The main type of officer's allowance in the Russian army was the salary, which consisted of the officer's regular salary, canteens and additional money. Staff salaries were assigned, as a rule, depending on rank, and only in some institutions were salaries assigned to officers and generals holding administrative positions depending on the position held. Doctors (including veterinarians) were paid salaries, canteens and additional money depending on their position, rank assigned to them and length of service, and military officials - depending on their position and length of service.

In remote areas (Turkestan Military District, Omsk, Irkutsk, Arkhangelsk provinces, Primorsky Territory, Sakhalin, Kamchatka and Yakutia), officers, officials and military doctors were assigned increased salaries. The same salaries were received by doctors working in clinics for the nervous and mentally ill, students of military academies and officer schools, the permanent staff of officer schools, as well as military personnel of aeronautical and aviation units.

Since 1909, combatant officers began to be paid so-called additional money depending on their rank. Thus, chief officers received additional money for length of service for 4 years of service in the ranks, and staff officers - for 5. At the same time, lieutenant colonels received it if the total amount of salary, canteen and additional money received did not exceed 2,400 rubles, and colonels - 2520 rubles.

Table money, in contrast to salaries and additional money, was assigned not depending on rank, but on the position held. Guards officers received a salary one step higher than their existing rank (i.e., a guard captain received the same salary as an army colonel). In addition, they received an annual increase in the amount of half the salary according to the 1859 report card. Deductions from salaries and table money were fictitious and were paid from the so-called special allowances for salaries and table money. They were:
- from the salary: 6% - to the emeritus fund, 1.5% - for medicines and 1% - for the hospital,
- from table money: 6% - to the emeritus fund and 2% - to disabled capital.

Since July 1912, additional pay was established for pilots and army aviation personnel. Thus, pilot officers received an additional 200 rubles per month, and ensigns and non-commissioned officers - 75 rubles per month.

The following additional payments were issued in aeronautical units:
- airship commander - 150 rubles,
- assistant commander and senior engineer - 90 rubles,
- junior mechanic – 60 rubles,
- motor mechanics from the lower ranks - 30 rubles.

The rest of the lower ranks were paid one ruble for each day of flight. The accrual of the specified additional money began from the day of the first flight and was carried out 6 months a year, provided that the flight time was at least 10 hours per month.

There were also various additional payments, for example, in some remote areas, officers received additional special daily money. In addition, daily allowances were provided in peacetime during a campaign lasting more than 3 days as part of a unit, during business trips, camp training, etc. In wartime, instead of daily allowances, ration money was paid, which was divided into field rations (directly at the theater of military operations) and camp rations and depended on the position held.

In addition to permanent payments, in some cases, officers received one-time cash payments - for tailoring uniforms, purchasing a horse and saddle, purchasing edged weapons and equipment, for completing an academy course in the 1st category, when an officer left for further service in remote areas, when mobilization was announced and etc.

All generals and officers had the right to receive a government apartment, and if it was impossible to provide it, rent money for renting an apartment. In addition, money was allocated for heating, lighting the apartment and maintaining the stables. The size of payments depended on the category of locality. All areas of the Russian Empire were divided into 9 categories. The 1st included the most expensive cities - St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kyiv, Odessa, Vladivostok, and the 9th - small county towns and towns.

Money for renting a stable, as well as fodder, was paid to generals and officers if they were entitled to a horse for their service. Officers purchased uniforms at their own expense, which seriously affected the officer’s budget due to its high cost. The peacetime uniform was divided into ceremonial, ordinary, service and everyday, and in the guard - additionally ball ceremonial and everyday. The peacetime uniform of each branch and type of troops, and sometimes for each unit and institution, had its own distinctive features. The wartime uniform was basically unified and was worn both in the theater of war and in units prepared to be sent to the front, and in peacetime - during exercises, maneuvers and camp training.

The standard wartime uniform included:
- a camp jacket (in summer) or a khaki uniform,
- shortened trousers of a protective color (in the cavalry and among the Cossacks - dark blue),
- high boots, those who are supposed to have them - with spurs,
- a khaki cloth cap or a gray merlushka hat,
- coat, hood, headphones and gloves.

With this form, it was necessary to have a saber on the waist or shoulder (in cavalry) belt, a revolver in a leather holster (or a pistol of an approved brand), binoculars and an officer's bag.

Gabriel Tsobekhia

4. Salary of military personnel, its changes during the war years During the World War, a significant part of the military department's budget was spent on the maintenance of military personnel - approximately 40 percent. Compared to previous wars, this figure has decreased slightly (previously - three quarters) due to the strengthening of the technical equipment of the army and, accordingly, the increase in costs for the acquisition of weapons and equipment, their maintenance and operation. Issues of pay for military personnel were given exceptional importance; they were often covered in the press, and proposals to change the pay for military service were discussed.

These issues have more than once been the subject of heated debate on the agenda of the State Duma. Professor of the Quartermaster Academy F.A. Maksheev wrote: “The correct solution to the issue of the amount of pay for officers and military officials is very important. A favorable resolution of the issues of recruiting completely suitable personnel depends on this to a large extent. The military profession should not be paid less than other public service professions. A military career should not be less attractive than another career."

Salary of officers was divided into permanent leaves and paid in special cases. The permanent payments included: salary, canteen money, apartment money, food money, for hiring servants, and hospitality. Travel allowances, one-time payments, rewards, additional salaries for orders, etc. were considered paid in special cases.

Salary amount as before, was determined by the vast majority of officers and generals according to their military rank (Table 1). The already mentioned professor F.A. Maksheev in the same work noted the advantages of this rule. “Salary according to rank,” he wrote, “emphasizes the importance of rank, which is very important in military life, since ranks determine the relationships between military personnel... The main component of the maintenance of officers, wherever they serve, should be salary according to rank. The rank must be given its proper meaning, otherwise it loses its meaning and respect for it is lost.” For generals and officers in administrative positions, the salary was set according to the positions held, indicating their states, and the amount of this salary was lower than according to rank.

Table 1

The amount of pay for generals and officers from 1859 to 1917

(in rubles per year)

Some generals and officers had the right to receive “enhanced”, i.e. increased salaries, including for service in remote areas (in military districts: St. Petersburg, Kazan, Caucasus, Turkmen, Omsk, Irkutsk, Amur), as well as students military academies and officers of permanent and variable composition of officer schools.

Special privileges were retained for service in the guard; for officers of guard units, the salary according to rank was determined higher by one step of their rank (for example, a second lieutenant - like a lieutenant).

In the military press in the years preceding the war, the issue of increasing officer salaries was widely discussed, and it was considered in the State Duma. The obviously low material support of military officers was recognized. “The question of maintenance sufficient for a decent existence as an officer is one of the serious ones in the structure of an officer’s life. The officers in the combat units are in the most difficult financial situation.”

According to the conclusion of the Chief of the General Staff, the main reason for the 50-60 percent shortage of officers in some units of the troops after the Russo-Japanese War was their insufficient supply. The War Ministry was concerned about creating living conditions for the officers in which there would be no need to worry about their daily bread, and they would devote all their time to official work. To this end, the pay of army officers was increased in two ways.

The first one. Since January 1909, the salary has been increased by issuing to combat officers who served in combat units and departments special “additional money” according to their rank: colonel and lieutenant colonel - 480 rubles. per year, captain - 360 rubles, staff captain - 300 rubles, lieutenant - 240 rubles, second lieutenant - 180 rubles, warrant officer - 120 rubles.

Second way. The same money has been introduced for a long stay in the same military rank. The fact is that the financial situation of officers was negatively affected by slow promotion, since in this case the next military rank could not be awarded. As General A. A. Brusilov noted, the percentage of vacancies for the positions of commanders of individual units was very small and therefore the vast majority of army officers were dismissed due to age at the rank of captain or lieutenant colonel. Unwittingly, the army officers looked apathetically at their lot. In order to limit to some extent the unfavorable impact of officers remaining in the same rank for a long time, an additional increase in pay is being introduced for officers who served in combat units, taking into account length of service in a certain rank (staff captain and captain after 4 years of service in for this rank - 120 rubles per year, for lieutenant colonel and colonel after 5 years, respectively - 180 rubles per year).

Thus, the battalion commander, a lieutenant colonel, could receive a salary of 1,080 rubles per year in addition to his salary. additional 660 rub. (480 + 180), and the company commander, captain, to 900 rubles - 480 rubles. (360 + 120).

According to the Chief of the General Staff, measures to increase pay could not but have a positive impact on the recruitment and quality of the officer corps; in the last years before the war, a lot of young people with higher education entered military service.

Additional permanent salary increases were awarded to officers serving in remote areas. Their size depended on the location of the military unit and the length of the officer’s continuous service in remote areas. When appointed to service in these regions, an allowance was also paid for recruitment and establishment, the amount of which was determined according to the marital status and point of the officer's new service.

Before the war, additional pay was introduced to pilot officers, monthly and in a fairly large amount (200 rubles). True, it could be paid no more than six months a year and only in those months when they were in the air for a certain number of hours. On the same basis, additional maintenance was provided for balloon crew members.

Mess allowance were paid to officers from the company commander inclusively and above, their amount was established according to the position held. Generals and regiment commanders continued to receive especially large sums of canteen money. For some positions, “reinforced”, i.e., increased table salaries were established, including for positions in the military district administration, corps and division commissariat.

Junior officers and platoon commanders were not entitled to table money. Reimbursement for food expenses was carried out in the same way as in the last century.

Apartment money continued to pay officers who were not provided with government apartments. Their size depended on the place of residence (settled areas were assigned one of 8 categories) and the rank of the officer. For example, the amount of apartment money was as follows: in the area, in the 1st category, the company commander was owed 544 rubles. per year (with a salary of 900 rubles per year), for a major general - 1666 rubles. per year, including for renting an apartment - 1332 rubles. (with a salary of 1800 rubles).

table 2

The amount of apartment money for generals and officers in 1913

(in rubles per year)

Feed money horses were paid to feed generals and officers, who were required to have their own riding horses.

List of officials who are entitled to representative money, determined by the states and by order of the Minister of War. For a number of years, the troops were entitled to this money: the corps commander - 1,500 rubles. per year, division commander - 1,500 rubles. and the brigade commander - 1200 rubles.

Monetary leave for officers paid in special cases included travel allowance. It included passing money to pay for travel (including on horses) in connection with assignments to service, transfers, and business trips. For example, a lieutenant general, a division commander, was paid for travel on 12 horses, a colonel - on 5. Instead of “runs”, it was allowed, at the request of military personnel, to receive travel documents for travel by rail. Daily allowances were divided into travel allowances, camp allowances, marching allowances and guard allowances. They were paid: travel allowances - for official business trips, camp allowances - for the time spent in the camps, marching allowances - for the time of movement as part of troops and mobile training camps, guard pay - for the time of guard duty.

One-time payments provided for various groups of military personnel. Of interest is the material encouragement of training in military academies and primary promotion to officers. When enrolled in the first year of the academy, officers were given an allowance for books and educational supplies - 140 rubles, when transferred to subsequent courses - 100 rubles each, upon graduation from the academy - an annual salary. During the initial promotion to officers, they were entitled to a one-time allowance for establishment in the amount of 300 rubles, and those who graduated from military schools received an additional allowance for the purchase of a horse and saddle.

Awards, rewards for excellent service were paid in the form of additional salaries to officers for merits and circumstances of service. For some, it was issued monthly throughout their military service, regardless of the position held and the salary received, including with an increase in salary upon appointment to another position. For others, additional salary was assigned only for a certain period, which was indicated when documenting this salary.

Additional salary due With awarding military personnel a military order or medal was assigned from the salary of the rank in which the serviceman was on the day of the feat. Cavaliers of the 4th degree were paid one third of the annual salary, 3rd degree - two thirds, 2nd degree - full salary, 1st degree - one and a half salary.

In 1912, the Quartermaster's Journal outlined the history of the development of the pay system for officers over half a century, starting in 1859, when a new salary schedule for officers was established.

Over 50 years, the pay of company commanders, battalions and junior officers has increased the most (about 3 times); for regiment and division commanders it has increased by 1.6-1.8 times. True, it should be borne in mind that the basis for calculating this increase was completely incomparable: the salaries of junior officers were much lower than the salaries of senior officers, especially generals.

Many provisions on monetary allowances for military personnel in peacetime were retained in war time. At the same time, considerable changes were made to the pay of military personnel in the active army.

First of all, it should be noted that the entire officer corps received an increased salary in the amounts established in 1899. As in past wars, “portions” were paid to take into account the special conditions and high cost of camp life. According to their purpose, they were divided into marching ones - from the day of mobilization and field ones - during their stay at the theater of war (field ones are twice as large as marching ones). Each officer position was assigned a rank by order of the Minister of War, according to which the amount of ration money was established. Their maximum size is 20 rubles. and 10 rub. per day (corps commander), minimum - 2 rubles. 50 kopecks and 1 rub. 25 kopecks (platoon commander), i.e. the difference in size for these positions is eight times.

Among the one-time benefits, first of all, it is worth noting the military raise money, which relied on the officers to acquire the items necessary for the campaign (camping clothes, equipment). Their size was set depending on rank (generals - 250 rubles, headquarters officers - 150 rubles, other officers - 100 rubles). Military raise money was paid in double, one and a half and ordinary sizes. The list of positions for which a serviceman was entitled to receive increased benefits was approved by the Minister of War. For example, combatant commanders in the troops received double the amount, and one and a half - at the headquarters of the front and army.

A number of one-time benefits were provided due to the fact that officers were required to have their own horses and carts. In this regard, an allowance was provided for acquiring a horse, purchasing transportation means (crew or cart), harnesses, saddles, packs.

It is interesting to note that at the material support front, a group of senior command personnel was allocated, who were given significant advantages in monetary allowance. This was done by introducing additional money in very large amounts. Thus, the Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the front received this money in the amount of 12 thousand rubles per year, the commander of the army - 8 thousand, the chief supply officer of the armies of the front - 5700 rubles. In addition, these same persons were provided with increased amounts of table money. The commander-in-chief of the front armies was entitled to the entire amount of additional money, and the army commander - half of it.

Of particular interest is the monetary provision of wounded military personnel and those in captivity.

Upon arrival at the medical institution, the serviceman submitted a written statement to the head of the institution indicating all types of monetary allowance that he received at the time of departure from the military unit. In it, he also reported what part of the allowance was paid to his family. In addition to salaries and canteen money, the officers received daily money: in the hospital - 75 kopecks. per day, for treatment in your own apartment - 1 rub. per day.

Officers who were wounded or sick in the theater of operations were given an allowance for the purpose of providing assistance, since upon leaving the medical institution they could temporarily find themselves in a difficult financial situation. The amount of the benefit was determined depending on various circumstances and marital status within the following limits: for generals and colonels - from 200 to 300 rubles, headquarters officers - from 150 to 250 rubles, other officers - from 100 to 200 rubles, lower ranks - from 10 to 25 rub. According to the rules for issuing benefits to the wounded, it was paid from the military fund, and the decision on its amount was made by the Chief of the General Staff.

Wounded officers who lost part of their property at the front could claim benefits in the amount of no more than the military allowance money they were entitled to. At the front, such a decision was made by the corps commander, and in the rear, in the event of evacuation of officers due to injury or illness, by the commander of the military district.

A benefit with a chain of financial assistance could also be assigned to the family of a serviceman, the head of which was killed, died of wounds or illness, or was missing.

When leaving a medical institution for the front, one-time wartime benefits were paid more than once, but upon each return to the active army from a medical institution.

Officers who were captured, if they were not in the military service of the enemy, upon arrival from captivity were paid a salary for the entire time they were in captivity (with credit given to the family). The families of captured officers were paid half of his salary and canteen money, rent in full, and, in addition, an allowance for hiring servants, if the officer was entitled to one before capture.

Monetary allowances for lower ranks(military personnel of conscript and long-term service). Conscripts were provided with full free government support (room, food, clothing and other services). They were given an insignificant cash salary, which was mainly intended to provide them with the necessary pocket money to cover those small needs for which government money was not allocated.

The salary of the lower ranks of conscript service was basic and increased (in remote areas and in the theater of war), their annual amount was determined by military rank.

Table 3

The army was interested in long-term servicemen, so they tried to make their service attractive with the help of sufficient provision from the treasury. Their salary was set according to the salary scale of conscripts, but in order to improve their financial situation in order to be interested in military service, they were paid:

additional salary (annually from 280 to 400 rubles, depending on rank and length of service);

one-time allowance for two years of service - 150 rubles, for ten years: for warrant officers - 100 rubles, for non-commissioned officers - 500 rubles;

rent in the amount of half the norm for officers;

pension for 15 years of service in the amount of 96 rubles. in year.

One circumstance should be noted that characterizes the monetary allowance not from the best side. We are talking about mandatory in very large amounts, deductions from salary. A list of these deductions was sent to all military schools before graduation as officers, so that they, young officers, knew what expenses awaited them from the first steps of service in the regiment.

In the Guard and some other units, the retentions were extremely excessive. Here the officers had to live not on their salaries, but on their own income. That is why these units were staffed with officers by young people from the upper strata of society, the privileged classes.

The list of mandatory deductions reached more than two dozen, including: for officer loan capital, officer meeting, for the organization of regimental holidays, comradely and camp dinners, random deductions (for gifts and farewells), the entrance fee for young officers upon arrival in the regiment and etc. Deductions of approximately 400 rubles were considered normal. per year, and in the “general regiments” they reached 780 rubles. and even more than 1000 rubles. and then almost the entire salary of junior officers ended up in deducted amounts. At a meeting of the State Duma, an example was given of deductions from one second lieutenant in 1906, 1907 and 1908. In one month his entire salary was withheld; in other months he was left with from one to eight rubles. This situation with deductions from salary was considered “a serious ulcer in officer life.”

Banquet at the regimental officers' meeting

Of course, at the front, not all monetary payments turned out to be justified from the point of view of achieving military success. General A. A. Brusilov, commander of the army, testifies that during the war partisan detachments were formed on the model of the Patriotic War of 1812, and the template of that time was strictly followed, although the conditions for the actions of partisans in the world war were completely different. In particular, the enemy front was continuous and there was no way for the partisans to influence its communications, as in 1812. With bitterness, A. A. Brusilov concludes that in the end, in the spring of 1916, the partisans were disbanded without bringing any benefit, and they cost a huge amount of money.

Table 4

Prices for food and industrial goods

from the middle of the 18th century to the beginning of the 20th century

Note: prices are given in kopecks.

5. New pension charter of 1912. Organization of provision for families of fallen soldiers

During the Russian-Japanese War and after its end, issues of pension provision for officers and their families were repeatedly discussed in the press. Such major shortcomings were noted as the provision of a pension only if there was at least 25 years of service, a sharp difference in the size of pensions (for 25 years - 50 percent of the salary, and for 35 years - the full salary). The officers proposed “to give the army a good pension charter... The pension period should begin after ten years of service and then for each subsequent year a certain share should be added until the full salary is served. Such a pension charter will make it possible at any given moment, without any compassion, to remove officers unsuitable for it from the army. Under the current system, when pension service begins only after 25 years, one inevitably has to endure an unsuitable element in the service.”

From 1827 to 1912, i.e., for 85 years, pensions were assigned according to the pension charter of 1827, which was criticized for the fact that pension provision was not sufficiently linked to the service and salary of generals and officers.

In order to eliminate the imperfections of this charter, after the end of the war with Japan, the “Temporary Rules on Additional Pensions” were introduced, which were extended to combat officers. By paying these pensions, they sought to achieve not only an increase in the size of the pension, but also the creation of conditions for the rejuvenation of the army officer corps. According to the testimony of General A.I. Denikin, who had considerable experience in the army before the start of the World War, as a result of these changes in pensions, as well as new certification rules and testing the knowledge of senior officers, both the voluntary departure of officers from the army and their "forced screening". During 1906-1907. 50 to 80 percent of the commanders were fired and replaced, from the regiment commander to the commander of the district troops.

The temporary rules introduced a new, quite reasonable, rule for assigning pensions. The right to a pension at the last rank and position was conditioned by staying in them for at least two years. This was established in order to suppress the desire to obtain a higher position and rank only in order to immediately retire upon receiving a promotion. The temporary rules applied until 1912, and then they were included in the new charter.

The 1912 charter provided for an increase in the size of pensions; they were made more dependent on salary, characteristics and length of military service. The most important change that led to an increase in pensions was their calculation not only from salaries, as was the case for a century, but also from canteens and additional money. Bearing in mind that the size of the latter for generals and officers was quite significant, the size of pensions increased significantly. The adoption of a new pension charter, which had a significant impact on the situation of pensioners, was considered, along with an increase in pay, one of the major measures on the eve of the war in the general system of measures to improve the material support of military personnel.

Generals, officers and their families had the right to a pension from the state treasury. The size of the pension was calculated from salaries (basic or “reinforced”), canteens and additional money. For 25 years of service, 50 percent was due. salaries; for each year of service beyond 25 years, the pension increased by three percent (up to 35 years). Full pension was considered for 35 years of service in the amount of 80 percent. salaries The maximum and minimum pension amounts were established: 7,000 rubles. and 300 rub. in year. When granting pensions, maintenance salaries were determined by the last rank or position before dismissal, and if the service was less than two years, by the penultimate one.

A preferential calculation of length of service for retirement was provided for, including service in the active army, disciplinary units, remote areas, as pilots and educational personnel, and time spent on business trips to areas affected by the plague. The greatest increase in retirement experience was provided by service in Port Arthur during the siege of the fortress and being in a plague area, when one month was counted as twelve.

When military personnel were discharged due to illness or injury, the mandatory period of service for retirement was reduced, and disabled people of the first group were assigned a pension in the amount of their full annual salary. According to special rules, pensions were assigned to pilots retired due to illness. They were entitled to a pension with a short period of military service.

One can note considerable advantages in pension provision for military personnel who served in remote areas. They had three types of benefits: an increased pension, its assignment from the “enhanced” salary, preferential calculation of length of service (two days for three, three for four, four for five, depending on the area).

Benefits were also provided for a number of other persons when assigning pensions. It was not the Minister of War, but the Tsar personally who appointed increased pensions to the Minister, members of the Military Council and the Committee for the Wounded, commanders of military districts, corps commanders, heads of the main departments of the Ministry and the families of all these persons. Additional monthly payments, which were due to those awarded the St. George Cross or medal, were added to the pension when it was assigned. By decision of the king, personal pensions were assigned. For example, in 1916, the widow of a deceased colonel, the mother of three deceased officer sons awarded the Order of St. George, was awarded a pension in the amount of 3,000 rubles. in year.

Pension provision for officers at the expense of the emeritus fund carried out in the same manner as before. The size of pensions depended on two factors: the duration of membership in the fund and the length of military service. There was the concept of a “full salary of pensions”, equal to the salary, and since 1912 - the sum of the salary, canteen and additional money. This amount of pension was assigned if the length of military service and membership in the fund exceeded 35 years. For lower rates, the pension amount was set as a fraction of the full pension salary.

Table 5

Amount of pension from the emeritus fund

Three important conclusions emerge from the rules for assigning a pension at the expense of the emeritus fund. First, only officers and generals with at least 25 years of military service could receive it. With the same length of service, a pension was awarded from the State budget. Officers who were members of the treasury for quite a long time and paid dues, but did not serve in the army for 25 years, were not granted a pension from the emerital treasury. Secondly, a pension equal to cash salaries was provided for those with more than 35 years of military service. With such service, a full state pension was also awarded (80 percent of the salary). Long military service was thus stimulated by high pensions from two sources. Third, the right to receive a pension came only after 20 years of membership. Without this condition, even more than 25 years of military service did not provide the opportunity to use the capital of the treasury. This additional requirement was introduced in connection with the deterioration of the financial situation of the cash fund; it limited the number of people applying for help and at the same time stimulated entry into membership of the cash fund.

In 1917, a report on the cash turnover of the emeritus treasury of the military land department was published in the press, summing up the results of its 50-year activity. Over these years, pensions were granted to about 85 thousand people, more than half of them were military personnel. As of January 1915, there were about four tens of thousands of pensioners. It is significant that by 1915 the cash register had increased its capital to 111 million rubles, 93 percent. which was stored in interest-bearing securities that generated stable income. Another constant source of cash - contributions from military personnel's allowances - was less than this income. Profits from interest-bearing securities made it possible to more than cover all expenses. In 1914, for example, these expenses were four times less than income from interest-bearing securities. However, in connection with the ongoing war, an increase in the number of persons who were entitled to security from the treasury was expected and, in connection with this, a deterioration in its favorable financial situation.

Military personnel and their families in the pre-war years and during the war continued to receive helpat the expense of the Committee for the Wounded, the income of which was, as before, mandatory contributions from institutions and organizations, voluntary donations and interest for storing disabled capital in credit institutions. Analysis of data characterizing the state and use of committee funds on the eve of the war allows us to draw the following conclusions.

Firstly, the stable balance of the disabled capital reached a large amount - over 61 million rubles, it united several dozen separate capitals of different names (targeted donations).

Secondly, the number of persons who were taken under the protection of the Committee on the Wounded increased noticeably. There were over 100 thousand people receiving pensions alone, and benefits were paid to more than three tens of thousands.

Thirdly, the bulk of the disabled capital was spent on paying pensions (over 80 percent), i.e., for the purpose of providing regular assistance. Receiving a monthly pension by a military personnel or a member of his family contributed to the stability of their financial situation, and the assignment of pensions for life or for a long time guaranteed their constant financial security. Assistance from disabled capital served as good material support for military personnel or their families, since the size of the pension could be half or more of their salary.

Fourthly, the list of assistance and services provided at the expense of disabled capital funds has expanded (about two dozen). Particularly noteworthy is the Committee's compassionate care for the children of fallen servicemen. Very multi-purpose sums were allocated for them, including for their maintenance in childhood, education in secondary and higher educational institutions and for other needs.

IN the war years were accepted measures to ensure the fastest possible financial support for the families of fallen soldiers.

Family members of officers who went to war were paid all or part of the serviceman's allowance (salary and table money), according to the serviceman's statement, as well as apartment rent and money for hiring servants.

If the family of a serviceman remained to live in the military unit in which the head of the family served, then cash payments to the family were made by order of the commander of this military unit (according to an allocation for the treasury). If the family did not live at the location of the unit or the military unit left for the front, then the care of the families lay with the district military commanders. The military units sent these commanders, in whose district the families would live, a certificate for the right to receive part of the salary of the head of the family, as well as rent money and for hiring servants. The certificate was sent only once and was replaced if it was necessary to increase, decrease or even stop issuing the specified types of monetary allowance to the family (in the event of a change in the service status of a military man, leaving service, or death).

Based on these certificates, the district military commander issued a monthly certificate to the family to receive the required money from the local treasury, which remained in the treasury and was then sent to the control body. All communications regarding the replacement of certificates or termination of their validity were made by telegraph.

If there was no news from the serviceman and his fate was unknown, then the family was paid a “temporary allowance”, consisting of one-third of the salary allowance (salary and table money) and the full norms for hiring servants. Once the pension was assigned, payment of this allowance to the family was stopped and a recalculation was made. At the same time, the family was entitled to an additional payment if the pension turned out to be more than the temporary allowance. If, on the contrary, the pension was assigned in a smaller amount than this allowance was paid, then no deduction was made from the family.

In order to shorten the period of payment of temporary monetary allowance to the officer's family and to more quickly process the pension, it was decided to assign conditional or temporary pensions. The final calculation of the pension required the submission of many documents and therefore the correct calculation of the pension could not be made, with very rare exceptions, until the end of hostilities. Therefore, a conditional, or temporary, pension was introduced, for the registration of which a strict deadline was set - one month from the date the family member signed the application for a pension. The district military commander sent notification of the death of a serviceman, a request for a pension, and a sheet with some additional information directly to the General Staff, which transferred these documents to the State Treasury. The granting of the pension was then reported to the district chief, the family and the local treasury.

At the end of hostilities, the military unit in which the deceased serviceman served was obliged to send a verified service record to the General Headquarters to establish whether the assigned (conditional) pension was actually due. The results were reported to the State Treasury and the conditional pension was replaced by a permanent one.

If we objectively consider the position of the army at the time of the death of the Russian Empire, a sad picture easily emerges. There is a myth about the officers of the tsarist army. This will be somewhat surprising, but, in my opinion, it was created primarily by Soviet propaganda. In the heat of the class struggle, “gentlemen officers” were portrayed as rich, well-groomed and, as a rule, dangerous enemies, the antipodes of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army in general and its command staff in particular. This was especially evident in the film “Chapaev”, where instead of Kolchak’s rather poorly dressed and trained troops, Chapaev was confronted by the “Kappelites” in clean black and white uniforms, advancing in a “psychic” attack in a beautiful formation. According to high income, training was also assumed, and as a consequence, a high level of training and skills. All this was picked up and developed by fans of “The Russia We Lost” and the White Cause. Despite the fact that among them there are, of course, talented historians and simply lovers of military history, the praise of the officers often reached the point of absurdity.

In fact, the situation with the combat training of officers was initially sad. And not the least role in this was played by the rather difficult financial situation of the officers. Roughly speaking, the best students of the gymnasium simply did not want to “pull the burden” in the service of an officer, when much simpler and more profitable career prospects in the civilian field opened up before them. It is no coincidence that the future Marshal of the Soviet Union, and at the beginning of the 20th century, cadet Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, wrote in his memoirs: “ Of course, it was difficult for my then comrades to understand my decision to go to military school. The fact is that I graduated from a real school, as noted above, with an average score of 4.3. With this score they usually entered higher technical educational institutions. In general, young people with weak theoretical training went to military schools. At the threshold of the 20th century, such an opinion about the command staff of the army was quite common."Boris Mikhailovich himself joined the army because" My parents lived very frugally, because my younger sister Yulia also started studying in Chelyabinsk at a girls’ gymnasium. I had to think more than once about the questions: how can I make life easier for my family? More than once the thought came to mind: “Shouldn’t I go into military service?” Secondary education would allow one to enter directly into a military school. I couldn’t even dream of studying at a higher technical institution for five years at my parents’ expense. Therefore, I have already, privately, firmly decided to go along the military line.»

Contrary to the cliche about officers as noble landowners, in fact, officers at the end of the Romanov era, although they came, as a rule, from the nobility, were close to commoners in their financial situation.

« The presence of land ownership even among the generals and, oddly enough, the guards was far from a frequent occurrence. Let's look at the numbers. Of the 37 corps commanders (36 army and one guards), data regarding land ownership is available on 36. Of these, five had it. The largest landowner was the commander of the Guards Corps, General. V.M. Bezobrazov, who owned an estate of 6 thousand dessiatines and gold mines in Siberia. Of the remaining four, one had no indication of the size of his estate, and each of the three had about one thousand dessiatines. Thus, in the highest command category, with the rank of general, only 13.9% had land ownership.
Of the 70 heads of infantry divisions (67 army and 3 guards), as well as 17 cavalry divisions (15 army and two guards), i.e. 87 people, 6 people have no information about property. Of the remaining 81, only five have it (two guards generals, who were large landowners, and three army generals, two of whom had estates, and one had his own house). Consequently, 4 people, or 4.9%, had land ownership.

Let's turn to the regiment commanders. As mentioned above, we analyze all the grenadier and rifle regiments, and half of the infantry regiments that were part of the divisions. This amounted to 164 infantry regiments, or 61.1% of the total. In addition, 48 cavalry (hussars, lancers and dragoons) regiments, which were part of 16 cavalry divisions, are considered.” If we compare these figures with similar ones for civil officials of the same classes, we get the following: “Let us turn to the list of civil ranks of the first three classes. In 1914, there were 98 second-class officials, of which 44 owned land property, which was 44.9%; third class - 697 people, of which 215 people owned property, which was 30.8%.

Let us compare data on the availability of land ownership among military and civilian officials of the corresponding classes. So, we have: second class ranks - military - 13.9%, civilians - 44.8%; third class - military - 4.9%, civilians - 30.8%. The difference is colossal.»

About the financial situation P.A. Zayonchkovsky writes: “ So, the officer corps, which included up to 80% of the nobles, consisted of the serving nobility and in terms of financial status was no different from the commoners"Quoting Protopresbyter Shavelsky, the same author writes: " The officer was an outcast from the royal treasury. It is impossible to indicate a class in Tsarist Russia that was worse off than the officers. The officer received a meager salary that did not cover all his urgent expenses /.../. Especially if he had a family, eked out a miserable existence, was malnourished, entangled in debt, denying himself the most necessary things.»

As we have already seen, the land holdings of even the highest command staff were in no way comparable to those of civil officials. This was partly a consequence of the fact that the salaries of officials were significantly higher than that of generals: “ As mentioned above, the annual salary of the division chief was 6,000 rubles, and the governor’s salary was from 9,600 thousand to 12.6 thousand rubles per year, i.e. almost twice as much.“Only the guardsmen lived lavishly. General Ignatiev colorfully, although perhaps somewhat tendentiously, describes his service in perhaps the most elite regiment of the army of the Russian Empire - the Life Guards Cavalry Regiment. He notes the enormous “cost” of serving in this regiment, which was associated with the cost of uniforms, two particularly expensive horses, etc. However, P.A. Zayonchkovsky believes that even this was not the most “expensive” regiment. He considers this to be the Life Guards Hussar Regiment, during service in which he had to spend 500 rubles a month - the salary of the division chief! In general, the Guard was a completely separate corporation, the existence of which brought great confusion to the career growth of officers.

On the one hand, the guard was staffed by the best graduates of schools. To do this, you had to get a “guards score” (more than 10 out of 12). Moreover, thanks to the system in which graduates chose their vacancies in order of average scores, the best cadets entered the guard. On the other hand, vacancies in the guard were available only in elite educational institutions. For example, it was almost impossible for a non-nobleman to get into the most elite Corps of Pages. Already fourth on the semi-official list of the most prestigious schools, Aleksandrovskoe always had a minimum of guards vacancies, and therefore Tukhachevsky was very lucky in that he was able to graduate as the best among the cadets. Thus, the already closed nature of the schools, which had a significant number of vacancies, greatly limited the entry of unborn cadets there. However, this was not the last obstacle to getting into the guard. According to an unspoken law, but firmly followed and noted by many researchers: joining the regiment must be approved by the officers of the regiment. This closeness and casteism could block the path up the career ladder for any “freethinker,” since loyal feelings were mandatory for service in the guard. Finally, we have already talked about the “property qualification”. Thus, first of all, rich, well-born officers ended up in the guard. True, they had to complete the school course with excellence, but most equally, if not more talented officers did not even have the opportunity to join the guards regiment. But the guard was the “forge of personnel” for the generals of the tsarist army! Moreover, promotion in the guard was, in principle, faster and easier. Not only did the guardsmen have a 2-rank advantage over army officers, but there was also no rank of lieutenant colonel, which further accelerated growth. We are no longer talking about connections and prestige! As a result, most of the generals came from the Guard; moreover, most of the generals who did not have an education at the General Staff Academy came from there. Eg " in 1914, the army had 36 army corps and 1 guard corps. ... Let us turn to the data on education. Of the 37 corps commanders, 34 had higher military education. Of these, 29 people graduated from the General Staff Academy, 2 from the Artillery Academy, and 1 from the Engineering and Legal Academy. Thus, 90% had a higher education. The three who did not have higher education included the commander of the Guards Corps, General. V.M. Bezobrazov, 12th Army Corps General. A.A. Brusilov and the 2nd Caucasian Corps, General. G.E. Berkhman. Of the listed corps commanders, 25 people in the past, and one (General Bezobrazov) currently served in the guard.»

It is difficult to agree with the author that this was explained solely by the “ability” of the guards. After all, it was they who first of all got to the highest positions, without having an education from the Academy of the General Staff, which the author himself admits: “ According to the “Schedule” of 1914, the Russian army consisted of 70 infantry divisions: 3 guards, 4 grenadiers, 52 infantry and 11 Siberian rifle divisions. Their commanders were lieutenant generals... By education: 51 people had higher military education (46 of them graduated from the General Staff Academy, 41 graduated from the Military Engineering Academy, 1 from the Artillery Academy). Thus, 63.2% had higher education. Of the 70 commanders of infantry divisions, 38 were guardsmen (past or present). It is interesting to note that of the 19 people who did not have a higher military education, 15 were guards officers. The guards' advantage was already showing here.“As you can see, the “guards advantage” affects the level of division commanders. Where does it go when the same people are appointed to the slightly higher post of corps chief? Moreover, for some unknown reason, the author was mistaken about G.E. Berkhman’s lack of higher education, and the rest of the generals were precisely from the guard. Bezobrazov, who did not have a higher education, but was very rich, generally commanded the Guards Corps. Thus, the guard was a “supplier” of academically uneducated officers to the highest echelons of the army.

We can talk about such a serious problem as the lack of fairness in the distribution of ranks and positions: richer and more well-born officers, once in the guard, had a much better chance of making a career than those who pulled the burden and were sometimes more prepared (if only because of less ceremonial conditions of service) army colleagues. This could not but affect the quality of training of senior command staff or the psychological climate. It is known that division into “castes” reigned in the army. As already mentioned, guardsmen were allocated to a special group, having significant preferences among all officers. But it cannot be said that there were no frictions and differences within the guard and the rest of the army. Thus, the most educated officers traditionally served in the engineering troops and artillery. This was even reflected in jokes: “a handsome man serves in the cavalry, a smart man serves in the artillery, a drunkard serves in the navy, and a fool serves in the infantry.” The least prestigious was, of course, the infantry. And the “aristocratic” cavalry was considered the most prestigious. However, she also shared. So the hussars and lancers looked down on the dragoons. The 1st Heavy Brigade of the Guards Cavalry stood apart: the “courtiers” of the Cavalry Guards and the Life Guards Horse Regiment, “fought” for the title of the most elite regiment. In the foot guards, the so-called "Petrovskaya Brigade" - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments. But, as Minakov notes, even here there was no equality: Preobrazhensky was more well-born. In the artillery, the cavalry was considered the elite, but the serfs were traditionally considered “outcasts,” which came back to haunt them in 1915 during the defense of fortresses. Of course, it cannot be said that such differences do not exist in other armies, but there was nothing good in separating and isolating different types of troops from each other.

Almost the only opportunity to accelerate career growth for talented army officers was admission to the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff. The selection there was very careful. To do this, it was necessary to pass preliminary exams, and then entrance exams. At the same time, the best officers of the regiments initially surrendered them. According to Shaposhnikov, in the year of his admission, 82.6% of those who passed the preliminary exams passed the competition. However, despite such a careful selection of applicants, applicants had serious problems with general education subjects. " 1) Very poor literacy, gross spelling errors. 2) Poor overall development. Bad style. Lack of clarity of thinking and general lack of mental discipline. 3) Extremely poor knowledge of history and geography. Insufficient literary education“However, one cannot say that this applied to all General Staff officers. Using the example of B.M. Shaposhnikov, it is easy to see that many of them did not have even a shadow of the problems mentioned above in the document. However, it should be noted that subsequent problems with education in the Red Army were radically different from similar ones in the tsarist army. The image of a well-educated tsarist officer is fairly idealized.

Training at the General Staff Academy lasted two years. In the first year, both military and general education subjects were covered, while military officers mastered disciplines related to the combat operations of units. In the second year, general education subjects were completed, and disciplines related to strategy were studied from the military. In addition, every day there were horse riding lessons in the arena. As Shaposhnikov notes, this was a consequence of the experience of the Russian-Japanese War, when the division, during the battles near the Yantai mines, Orlov’s division scattered, ending up in a high kaoliang, when the chief of staff’s horse bolted and he could not stop it, leaving the division completely decapitated, since the commander division was wounded. Perhaps this was already unnecessary for the positional massacre of the First World War, but in response to the critical remark of Boris Mikhailovich himself about the archaic nature of the horse as a method of transportation compared to the automobile introduced in Europe, we note that Russian industry simply did not have the ability to supply the army with a sufficient amount of transport. Buying it abroad was expensive and quite reckless from the point of view of independence from foreign supplies.

The training itself also had significant shortcomings. For example, many authors note little attention to the development of initiative and practical skills in general. Classes consisted almost exclusively of lectures. The end result, instead of highly qualified staff workers, was theoreticians who did not always have an idea of ​​how to act in a real situation. According to Ignatiev, only one teacher even focused on the will to win.

Another problem was the enormous amount of time spent on some completely outdated items, such as drawing the terrain in line drawings. In general, this art was such a memorable subject that many memoirists write unkind words about it. ,
Contrary to the well-known myth about the generals’ passion for the French school of Grandmaison, “élan vitale”6, Shaposhnikov testifies to his sympathy for German theories. True, he notes that the top generals were not familiar with German methods of war.

In general, the strengths of the career officers of the tsarist army were their fighting spirit and readiness for self-sacrifice. And there could be no talk of carelessness like conversations about absolutely secret things in a cafe, which Shaposhnikov describes in “The Brain of the Army” in relation to the Austrian army. The concept of an officer’s honor was worth a lot to career military personnel. Young officers of the General Staff, after the reforms carried out by Golovin, received a generally good education, despite many shortcomings. What was especially important was that the tactics of the German troops were no longer a revelation to them, as they were to more senior commanders. The problem of the latter was a weak interest in self-development, in innovations both in technology and in the art of war. As A.M. Zayonchkovsky notes, the disastrous situation with the training of senior command personnel was partly a consequence of the General Staff’s inattention to the problem: “About Paying great attention to the training of troops and the improvement of junior command personnel, the Russian General Staff completely ignored the selection and training of senior command personnel: the appointment of persons who spent their entire lives after graduating from the academy in an administrative position immediately to the position of division chief and corps commander was not uncommon.“Before the Russo-Japanese War, this situation was especially clear. There were jokes: “ in 1905–1906 Commander of the Amur Military District, Gen. N.P. Linevich, seeing the howitzer, asked in surprise: what kind of weapon is this?"The same author notes: " The same Lenevich (correctly Linevich - N.B.) did not know how to read maps properly and did not understand what it was like for trains to move on schedule. “And among the commanders of regiments and brigades,” Shavelsky further notes, “sometimes there were complete ignoramuses in military affairs. Military science was not loved by our military" Denikin echoes them:

"I The Japanese war, among other revelations, led us to the realization that command personnel need to learn. Forgetting this rule was one of the reasons for the dependence of many commanders on their headquarters. Before the war, the commander, starting from the position of regiment commander, could remain calm with the “scientific” baggage that he once carried out from the military or cadet school; may not have followed the progress of military science at all, and it never occurred to anyone to take an interest in his knowledge. Any inspection would be considered insulting... The general condition of the unit and partly only its control during maneuvers provided a criterion for the commander’s assessment. The latter, however, is very relative: given the inevitable conventionality of maneuvering actions and our general complacency during maneuvers, it was possible to make as many gross mistakes as we wanted and with impunity; the disapproving review in the description of large maneuvers, which reached the units after a few months, lost its sharpness.»

In addition, the officer corps at the highest echelons was extremely old. The corps commanders were distributed by age as follows: from 51 to 55 years old - 9 people, from 56 to 60 - 20, and from 61 to 65 - 7. Thus, over 75% of corps commanders were over 55 years old. Their average age was 57.7 years. The division commanders were only slightly younger. From 51 to 55 years old - 17, from 56 to 60 - 48 and from 61 to 65 - 5. Thus, the bulk of the commanders of infantry divisions were over 55 years old. Their average age was 57.0 years. True, the commanders of cavalry divisions were on average 5.4 years younger. And this was after the “purge” carried out by the energetic Minister of War Roediger, who, however, quickly lost his portfolio and was replaced by the less firm Sukhomlinov. During his rather short reign, the certification commission that worked under his leadership was appointed: commanders of district troops - 6; their assistants – 7; corps commanders - 34; fortress commandants – 23; chiefs of infantry divisions - 61; chiefs of cavalry divisions - 18; heads of individual brigades (infantry and cavalry) - 87; commanders of non-separate brigades - 140; commanders of infantry regiments - 255; commanders of individual battalions - 108; commanders of cavalry regiments - 45. He also petitioned for the dismissal of the most mediocre commanders from the army. But Nicholas II became the problem. Now praised with all his might, the monarch cared little about the combat effectiveness of the army, paying much more attention to its uniform and loyalty to the throne. The tsar in every possible way prevented the removal of generals he liked and the financing of the army to the detriment of the fleet. The appointment of Yanushkevich, who was completely inappropriate for the position of Chief of the General Staff, for example, became possible only thanks to the patronage of the Sovereign. No less blame lies with the prime minister, since the distribution of budget funds largely depended on him. That is why he protected from dismissal the generals who showed talent in pacifying the rebels, and not on the battlefield. Quoting Polivanov’s diary P.A. Zayonchkovsky writes: “ “Received from E.V. journal of the Higher Attestation Commission regarding corps commanders; permission followed for the dismissal of the gene. Shutleworth; against the conclusion on the dismissal of the general. Krause and Novosiltseva - the highest resolution is to “leave”, but against the gene. Adlerberg: “I know him, he is not a genius, but an honest soldier: in 1905 he defended Kronstadt”" What blood it cost to appoint Rennenkampf, who had not distinguished himself in any way on the battlefields of Manchuria, but was the “hero” of the suppression of the 1905 revolution, as commander of the army invading East Prussia is well known.

True, it cannot be said that they did not try to rectify the situation. As the same Denikin writes “T one way or another, after the Japanese war, senior command staff were also forced to study. In the spring of 1906, the order of the Minister of War first appeared by order of the highest order: “Troop commanders should establish appropriate training for senior command personnel, starting with unit commanders up to and including corps commanders, aimed at developing military knowledge.” This innovation caused irritation at the top: the old people grumbled, seeing in it a desecration of gray hairs and an undermining of authority... But things progressed little by little, although at first there were some frictions and even oddities."It was possible to partially instill an interest in self-development in artillery: " Never before has military thought probably worked so intensively as in the years following the Japanese War. They talked, wrote, and shouted about the need to reorganize the army. The need for self-education increased, and, accordingly, interest in military literature increased significantly, causing the emergence of a number of new bodies. It seems to me that if it were not for the lesson of the Japanese campaign and the subsequent recovery and feverish work, our army would not have withstood even several months of the test of a world war...“However, the white general immediately admits that the work was proceeding at a very slow pace.

However, it cannot be said that these measures did not affect the combat effectiveness of the army. A.A. Svechin writes: “N e less progress should be noted both in relation to tactical training of troops and in improving the qualifications of middle and lower command personnel».

But this was not enough. It’s hard to disagree with A.M. Zayonchkovsky, who gave a very short, but also very succinct description of the Russian army before the First World War: “ In general, the Russian army went to war with good regiments, with mediocre divisions and corps, and with bad armies and fronts, understanding this assessment in the broad sense of training, but not personal qualities.»

The Achilles heel of the old army was the complete absence of any political preparation. The officers were ready to go to their own death, but they did not know how to lead. Svechin in his book “The Art of Driving a Regiment” points to the inability of career officers to communicate with soldiers, understand their needs and build discipline that is suitable not only in peacetime. We must understand that the days of Friedrich’s principle “a soldier should be more afraid of the non-commissioned officer’s stick than the enemy’s bullet” are long gone and it is impossible to keep a soldier at the front only by force. Alas, no one simply taught Russian officers this. And given their completely childish knowledge of social and political sciences, it is not difficult to understand that the officers were completely disoriented when faced with the propaganda of socialist parties. The separation of officers from the mass of soldiers also had an effect. For example, Ignatiev notes that scuffles in the 1st Guards Cavalry Division were not used solely due to Guards tradition. The so-called “tsug”, similar in meaning to modern hazing, was also considered a completely normal phenomenon. , All this was not noticeable for a significant part of the war, but the collapse of discipline, and as a consequence of the entire army in 1917, perfectly showed what inattention to the moral climate within the army team could lead to.
The outbreak of World War II completely revolutionized the officer training system. If before that they were trained according to a completely harmonious system, going from the cadet corps to the school, and after graduation and service the best of them could graduate from one of the academies, but now, although the schools continued to train lieutenants, but only according to a greatly reduced accelerated course. But they could not satisfy the needs of the army. A significant number of warrant officer schools were opened, producing officers with extremely poor skills and knowledge.

The most difficult situation was in the infantry. You can often see ratings like this:

« Our infantry regiments lost several sets of command staff during the World War. As far as I can judge from the data I have, only in a few regiments the loss of officers killed and wounded drops to 300%, but usually reaches 400 - 500% or more.

For artillery I do not have sufficiently complete data. Information for a number of artillery brigades indicates officer losses (over the entire war) of 15 - 40%. The losses of technical troops are even less. In the cavalry, losses are very uneven. There are parts that have suffered greatly, while in others the loss is completely insignificant. In any case, even the losses of the most damaged cavalry units are negligible in comparison with the losses of the infantry.”

The consequence of this situation was, on the one hand, a sharp “washing out” of the best-trained personnel. Those. Even those officers who were available and commanded units did not have sufficient education and experience by the end of the war. “The senior command (commanding) staff, taken from the army alone, does not represent such a large group in number that the results of its consideration could be applied to the entire Russian army without significant reservations...

First of all, when considering the data on the command staff, a significant percentage of temporary commanders strikes the eye: namely, 11 out of 32 regiments... According to the previous service before receiving the regiment, 27 regiment commanders (i.e., almost 85% of their total number) belong to the combat officers ; the remaining five held positions in various institutions and institutions of the military department (corps, military schools, etc.). Among the 32 regiment commanders there was not a single General officer. Headquarters. Undoubtedly, this is an accident, but a very characteristic accident, indicating a significant decrease among the infantry command staff of persons with higher military education... The qualifications for commanding regiments for the majority are very low:

from 1 to 3 months. at 8 regiments,
from 3 to 6 months. at 11 regiments,
from 6 to 12 months. at 8 regiments,
from 1 to 2 years. at 3 regiments,
more than 2 years. at 2 rows of regiments,
... The entire officer corps under study can be divided into 2 unequal, sharply different groups - into career officers and into wartime officers.
The first group includes all staff officers, almost all captains (9 or 10) and a small part of staff captains (7 out of 38).
The total number of career officers is 27, i.e. not a full 4% of the total. The remaining 96% are wartime officers»

So, the regular infantry officers have been knocked out. And who replaced them? This is where the very serious problem of the future Red Army lies. The fact is that the retired officers were replaced mainly by people who had completely insufficient training, both military and simply general education. The same author provides the corresponding tables:

Educational qualification	Staff officers	Captains	Staff captains	Lieutenants	Second Lieutenants	Ensigns	Total	Percent of total
Higher education	-	-	2	3	6	26	37	5
Secondary education	7	8	12	7	46	78	158	22
Secondary incomplete	4	2	3	20	37	81	147	20
Secondary incomplete	-	-	9	20	43	153	225	31
Preparation at home and at work	-	-	12	13	27	106	158	22
Total	11	10	38	63	159	444	725	100

These tables speak volumes. Firstly, it is clear that the rank of “captain” was almost unattainable for a wartime officer. It was the senior officers, therefore, who were most interesting as future cadres of the Red Army in terms of professional training. On the other hand, they had already reached high positions under the “old regime” and therefore the incentive for a career in the new army under new conditions was not as strong for them and therefore were not as loyal as junior officers. Secondly, it should be noted the difference in general education. His level of education for career officers was equal, however, it should be noted that incomplete secondary education is not exactly what was required of an officer in such a technically intensive war as the First World War. But already among the staff captains there is complete discord. Officers with higher education appear. Obviously, these are wartime volunteers who initially chose the civilian path for themselves, but whose fate was changed by the Great War. As the famous military writer Golovin notes, this was the best material for obtaining officers, since an intellectual could easily escape conscription and therefore those who joined the army had not only the best general education, but also the best fighting spirit, and in some ways the best moral qualities than, for example, the notorious “Zemgusars”. On the other hand, many officers did not even have a secondary education, but a lower one, or had no general education at all. Only a little more than a third of the staff captains had completed secondary education. This suggests, on the one hand, that the intelligentsia did not really want to join the army. On the other hand, the image of an officer of the “old army” as a person from the “educated classes”, which became widespread in the mass consciousness thanks to Soviet cinema, is far from the truth. The army was replenished mainly by poorly educated people. There was also some advantage to this. After all, these statistics indicate the class affinity of wartime officers (and, obviously, they were the main contingent among staff captains who did not receive a secondary education) of the new government.

Among lieutenants, second lieutenants and especially warrant officers, the situation with education becomes even worse. Among warrant officers, only less than a quarter of officers had a complete secondary education, and less than a third of the total graduated from military schools, rather than warrant officer schools.

Thus, two features should be noted. Firstly, the infantry personnel were largely eliminated. Companies, and often battalions, were commanded by wartime officers who, in principle, did not have sufficient training. Moreover, wartime officers did not have a reasonable education to be able to make up for educational deficiencies in the future.

In general, we have to admit that even before the Great War, officers had significant shortcomings in training. Moreover, if young commanders managed to receive an education in reformed schools and academies, then the senior, older command staff continued to lag far behind the requirements of the time in terms of their qualities. Theses about the loss of senior command personnel by the Red Army as a catastrophe are untenable. Even without mentioning the dubious benefits of elderly generals of the First World War during the Second World War, of which France is a brilliant example, one cannot help but see the superiority of the senior command staff of future opponents over domestic strategists, if not in talent, then in the level of training. Much worse was the killing of young officers during the First World War, and then the Civil War. Unfortunately, unlike Germany, the Republic of Ingushetia was unable to establish high-quality training for wartime officers, and this was for completely objective reasons: in Russia there simply was not a sufficient number of educated people. Like the Franco-Prussian War, the war on the Eastern Front was largely won by a Berlin schoolteacher.

It is interesting to note that large numbers of cadres of technical troops that were not knocked out ended up in the Red Army. But it was precisely these people “with a learned edging and a velvet collar,” according to Shaposhnikov, who had the highest percentage of those who graduated from the Academy of the General Staff among those admitted there, which indicates the best preparation. So, out of 6 engineers who entered together with Shaposhnikov, all 6 graduated. Of 35 artillerymen, 20, but out of 67 infantry officers, only 19!

________________________________________________________________________

Shaposhnikov B.M. Memories. Military scientific works. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1974. p. 55 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/shaposhnikov/index.html
There with. 52.
P.A. Zayonchkovsky (1904–1983): Articles, publications and memories about him. – M.: ROSSPEN, 1998. p. 46. ​​Quoted from: http://regiment.ru/Lib/A/7.htm
There with. 47
There with. 46
There with. 50-51
Ibid page 51
Ignatiev A. A. Fifty years in service. - M.: Voenizdat, 1986. p. 58 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/ignatyev_aa/index.html
MINAKOV S.T. SOVIET MILITARY ELITE IN THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE OF THE 20-30S http://www.whoiswho.ru/kadr_politika/12003/stm2.htm
Right there.
Shaposhnikov B.M. Op. op. With. 35
P.A. Zayonchkovsky Decree op. With. 41
There with. 42
http://www.grwar.ru/persons/persons.html?id=378
Minakov S.T. Decree op. http://www.whoiswho.ru/kadr_politika/12003/stm2.htm
Shaposhnikov B.M. Decree op. With. 129.
Zayonchkovsky P.A. Decree op. With. 27
Shaposhnikov B.M. Decree op. With. 127.
Ignatiev A.A. Decree op. With. 102
There with. 99
Shaposhnikov B.M. Decree op. With. 135
Shaposhnikov B.M., The brain of the army. - M.: Voengiz, 1927 Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/science/shaposhnikov1/index.html
Zayonchkovsky A. M. The First World War - St. Petersburg: Polygon Publishing House LLC, 2002. - 878, p. ill., 64 colors. ill. - (Military History Library).
pp.14–15. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/h/zayonchkovsky1/index.html
P.A. Zayonchkovsky Autocracy and the Russian army at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries, M., 1973. p. 174 Quoted from: http://regiment.ru/Lib/A/18/4.htm
Ibid.
Denikin A.I. Old army. Officers / A. I. Denikin; preface A. S. Kruchinina. - M.: Iris-press, 2005. - 512 p.: ill. + insert 8 pp. - (White Russia). Circulation 3000 copies. ISBN 5–8112–1411–1. Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/denikin_ai4/index.html p. 109
Zayonchkovsky P.A. Decree op. With. 41-42
Right there.
Right there. P.38-39
There with. 40.
Denikin A.I. Decree op. With. 110–111.
There with. 221.
The Great Forgotten War. – M.: Yauza; Eksmo, 2009. – 592 p. With. 7.
Zayonchkovsky A.M. Op. op. With. 16.
Ignatiev A.A. Decree op. With. 57.
Right there. pp.44–46.
Kamenev A.I. History of officer training in Russia. - M.: VPA im. Lenin, 1990. p. 163 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/science/kamenev2/index.html
On the question of the officer composition of the Old Russian Army towards the end of its existence. V. CHERNAVIN. Military collection of the society of adherents of military knowledge. Book 5, 1924, Belgrade. Quoted from http://www.grwar.ru/library/Chernavin-OfficerCorps/CC_01.html
Right there.
Right there.
Golovin N. N. Russia in the First World War / Nikolai Golovin. - M.: Veche, 2006. - 528 p. - (Military secrets of Russia). Circulation 3,000 copies. ISBN 5–9533–1589–9. With. 187 Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/research/golovnin_nn/index.html
Shaposhnikov B.M. With. 166–167.

1. On the question of the officer composition of the Old Russian Army towards the end of its existence. V. CHERNAVIN. Military collection of the society of adherents of military knowledge. Book 5, 1924, Belgrade. Taken from http://www.grwar.ru/library/Chernavin-OfficerCorps/CC_01.html
2. Zayonchkovsky A. M. The First World War - St. Petersburg: Polygon Publishing House LLC, 2002. - 878, p. ill., 64 colors. ill. - (Military History Library).
3.. Shaposhnikov B.M. Memories. Military scientific works. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1974. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/shaposhnikov/index.html
4. P.A. Zayonchkovsky (1904–1983): Articles, publications and memories about him. – M.: ROSSPEN, 1998. Quoted from: http://regiment.ru/Lib/A/7.htm
5. Ignatiev A. A. Fifty years in service. - M.: Voenizdat, 1986. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/ignatyev_aa/index.html
6.S.T.MINAKOV SOVIET MILITARY ELITE IN THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE OF THE 20-30S http://www.whoiswho.ru/kadr_politika/12003/stm11.htm
7.http://www.grwar.ru/persons/persons.html?id=378
8. Shaposhnikov B.M., The brain of the army. - M.: Voengiz, 1927 Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/science/shaposhnikov1/index.html
9. Kamenev A.I. History of officer training in Russia. - M.: VPA im. Lenin, 1990. Quoted from http://militera.lib.ru/science/kamenev2/index.html
10. Denikin A.I. Old army. Officers / A. I. Denikin; preface A. S. Kruchinina. - M.: Iris-press, 2005. - 512 p.: ill. + insert 8 pp. - (White Russia). Circulation 3000 copies. ISBN 5–8112–1411–1. Quoted from: http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/denikin_ai4/index.html

Salary of officers in Russia in 1913.

By 1913, in the Russian Army, the monetary income of officers consisted of the following elements:

The size of the salary was determined by the rank of the officer and the position held. The amount of pay was indicated in the regiments' staffs, time sheets and separate regulatory instructions of the Imperial Apartment and the Military Department. All documents of that time indicated the amounts due to the officer for the year. The issuance of money was carried out, as a rule, once every 4 months (the so-called issuance “in a third of the year”).

There were basic and enhanced salaries. Increased salaries were awarded to officers serving in remote areas.

	Basic salary				Enhanced salary
	Zhalov	Tables	By adding	Total	Zhalov	Tables	By adding	Total
General of infantry (cavalry) as corps commander	2100	5700	-	7800	2490	5700	-	8190
Lieutenant General as Division Chief	1800	4200	-	6000	2472	4200	-	6672
Major General as brigade commander	1500	3300	-	4800	2004	3300	-	5304
Colonel	1200	600	660	2460	1536	600	660	2796
Lieutenant colonel (military sergeant major) with 5 years of service or more	1080	600	660	2340	1344	600	660	2604
Lieutenant colonel (military sergeant major) with 1-4 years of service	1080	600	480	2160	1344	600	480	2424
Captain (captain, captain) 5th year of company command	900	360	480	1740	1080	360	480	1920
Captain (captain, esaul) 1-4 years of company command	900	360	360	1620	1080	360	360	1800
Staff captain (staff captain, podesaul) 5th year in the rank of junior officer of the company	780	-	420	1200	948	-	420	1368
Staff captain (staff captain, podesaul) 1-4 years in rank as a junior officer of a company	780	-	300	1080	948	-	300	1248
Lieutenant	720	-	240	960	876	-	240	1116
Second Lieutenant	660	-	180	840	804	-	180	984
Reserve ensign on active service in wartime	600	-	120	720	732	-	120	852
Reserve ensign on active service in peacetime	300	-	120	420	-	-	-	-

In the guard, officers received a salary one level higher than in the army, plus:
* second lieutenant of the guard - 147 rubles.
* guard lieutenant - 156 rubles,
* staff captain of the guard -169 rubles.
* captain of the guard - 183 rubles,
* Colonel of the Guard 343 rub.

Remote areas in which officers received increased salaries included:

*Petersburg Military District - Arkhangelsk Province local teams Kemskaya, Mezenskaya, Onezhskaya, Pinezhskaya, Kholomogorskaya.

*Kazan Military District - Turgai region, Ural region (but only on the left side of the Ural River and within the former region of the Orenburg Kyrgyz).

*Caucasian Military District - Kuban region, Terek region, Transcaucasia.

*Turkestan Military District - the entire territory of the district.

*Omsk Military District - Akmola region (except for the cities of Omsk and Petropavlovsk and the strip occupied by the Cossack population), Semipalatinsk region on the left side of the Irtysh River and in the border area with China, Kokpety, Zaisan police station, Berezovsky local team of the Tobolsk province.

*Irkutsk Military District - Yakut region, Transbaikal region, Irkutsk province, Yenisei province.

*Amur Military District - Primorsky Region, Amur Region, Kamchatka Region, Sakhalin Region.

Additional money was paid only to officers of combat units of infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineering and railway troops, i.e. those officers who served in regiments and individual battalions, as well as in the headquarters of brigades, divisions, corps, fortresses, and also who served as district military commanders.

Officers studying at military academies receive the same salary that they had at the time of entering the academy.

During ordinary leave for recreation or household chores lasting up to 2 months, the officer retained his full salary. However, provided that the officer uses his right to 2 months leave no more often than once every two years. Officers with the rank of captain and above - no more than once a year. In all other cases, the officer does not receive any pay during his vacation.

If an officer receives sick leave for up to 4 months, then he retains all of his pay during the leave.

Upon graduation from military academies, an officer has the right to one 4-month leave with full pay. Moreover, this right is retained for 3 years.

Officers dismissed from service receive their full allowance until the day they are removed from the unit's lists.

Officers awarded orders paid certain sums of money in a lump sum to the chapter of the order. The amount of the contribution was determined by the statute of the order.
So for the Order of St. Stanislav, 3rd degree, the fee was 15 rubles, 2nd degree, 20 rubles, for the Order of St. Anna 3rd degree 20 rubles, 2nd degree 35 rubles, for the Order of St. Vladimir 4th degree 40 rubles, 3rd degree 45 rubles.

Daily money.

1) For every day of duty on guard in their garrison, officers were paid:
*chief officers - 30 kopecks.
*staff officers - 60 kopecks.

2) When performing guard duty with travel outside the garrison, the paid time also includes the time traveling to the place of guard duty and back.

3) When performing tasks to restore order during mass unrest:
*generals - 3 rubles. per day,
*staff officers - 2 rubles. per day,

4) When troop movements (exercises, training marches, etc.) lasting more than 3 days, daily marching allowances are paid in the amounts:
*generals - 2.50 rub. per day,
*staff officers - 2.25 rubles. per day,
*chief officers - 1.5 rubles. per day.

5) During camp fees, daily camp money is paid:
*staff officers - 1.5 rubles. per day,
*chief officers - 1.0 rub. per day.

6) During field trips, daily allowance is paid (but not more than for 8-10 days):
*generals - 5 rubles. per day,

7) During business trips to the certification commissions and examination commissions:
*generals - 5 rubles. per day,
*staff officers - 4 rubles. per day,
*chief officers - 3 rubles. per day.

8) During business trips to the commissions to check the mobilization readiness of units:
*generals - 4 rubles. per day,
*staff officers - 3 rubles. per day,
*chief officers - 2 rubles. per day.

9) While traveling by rail on business trips
staff officers - 2.25 rubles. per day,
*chief officers - 1.50 rubles. per day.

10) Officers sent to train militia warriors - 3 rubles per day.

11) For officers appointed to the commissions for the construction of barracks from 5 rubles to 50 kopecks. per day, depending on the duties performed.

12) For officers on their way to treatment in medical institutions - headquarters officers 2.25 rubles per day, chief officers 1.50 rubles per day

Portion money

Portions were paid:
* For junior company officers (1 ruble per day) and company commanders (1.75 rubles per day) in the Merv district of the Trans-Caspian region in the Kerkinsk, Termez, Chardzhui garrisons.
* All chief officers 30 kopecks. per day in other areas of the Transcaspian region, in the steppe fortifications of the Turgai and Ural regions, in the Amur Military District, in the Transbaikal region,
*Officers on business trips from the main artillery department, headquarters officers - 1.75 rubles, chief officers - 1.15 rubles per day.
*Officers seconded to Uyezd (District) Military Presences for the duration of the conscription campaign - headquarters officers 1.25 rubles per day, chief officers 0.90 rubles. per day.
*Officers accompanying non-staff teams, prison parties and prisoners - headquarters officers 1 ruble per day, chief officers - 0.50 ruble per knock.
*Officers assigned to perform work in the engineering, artillery departments, work on the railway and seaports - headquarters officers - 0.30 rubles per day, chief officers 0.15 rubles per day.

Annual allowance for guard officers

*All guard officers receive an annual allowance in the amount of half their annual salary (salary and table money) from the emperor’s personal sums.

In addition to the regular salary of officers, there were also various one-time benefits designed to ensure the normal performance of official duties by officers:

One-time allowance for uniforms

*Graduates of military schools who successfully completed them in categories 1 and 2 - 300 rubles.
*Graduates of military schools who did not receive an officer rank and were released as non-commissioned officers - 50 rubles (if assigned an officer rank later - an additional 250 rubles).
*Military school graduates graduating into Cossack regiments as cornets - 300 rubles for uniforms and 200 rubles for a horse.
*Volunteers who have received the rank of second lieutenant and are assigned to active officer service - 300 rubles.
*Reserve warrant officers when called up for active service upon mobilization - 300 rubles.

One-time allowance for initial establishment

*For everyone who has received the rank of officer, upon arrival at the place of duty - 100 rubles.
*For those who successfully graduate from the Mikhailovsky Artillery Academy, upon admission to the Guards Artillery - 500 rubles, to the Army Artillery - 300 rubles.

One-time allowance for books and educational supplies

*Academy students in 1st grade -40 rubles.
*Academy students in the 2nd and subsequent grades of the academies receive 100 rubles.
*Students taking courses in oriental languages ​​- 15 rubles.

One-time benefit for graduation from the Nikolaev Military Academy

*Graduates who have served for graduation are entitled to an award based on length of service - an annual salary.
*Graduates who did not qualify for graduation are entitled to an award based on length of service - two annual salaries.
*Graduates who have completed an additional course at the academy - 300 rubles.

One-time release allowance at from the gymnastics and fencing school

*For those who successfully complete the course - 120 rubles.

One-time allowance upon taking office

*150 rubles - brigade commander, general for assignments under the district commander, head of the hospital, duty staff officer of the head of the local team, district military commander, chief of staff of the division, chief of staff of the fortress, chief of staff of the brigade, chief of staff of the Transbaikal Cossack army, staff officer at headquarters of the Cossack brigade, a number of positions in the artillery and engineering departments, commanders of cadet companies and battalions.

*100 rubles - a district military commander in small districts, a staff officer transferred to another garrison against his will, a captain upon promotion to lieutenant colonel, a staff officer of the General Staff, a staff officer of the corps headquarters, a number of positions in the artillery and engineering departments, military educational department

One-time benefit for treatment and funeral

*Lieutenant Colonel - 125-175 rubles.
*Chief officers - 30-125 rubles

Pass money

For official trips, as well as for trips upon assignment to service, appointment to a position, and transfers, officers were paid travel money.
The calculation of this money is not entirely clear to us today, but according to the reference book, the running money was issued on the basis of:
*field marshal general - for 20 horses,
*general of infantry (cavalry) - for 15 horses,
*lieutenant general - for 12 horses,
*major general - for 10 horses,
*colonel - for 5 horses,
*lieutenant colonel, guard captain - for 4 horses,
*captain and guard staff captain - for 3 horses,
*other officers - 2 horses.

Officers of the emperor's retinue and other officers sent urgently on special assignments receive double travel money.

Apartment money.

If an officer could not be provided with housing in state-owned houses or houses rented by the military department, then he was given money to rent an apartment. The size of the amounts given out varied greatly depending on the rank and on what category a particular locality belonged to. In total, areas were divided into 9 categories. The 1st category included the capital and some large provincial cities, the 8th category included small towns such as Zhmerinka, Galich, Zhizdra, Lipetsk. The 9th category included rural areas.
It is impossible to list all cities and amounts of rent within the scope of the article. Let's just say that the amounts ranged for full generals from 1692 rubles to 426 rubles, for chief officers from 246 rubles to 72 rubles. in year.
It can be said that the amounts should have provided for the rental of apartments in the sizes provided for by the standards of government apartments.

In addition to money to pay for the apartments themselves or the provision of government apartments, officers were given money for heating and lighting. The size of the amounts also depended on the category of the area (climate was also taken into account here) and the rank of the officer (obviously, this was based on the area of ​​the officer’s apartment).

Today it is difficult to judge how great the salary of officers of the Russian Army was. Even in comparison with the prices that existed then. Many books exploring the life of officers at the beginning of the 20th century say that the salary was completely insufficient, that chief officers almost starved and were forced to save on literally everything.
In any case, the statements of Soviet historiography that the officers of the tsarist army were entirely representatives of the exploiting classes, the so-called. The “white bone” and the mountain stood for autocracy and for the oppression of the working people are groundless.

Sources and literature

1. S.M.Goryainov. Statutes on military service. Commissioner of military educational institutions. St. Petersburg 1913
2. Reference book for combatant chief officers. Printing house of the Guard troops and the St. Petersburg Military District. St. Petersburg 1913
3. Directory of necessary knowledge. All Perm, Algos-Press. Permian. 1995
4. Life of the Russian Army of the 18th - early 20th centuries. Military publishing house. Moscow. 1999
5. A. Vorobyova and O. Parkhaev. Russian cadets 1864-1917. History of military schools.Astrel.AST. Moscow. 2002
6.A.A.Ignatiev. Fifty years in service. Military publishing house. Moscow. 1986
7.L.E.Shepelev. The official world of Russia. Art-SPB. Saint Petersburg. 2001
8. S.V. Volkov. Russian officer corps. Centerpolygraph. Moscow. 2003

Material support for officers of the Russian army during the reign of Alexander I

Nowadays there is a lot of talk about the need to raise the prestige of the military profession and revive the former glory of Russian officers. Russia's participation in the operations of peacekeeping forces, the conduct of military operations in the Chechen Republic, and the turbulent domestic and foreign political situation itself forces us to pay closer attention to the person in uniform, his social position, which makes it possible to honorably fulfill his professional duty.

In many countries, the military profession is one of the highest paid, which is associated with the constant risk that accompanies this type of activity. But the state of the armed forces, the financial situation of military personnel depends on several components: the economic and political situation in the state, society’s understanding of the need for the army and the military profession.

In Russia, military men were traditionally treated with respect, which was associated with an active foreign policy and frequent wars waged by the Russian state throughout the history of its existence. Constantly in need of highly professional army command staff, the Russian government tried to provide decent salaries for officers, established a pension or disability pay upon retirement, provided benefits for sending their children to state-owned educational institutions, and provided for families in the event of the death of an officer. This raised the prestige of the military profession, which became the main one for the Russian nobility. And although during the reign of Catherine II, according to the Charter of 1785, public service for nobles ceased to be mandatory, many nobles still chose military affairs. In addition, military service for many was practically the only source of income, an opportunity to provide decent support for their families.

The era of Alexander I was a brilliant page in the military history of the Russian state. During the military reforms of the first decade of his reign, a combat-ready army was created, which made it possible to defeat the seemingly invincible Napoleon Bonaparte. But the victory came at a heavy price: heavy human and material losses, a general decline in the country’s economy caused by Russia’s participation in the anti-British economic blockade, the ruin of a large part of Central Russia during the military operations of 1812, the enormous costs of maintaining the army, and complete financial breakdown. However, the government, having waged almost continuous wars since 1805, with France (1805-1807, 1812-1814), Turkey (1806-1812) and Sweden (1808-1809) tried, to the extent financially possible, to take care of the personnel of the army, paying special attention to the officer corps.

Contentment of officers of the Russian army in the first quarter of the 19th century. consisted only of cash salaries and rations (cash leave for the allowance of orderlies). Already in 1801, Alexander I, having ascended the throne, increased the salaries of officers by a quarter. The ration size was determined at 1 rub. 50 kopecks The number of rations depended on the rank of the officer and varied from 25 (cavalry colonel) to 3 (ensign of army infantry). That is, not only the material support of the officer, but also his orderly was determined by the height of the officer’s rank, which was fully consistent with the social structure of Russian society at that time. Rations were included in the salary and were issued along with it.

By 1805, the salaries of military personnel were increased again, which was associated with preparations for military operations against France, the need to fill command positions in the army with experienced officers who retired during the reign of Paul I. According to the new position, colonels, depending on the type of troops, received from 1040 to 1250 rub. per year, lieutenant colonels - 690-970 rubles, majors - 530-630 rubles, captains, staff captains, captains and staff captains - 400-495 rubles, lieutenants - 285-395 rubles, second lieutenants, cornets and warrant officers - 236-325 rub. Cavalrymen received higher salaries, which was associated with expenses on horses, their food and harness. The salary of privates was also increased: from 9 rubles. 50 kopecks up to 12 rubles, and on top of that they received from 11 rubles for uniforms. 63 kopecks up to 15 rub. 18 ? cop. and for cavalry harness from 8 rubles. 10 ? cop. up to 16 rub. 94 1/3 kop.

In 1809, ensigns, sub-ensigns and lieutenants of the troops located in the border three Baltic and two Lithuanian provinces, as well as in the Bialystok region, had their salaries increased by another third.1

Before the War of 1812, the value of the salary issued changed, as it began to be issued in paper notes, the rate of which had fallen significantly compared to silver. But initially, salaries in banknotes were given to troops at the then existing rate. At the end of the wars with France, only troops stationed in Georgia to conduct military operations in the North Caucasus received salaries in silver2, but by the end of Alexander’s reign their allowance was transferred to banknotes.

By 1825, the size of an officer's salary was finally determined: in the army infantry from 1200 rubles. per year up to 450 rubles. depending on the rank. In the guards and army cavalry the salary was slightly higher. The salaries of major generals were left the same: from 2,600 rubles. (major general) up to 8180 rub. (Field Marshal General). Since 1816, unit commanders and senior combat commanders were paid table money: regiment commander - 3,000 rubles, brigadier general - 4,000 rubles, division chief - 1,000 rubles. and corps commander - 10,000 rubles.3

And yet this salary was barely enough for a normal existence. The envoy of the Sardinian king to Russia, Count Joseph de Maistre, reported: “the military simply cannot exist anymore. Recently, one young officer said: “I have a salary of 1,200 rubles; a pair of epaulettes costs 200, and to have a decent appearance at court, I need half a dozen of them a year. So the account is very simple." I know officers who live only on their salaries, who simply do not go out, trying to take care of their uniforms. Outside of duty hours, they sit at home, like Trappist fathers, wrapped in greatcoats."4

The difficult financial situation in the state in the post-war period did not allow for a significant increase in officer salaries, which worried the emperor. Refusing to increase the salaries of quartermaster officials according to the new states developed by the Quartermaster General of the 1st Army E.F. Kankrin, Alexander wrote to the commander-in-chief of the 1st Army, Prince M.B. Barclay de Tolly on March 10, 1816: “Give everyone a decent salary has always been and is the object of my desires. But if, despite all this, even army officers, who in the field of blood have earned the right to an increase in their salaries, remain to this day with those insufficient salaries, which were determined by the States of 1802; then it would be unfair that at this time alone officials of the Quartermaster Department enjoyed the huge salary that was assigned according to the states of Kankrin."5

By increasing the salaries of generals, staff and chief officers, they cut costs on other parts of the military economy: forage, increasing the period of time for the army's horse grazing, and reducing the number of hoisting and combat horses in army infantry regiments. According to Barclay de Tolly, this could result in savings of 1,042,340 rubles for the 1st Army. (while 6,833,063 rubles were required for an increase in salary).6 More than once the emperor asked the commanders-in-chief of the 1st and 2nd armies, Prince Barclay de Tolly and Count Wittgenstein, to reconsider the cost of provisions.

The regime of severe austerity introduced in the army at the end of the French wars forced every penny to be saved, including on the salaries of officers whose behavior for some reason displeased their superiors. Thus, the Chief of His Imperial Majesty’s Main Staff, Prince P. M. Volkonsky, refused the request of the Chief of the Main Staff of the 1st Army, I. I. Dibich (April 26, 1815), to issue a salary to Lieutenant Colonel Konovalov for the period from May 1, 1812 to 1 September 1814 at the silver rate, since his statement about illness during this period aroused doubts from Volkonsky. At his own peril and risk, the head of the quartermaster unit of the Main E.I.V. headquarters, Major General N.I. Selyavin gave 500 rubles to a needy officer. from government funds.7

Trying to alleviate the situation of officers, especially young officers who had just graduated from college, the government allocated the amounts necessary for uniforms and the purchase of a riding horse (120-150 rubles, and the same amount for a saddle with equipment). But this amount was sometimes only enough to pay off the debts and, upon arriving at the unit, the officer again borrowed money, sometimes from government funds, unable to pay off the debts on a timely basis. Sometimes this led to lengthy correspondence between high military authorities, which sorted out the financial claims of the Quartermaster Department against officers and financial misunderstandings between fellow servicemen. There is a known case when Selyavin was forced to enter into a lengthy correspondence with the Quartermaster General of the 1st Army, Major General Harting, regarding a debt of 214 francs to the Parisian tailor of the quartermaster's ensign Genn, when he was in Paris during the Russian army's overseas campaign. The ensign’s father and the Chief of the General Staff, Prince Volkonsky, were also involved in the discussion of the possibilities for resolving this issue, who gave advice to the unlucky debtor to henceforth live within his means.8

Since many nobles who wanted to become officers did not have the means to fulfill their desire, in 1817, by a special decree, 16-year-old nobles wishing to enter military service were given an allowance for travel to the capital, which “will sufficiently facilitate the means for noble youth to enter the service in accordance with their rank."9 Poor young nobles could receive the necessary military education at public expense in secondary military educational institutions and army schools.

The government also considered the issues of maintaining officers who received wounds and injuries and were dismissed due to old age, illness and injury. According to the decree of May 21, 1803, officers who served 20 years without fault received a disability allowance, 30 years received half pay according to rank, and 40 years received full pay in the form of a pension. Those who became incapable of service due to injury were supposed to be provided with “decent service” content regardless of length of service. The length of service was counted from the moment of entry into active service (the time spent studying in the cadet corps was not counted). Since 1807, all officers who retired due to injury or injury were paid a lifelong pension in the amount of their full salary according to their rank, and were also paid for travel to their chosen place of residence. Officers assigned to disability support and who did not have their own home or estate were assigned apartments in the provincial cities of Central Russia, in Ukraine, in the Volga region and in Tobolsk. Officers dismissed for bad behavior, as well as persons who did not serve the required term, but applied for a pension after 8 years of retirement, received a lower pension salary of 1/3 of their salary. Even those dismissed by court decision could hope for a small pension, “so as not to be left without care and to provide them, out of philanthropy, with some means of subsistence.”

In 1805, in the Sergievskaya Hermitage near St. Petersburg, at the expense of the Counts Zubovs, the first invalid home for 30 officers was created. In 1807, following his model, state-run nursing homes for lower ranks were created in both capitals, Kyiv, Chernigov and Kursk.10

On August 18, 1814, on the anniversary of the Battle of Kulm, Alexander I established a special Committee for the Wounded to help poor wounded generals and officers. Funds for the Committee's needs came from the treasury and public donations. With the money collected by subscription by the publisher of the Russian Invalid, collegiate adviser Pesarovius (395 thousand rubles) in December 1815, 1,200 officers received pensions.11

In 1809, legislation began to formalize the provision of benefits to the families of deceased officers. For officer widows over 40 years of age or younger, but with physical disabilities that prevented them from getting married, pensions were established at 1/8 of their husbands' salaries. True, the pension was issued only to those who did not have real estate generating income in an amount exceeding the husband’s annual salary. Upon remarriage, the pension was lost. A pension was also given to orphans: daughters - until marriage or placement in an educational institution, sons - until the age of 16 or entering the service, as well as to a state-owned educational institution.

For officers who were killed or died from wounds, the pension to their widows was paid in full for life (from 1803 to 1809, the pension was paid even if they remarried). Pensions were also awarded to the mothers of fallen officers.12

Thus, the government of Emperor Alexander I tried to ensure that none of the military personnel who honestly fulfilled their duty to the Fatherland would be left without a means of subsistence or disgrace their rank by begging. It was even ordered to ensure that those “of them who, wishing better to evade from one place to another and bring the gullible into pity with their apparent poverty, rather than live peacefully where they can have an assigned allowance, do not behave in such behavior uncharacteristic of the rank of an officer.” 13

And in subsequent reigns, the Russian government invariably tried to take care of the financial situation of officers, regardless of the economic situation in the country, maintaining the high social status of the defenders of the Fatherland in society, which continued to make the military profession one of the most significant in Russia.