should the official responsible for developing the plans have answered?

Why didn't he deal with them?

Write a “report” on yourself?

So he wrote that some plans (“border defense”) were “naturally” developed for units located there on orders from the General Staff. But before the start of the war, they never began to be implemented. In addition, emergency rise plans were developed (an obligation for ANY unit, regardless of further plans). But whether the pre-war deployment of those units corresponded specifically to the task of defense against a specific attack by the German Wehrmacht - General Purkaev wrote nothing about this.

And here is the result of such planning:

"Major General G.I. Sherstyuk (former commander of the 45th Rifle Division of the 15th Rifle Corps). Plan for the defense of the state border from the headquarters of the 15th Rifle Corps and the 5th Army before me, as commander of the 45th Rifle Division , was never brought up by anyone, and the combat operations of the division (I) deployed according to the indicative plan developed by me and the chief of staff, Colonel Chumakov, and communicated to the commanders of units, battalions and divisions.

There was no defense plan! Did not have! - Again and again! If there was something, then something on some other topic.

"Major General S.F. Gorokhov (former chief of staff of the 99th Rifle Division of the 8th Rifle Corps of the 26th Army). The state border defense plan was received in February-March 1941 at the headquarters of the 26th Army in a sealed envelope and was not worked out with us. But even before it was handed over, the army commander, Lieutenant General F.Ya. Kostenko, personally and the division commander, Colonel N.I. Dementyev, informed me and the division commander, Colonel N.I. Dementyev, about the demarcation lines of the formation and regiments’ defense sector, the location of command and observation posts, and firing positions artillery In addition, a special order ordered the division to prepare the foothills of the Przemysl fortified area and dig trenches in its zone.

The headquarters of the division and border detachment developed a plan for covering the state border according to two options - in case of sabotage and possible war.

This is another confirmation that the defense plan was not specifically discussed. But some plans about something existed “in sealed form.”

Marshal Rokossovsky wrote in his response that while he served in the early 30s in Transbaikalia, there “There was a clearly developed plan for covering and deploying the main forces” and “it changed in accordance with changes in the general situation in a given theater.” And then he tactfully writes that “in the Kiev Special Military District, in my opinion, this was lacking.” And in the “restored” parts of his memoirs this is spoken of more openly: “In any case, if there was any plan, it clearly did not correspond to the situation that had developed at the beginning of the war, which resulted in a heavy defeat for our troops in the initial period of war."

There was no defense plan! Did not have! Did not have!– The generals and colonels who served in the Western OVO by June 22, 1941 explain in unison.

And if there was something, it did not actively and seriously concern the preparation of defense specifically.

* * *

Pokrovsky’s second question:

2. From what time and on the basis of what order did the covering troops begin to enter the state border and how many of them were deployed before the start of hostilities?

So, there were no “defense plans”. There were some “state border defense plans.” And then, mostly in the development stage. In addition, some activities were carried out as part of combat training. And some orders were received to move troops closer to the western border. In accordance with what plan is not really known. It is possible that on the “borders of defense”. But, for example, the IMM theory requires the creation of defensive strongholds deep in one’s territory in the directions of possible enemy attacks. At ranges of up to 100 km in order to have time to maneuver reserves. And for this, the General Staff must predict them in advance based on intelligence information. As part of a more general "defense plan". And it is important not only to draw it up “just in case,” but in conditions of threat (as was the case in the spring of 1941 and early summer of 1941) to actually begin to implement it. But for this you need an order from the People's Commissar (at a minimum).

However (as it turned out above), it has not yet been found. Although there were some plans and they apparently began to be implemented. Incl. some military units moved to the border on special orders from Moscow. But it is not known how adequate their “defense lines” were to the situation of a German attack. Therefore, the question remains: for what purpose did they begin to move towards the border under the guise of “exercises”. But first, it is useful to familiarize yourself with the answers of the generals.

Answers from generals from the former PribOVO:

"Colonel General P.P. Poluboyarov (former chief of the district's armored forces). On June 16 at 11 p.m., the command of the 12th Mechanized Corps received a directive to put the unit on combat readiness. The corps commander, Major General N.M. Shestopalov, was informed about this at 23:00 on June 17 upon his arrival from the 202nd Motorized Division, where he was checking mobilization readiness. On June 18, the corps commander raised formations and units on combat alert and ordered them to be withdrawn to the planned areas. During June 19 and 20, this was done .

On June 16, by order of the district headquarters, the 3rd Mechanized Corps (commander Major General of Tank Forces A.V. Kurkin) was also put on combat readiness, which concentrated in the specified area at the same time.

1953."

"Lieutenant General I.P. Shlemin (former chief of staff of the 11th Army). I don’t remember any order on the withdrawal of troops to the state border. Apparently, there was none, since the 28th and 33rd rifle divisions were in close proximity to it, and the 5th was in the camp (30-35 km from the border).

In the second half of June, under the pretext of going to a field camp in the Kovno region, the 23rd Infantry Division from Dvinsk concentrated.

In June, between the 18th and 20th, the commanders of the border units turned to the army headquarters with a request to provide them with assistance in the fight against saboteurs penetrating into the territory of Lithuania. In this regard, a decision was made, under the guise of tactical exercises, for the divisions to take up defensive positions in their sectors and issue ammunition to the soldiers? which, however, the commander of the district troops ordered to be taken away and delivered to divisional warehouses.

Thus, by June 20, three rifle divisions took up defensive positions with the task of firmly holding their positions in the event of an enemy attack.

"Lieutenant General P.P. Sobennikov (former commander of the 8th Army). On the morning of June 18, 1941, I and the chief of staff of the army went to the border zone to check the progress of defensive work in the Siauliai fortified area. Near Siauliai, I was overtaken by a passenger car, which soon stopped. Colonel-General F.I. Kuznetsov (commander of PribOVO) got out of it. I also got out of the car and approached him. F.I. Kuznetsov took me aside and excitedly reported that some Germans had concentrated in Suwalki mechanized units. He ordered me to immediately withdraw the formations to the border, and by the morning of June 19 to place the army headquarters at a command post 12 km southwest of Siauliai.

The commander of the district troops decided to go to Taurage (about 25 km from the border) and put Major General M.S.’s 11th Rifle Corps there on combat readiness. Shumilov, and ordered me to go to the right flank of the army. Chief of Army Staff Major General G.A. We sent Larionov back to Jelgava. He received the task of leading the headquarters to the command post.

By the end of the day, verbal orders were given to concentrate troops on the border. On the morning of June 19, I personally checked the progress of the order. Units of the 10th, 90th and 125th Infantry Divisions occupied trenches and wood-earth firing points (bunkers), although many structures were not yet completely ready. On the night of June 19, units of the 12th Mechanized Corps were withdrawn to the Siauliai area, and at the same time the army headquarters arrived at the command post.

It should be noted that no one received any written orders to deploy formations. Everything was carried out on the basis of an oral order from the commander of the district troops. Subsequently, contradictory instructions began to be received by telephone and telegraph about the construction of detectors, mining, and so on. It was difficult to understand them. They were cancelled, reconfirmed and cancelled. On the night of June 22, I personally received an order from the district chief of staff, Lieutenant General P.S. Klenov to withdraw troops from the border. In general, great nervousness and fear of provoking war were felt everywhere and, as a result, inconsistency in actions arose.

1953"

Answers from generals from the former KOVO.

"Major General P.I. Abramidze (former commander of the 72nd Mountain Rifle Division of the 26th Army). Two rifle regiments (187 and 14 joint ventures) of the division were located near the state border since August 1940.

On June 20, 1941, I received the following encrypted message from the General Staff: “All units and units of your formation located on the border itself are to be withdrawn several kilometers back, that is, to the line of prepared positions. Do not respond to any provocations from German units until such "will not violate the state border. All units of the division must be put on combat readiness. The execution must be carried out by 24 hours on June 21, 1941."

Exactly at the specified time, I reported by telegraph that the order had been carried out. The report was attended by the commander of the 26th Army, Lieutenant General F.Ya. Kostenko, who was entrusted with checking the execution. It is difficult to say for what reasons the occupation of defensive positions was not allowed, but the enemy took advantage of this at the beginning of hostilities.

The remaining units and special units of the formation began to cover the state border upon receiving a signal to open the package with the mobilization plan.

Answer from the commander of the 135th Infantry Division, General Smekhotvorov:

"Colonel General comrade Pokrovsky A.P.

I report:

... Before the start of hostilities, units of the 135th division of the state. the border was not withdrawn and no such order was received. On June 18, 1941, the 135th division set out from the permanent quartering area - Ostrog, Dubno, Kremets and by the end of June 22, 1941, arrived in Kivertsy (10-12 kilometers northeast of Lutsk) for the purpose of undergoing camp training, according to order of the commander of the 5th Army, Major General Potapov. ..."

Answer from the former chief of staff of the 62nd Infantry Division of the 15th Infantry Division of the 5th Army, Colonel P.A. Novichkova (the one in whose place Smehotvorov’s 135th Infantry Division was nominated):

“Units of the division, on the basis of an order from army headquarters, set out from the Kivertsy camp on the night of June 16-17. Having made two night marches, they entered the defense zone by the morning of June 18. However, they did not occupy defensive lines, but concentrated in forests and settlements near it These actions were taken under the guise of moving to a new location, where they began to deploy combat training.

On June 19, the unit commanders conducted a reconnaissance of the defense areas, but all this was done with uncertainty; it was not thought that war would break out soon. We did not believe that we were going to fight, and we took everything unnecessary for the battle. As a result, we overloaded our automobile and horse transport with excess property.”

(Document date not available)

So, from the generals’ answers to Pokrovsky’s second question, we can conclude that after June 15, various orders began to arise in the western districts for the redeployment of a number of units and formations towards the border. But the task of preparing defense was not specifically set; no serious defensive measures were taken. The task of conducting exercises was mentioned more often. This is from the answers to the first part of the question. To the second, specific answers could hardly be obtained. What does it mean “how many... were deployed before the start of hostilities?” Quantity of what? Divisions? Those. how many regiments? Army? Those. how many divisions are there? Or buildings? How important is it? In reality, without a map it is impossible to understand anything in comparison with the enemy’s dislocation. And without reference to the “defense plan” (which was never found). Which is exactly what happened.

* * *

Pokrovsky's third question:

3. When the order was received to put troops on alert in connection with the expected attack by Nazi Germany on the morning of June 22; what and when were the instructions given to carry out this order and what was done by the troops?

There are few answers to this.

For example, the response of the commander of the 135th KOVO KOVO Rifle Division, General Smekhotvorov:

"Colonel General comrade Pokrovsky A.P.
To your No. 679030 dated January 14, 1953.
I report:

... There was no order to bring the 135th Rifle Division units into combat readiness before the start of hostilities, and when the division on the march on the morning of June 22 was subjected to machine-gun fire by German planes, the 5 A headquarters received an order: “Don’t give in to provocation, don’t shoot at the planes.”

The order to put on combat readiness and to implement the mobilization plan came only on the morning of June 23, 1941, when units of the division were in Kivertsy, 100-150 kilometers from the permanent cantonment points."

(TsAMO, f. 15, op. 1786, d. 50, box 22099, pp. 79-86).

Answer from Lieutenant General G.V. Revunenko, Chief of Staff of the 37th Infantry Division of the 3rd Army of the Zapovo Military District:

“On June 17, 1941, I, the commander of the 1st Rifle Corps, Major General F.D. Rubtsov, and the division commander, Colonel A.E. Chekharia, were summoned to the district headquarters. We were told that the 37th Rifle Division should leave for a field camp near Lida , although it was clear that the redeployment was carried out in terms of deploying troops on the state border... They were ordered to have everything with them for life in the camp.

Two regiments set out from Lepel in marching order, and parts of the Vitebsk garrison were sent by rail. The echelons were drawn up for ease of transportation, so the division headquarters followed without a communications battalion, and the ammunition was in the final echelon.

We learned about the beginning of the war at 12 o’clock on June 22 at Bogdanow station from a speech by V.M. Molotov. At that time, units of the division were still moving forward, there was no contact with them, neither the commander nor the headquarters knew the situation.

"Major General S.F. Gorokhov (former chief of staff of the 99th Infantry Division of the 26th Army). Before the start of hostilities, there was no order for units to enter the defense sectors. Only artillery regiments, by order of the commander of the 8th Rifle Corps, General Major M.G. Snegov were advanced into the forests near the planned firing positions. At the moment of the outbreak of hostilities, he gave conflicting orders: the rifle regiments should take defensive lines, and the artillery regiments should not open fire until further notice. Despite our insistent demands, until 10 o'clock On June 22, there was still no permission to use artillery.

"Major General N.P. Ivanov (former chief of staff of the 6th Army). At the time of a sudden enemy attack, artillerymen, machine gunners, and sappers were assembled. Because of this, the formations were organizationally fragmented. Some of the troops were located in camps, having permanent deployment of weapons and materiel.

By order of the commander of the KOVO troops, covering units were prohibited from moving to the border.

"From the journal of combat operations of the troops of the Western Front for June 1941 on the grouping and position of the front troops at the beginning of the war1

June 22, 1941 At about one o'clock in the morning an encrypted message was received from Moscow with an order to immediately put troops on combat readiness in case of a German attack expected in the morning

At approximately 2:00 - 2:30 a.m., a similar order was issued to the armies in code; units of the fortified areas were ordered to immediately occupy the fortified areas. At the signal "Thunderstorm" the action "Red Package" was introduced, containing a plan for covering the state border.

The encryption of the district headquarters by the army headquarters was received, as it turned out, too late; the 3rd and 4th Armies managed to decipher the orders and make some instructions, and the 10th Army deciphered the warning after the start of hostilities.

The troops were pulled up to the border in accordance with the instructions of the General Staff of the Red Army.

No written orders or instructions were given to the corps and divisions.

Division commanders received instructions orally from the district chief of staff, Major General Klimovskikh. It was explained to the personnel that they were going on a large exercise. The troops took with them all training equipment (devices, targets, etc.)
.....

Deputy Chief of Staff of the Western Front
Lieutenant General Malandin
....."

(F. 208, op. 355802s, d. 1, pp. 4-10.)

Answer from Major General B.A. Fomin, former deputy. Head of the Operations Department of the ZapOVO headquarters:

“The divisions began redeployment to the border areas in marching order in April-May 1941. Mechanized artillery and NZ warehouses were transported by rail. The following formations were moved: 85th Infantry Division - to areas west of Grodno, 21st Infantry Division - from Vitebsk north- west and north of Lida, 49th and 113th rifle divisions - west of Belovezhskaya Pushcha, 75th - from Mozyr to the Malorita area, 42nd - from Bereza-Kartuzskaya to Brest and to the north.

In mid-June, the 47th Infantry Division was ordered to move by rail to the Obuz-Lesny area by June 21-23. At the same time, the 55th (Slutsk), 121st (Bobruisk), 143rd (Gomel) regiments with a combined march proceeded there, and the 50th regiment from Vitebsk to the Gainovka region.

Before the start of hostilities, troops were prohibited from taking up defensive positions in their zones along the state border. By the beginning of the air strike (at 3:50 a.m. on June 22) and artillery barrage (at 4 a.m. on June 22) the enemy managed to turn around and take up the defense of the state border: in the 3rd Army - the command of the 4th infantry, 27th and 56th infantry divisions; in the 10th - control of 1 and 5 sk, 2, 8, 13 and 86 sd; in the 4th - 6 and 75 rifle divisions. In the process of advancement they were attacked: in the 3rd Army - 85 Infantry Division, in the 4th Army - 42 Infantry Division.

"What is the question, is the answer." Until now, only one General Staff document is known, which clearly mentions the threat of a German attack - “Directive No. 1”, which was sent to the district headquarters on the night of June 21-22, 1941. In this regard, if they managed to send it to the “troops” order to rise on combat alert, then at the very moment the war began. Or after it. Hence the logical conclusion: a German attack was not expected until the morning of June 22, 1941. As the logical conclusion of all pre-war policy: there were no “defense plans”. Timely orders to carry out defensive measures too. Nobody believed in a German attack. Which the generals confirmed with their answers.

This is also confirmed by Pokrovsky’s fourth question:

* * *

4. Why was most of the artillery located in training centers?

But the generals’ answers to it are not given in VIZH.
"Why", "why"? Moscow ordered through district headquarters!
A completely logical event during the planned preparation of military operations.
But not defense against an unexpected attack.

* * *

Pokrovsky’s 5th question was not discussed on the “slander” website:

5. To what extent were the headquarters ready to control troops and to what extent did this affect the course of operations in the first days of the war?

If the rest was not ready, then what kind of successful work of the headquarters could we talk about?

* * *

The question may arise: within the framework of what theory could the actions of the Red Army before June 22, 1941 turn out to be correct and logical? As a study of Soviet sources from the 30s shows, this can only be the preparation of a “maneuver” according to the theory of MW (motorized mechanized warfare). Moreover, it was an offensive maneuver.

There is even a specific article in the magazine "Military Thought" number 3 for 1941 "OPERATIONAL SURPRISE" (author - Colonel A.I. STARUNIN) (), in which the only reason for these particular actions is explained simply (p. 33):

"Ensuring sudden maneuver in modern conditions

The main obstacle to a sudden operational maneuver is aviation. Naturally, with the decisive superiority of aviation, as was the case, for example, on the German side during the German-Polish War, operational surprise can be achieved relatively easily on any sector of the front. With equal forces in aviation and motorized mechanized troops, achieving surprise is much more difficult.

Without dwelling on the actions of aviation, we will consider ensuring the surprise of maneuver of ground troops. Taking into account the possible actions of enemy aviation reconnaissance, every commander of a large combined arms formation, especially an army, must prepare in advance for counteraction and find all the ways and means to “hide” his planned maneuver from enemy aviation, at least for a certain time. The success of this will largely depend on the training of troops in peacetime. The concentration of large military formations (and even more so armies) in the desired area, unnoticed by the enemy, must be carried out dispersedly. The rifle division will be forced to move to the concentration area in small-depth columns on a wide front and, as a rule, at night time. Naturally, such a maneuver will require significant effort and appropriate training of forces in peacetime."

At night it is necessary to move divisions to the place of concentration to perform maneuvers in a motorized mechanized war! What is it (a “maneuver”)? Let me clarify: the troops are going on the offensive. There cannot be any other understanding. For defense, you don’t have to move at night. If you have time, during the day is enough. And by inviting correspondents from all accredited newspapers along these paths. To the accompaniment of orchestras and slogans: “We are going to defend our country!” And with various demarches of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with an appeal to the entire world community. Let the preparing adversary think about how much blood he will have to spend if he decides to attack!

But it makes sense to secretly move troops to the border at night in preparation for an offensive.
The main thing is to have time to concentrate. For if it fails and the enemy strikes earlier, then great confusion and disruption of the entire plan may occur (which most likely happened in the summer of 1941).

As for Oleg Kozinkin’s comment on the “slander” website, in order to agree with him, you will also have to agree with the fact that in the USSR by June 1941 there were THREE separate pairs of the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff.

1. Firstly, there had to be a “correct” General Staff and the People’s Commissariat of Defense, which saw the threat of a German attack and prepared troops in time to repel it. In particular, already in advance on June 13-18, the correct orders were sent to the western districts to urgently bring troops to combat readiness. Here are some thoughts that Oleg Kozinkin confirms this hypothesis:

".... So maybe there was no “initiative” at all in PribOVO (especially in Odessa)? And Kuznetsov just carried out orders from the General Staff, but didn’t convey these orders to his subordinates? Yes, and he did it these orders of NPOs and General Staff dated June 13-18 so with his chief of staff, Klenov, that they caused complete chaos in the district’s troops. That is, in the case of verification from Moscow - like the order of the General Staff of June 18 about bringing to the city. performed. But in fact, the troops operate in the “come here - stay there” mode. And in much the same way, they withdrew troops from the depths of the districts to the border on the same days, under the guise of “exercises.” Without leading to the command of armies, that Moscow’s order (Directive of NGOs and the General Staff of June 13) is clear- “deliver to the areas provided for in the cover plan” and this means that there is no need to take any “targets”.

.....

And Abramidze’s border division began to reach its defense lines precisely after it received a “special order from the People’s Commissar,” after Abramidze received this order on June 20. And most likely, Abramidze’s answer is about order of the General Staff of June 18, the existence of which is strongly denied by skeptics and “official” historians..."

2. But at the same time there had to be a couple of “wrong” General Staff and the People’s Commissariat of Defense, which, even if they saw the threat of a German attack, did their best to sabotage the task of preparing the Red Army to repel it. According to Oleg Kozinkin, this is especially clearly seen in the example of sabotage of sending “Directive No. 1” to the districts:

"... After the evening of June 21 in Stalin's office a decision was made to bring all troops of the western districts to full combat readiness, at 22.20 a direct order was signed to put them on combat readiness. "Directive No. 1" was signed. After which the districts were to it is already open to raise troops on combat alert, and after that the next stage of deliberate sabotage on the part of the generals in bringing this directive to the troops of the western districts. And the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR S.K. is directly involved in this. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, and also possibly the head of the operational department of the General Staff G.K. Malandin (in the districts, the district commands were already involved in disrupting the communication of “Directive No. 1” to the troops).

These three did everything possible to “immediately” send Directive No. 1 to the western districts and did it so “quickly” that it was sent from the General Staff only around and after 1.00 am. Those. almost 2.5 hours after it was signed in Stalin’s office!!!"

3. In addition, there should have been a third pair of “wrong” General Staff and the People’s Commissariat of Defense, which did not see the need to prepare defense on their territory. And instead, they were doing some kind of nonsense: they tried to prepare some kind of “counterattack,” apparently guided by the consideration: that the best defense is an offensive!

" 3) Now, when analyzing the events that took place, it became clear that individual employees of the General Staff, knowing that in the first period of the war, superiority in real forces would be on the side of Germany, for some reason they carried out and developed mainly offensive operations and only recently (in at the end of May 1941) carried out a game to cover the border, whereas it was necessary to develop defensive operations for the first period of the war, taking into account the surprise of the attack."

....

And this is a direct accusation of the General Staff that instead of the active defense provided for in the “Considerations …” from Shaposhnikov of October 1940, the General Staff, i.e. Zhukov and company launched an all-out immediate counter-offensive along the entire front against the invading enemy. And maybe in May they “played a game to cover the border,” but in reality, Zhukov and Timoshenko tried to organize a general offensive in the very first days of the War. And the general deployment of troops and warehouses was supposed to “contribute” to just this. ...."

But the number of saboteurs does not end there. It turns out (according to Oleg Kozinkin) that the correct commands from the General Staff and NGOs (you just need to clarify: from which “pair”) were also in no hurry to carry out the correct commands on the “locations”. Generals at district headquarters showed particular “zeal” in “slowing down.”

As a result, lower-level officers and generals could not clearly understand the situation and were forced to take the initiative at their own “peril and risk” (?). Or don't show it.

This is the result of the “debacle”.

Perhaps this “logic” makes some sense. (If we agree that in the USSR before June 22, 1941, there were THREE “NKO-General Staff” pairs).

But Oleg Kozinkin does not insist on his interpretation. He ends his “research” with a clarification:

".... Documents are shown, memoirs are sorted out, “testimonies” are presented. And the reader can only draw his own conclusion - were the troops of the western districts put on combat readiness a few days before June 22 or not? And if they were, then why were never brought into reality? And after this, only one question will remain - who is to blame for the fact that the bringing of troops on the border to combat readiness before June 22 did not take place, or rather, it was disrupted, and by whom?

Without in any way claiming to be the “ultimate truth”, I would still like for possible opponents to draw their conclusions based specifically on documents, memoirs and testimonies... Take these documents, memoirs and testimonies, find new ones and draw the opposite conclusion - I will be glad if possible. But do not forget that the “verdict” in a dispute of “conclusions” will be made by the reader…. This work is not a “version” or a “hypothesis that explains everything.” This is the analysis and analysis of existing, published and completely accessible materials. So read, analyze and draw your own conclusion... And choose - whose truth is true.

08/17/2010."

So read, analyze and draw a conclusion for yourself (how many “NPO-General Staff” pairs were there, eh?. Maybe not even three, but more?)....

Commander of the troops of the Kuban region

Pokrovsky Viktor Leonidovich (1889-1922) - Lieutenant General. He graduated from the Pavlovsk Military School and the Sevastopol Aviation School. Participant First World War , military pilot. Knight of St. George. In 1917 - staff captain and commander of the 12th Army Aviation Detachment in Riga. After the October Revolution, he formed the 2nd Volunteer Detachment in Kuban. After initial successes, he was forced to leave Yekaterinodar on March 1, 1918. Appointed by the Kuban Rada as commander of the troops of the Kuban region and promoted to colonel, and then to major general. He commanded the Kuban Army, which went on the Ice Campaign, until it united with the Volunteer Army in the village of Shendzhiy. In the Volunteer Army - commander of a cavalry brigade and division. IN WSUR - commander of the 1st Kuban Cossack Corps as part of the Caucasian Army of General Wrangel. For the capture of Kamyshin by the general Denikin was promoted to lieutenant general. From November 1919 to February 1920 - commander of the Caucasian Army (after General Wrangel ). In the Russian Army, General Wrangel was not appointed to a command position and emigrated in April 1920. General V.L. Pokrovsky was killed by terrorists on November 9, 1922 in Kyustendil (Bulgaria).

Materials used from the book: Nikolai Rutych Biographical reference book of the highest ranks of the Volunteer Army and the Armed Forces of the South of Russia. Materials on the history of the White movement M., 2002

Commander of a group of troops

Pokrovsky Viktor Leonidovich (1889-09.11.1922). Staff captain (1917). Colonel (01/24/1918) and Major General (03/01/1918) - both ranks were awarded by decision of the Kuban Rada. Lieutenant General (04/04/1919, promoted to General Denikin). He graduated from the Odessa Cadet Corps (1906), the Pavlovsk Military School (1909) and the Sevastopol Aviation School. Participant in the First World War: captain in the 1st Grenadier Regiment; military pilot - squadron commander and commander of the 12th air squadron in Riga, 1914-1917. In the White movement: on behalf of the Kuban Rada, he formed the 2nd volunteer detachment (Kuban Army) with about 3,000 soldiers, 01-03.1918. The first small detachment of Pokrovsky (about 300 Cossack soldiers) in battles with the red units inflicted (01/21 - 23/1918) a severe defeat on them near Enem, near the village of Georgie-Afinskaya. 02/03/1918 returned to Krasnodar, which soon, 03/01/1918, was forced to leave under pressure from significantly superior Red forces. Appointed commander of the Kuban Army 03/01–03/30/1918. After a meeting with the Volunteer Army of General Kornilov on March 27, 1918 in the area of ​​the village of Ryazanskaya (Shendzhiy village), the Kuban Army became an integral part (3,000 fighters) of the Volunteer Army (2,700 bayonets and sabers, of which 700 were wounded), and by mutual agreement, the general command of these forces were entrusted to General Kornilov. Commander of the troops of the Kuban region, 04-06.1918; commander of the 1st Kuban brigade, 06-08.1918. Commander of the 1st Kuban Cavalry Division, 08.1918-01.1919. From 01/03/1919 commander of the 1st Kuban Corps, 01-07/1919. Commander of a group of troops of the Caucasian Army near Tsaritsyn, captured Kamyshin, on the Volga; 07-09.1919. On 09/09/1919 he fell ill and surrendered the 1st Kuban Corps to General Pisarev. After recovery, he was appointed chief of logistics of the Caucasian Army, 10-11.1919. S 13 (26). 11. 1919 commander of the Caucasian Army, replaced General Wrangel; 26.11.1919-21.01.1920. He emigrated from Crimea on 04.1920 to Bulgaria, without receiving a command post in the Russian army under General Wrangel. Killed on November 9, 1922 (by NKVD agents?) in Kyustendil (Bulgaria) in his office as a newspaper editor.

Materials used from the book: Valery Klaving, Civil War in Russia: White Armies. Military-historical library. M., 2003.

Baron Wrangel testifies

I knew General Pokrovsky, promoted to this rank by decree of the Kuban government, from his work in St. Petersburg in the officer organization headed by Count Palen. At that time he served in the aviation troops with the rank of staff captain. He had an extraordinary mind, outstanding energy, enormous willpower and great ambition, but at the same time he was unscrupulous in his means and prone to adventure.

Wrangel P.N. Notes. November 1916 - November 1920 Memoirs. Memoirs. - Minsk, 2003. vol. 1. p. 109

At the meeting of the Regional Rada, except General Pokrovsky and Colonel Skin , a number of officers from the army. Despite the presence of headquarters in Yekaterinodar, both the officers who arrived and those living in the rear behaved in an inadmissibly dissolute manner, drank, behaved outrageously, and wasted money. Colonel Shkuro behaved especially inappropriately. He brought with him to Yekaterinodar a division of his partisans, called “Volchy”. In wolf hats, with wolf tails on their horsetails, Colonel Shkuro’s partisans were not a military unit, but a typical freeman of Stenka Razin. Quite often at night after a partisan drinking binge, Shkuro and his “wolves” rushed through the city streets singing, booming and shooting. Returning to the hotel one evening, I saw a crowd of people on Krasnaya Street. Light poured from the open windows of the mansion; trumpeters played and Cossacks danced on the sidewalk under the windows. Several “wolves” stood at a distance, holding their horses by the reins. When I asked what this meant, I received the answer that Colonel Shkuro was “walking.” In the military hotel where we were staying, the most reckless revelry was happening all the time. At Chesov at 11-12 pm a gang of tipsy officers appeared, the songbooks of the local guards division were brought into the common room and a revelry took place in front of the public. General Pokrovsky, Colonel Shkuro, and other officers usually sat at the head of the table. One of these drinking parties, chaired by General Pokrovsky, ended tragically. The escort officer shot and killed an officer of the Tatar division. All these outrages were carried out in front of the commander-in-chief, the whole city knew about them, and at the same time nothing was done to stop this debauchery.

Wrangel P.N. Notes. November 1916 - November 1920 Memoirs. Memoirs. - Minsk, 2003. vol. 1. p. 153

Document

Order No. 2 for the city of Maykop

For the fact that the population of the city of Maikop (Nikolaevskaya, Pokrovskaya and Troitskaya Slobodkas) fired at the volunteer troops, I impose an indemnity of one million rubles on the above-mentioned outskirts of the city.

The indemnity must be paid within three days.

If my demand is not met, the above-mentioned settlements will be burned to the ground.

I entrust the collection of indemnities to the commandant of the city, Yesaul Razderishchin.

Head of the 1st Kuban Cossack Division

Major General Pokrovsky.

(Quoted from the personal archive of Artem Vesely “Russia washed in blood”, “New World” No. 5, 1988)

On November 9, 1922, in the city of Kyustendil, on the border of Bulgaria and Serbia, one of the conscientious patriots of the Russian land, General Viktor Leonidovich Pokrovsky, died from the treacherous hand. He was an energetic, hot-tempered, educated, selfless, humane, inspired person and fanatically devoted to the idea of ​​​​the fight against Bolshevism.

RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> This is Pokrovsky, who was the first of the Russian military pilots during the European War to capture an enemy aircraft with a pilot and an observer in an air battle, and thus at the very beginning of hostilities immediately covered the name of the then young Russian aviation with glory.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> This is the Pokrovsky who, amid extremely difficult conditions, was the first to raise the banner of the struggle in the Kuban for the liberation of Russia from its oppressors.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> He died in the full bloom of his strength, at a time when, as a leader, he arrived to his old comrades in order to help them, amid the hardships of exile, to breathe, and support their fading strength and entice them to a new feat.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> He could not put up with the gray emigrant life. His exceptional ideological spirit, high sense of nationalism and love for Russia always attracted him to self-sacrifice for his beloved Motherland.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> Two years of his foreign life passed for the deceased in continuous scientific work. He perfectly studied the current general political and economic situation in Europe and in particular Soviet Russia, writing a huge work of analysis about it in five parts.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> It was too difficult for him to live and work among the Parisian, Berlin and Viennese emigration, most of whom had withdrawn into the area of ​​personal material concerns of life.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> At the end of 1922, he left Berlin and headed to the country where, amid particularly difficult conditions, army personnel live - that category of Russian emigrants who bore on their shoulders the entire burden of armed struggle, campaigns and evacuations, but

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> which nevertheless continues to firmly and ideologically believe in the imminent fall of the power of the soviets - in Bulgaria. His appearance in Bulgaria caused him to be hunted by the communists.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> He was twice betrayed by them, who vigilantly followed, in the person of the security officer Chaikin, the traitor Sekretev and others, this brilliant organizer. The first time he was betrayed by General Muravyov, who sold his sword to the Bolsheviks. - “Fortunately, although at the last moment, wrote V.L. Pokrovsky on October 30, 1922, it was still noticed.” I had to leave Sofia and move to the city of Rodomir. Alas!.. He escaped from one traitor, and there another was waiting for him. And who? An officer he had known for four years. Sotnik Artemy Sokolov.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> On November 7, Pokrovsky sent Sokolov to Sofia to carry out some assignments and ordered him the next day with a certain train to arrive in the city of Kyustendil, where their meeting was to take place. Before Sokolov was sent, the officers who were with General Pokrovsky told the latter that they did not trust Sokolov and were afraid that he might betray him.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> “I have known him personally for 4 years, he and everyone who is with me - people - are above suspicion,” Pokrovsky answered.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> But the next day Sokolov did not arrive with the agreed train; this aroused even more suspicion among those who were with Pokrovsky, who suggested that he move to another city. However, he decisively rejected this proposal.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> On November 9, at about 10 p.m., Chaikin’s security officers arrived in Kyustendil in cars and, together with Bulgarian soldiers, surrounded the house where Pokrovsky was located and opened fire. Pokrovsky ran out, wounded two security officers with shots from a revolver and broke through the attackers into the yard; here he was wounded in the side by a Bulgarian soldier with a bayonet and fell; The communists ran up, grabbed the wounded man, put him on a car and took him away. On the way, he was tortured, robbed and, finally, brutally finishing off, his mutilated body was thrown into the morgue of the Kyustendil hospital.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> The Bulgarian authorities did not even consider it necessary to respond to the request of the relatives of the murdered man to the prosecutor of the Sofia court to conduct an investigation into the robbery of V.L. Pokrovsky and the torture that resulted in his death. The traitor Sokolov, having received 10,000 Bulgarian levs for his vile deed, remained in Sofia under the protection of the communists and their minions.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> The past of this outstanding man is very interesting. It also reveals his exceptional talents, rare love for the Motherland and firm, unshakable faith in the revival of Russia.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> V.L. Pokrovsky from the Odessa Cadet Corps entered the Pavlovsk Military School in 1906, from which he graduated first and was then promoted to officer in the Little Russian Grenadier Regiment. The mediocre service in the regiment did not satisfy him: he, still very young, dreamed of big work, of broad activities. He devoted all his leisure time to reading, scientific studies, and became especially interested in aviation. He believed in its future, in its enormous significance in the war, and decided to devote himself to this area.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> In 1912, he entered the Petrograd Polytechnic Institute, in the aviation class, where he studied aircraft technology with exceptional interest, and then moved to undergo practical training at the Sevastopol Aviation School. Having completed the course and passing the exam in November 1914, he immediately went to the Active Army, with the rank of military pilot so dear to him.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> Not a month goes by without a brave pilot accomplishing an outstanding feat. One after another, military awards adorn his chest. Here is a small extract from Pokrovsky’s track record for just two months of his activity:

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> Military pilot Lieutenant Viktor Pokrovsky, during the period from May 16 to July 15, 1915, excluding flights, carried out 40 aerial reconnaissance missions, each time carrying out these tasks, giving corps headquarters valuable information about the enemy. These reconnaissance missions were carried out under heavy enemy gun, machine gun and rifle fire. During the indicated period of time, Pokrovsky, according to the official report, spent 141 hours in the air over the enemy; participated in four air battles, firing at enemy aircraft and twice preventing them from conducting reconnaissance; In addition, on May 16, he participated in an air battle with a German aircraft and carried out reconnaissance, despite the fact that his aircraft was damaged by an enemy bullet, and 35 versts from his positions and all the way to them was fired upon by a German aircraft flying directly overhead , and crossed positions at an altitude of only 700 meters. On June 7, he fired at a German apparatus and forced it to descend. On June 15, he made a night flight to search for enemy batteries and discovered six enemy batteries. On June 27th, I pursued an enemy craft and forced it to turn around and descend. On July 9, during reconnaissance of the enemy’s rear, a bullet hit the engine, the valve and rod of the cylinder of Pokrovsky’s apparatus were turned off and, despite the fact that the cylinder was rendered completely unusable and the engine turned off 11 versts in the enemy’s rear, he managed to descend on his territory without damaging the device.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> On July 15, Pokrovsky performed a deed so significant in terms of courage and value of the result that soon, on the recommendation of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, he was awarded the officer's cross of St. George, 4th degree, and his name appeared on the pages of numerous orders, newspapers and magazines.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> It was on the Austrian front, near Zolotaya Lipa, where the 2nd Siberian Corps Aviation Detachment, in which the deceased served, was stationed.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> On the morning of July 15, Pokrovsky, together with his observer Cornet Plonsky, having completed a routine reconnaissance, returned very tired to the detachment’s airfield.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> On the same day, around noon, a large Austrian “albatross” suddenly appeared near the Golden Linden, heading towards the army headquarters located not far from the 2nd Siberian Aviation Detachment, apparently with the intention of throwing bombs there.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> Pokrovsky noticed this: forgetting his fatigue, he ordered the observer Plonsky to board the airplane. Instantly they jumped onto the Farman and the device began to gain altitude, heading straight towards the Austrian albatross. At an altitude of about two miles, almost above the army headquarters, Pokrovsky entered into battle with an Austrian pilot. With accurate shooting and amazingly skillful control of the apparatus, Pokrovsky caused confusion on the albatross and the Austrian, turning, began to leave. But Pokrovsky managed to take a position above him and began to press him down. The enemy descended and then, fearing to land on the tops of the forest, was forced to descend. Then Pokrovsky hastened to descend about 40 fathoms from the albatross and jumped out of his farman; having ordered Plonsky to guard him, he himself rushed towards the Austrians, who were in a hurry to set fire to their apparatus. Pokrovsky quickly ran up to the pilot and knocked him down with a blow from the handle of his revolver, and pointed a Mauser at the observer, an officer of the Austrian General Staff. Having disarmed the officers and placed them in front of him with their hands behind them, he followed them personally and thus brought the prisoners to army headquarters, and then delivered a completely serviceable Austrian apparatus to the aviation detachment.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> The name of Pokrovsky became popular among the troops. In September 1915, he was urgently summoned to Headquarters, where he was given the extremely important task of reconnaissance deep behind enemy lines. This assignment was carried out brilliantly by him.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> In January 1916, Pokrovsky, with the rank of captain, was appointed commander of the 12th Army Aviation Detachment stationed in Riga. Daily raids by German Taubes made the detachment's work extremely tense; constant reconnaissance was often accompanied by air battles. The composition of the detachment was greatly reduced; Pokrovsky himself, already wounded, received a concussion, a fracture of two ribs and frostbitten hands. For this, his squad gained the glory of being undaunted and broke the record for staying in the air.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> The revolution came, and with it the disintegration of the army. The true warrior could not bear and come to terms with the indelible shame of the “great and bloodless” and, leaving his favorite work, went to St. Petersburg, where he joined the organizations of Kornilov and Kolchak. After the October revolution, without losing faith in the cause of salvation, he made his way to the Don to Kaledin, and then to"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> Kuban - to Ekaterinodar, where he became the head of the first volunteer formations.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> Kuban itself best characterizes Pokrovsky in its numerous decrees electing him as an honorary Cossack of the cities and villages he liberated from the Bolsheviks. The simple, unsophisticated language of the resolutions of the Cossack levies calls him the hero of Kuban, the liberator of the region from the fanatic Bolsheviks, the defender of law and justice, the patron of the disadvantaged. 95 villages of the Kuban Army elected him as their honorary old man. He received the same honorary title from 8 Circassian villages, 7 villages of the Terek Army, 5 Don Army and 3 Astrakhan Army. Ekaterinodar, Novorossiysk, Maykop, Yeysk, Anapa, Temryuk and Tuapse elected him as their honorary citizen.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> Having independently raised an uprising in the Kuban in December 1917, defeated the Bolsheviks in the Novorossiysk direction, organized the heroic defense of Ekaterinodar and captured more than 4,000 people, 16 guns, 60 machine guns in the January and February battles, Pokrovsky, already in the position of Commander of the Troops of the Kuban Region, safely withdrew the Army and Ekaterinodar on February 28, 1918, and on March 14 united with the Army of General Kornilov.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> To fulfill the task of General Kornilov, he, as they say, from horseback, amid all the hardships of the 1st Kuban campaign, began organizing regular units of the 1st Kuban Cossack Division. He attached a strictly thought-out plan to this matter and by May 1918 he formed the first 4 regiments of this division and thereby revived the Kuban cavalry. Forming and at the same time fighting with his regiments, Pokrovsky from April to August liquidated the Batai and Taman red armies, cleared the Zadonsk region and all the Black Sea and Trans-Kuban villages from the Bolsheviks. He participated with his division in the occupation of Yekaterinodar and, after continuous fighting, captured the cities of Temryuk, Anapa, Novorossiysk, Maikop, Tuapse and Yeisk.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> As the Commander of the 1st Kuban Cossack Corps from August 1918 to February 1919, Pokrovsky defeated and captured the 11th, 12th and 13th Soviet armies and captured almost the entire North Caucasus, with the cities of Georgievsk, Mozdok, Grozny, Kizlyar, and took 119,000 Red Army soldiers, 171 guns, 426 machine guns and 19 armored trains were captured.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> In February 1919, the 1st Kuban and 2nd Don Corps, under the overall command of Pokrovsky, were transferred to the Don, where the position of the Whites then deteriorated greatly. He fought tirelessly on the outskirts of Novocherkassk, forced the Bolsheviks to retreat and captured the Donetsk coal basin, the 2nd Don and Salsky districts and, most importantly, completely defeated Dumenko’s cavalry.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> In May 1919, Pokrovsky, as part of the Caucasian Armies, led a campaign against Tsaritsyn and in June already participated in the capture of the latter.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> Throughout the summer of 1919, Pokrovsky commanded the troops of the Volga group; defeated the 8th, 9th and 10th Soviet armies and captured the Kamyshinsky and Volga fortified areas, right up to the 1st line of forts in Saratov, and captured 52,000 people, 142 guns, 396 machine guns, 2 armored trains from the Reds.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> During these battles, Pokrovsky showed exceptional personal courage and was wounded. For the occupation of Kamyshin, Commander-in-Chief General Denikin promoted him to lieutenant general.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> In October of the same year, Pokrovsky was appointed successor to General Wrangel, who resigned as Commander of the Caucasian Army.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> Commanding the Army until February 1920, when he was ordered to retreat, he defeated 34, 35, 37 and part of 38 Soviet rifle divisions.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> During the entire period of command of the troops, in battles against Soviet forces, General Pokrovsky took prisoners and trophies: prisoners - 239,000, guns - 454, machine guns - 1193, armored trains - 34, armored cars - 19, gunboats - 3, monitors - 6, bolinders - 7 .

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> And as a result of this incomprehensibly colossal work, long years of war, injuries, extraordinary efforts and hardships, saving hundreds of thousands of human lives - betrayal, martyrdom and an orphaned family with three young children without a means of support.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> Even Pokrovsky’s ashes have not yet been taken from Bulgaria to Serbia, as the unfortunate widow of the deceased so requests.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> With a punishing sword in his hand, wearing a crown of thorns, another knight of duty and honor left us. His bright star, in which he so invariably believed, went out. The vibrant life that was so important in the Russian national cause was interrupted."Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA">

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> The souls of the handful of his surviving comrades became even darker.

"Microsoft Sans Serif";color:black;mso-ansi-language:RU;mso-fareast-language:
RU;mso-bidi-language:AR-SA"> But let each of us, amid the common Russian suffering, more often remember the words of Pokrovsky, which he always said in the difficult days of the past struggle: “The darker the night, the brighter the stars.”...

Viktor Leonidovich Pokrovsky(, Nizhny Novgorod province - November 8, Kyustendil, Bulgaria) - lieutenant general. Participant in the Great and Civil Wars. Pioneer. In 1919, commander of the Caucasian Army, successor in this post to General Baron P. N. Wrangel.

Biography

World War I

Pokrovsky was young, of low rank and military experience, and unknown to anyone. But he showed vigorous energy, was brave, cruel, power-hungry and did not really take into account “moral prejudices.” ... Be that as it may, he did what more respectable and bureaucratic people failed to do: he assembled a detachment that alone represented an actual force capable of fighting and beating the Bolsheviks.

In April - June 1918 - commander of the troops of the Kuban region, in June - August 1918 - commander of the 1st Kuban brigade. In August 1918 - January 1919 - commander of the 1st Kuban Cavalry Division, from January 3, 1919 - commander of the 1st Kuban Corps. From July 1919 - commander of a group of forces of the Caucasian Army near Tsaritsyn, captured Kamyshin on the Volga.

On September 9, 1919 he fell ill and surrendered the 1st Kuban Corps to General Pisarev. After recovery, he was appointed chief of logistics of the Caucasian Army (October - November 1919). In this capacity, on the orders of General Wrangel, he led the dispersal of the Kuban Cossack Rada, accused of separatism, one of whose leaders, priest Alexey Kulabukhov, was hanged “for treason against Russia and the Kuban Cossacks” by the verdict of a military court.

From November 26, 1919 to January 21, 1920 - commander of the Caucasian Army, replaced General Wrangel, who characterized V.L. Pokrovsky as follows:

He had an extraordinary mind, outstanding energy, enormous willpower and great ambition, but at the same time he was unscrupulous in his means and prone to adventure.

He was removed from office after the complete disintegration of the troops entrusted to him under the blows of the Red Army.

He was distinguished by his cruelty: according to contemporaries, where Pokrovsky’s headquarters stood, there were always many shot and hanged without trial, on suspicion of sympathizing with the Bolsheviks. He is credited with jokes like “the sight of a hanged man enlivens the landscape” or “the sight of a gallows improves appetite.” Modern Russian historian S.V. Karpenko gives the following “portrait” of V.L. Pokrovsky:

His terrible reputation as a hangman was emphasized by his appearance. A short, stooped figure, wrapped in a permanent Circassian coat, a frowning forehead, a hooked bird's nose and a piercing gaze of dark eyes resembled a merciless steppe predator. The menacing appearance of the heavily armed officers of his personal convoy - Chechens and Ingush - further thickened the atmosphere of fear around their adored boss.

In exile

Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army: A. V. Kolchak † Don Army: P. N. Krasnov · A. P. Bogaevsky · K. K. Mamantov † · P. Kh. Popov · I. D. Popov † · E. F. Semiletov † · G. D. Kargalskov · A. N. Moller · M. V. Bazavov · M. G. Khripunov · I. F. Bykadorov · V. I. Sidorin · S. V. Denisov · A. P. Fitzkhelaurov Caucasian Army: V. L. Pokrovsky· Ya. D. Yuzefovich · P. N. Shatilov Kuban Army: A. G. Shkuro · S. G. Ulagai Crimean-Azov Army: A. A. Borovsky Volunteer Army: I. P. Romanovsky † · A. S. Lukomsky · P. S. Makhrov · I. M. Vasilchenko † · I. G. Barbovich · A. M. Kaledin † · M. V. Alekseev † · L G. Kornilov † · A. I. Denikin · V. Z. May-Maevsky † · P. N. Wrangel Turkestan Army (VSYUR): I. V. Savitsky · A. A. Borovsky · B. I. Kazanovich Troops of the Kyiv region: N. E. Bredov · A. M. Dragomirov · V. E. Flug Troops of the Novorossiysk region: M. N. Promtov · N. N. Shilling 1 AK: B. I. Kazanovich · A. P. Kutepov · V. K. Vitkovsky 2 AK: A. A. Borovsky · V. Z. May-Maevsky † · M. N. Promtov · Y. A. Slashchev 3 AK: V. P. Lyakhov · Y. A. Slashchev Drozdovites: M. G. Drozdovsky † · V. K. Vitkovsky · A. V. Turkul Kornilovites: A. P. Kutepov · N. V. Skoblin Markovites: S. L. Markov · N. S. Timanovsky Alekseevtsy: A. P. Bogaevsky · B. I. Kazanovich Eastern Front: A. V. Kolchak † · V. O. Kappel † · M. K. Diterichs · A. F. Matkovsky † · A. N. Grishin “Almazov” † · V. P. Gulidov † · A. I Dutov † · G. M. Semenov · K. V. Sakharov · S. N. Voitsekhovsky · ·

An excerpt characterizing Pokrovsky, Viktor Leonidovich

Gerasim and the janitor, who were following Makar Alekseich, stopped him in the hallway and began to take away the pistol. Pierre, going out into the corridor, looked at this half-crazed old man with pity and disgust. Makar Alekseich, wincing from the effort, held the pistol and shouted in a hoarse voice, apparently imagining something solemn.
- To arms! Aboard! You're lying, you can't take it away! - he shouted.
- It will, please, it will. Do me a favor, please leave. Well, please, master... - said Gerasim, carefully trying to turn Makar Alekseich towards the door by his elbows.
- Who are you? Bonaparte!.. - shouted Makar Alekseich.
- This is not good, sir. Come to your rooms and rest. Please give me a pistol.
- Get away, despicable slave! Don't touch! Saw? - Makar Alekseich shouted, shaking his pistol. - Aboard!
“Get involved,” Gerasim whispered to the janitor.
Makar Alekseich was grabbed by the arms and dragged to the door.
The hallway was filled with ugly sounds of fussing and the drunken, wheezing sounds of a breathless voice.
Suddenly a new, piercing female scream came from the porch, and the cook ran into the hallway.
- They! Dear fathers!.. By God, they are. Four, mounted!.. - she shouted.
Gerasim and the janitor released Makar Alekseich from their hands, and in the quiet corridor the knocking of several hands on the front door was clearly heard.

Pierre, who had decided with himself that before fulfilling his intention he did not need to reveal either his rank or knowledge of the French language, stood in the half-open doors of the corridor, intending to immediately hide as soon as the French entered. But the French entered, and Pierre still did not leave the door: irresistible curiosity held him back.
There were two of them. One is an officer, a tall, brave and handsome man, the other is obviously a soldier or orderly, a squat, thin, tanned man with sunken cheeks and a dull expression on his face. The officer, leaning on a stick and limping, walked ahead. Having taken a few steps, the officer, as if deciding with himself that this apartment was good, stopped, turned back to the soldiers standing in the doorway and in a loud commanding voice shouted to them to bring in the horses. Having finished this matter, the officer, with a gallant gesture, raised his elbow high, straightened his mustache and touched his hat with his hand.
- Bonjour la compagnie! [Respect to the whole company!] - he said cheerfully, smiling and looking around him. Nobody answered.
– Vous etes le bourgeois? [Are you the owner?] - the officer turned to Gerasim.
Gerasim looked at the officer in fear and questioningly.
“Quartire, quartire, logement,” said the officer, looking down at the little man with a condescending and good-natured smile. – Les Francais sont de bons enfants. Que diable! Voyons! Ne nous fachons pas, mon vieux, [Apartments, apartments... The French are good guys. Damn it, let's not quarrel, grandfather.] - he added, patting the frightened and silent Gerasim on the shoulder.
- Aca! Dites donc, on ne parle donc pas francais dans cette boutique? [Well, really, no one here speaks French?] he added, looking around and meeting Pierre’s eyes. Pierre pulled away from the door.
The officer turned to Gerasim again. He demanded that Gerasim show him the rooms in the house.
“The master is gone, don’t understand... mine is yours...” said Gerasim, trying to make his words clearer by the fact that he spoke them inside out.
The French officer, smiling, spread his hands in front of Gerasim's nose, making him feel that he did not understand him, and, limping, went to the door where Pierre stood. Pierre wanted to move away to hide from him, but at that very time he saw Makar Alekseich leaning out from the open kitchen door with a pistol in his hands. With the cunning of a madman, Makar Alekseich looked at the Frenchman and, raising his pistol, took aim.
- Aboard!!! - the drunk shouted, pressing the trigger of the pistol. The French officer turned around at the shout, and at the same instant Pierre rushed at the drunken man. While Pierre grabbed and raised the pistol, Makar Alekseich finally hit the trigger with his finger, and a shot was heard that was deafening and covered everyone in gunpowder smoke. The Frenchman turned pale and rushed back to the door.
Having forgotten his intention not to reveal his knowledge of the French language, Pierre, snatching the pistol and throwing it, ran up to the officer and spoke to him in French.
“Vous n"etes pas blesse? [Are you not injured?],” he said.
“Je crois que non,” answered the officer, feeling himself, “mais je l"ai manque belle cette fois ci,” he added, pointing to the loose plaster in the wall. “Quel est cet homme? [It seems not... but this since it was close. Who is this man?] - the officer said, looking sternly at Pierre.
“Ah, je suis vraiment au desespoir de ce qui vient d"arriver, [Ah, I’m really in despair at what happened],” Pierre said quickly, completely forgetting his role. “C”est un fou, un malheureux qui ne savait pas ce qu"il faisait. [This is an unfortunate madman who did not know what he was doing.]
The officer approached Makar Alekseich and grabbed him by the collar.
Makar Alekseich, his lips parted, as if falling asleep, swayed, leaning against the wall.
“Brigand, tu me la payeras,” said the Frenchman, removing his hand.
– Nous autres nous sommes clements apres la victoire: mais nous ne pardonnons pas aux traitres, [Robber, you will pay me for this. Our brother is merciful after victory, but we do not forgive traitors,” he added with gloomy solemnity in his face and with a beautiful energetic gesture.
Pierre continued in French to persuade the officer not to punish this drunken, insane man. The Frenchman listened silently, without changing his gloomy appearance, and suddenly turned to Pierre with a smile. He looked at him silently for several seconds. His handsome face took on a tragically tender expression, and he extended his hand.
“Vous m"avez sauve la vie! Vous etes Francais, [You saved my life. You are a Frenchman," he said. For a Frenchman, this conclusion was undeniable. Only a Frenchman could accomplish a great deed, and saving his life, m r Ramball "I capitaine du 13 me leger [Monsieur Rambal, captain of the 13th light regiment] - was, without a doubt, the greatest thing.
But no matter how undoubted this conclusion and the officer’s conviction based on it were, Pierre considered it necessary to disappoint him.
“Je suis Russe, [I am Russian,”] Pierre said quickly.
“Ti ti ti, a d"autres, [tell this to others," said the Frenchman, waving his finger in front of his nose and smiling. "Tout a l"heure vous allez me conter tout ca," he said. – Charme de rencontrer un compatriote. Eh bien! qu"allons nous faire de cet homme? [Now you'll tell me all this. It's very nice to meet a compatriot. Well! What should we do with this man?] - he added, addressing Pierre as if he were his brother. Even if Pierre was not a Frenchman, having once received this highest title in the world, he could not renounce it, said the expression on the face and tone of the French officer. To the last question, Pierre once again explained who Makar Alekseich was, explained that just before their arrival this a drunken, insane man stole a loaded pistol, which they did not have time to take away from him, and asked that his act be left unpunished.
The Frenchman stuck out his chest and made a royal gesture with his hand.
– Vous m"avez sauve la vie. Vous etes Francais. Vous me demandez sa grace? Je vous l"accorde. Qu"on emmene cet homme, [You saved my life. You are a Frenchman. Do you want me to forgive him? I forgive him. Take this man away," the French officer said quickly and energetically, taking the hand of the one who had earned him for saving his life into the French Pierre, and went with him to the house.
The soldiers who were in the yard, hearing the shot, entered the vestibule, asking what had happened and expressing their readiness to punish those responsible; but the officer strictly stopped them.
“On vous demandera quand on aura besoin de vous,” he said. The soldiers left. The orderly, who had meanwhile managed to be in the kitchen, approached the officer.
“Capitaine, ils ont de la soupe et du gigot de mouton dans la cuisine,” he said. - Faut il vous l "apporter? [Captain, they have soup and fried lamb in the kitchen. Would you like to bring it?]
“Oui, et le vin, [Yes, and wine,”] said the captain.

The French officer and Pierre entered the house. Pierre considered it his duty to again assure the captain that he was not a Frenchman and wanted to leave, but the French officer did not want to hear about it. He was so courteous, kind, good-natured and truly grateful for saving his life that Pierre did not have the spirit to refuse him and sat down with him in the hall, in the first room they entered. In response to Pierre’s assertion that he was not a Frenchman, the captain, obviously not understanding how one could refuse such a flattering title, shrugged his shoulders and said that if he certainly wanted to pass for a Russian, then let it be so, but that he, despite then, everyone is still forever connected with him with a feeling of gratitude for saving his life.
If this man had been gifted with at least some ability to understand the feelings of others and had guessed about Pierre’s feelings, Pierre would probably have left him; but this man’s animated impenetrability to everything that was not himself defeated Pierre.
“Francais ou prince russe incognito, [Frenchman or Russian prince incognito," said the Frenchman, looking at Pierre’s dirty but thin underwear and the ring on his hand. – Je vous dois la vie je vous offre mon amitie. Un Francais n "oublie jamais ni une insulte ni un service. Je vous offre mon amitie. Je ne vous dis que ca. [I owe you my life, and I offer you friendship. The Frenchman never forgets either insult or service. I offer my friendship to you. I say nothing more.]