In January 1923 the Ruhr was occupied. Ruhr crisis. Exacerbation of the German problem

Until the end of 1922, Germany paid, according to the reparation commission, 1.7 billion marks in gold and about 3.7 billion in kind. Of this amount, England received 1.1 billion, and France - 1.7 billion. The size of the actual payments was far behind the reparation obligations. Germany constantly demanded a moratorium and, deliberately creating inflation, avoided its obligations in every possible way. The Poincaré government saw the only way out of the situation in putting forceful pressure on Germany through the occupation of the Ruhr region. England opposed these intentions and thereby actively encouraged the Germans to resist. While Poincaré demanded effective guarantees for the payment of reparations, England insisted on a moratorium for Germany. The British representative on the reparations commission made a special trip to Berlin in November 1922 and persistently advised the German government to stand firmly for the provision of a moratorium. Many British leaders deliberately provoked the Germans to oppose the payment of reparations, hoping to cause a crisis in which France would be defeated and lose its importance in European politics. This made the occupation of the Ruhr inevitable.

On the other hand, British politicians were inclined to welcome the Ruhr crisis, hoping that it would eliminate the tendency in Germany towards a separate agreement with France and make England ready to act as an arbiter. An important place in Lloyd George's plans was to involve the United States in European affairs, in particular, in financing Germany to pay payments and linking its own debt with them. British diplomacy provoked the Ruhr conflict without fully understanding the French diplomatic game.

France sought not only the payment of payments by Germany, but above all the establishment of the hegemony of French industry in Europe. The talk was about combining the coal and metallurgical industries of France and Germany. France needed coal; Germany had a shortage of iron ore. Even before 1914, some Ruhr companies bought iron ore enterprises in France, and French metallurgical companies bought Ruhr coal mines. The largest German industrialist Hugo Stinnes in 1922 intensively sought the possibility of creating a Franco-German cartel of coal and steel.24 The Ruhr occupation, with the participation of 5 French divisions and one Belgian, had as its main goal the integration of these two key industries under French control. The statements of French diplomats about security and reparations were only an additional argument to justify this act. In addition, the French ruling circles planned the dismemberment of Germany. The occupation was supposed to end with the annexation of the left bank of the Rhine and the Ruhr region to France, the separation of southern Germany from the northern, and the inclusion of the dismembered Reich in the sphere of French hegemony on the European continent.

The area of ​​French occupation covered an area 96 km deep and 45 km wide. But 80-85% of Germany's entire coal production, 80% of iron and steel production, and 10% of the country's population were concentrated in this small area. Shortly before the French intervention in Germany, a center-right government came to power, consisting of the German People's Party led by Stresemann, representatives of the Catholic Center, etc. The government was headed by a representative of German big capital, Wilhelm Cuno (1876-1933), who had extensive business connections in the USA and England.

Cuno's government, counting on the support of the United States and England, called on all employees, workers and entrepreneurs to renounce all cooperation with the occupying forces and stopped paying reparations altogether. It was a policy of passive resistance. All political parties supported her. The French occupation authorities began to evict from the Rhineland all government officials who took part in acts of sabotage. A total of 100 thousand workers and employees were evicted. The French began sending their own transport engineers and miners. The burden of intervention quickly grew on the French budget. At the same time, the occupation of the Ruhr and passive resistance led to the collapse of the German mark and the German economy was on the verge of complete collapse. The time came when the Berlin government could not find money to ensure passive resistance of the Ruhr population.

There was growing alarm in England about the French occupation of the Ruhr. English diplomats feared that if France succeeded, it would occupy a position similar to the one it occupied after the Peace of Tilsit. The support provided by England to Germany became more active. British diplomats encouraged the Germans to continue their resistance, advising them to hold out until the financial pressure on France from England and the United States took its toll. At the same time, England did not undertake anything real to materially support the German resistance. The leader of the German People's Party, Gustav Stresemann (1878-1929), wrote in his memoirs: “We were warned from confidential sources in this country (i.e. England) that the conflict could last for months and that we must hold out. The latest news from America allows to assume that America is inclined to participate in actions against France, at least in financial measures calculated to lower the franc"25. British diplomats deceived the Germans. They did not care about German destinies; it was important that France suffer economic damage and suffer political defeat. Exhausted Germans, half-starved urban residents of the Ruhr were to play the role of the vanguard in the English anti-French struggle. The Germans once again fell for the bait of the British and, there is no doubt that without the inspiring promises of England, the “passive resistance” of the Germans would not have lasted long and would not have brought any effect.

Whenever it seemed that the policy of passive resistance was beginning to weaken, and the shadow of a political and economic crisis hung over Germany, British diplomacy began to act especially actively. On August 11, 1923, Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Minister, in a note published in the press, sharply condemned France's Ruhr policy and threatened separate action if France did not agree to an agreement with Germany. The note stated that England “cannot advise Germany to cease passive resistance.” This was an attempt by England to directly intervene in the conflict and, at the same time, to encourage those circles of the German bourgeoisie who not only did not suffer from “passive resistance,” but also received substantial compensation from the government in the form of subsidies for business downtime.

But Poincare did not pay attention to Curzon’s note and demanded unconditional surrender from the German government. Germany had no choice. In August 1923, the Reichsbank did not even have depreciated marks to pay for passive resistance. The crisis in the country deepened every day. The political situation has become extremely tense. On August 12, 1923, the Cuno government fell and on August 13, Gustav Stresemann formed a “grand coalition” government, which included the Social Democrats, the Center Party, and others. The new government headed for an agreement with the French. This decision was accelerated by the announcement of a general strike in Germany. A separatist movement began in the country. In the western lands, the creation of the Rhine Republic was announced, which was announced in Cologne by the mayor of the city, Konrad von Adenauer. The collapse of the state was brewing. On September 27, the government announced an end to passive resistance. Stresemann explained this act of the German government, first of all, by fear of social upheaval. He wrote on October 10: “We stopped passive resistance because it completely exploded on its own and would only plunge us into Bolshevism if we continued to finance it.”26

The political situation was tense to the limit. Separatist uprisings occurred in Koblenz, Wiesbaden, Trier, Mainz, and a republic with its own armed forces was proclaimed in northern Bavaria. The French occupation authorities recognized the "de facto" governments of these "republics". In Saxony and Thuringia, as a result of local elections, coalition governments consisting of communists and socialists came to power. In Hamburg, on October 22-24, a popular uprising took place led by the city's communist leader, Ernst Thälmann, the future chairman of the German Communist Party. In Saxony and Thuringia, the “Red Hundreds” were created, which were armed revolutionary detachments. A fascist putsch began in Munich and a fascist organization led by Adolf Hitler began a march on Berlin on November 8, 1923. A civil war actually began in the country on the principle of “a war of all against all.” It was urgent to take measures to save the German state. On September 27, Stresemann announced the end of passive resistance. This was a tactical ploy by German politicians, who hoped that such a move would lead to negotiations with the French government and reparations and the withdrawal of troops from the Ruhr.

But the French government, taught by the bitter experience of the Germans’ attitude to the problem of reparations, refused to even talk about the Rhineland, the Ruhr and reparations. It stated that France needed certain guarantees, which could only be provided by the obligations of the Ruhr industrialists. The Ruhr magnates were forced to reach an agreement with the French military authorities. They feared that the French occupation of the Ruhr could result in permanent French control in western Germany, over the industry of the Ruhr and the Rhineland. Stresemann's government allowed Ruhr industrialists to begin negotiations with the French authorities on the issue of industrial production and payment of reparations. It promised to reimburse them later, when the opportunity to obtain foreign loans presented itself. On November 23, a comprehensive agreement was concluded with the occupation authorities, according to which German industrialists guaranteed reparations supplies and timely payment of monetary contributions. Poincaré won, the German government abandoned passive resistance and accepted the conditions of France. But much more important was England’s refusal to jointly oppose France with Germany. On September 20, 1923, after a meeting between the British Prime Minister S. Baldwin and Poincaré, a communiqué was adopted, which stated that both sides “were happy to establish a general agreement in views and to discover that on no issue there is such a disagreement about goals and principles that would hinder cooperation between both countries, cooperation on which so much depends on peace and harmony throughout the world."27

Germany once again received an object lesson from the diplomats of the “island of the Pharisees,” as the great English writer Galsworthy called England. England provoked the Ruhr crisis, brought Germany to economic collapse and betrayed it as soon as it became clear that France intended to carry out its Ruhr policy. France won economically and politically. She showed that she was a force to be reckoned with, whether England liked it or not. It has enough power resources to force Germany to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty of Versailles. Germany capitulated and had to change tactics. The main hopes were placed on the United States and the development of a new Eastern policy, the basis of which was relations with the Soviet Union. England had the opportunity to isolate France through an agreement with the USA and Germany.

The economic situation in Germany in 1922 continued to be extremely difficult. Industrial production was only two-thirds of pre-war levels. Inflation has increased. In April 1922, a gold mark was worth about one and a half thousand, and in January 1923 - more than 11 thousand paper marks. The standard of living of workers fell 4-5 times lower than before the war. The incomes of the middle strata fell catastrophically, their savings in banks turned into worthless pieces of paper.

Speculators paid for goods within the country with depreciated money, and abroad received hard foreign currency for them. Heavy industry magnates - Stinnes, Krupp, Fegler, Wolf and others - increased their capital. From 1919 to 1923, large capitalists exported 12 billion gold marks abroad.

"The children of Germany are starving!" Lithograph by K. Kollwitz. 1924

The concentration of production and capital increased. Created by Stinnes in the fall of 1921, the grand Siemens-Rhein-Elbe-Schuckert-Union trust had 1,220 industrial, banking and trading enterprises in 1923, owned forests and sawmills, shipping companies and shipyards, hotels, restaurants, and newspapers. Stinnes' economic interests extended to Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Brazil, and Indonesia. His fortune was estimated at 8-10 billion gold marks. His “empire” employed 600 thousand people.

The country's agriculture continued to deteriorate. From year to year, crop yields fell, the harvest of grains and potatoes decreased, and the number of livestock decreased. The poorest peasantry suffered especially; unable to buy fertilizers and feed for livestock, it suffered great hardships and went bankrupt.

Since May 1921, the post of Chancellor of Germany was held by one of the leaders of the Catholic Center Party, I. Wirth. A prominent member of his cabinet (Minister of Reconstruction and then Minister of Foreign Affairs) was W. Rathenau. Wirth and Rathenau believed that Germany should faithfully fulfill its reparation obligations. At the same time, reflecting the interest of a certain part of the industrial bourgeoisie in weakening Germany’s dependence on the victorious countries, they stood for the establishment of close economic ties and normal political relations with Soviet Russia. Therefore, the German government signed the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922, which strengthened Germany’s international position and created ample opportunities for German-Soviet economic cooperation. However, such a foreign policy line met with opposition from heavy industry magnates and farmers.

With the funds of monopolists and cadets, reactionary and fascist organizations were planted, which included former officers and non-commissioned officers, bourgeois youth, part of the bureaucracy and petty bourgeoisie, and declassed elements. They sought the liquidation of the Weimar Republic, the defeat of the Communist Party and other progressive forces, the establishment of an open dictatorship of monopoly capital and the transition to an aggressive foreign policy. Chauvinistic demonstrations, intimidation and murder became the main means to achieve these goals. Munich was the center of the fascist party that emerged in 1919. To deceive the workers, it called itself the National Socialist German Workers' Party; since 1921 it was headed by Hitler.

In Chemnitz, the Nazis staged a demonstration under the slogan “For God, the Kaiser and the Empire,” which ended in a bloody clash with the workers. In Munich, the Nazis publicly burned the banner of the republic. An attempt was made on E. Thälmann's life in Hamburg. Fascist gangs also attacked some representatives of the bourgeoisie - supporters of bourgeois democracy and moderate foreign policy. In August 1921, Erzberger, who signed the Compiegne Armistice on behalf of Germany, was killed, and in June 1922, Rathenau, who signed the Treaty of Rapallo.

The working class demanded an end to terrorist activities and reactionary provocations. In the summer of 1922, 150 thousand workers demanded the dissolution of fascist organizations in Cologne, 80 thousand in Kiel, 150 thousand in Düsseldorf, 200 thousand in Leipzig and 300 thousand in Hamburg. A powerful demonstration took place in Berlin, in which 750 thousand people participated. But the protests remained without consequences. The government did not take action against the Nazis.

In the fight against fascism, the activity of trade unions intensified, and the influence of communists grew. It was especially strong in the factory committees of metalworkers, builders, and woodworkers. The leadership of the Social Democratic Party and trade unions began to seek the exclusion of revolutionary workers from factory committees in order to keep these organizations in positions of cooperation with the bourgeoisie. But then new, revolutionary factory committees began to emerge. The First All-German Congress of Revolutionary Factory Committees, held in November 1922, declared the need to form a workers' government and arm the working class.

As a result of the aggravation of the internal political situation and pressure from extremely reactionary groups, Wirth's cabinet fell, and in November 1922 Cuno, a protege of the Stinnes group, formed a government of representatives of the People's Party, the Democratic Party and the Catholic Center Party. Cuno was closely connected with American capital as the general director of the Hapag shipping company, which had an agreement with the American concern Harriman, and as a member of the supervisory board of the German-American Petroleum Society, which was part of the Rockefeller trust.

Occupation of the Ruhr

At the London Conference of 1921, the victorious powers established the amount of German reparations at 132 billion gold marks. The financial ruin that reigned in Germany made it increasingly difficult to pay them. But the French government insisted on full and accurate payment of reparation payments, despite the difficult situation of the German economy and finances. France viewed the weakening of Germany as a guarantee of its security and ensuring its hegemony in Europe. Therefore, when England, at the Paris Reparations Conference convened in early 1923, proposed reducing the size of reparations to 50 billion marks and providing Germany with a moratorium (deferment of payments) for four years, France raised strong objections, and the conference was disrupted.

Following this, France, having agreed with Belgium, decided to occupy the Ruhr. The reason for this was Germany’s violation of the deadline for the supply of coal and timber. The occupation of the Ruhr, according to the plans of the French ruling circles, should have led to the full collection of reparations, and ultimately to the separation of some territories from Germany. In this way, France hoped to achieve what it failed to achieve in 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference.

On January 11, 1923, a hundred thousand strong Franco-Belgian army entered the Ruhr and occupied it. 10% of Germany's population lived in the occupied territory, 88% of coal was mined and a significant amount of iron and steel was produced.

Cuno's government proclaimed a policy of "passive resistance". Enterprises seized by the occupiers, as well as all others that could benefit the occupiers, had to stop working. Residents of the Ruhr were forbidden to pay taxes and carry out the orders of the occupation authorities, transport their goods and send correspondence. Through “passive resistance,” the ruling circles of Germany hoped to cause damage to the occupiers and at the same time show the German people that the government was fighting for their interests. In fact, the occupation and the disasters it caused turned into a source of profit for the monopolists.

Ruhr industrialists enjoyed significant subsidies from the state in the form of compensation for carrying out “passive resistance”. Stinnes, Kirdorff, Thyssen and Krupp received 360 million gold marks for wages to miners, 250 million in compensation for material costs and 700 million for “lost profits.” But the owners paid the workers with devalued paper money. In July 1923, the gold mark was worth 262 thousand paper marks, and on November 5 - 100 billion paper marks. At the end of the year, there were 93 trillion paper marks in circulation.

In connection with the occupation of the Ruhr, the German bourgeoisie put forward the slogan “the fatherland is in danger.” Speaking later about this “patriotism” of the German capitalists, E. Thälmann noted that for them it was not about the interests of the nation, not about the fate of the fatherland, but about profits in hard cash, about the largest share of participation in the exploitation of the Rhine and Ruhr proletariat.

England and the United States supported a policy of "passive resistance", hoping that it would lead to the weakening of both France and Germany. England was especially interested in undermining French positions on the European continent, and American capitalists expected that Germany would turn to them for help and they would have the opportunity not only to take control of the German economy and finances, but also to achieve dominant influence in Europe.

The Soviet government protested against the occupation of the Ruhr. On January 13, 1923, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted an appeal “To the peoples of the whole world in connection with the occupation of the Ruhr region by France,” which stated: “In these decisive days, workers’ and peasants’ Russia again raises its voice of protest against the insane policies of imperialist France and its allies Again and with particular energy she protests against the suppression of the right of the German people to self-determination."

On January 29, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions decided to provide material support to Ruhr workers in the amount of 100 thousand rubles. gold. The All-Russian Union of Miners sent 10 thousand rubles. gold and 160 wagons of grain. The miners of the Urals came out

went to work on Sunday and gave all their earnings to the Ruhr workers. Workers at the Kharkov automobile and locomotive factories contributed 2% of their monthly earnings. The peasants of the Vyatka province contributed 3 thousand pounds of grain to the fund to help German workers. 1,400 tons of rye and two steamships with food were sent from other provinces and regions.

In March 1923, the congress of factory workers of the Rhine-Ruhr industrial region, on behalf of 5 million workers, adopted a message to the working people of the Soviet country with warm gratitude for the fraternal solidarity they expressed. “The money and bread you sent will be our weapons in a difficult struggle on two fronts - against insolent French imperialism and against the German bourgeoisie.” The message said that the struggle of Soviet workers “is for us a shining beacon in our difficult daily struggle.”

Help also came from workers in London, Amsterdam, Prague, Rome, Warsaw, and Paris. Communists from many countries opposed the occupation of the Ruhr. On January 6-7, 1923, representatives of the communist parties of France, England, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia and Germany held a conference in Essen at which they protested against the threat of occupation of the Ruhr. The manifesto adopted by the conference said: “Workers of Europe! The communist parties and trade unions belonging to the Red International of Trade Unions openly and clearly declare what they have stated more than once: they are ready, together with all workers’ organizations, to fight for a joint resistance to the threats and danger of the capitalist offensive and a new world war.”

Workers throughout Germany contributed 10% of their wages to the “Ruhr relief fund.”

Growing revolutionary crisis in Germany

On the very first day of the entry of Franco-Belgian troops into the Ruhr, the German communists began to fight against the invaders. On January 11, 1923, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany addressed an appeal to the German people and to the leadership of the Social Democratic Party and trade unions. The appeal pointed out that the Cuno government was to blame for the misfortunes of the working class and the current situation, and proposed organizing a united front to fight against the occupation and to overthrow the Cuno government. The leaders of the Social Democratic Party and trade unions rejected this proposal. They called for “patriotic unity” and the conclusion of a “civil peace” with the bourgeoisie. Thus, enormous harm was done to the cause of the struggle of the German people against the occupation, which was aggravated by the fact that the Social Democratic Party still had great influence on the workers and used it against the interests of the working class.

The forces of the revolution were also weakened by the fact that the opportunists Brandler and Thalheimer, who headed the Central Committee of the Communist Party, considered the united front of the working class as a bloc of the KKE with the top of social democracy, and the creation of a workers’ government was considered possible only through an agreement with this top, even on the condition of refusal from the most important principles of the class struggle.

Brandler and Thalheimer also pursued their opportunist line at the VIII Congress of the Communist Party, held in Leipzig on January 28 - February 1, 1923. E. Thälmann, V. Pick, K. Zetkin and others opposed this line. Thälmann declared that the entry of communists into the workers' government should be a means of preparing the defeat of the bourgeoisie, and the workers' government should become the embryo of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Nevertheless, Brandler and his like-minded people managed to include in the congress resolution the wording that the workers’ government is an attempt by the working class to pursue workers’ politics within the framework of bourgeois democracy. This attitude disoriented the German proletariat.

In its address to the international proletariat and workers of Germany, the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party explained that the occupation of the Ruhr was inspired by the German and French monopolies, which were reducing Germany to the status of an Entente colony. The party called on the German and French proletariat to jointly fight for the emancipation of the working class.

Throughout Germany, mass demonstrations and strikes took place demanding the expulsion of the occupiers, the resignation of the Cuno government as a government of “national betrayal,” and an increase in the living standards of the working people. More and more layers of the working class were drawn into the struggle. On March 9, Dortmund miners went on strike. At the end of April and on May Day, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in Berlin spoke out under the slogans: “Down with fascism!”, “Union with Soviet Russia!”

The Cuno government, supported by all bourgeois parties and the leadership of the Social Democratic Party, intensified its attack on the workers. On April 18, an unemployed demonstration in Mülheim was shot at and eight people were killed. At the same time, repressions against the leaders of the Communist Party intensified. The commission of the Prussian Landtag decided to deprive V. Pick of parliamentary immunity for his participation in distributing proclamations among soldiers. On May 5, 17 communist deputies of the Prussian Landtag were removed from the Landtag building with the help of the police. At the call of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, 100 thousand workers of Berlin took part in the protest demonstration.

The popular movement grew. In May, a strike broke out in the mining and metallurgical industry of the Ruhr, involving 400 thousand people. Armed fighting took place in Gelsenkirchen and the workers took possession of the town hall. In June, 100 thousand workers in Silesia went on strike. On July 29, an anti-fascist day was held in Germany on the initiative of the Communist Party. Millions of people came out to demonstrate.

Agricultural workers also took part in the revolutionary struggle. In Schleswig-Holstein, farm laborers on 60 estates stopped working. 120 thousand agricultural workers in Silesia fought for their rights for four weeks.

Attempts by fascists and reactionary elements to organize provocations and raids on communists were rebuffed by proletarian fighting squads - the “proletarian hundreds.” They were created at the beginning of 1923 on the initiative of the revolutionary factory committees of Berlin. By May 1923, there were about 300 such squads in the country. 25 thousand armed vigilantes came out to the May Day demonstration in Berlin. The Prussian Minister of the Interior, Social Democrat Severing, banned revolutionary factory committees and combat squads, but this ban remained on paper.

On August 11, the Berlin Conference of Factory Committees opened. It was attended by 2 thousand delegates. The conference decided to hold a three-day general strike with the following demands: the immediate resignation of the Cuno government, the confiscation of all food supplies, the lifting of the ban on proletarian militias, the establishment of a minimum hourly wage of 60 pfennig in gold terms, the lifting of the state of emergency, the immediate release of political prisoners. The next day, August 12, a general strike began. The number of strikers reached 3 million people. The united labor front was established in practice.

On the first day of the strike, the Cuno government fell. It was replaced by a coalition government of Stresemann, the leader of the People's Party, which included four Social Democrats. Describing the current situation, Stresemann said that “the government is sitting on a volcano.” However, the German Communist Party failed to take advantage of the favorable situation for the struggle. Brandler and Thalheimer did not put forward a clear political goal for the strike and did nothing to force the Social Democrats to form a workers' government. On August 14, the general strike ended.

Meanwhile, the hunger and poverty that reigned in the country intensified. Over 60% of the workers were partially or completely unemployed; a week's wages were enough for no more than two days. Thousands of hungry people wandered through the fields in search of grain and potatoes.

In the Rhineland and Ruhr, separatists led by the banker Hagen and the burgomaster of Cologne Konrad Adenauer became more active. They were now trying to do what they had failed to achieve in 1919 - to break away the Rhineland and Ruhr from Germany. Adenauer, who repeatedly stated that he stood for the defense of national interests, in fact led a group of the German bourgeoisie ready to split Germany. The separatists planned for September 1923 to proclaim the “Rhine Republic”. The Bavarian separatists also raised their heads; they relied on the monarchist-minded military and fascist organizations that threatened to march on Berlin, Ruhr, Saxony, Thuringia and other centers of the revolutionary movement. The plans of the separatists were thwarted by the working class, which organized powerful demonstrations and performances of fighting squads in defense of German unity.

In conditions of the revolutionary crisis, the influence of the Social Democratic Party fell. At the end of 1922 it had 1.5 million members, and by the end of 1923 no more than half that number remained; At many meetings, resolutions of no confidence in the party leadership were passed. Meanwhile, the influence of the Communist Party grew. Its numbers increased from 225 thousand members in January 1923 to 400 thousand in the fall of the same year. The party published 42 daily newspapers and a number of magazines, had 20 printing houses and its own bookstores.

But the opportunists who headed the leadership of the Communist Party did not prepare the working class for decisive battles with the bourgeoisie. Not even an attempt was made to rely on the revolutionary forces of the village. At the end of August, the district party conference of the Primorsky district, led by E. Thälmann, addressed the Central Committee with a proposal to give instructions on immediate preparations for an armed struggle to gain political power. Brandler rejected this demand, threatening Thälmann with expulsion from the party. The Brandlerites did not have a majority in the Central Committee, but skillfully used the conciliatory position of some of its members and the inexperience of others.

In September 1923, the Central Committee nevertheless formed a permanent Military Council. He began arming the proletarian fighting squads and developed a plan of struggle, which, however, provided for an uprising only in Central Germany and Hamburg; the importance of workers' centers such as the Ruhr and Berlin was underestimated.

Frightened by the growth of revolutionary forces, the bourgeoisie began to prepare for open action against the working class. On September 12, at a meeting of the parliamentary faction of the People's Party, Steenness said: “In two weeks we will have a civil war... we need to carry out executions in Saxony and Thuringia. Don’t miss a single day, otherwise the street will overthrow Stresemann’s cabinet.” The government began to look for ways to come to an agreement with the French imperialists. On September 27, it abandoned further “passive resistance” without presenting any conditions to the occupiers. “We stopped the passive resistance,” Stresemann later wrote, “because it had completely exploded on its own, and if we continued to finance it it would only plunge us into Bolshevism.”

Stresemann's government received emergency powers from the Reichstag and used them to impose a state of siege, ban strikes and abolish the 8-hour working day. Reichswehr forces and fascist organizations were put on alert.

Workers' governments in Saxony and Thuringia

The offensive of the reaction especially aggravated the political situation in Saxony and Thuringia, highly developed industrial regions. In Saxony, the ratio of the number of industrial workers to the total number of amateur population was the highest for the entire country. The third part of the fighting squads was concentrated there (by this time in Germany there were already about 800 “proletarian hundreds”, which consisted of up to 100 thousand people).

The Social Democrats in power in these lands were forced to come to an agreement with the communists. On October 10, 1923, a workers' government was formed in Saxony, consisting of five left-wing Social Democrats and two communists. On October 16, a workers' government with communist participation was also formed in Thuringia.

The situation fully justified the entry of the communists into the government together with the left social democrats. The idea of ​​a workers' or workers' and peasants' government embraced the masses. The movement for the creation of such a government has gained serious momentum in rural areas. The conference of the small tenants' union in Halle adopted a resolution demanding the creation of a workers' and peasants' government. At a conference of representatives of unions of peasants and small tenants in Weimar, a united organization emerged, numbering up to 1 million people and setting itself the task of fighting jointly with the working class for the formation of a workers' and peasants' government. However, while participating in the governments of Saxony and Thuringia, the communists did not demonstrate revolutionary independence. They could use their positions to arm the proletariat, establish control over banks and production, disband the police, replacing them with armed workers' militia, improve the financial situation of the working people, and encourage the revolutionary activity of the working class and peasantry. Instead, the communists - members of the Saxon and Thuringian governments - “behaved,” G. Dimitrov later said, “like ordinary parliamentary ministers within the framework of bourgeois democracy).

At the same time, the Brandlerites did not take the necessary measures to organize the masses for struggle throughout the country. The workers' forces turned out to be scattered, strikes took place without mutual communication. All this helped the ruling circles of Germany prepare the defeat of the Saxon and Thuringian governments.

On October 13, 1923, the Reichswehr command in Saxony declared the “proletarian hundreds” disbanded. An army of sixty thousand was transferred to the borders of Saxony within two days by order of Ebert. On October 21, Reichswehr troops entered Leipzig, Dresden and other centers of Saxony.

During these critical days, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany decided to call the proletariat for a general strike, which was then to develop into an armed uprising. It was planned that the workers of Hamburg would be the first to speak out on October 23. On October 20, a conference of Saxony factory committees met in Chemnitz to declare a strike. On the eve of its opening, the leadership of the Communist Party informed the secretaries of the district party committees who arrived in Chemnitz about their decision. However, at the conference, the question of a general strike was, at the insistence of the Social Democrats and Brandlerites, “transferred to the commission” and thus buried, and after the conference closed, Brandler notified all district party organizations that the armed uprising was cancelled. With this treacherous act, the Brandlerites thwarted assistance to the Hamburg proletariat, which by the time the decision on an armed uprising was canceled had already begun the struggle.

Hamburg uprising

On October 21, the workers of the Hamburg shipyards at their conference decided to call for a general strike if the Reichswehr opened military action against the workers' government of Saxony. The next day, when it became known that the Reichswehr troops had entered Saxony, a general strike began in Hamburg. At the same time, the Hamburg organization of the Communist Party received instructions from the Central Committee to begin an armed uprising on October 23.

Carrying out this decision, the District Party Committee scheduled the uprising for 5 a.m. on October 23. On the night of October 23, an appeal from the All-German Committee of Factory Committees was distributed in Hamburg, calling on the country's working class for a general strike in connection with the reprisal of government troops against the workers of Saxony and Thuringia.

The appeal said: “The decisive hour has come. One of two things: either the working people will save Central Germany, turn Germany into a workers’ and peasants’ republic, which will enter into an alliance with the Soviet Union, or a terrible disaster will come.”

At dawn on October 23, workers occupied 17 police stations, armed themselves, and began building barricades. Thousands of workers joined the struggle. At the head of the revolutionary forces was the Hamburg organization of the Communist Party, led by Thälmann, numbering 18 thousand people. The communists, many ordinary Social Democrats and non-party people fought shoulder to shoulder. Under the leadership of Willy Bredel, members of the Communist Youth League provided selfless assistance to the rebels.

The bourgeoisie fled the city in panic. The Senate, the majority of which belonged to the Social Democrats, as well as the leaders of the reformist trade unions opposed the uprising. Large forces of the army, police, and armed detachments of the bourgeoisie fell upon the rebels. The government ordered the Reichswehr units stationed in Schwerin to enter Hamburg.

On October 24, after two days of battles, the forces of the rebels began to weaken. Help did not come from other places, since by this time it became known that the Brandlerites had canceled the decision on an all-German uprising. Upon learning of this, Thälmann gave the order to stop the battle. On October 25, observing strict discipline, the rebels withdrew from the battle. The White Terror began in Hamburg. People were grabbed on the streets and killed without trial. The communist organization was banned and its property was confiscated.

The defeat of the Hamburg proletariat was a signal for the onset of reaction throughout the country. By order of Stresemann, Reichswehr troops occupied government buildings in Dresden, and on October 30 the workers' government in Saxony ceased to exist; On November 12, the workers' government of Thuringia was dispersed. General Seeckt, having received emergency powers from the government, organized the persecution of the communists. November 23, 1923 The German Communist Party was banned.

Thus ended the political crisis of 1923 in Germany. Having created a directly revolutionary situation, it did not, however, lead to a proletarian revolution. The main reason for this was the lack of unity in the German working class. The leaders of the Social Democratic Party and trade unions betrayed the interests of the working masses and contributed to strengthening the positions of the imperialist bourgeoisie. There were opportunists in the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Deprived of genuine militant leadership, the German proletariat could not resist the powerful onslaught of the bourgeois state and the forces of reaction.

The period of revolutionary upsurge is over. The bourgeoisie celebrated victory. However, this did not break the will of the German working class to continue the struggle. The defeat in Hamburg was, as Thälmann wrote, “a thousand times more fruitful and valuable for future class battles than a retreat without a single blow of the sword.”

September popular uprising in Bulgaria

The coming to power in June 1923 of the government of A. Tsankov meant the establishment of a fascist regime in Bulgaria and the beginning of a civil war. Spontaneous mass uprisings broke out in many areas against the military-terrorist dictatorship of Tsankov. In the Pleven and Shumen districts, about 100 thousand peasants and workers took part in them. Uprisings also covered Plovdiv, Vrachansky, Tarnovo and other districts.

The Bulgarian Communist Party took a position of neutrality in the outbreak of the civil war, believing that there was a struggle between two groups of the bourgeoisie. This led to the fact that the party missed, as G. Dimitrov later said, an extremely favorable situation for the complete defeat of the monarcho-fascist forces at the very beginning of their offensive.

The Nazis made mass arrests. On June 14, they captured and killed Alexander Stamboliysky, the head of the democratic government they overthrew, the leader of the Agricultural Union. In Pleven, 95 communists who took part in the June uprising were put on trial. One of them, A. Khalagev, was killed before the trial, which did not stop the Nazis from sentencing him to death by hanging. The fascist court handed down the same sentence to Atanas Katsamunsky and Nikola Gergalov, and sentenced the rest of the accused to various terms of imprisonment. Numerous arrests were made among trade union activists and among peasants. Those arrested were subjected to severe torture.

Under the influence of the strengthened revolutionary wing led by G. Dimitrov and V. Kolarov, the Bulgarian Communist Party began to develop a new political line. The Executive Committee of the Comintern helped the Bulgarian communists to abandon their erroneous assessment of the fascist coup. In a telegram to the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, he condemned the position taken by the party during the June events, and indicated that in the current conditions it was necessary to launch a struggle against the Tsankov government and wage it together with the Agricultural Union. “Otherwise, the government, having strengthened itself, will defeat the Communist Party. Seriously discuss the current situation, remember the tactics of the Bolsheviks at the time of the Kornilov rebellion and act without hesitation,” the telegram said.

On August 5-7, 1923, the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party decided to prepare an armed uprising to overthrow the fascist regime. At the same time, however, a serious mistake was made: despite the fact that the organizing secretary of the Central Committee Todor Lukanov objected to the uprising, he was not removed from his leadership post.

The party began preparations for an uprising. The main attention was paid to the accumulation of weapons, the creation of military revolutionary committees, and propaganda in the army and among the peasantry. In a short time, thirty machine guns and several thousand rifles were purchased.

Seeking unity of anti-fascist forces, the Communist Party turned to the Agricultural Union, Social Democratic and Radical parties with a proposal to form a united front against fascism. In a letter sent to the Social Democratic Party, the Central Committee of the Communist Party wrote: “We ask you - do you agree to abandon the coalition with the bourgeois parties and capitalists and begin a friendly struggle as a united labor front, together with the Communist Party, with the workers and peasants fighting under her banner? Ordinary Social Democrats supported the Communists' proposal, but the leadership of the Social Democratic Party, under all sorts of pretexts, avoided forming an anti-fascist front.

The communists managed to establish unity of action only with the organizations of the Agricultural Union. The united front program formulated by the Communist Party provided for the creation of a workers' and peasants' government, the transfer of land to working peasants, the defense of the interests of the proletariat, the dissolution of all fascist organizations, the restoration of democratic freedoms, the fight against high costs and profiteering, shifting the burden of war reparations to the capitalists, and maintaining peace with all peoples and the establishment of friendly relations with Soviet Russia. The reactionaries, in turn, prepared for struggle. In order to consolidate the reactionary forces, the fascist organization “People's Conspiracy” united a number of bourgeois parties, after which one ruling fascist party “Democratic Conspiracy” was formed. The government embarked on the path of open terror against the communists. On September 12, raids were carried out throughout Bulgaria on the premises of the Communist Party and the apartments of communists. About two and a half thousand of the most active party workers were arrested, clubs were destroyed, communist newspapers were banned, trade union associations were outlawed, and martial law was introduced. However, the fascists failed to capture the leaders of the Communist Party. Only the political secretary of the Central Committee, Hristo Kabakchiev, was arrested, after which the organizational secretary Lukanov took over his post.

Lukanov single-handedly canceled the general political strike planned for September 14 to protest against the terrorist acts of the fascist government.

The workers responded to the government's provocations with revolutionary actions. Spontaneous uprisings against the fascist government broke out in different parts of the country. On September 19, workers and peasants of the Stara Zagorsk district rose up. They captured the city of Nova Zagora and many villages in the district. In the village of Myglizh and some others, workers' and peasants' power was proclaimed. However, the rebels did not have a unified leadership, and as a result of three days of bloody battles, they were defeated by troops that the government was able to transfer from other districts.

In the midst of these events, on September 20, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, after a long struggle with the opportunist group of Lukanov, a directive was adopted to begin a general armed uprising on September 23. Later, speaking about the reasons that prompted this decision, Kolarov and Dimitrov wrote: “At this critical moment, when the government strangled any possibility of legal struggle and the masses of the people rose up spontaneously in many places, the Communist Party was faced with the test: to abandon the masses that had risen to fight without leadership, which would lead to the defeat of the revolutionary forces piecemeal, or take their side, try to unite the movement and give it a unified political and organizational leadership; Although the Communist Party was aware of the weight of the difficulties of the struggle and the shortcomings of the organization, but, being a party of working people, it could not take any other position than to stand up for the cause of the people, speaking together with the Agricultural Union, and call for an uprising on September 23.”

From the very beginning it was determined that the uprising would not be general. In Sofia, on September 21, the police arrested several members of the military revolutionary committee created there, and those who remained at large sent out a directive throughout the Sofia district to postpone the uprising. The treacherous activities of opportunists in the Plovdiv, Rusen, Burgas, Varna, and Shumen district committees of the Communist Party also slowed down the organization of the uprising. In some areas of Southern and Northeastern Bulgaria, uprisings did occur, but the government managed to suppress them one by one.

The situation was different in the northwestern part of the country, where preparations were better and where the military revolutionary committee headed by G. Dimitrov, V. Kolarov and G. Genov operated. The popular uprising here began on the night of September 24. It has gained great momentum. For several days, the rebel forces were masters of almost all of Northwestern Bulgaria and defeated government troops in a number of places. In some areas, power passed to revolutionary workers' and peasants' committees.

The Nazis gathered all their forces, transferred troops from other districts, mobilized officers and non-commissioned officers of the reserve, as well as the Russian White Guards-Wrangelites who were in Bulgaria. Having launched a broad offensive against the rebels, government troops occupied Northwestern Bulgaria by September 30.

The rebel forces dispersed and many rebels emigrated. The regime of fascist dictatorship won in the country. The reaction has intensified. More than 20 thousand workers, peasants, and members of the intelligentsia died as a result of fascist terror.

The heroic September uprising of the Bulgarian people in its significance went far beyond the borders of Bulgaria, being one of the links in the revolutionary crisis that shook capitalist Europe in 1923. It played a huge role in the development of the class consciousness of the Bulgarian proletariat and in the transformation of the Bulgarian Communist Party into a militant, truly Marxist, revolutionary organization. During the September uprising, the foundations of an alliance between the workers and peasants of Bulgaria and strong anti-fascist traditions were formed.

Speech of the workers of Poland in the fall of 1923. Krakow uprising

In the autumn of 1923, inflation, poverty and hunger in Poland assumed enormous proportions. An additional factor that stimulated the struggle of the Polish people was the revolutionary crisis in a number of European countries. At that time it seemed that bourgeois power would soon collapse in Germany. This increased the confidence of the Polish proletariat in its own strength and in the possibility of uniting its struggle with the revolutionary struggle of the workers of other countries.

In September 1923, under the leadership of the revolutionary-minded Executive Committee of Factory Committees, a strike began among the miners of Upper Silesia, joined by metal workers, railway workers and telegraph workers. At the initiative of the communists, a united front body arose that led the strike - the “Committee of 21”, headed by a prominent figure of the Communist Party J. Wieczorek. The government sent troops to Upper Silesia. Arrests began. Nevertheless, the workers achieved a partial victory - a slight increase in earnings and weekly payment, which was of great importance in conditions of inflation.

In October, the strike wave rose even higher: 408 thousand people went on strike. The ruling circles, having decided to bleed the Communist Party and thereby stop the growth of the revolutionary movement, resorted to provocation. On October 13, government agents blew up a gunpowder warehouse in Warsaw. The authorities blamed the Communist Party for this, arrested 2 thousand communists and other left-wing figures, and closed a number of trade unions. The offensive of the reaction only aggravated the situation in the country.

The congress of the trade union of railway workers, which took place in October, decided to declare a general strike on the railways on October 22. On the appointed day, the workers of the Krakow railway workshops went on strike, then the strike began to spread to large railway junctions and by the end of October covered a significant part of the country. Postal workers joined the railroad workers. On these same days, a general strike of textile workers began. Worker demonstrations took place in many places.

The government declared the railway workers mobilized and introduced field courts, but these repressions did not stop the development of the revolutionary movement. At the beginning of November the revolutionary upsurge reached its highest point. The Communist Party called on the working class to unite its forces to overthrow the reactionary bourgeois-landlord government. The appeal published by the party stated that all workers must take part in the general strike scheduled for November 5, and “not just for demonstration, not for the sake of a one-day action! The general strike must continue until victory!” Under pressure from the masses, the leaders of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and trade unions were forced to agree to declare a general strike in protest against the militarization of the railways and the introduction of courts-martial. However, true to their hesitant tactics, they set a different strike date for the miners and textile workers - November 7th.

On November 5 a general strike began. It affected many parts of the country, but the most tense situation was in Krakow, where workers had been on strike for several weeks. Therefore, the government decided to strike the first blow to the general strike here. Numerous police detachments from Kielce, Lublin, some military units from Poznan and other places were brought to Krakow. Machine guns were placed near the royal Wawel Castle to fire at working-class areas.

On the morning of November 6, police attacked a workers' demonstration and killed two workers. The demonstrators entered into battle. Two companies of soldiers arrived to help the police. Among them were many Western Ukrainian and Western Belarusian peasants. The soldiers began to fraternize with the workers and allowed themselves to be disarmed. Then the troops opened fire from the Wawel area, but the workers did not retreat. They drove off the police, repelled the attacks of the lancers; Without sparing their lives, they went against the armored cars and, having captured one of them, hoisted a red banner on it.

Most of Krakow fell into the hands of the rebels. But the spontaneous uprising did not have proper leadership. The arrests that had taken place throughout the country had weakened the Communist Party, and it was unable to lead the uprising and rally the entire Polish proletariat to support it. The rebellious Krakow was helped only by the workers of the nearest industrial areas: on November 6, major street battles took place in the center of the oil industry - Borislaw. The broad masses of workers believed in the leadership of the teaching staff, and the reaction took advantage of this. By agreement with the military command and the Krakow authorities, the leaders of the PPS told the workers that the government had made concessions, and therefore the fight must be stopped. The rebels believed, laid down their arms and dispersed. Arrests and trials of participants in the uprising immediately began.

For several more days, workers, despite police and judicial terror, went out to protest demonstrations. In Krakow, 100 thousand people took part in the funerals of the murdered workers. When the police killed three workers during a demonstration in Borislav, 50 thousand people came to their funeral. However, these speeches could not change anything.

The defeat of the Polish revolutionary forces in 1923 was caused primarily by the split in the working class. The majority of workers followed the opportunistic leadership of the PPP, which did everything possible to prevent the creation of a united workers' front and the transition to revolutionary action. Trade unions were also influenced by right-wing leaders; revolutionary figures were mainly in the grassroots trade union organizations. The Communist Party, drained of blood by repression, did not occupy leading positions in the trade unions and could not achieve unity of action of the proletariat throughout the country during the Krakow uprising. The revolutionary struggle of the peasantry and oppressed nationalities did not merge with the struggle of the insurgent workers. All this allowed the reaction to suppress the revolutionary actions of the Polish working class. It was also of certain significance that the revolutionary forces in Bulgaria and Germany had been defeated even earlier.

When, on January 9, 1923, the reparations commission declared that the Weimar Republic was deliberately delaying supplies, France used this as an excuse to send troops into the Ruhr Basin. Between January 11 and January 16, 1923, French and Belgian troops, initially numbering 60,000, occupied the entire Ruhr region, taking the coal and coke production facilities there as “production collateral” to ensure Germany fulfilled its reparations obligations. As a result of the occupation, about 7% of the post-war territory of Germany was occupied, where 72% of coal was mined and more than 50% of iron and steel were produced. However, the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, Raymond Poincaré, sought to achieve the assignment of the Rhineland and the Ruhr to a status similar to the status of the Saar region, where the ownership of the territory of Germany was only formal, and power was in the hands of the French. The entry of occupation troops caused a wave in the Weimar Republic popular anger. The government, led by Reich Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno, called on the population to “passive resistance.”

The occupation caused discontent on the part of Great Britain and the United States and aggravated problems in Europe. The occupation of the Ruhr region ended in July-August 1925 in accordance with the 1924 Dawes Plan.

Exacerbation of the German problem:

2 factions

1) “Proversals”: ​​exact fulfillment of obligations, cooperation to ease the sanctions regime

2) “Pro-Eastern” - connection with heavy industry, connection of “German intellect” with Russian labor resources and raw materials

Economic problems aggravated contradictions in Germany, a serious increase in anti-Semitic sentiments (the arrival of the wealthy Jewish population from Poland, jewelers, shop owners, shops). The population blamed them for speculative operations

In November 1923: “Munich Putsch” under the slogans of fighting against foreigners, which was suppressed→ 5 years in prison by Hitler.

Dawes Plan of August 16, 1924 established a new procedure for reparation payments to Germany after the First World War, according to which their size was brought into line with the economic capabilities of the Weimar Republic. To start the mechanism of the German economy, according to the Dawes Plan, an international loan was simultaneously provided to Germany.

On November 30, 1923, the Reparations Commission decided to create an international committee of experts chaired by Charles Dawes. The treaty was signed on August 16, 1924 in London (London Conference 1924) and came into force on September 1, 1924. Its implementation became possible only after overcoming inflation in Germany and brought the Weimar Republic into its heyday - the “golden twenties”. Implemented primarily under US pressure and thanks to the policies of Gustav Stresemann, the Dawes Plan ensured the restoration of the German economy.

Chapter 5
Ruhr crisis and Soviet-German military-political negotiations in 1923

Despite the position put forward by Seeckt that military contacts should develop behind the back and without the knowledge of the German government, almost all the heads of the German cabinets were not only informed, but moreover, they approved and supported this cooperation. Chancellor Wirth provided the greatest support during the difficult period of his organizational development. Being at the same time the Minister of Finance, he found the necessary funds for the War Ministry (the so-called “blue budget”), accordingly organizing the “transmission” of the War Ministry budget through the Reichstag (1).

After his resignation in November 1922. Chancellor V. Cuno, with whom Seeckt had friendly relations, was immediately informed by the general about the existence of military contacts with Soviet Russia. He approved and, to the extent possible, also supported them. In general, for the political life of the Weimar Republic, it was quite remarkable that the frequent changes of cabinets practically did not affect the persons who occupied the most important government posts: the president, the minister of war, and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Here the changes were minimal, which helped maintain continuity of leadership and the main guidelines of German policy. F. Ebert (1919-1925) and P. von Hindenburg (1925 - 1934) served as president for a long time (until his death); Minister of War - O. Gessler (1920 - 1928) and W. Groener (1928 - 1932); Commander-in-Chief of the Reichswehr - H. von Sect (1920 - 1926), W. Haye (1926-1930), K. von Hammerstein - Eckward (1930-1934).

The Cuno government's rise to power coincided with the deepening economic crisis in Germany from 1921 to 1923, rising unemployment and catastrophic inflation. In such conditions, fulfilling reparation obligations became one of the main problems for the Cuno government. His course was to evade paying reparations through the unrestrained issue of money (30 printing houses throughout Germany printed money around the clock. Inflation grew at a rate of 10% per hour. As a result, for one American dollar in January 1923 they gave 4.2 billion German marks ( 2)) led to a sharp deterioration in relations with France.

In such a situation, Germany decided to enlist the support of Soviet Russia, including the help of the Red Army in the event of an armed conflict with France. Under pressure from external conditions, Berlin tried to quickly complete negotiations with the Soviet government on establishing industrial cooperation, primarily the production of ammunition at Russian factories. To this end, on December 22, 1922, the German ambassador met in Moscow with the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, Trotsky.

Brockdorff-Rantzau posed two questions to Trotsky:

1. What wishes of an “economic-technical”, i.e. military, nature does Russia have in relation to Germany?

2. What political goals does the Russian government pursue in relation to Germany in this international situation and how will it react to violation of the treaty and military blackmail on the part of France?

Trotsky's answer completely satisfied the German ambassador: Trotsky agreed that "the economic construction of both countries is the main matter under all circumstances."

The ambassador recorded Trotsky's statements on the issue of a possible military action by France literally, noting that he meant the occupation of the Ruhr region:

“The moment France takes military action, everything will depend on how the German government behaves. Germany is currently unable to mount significant military resistance, but the government can make it clear through its actions that it is determined to prevent such violence. If Poland, at the call of France, invades Silesia, then we will by no means remain inactive; We cannot tolerate this and will stand up!”

In early January 1923, tensions between Germany and France reached their climax. Using as a pretext the refusal of the German authorities to supply coal and timber for reparation payments, France and Belgium sent troops into the Ruhr region on January 11, 1923 (3). A customs border, various duties, taxes and other restrictive measures were established. Cuno's government called for "passive resistance" to the occupying forces.

In this regard, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the USSR, in an appeal to the peoples of the whole world on January 13, 1923, noted: “The industrial heart of Germany has been captured by foreign enslavers. The German people have been dealt a new grave blow, and Europe is facing the threat of a new and cruel international massacre. At this critical moment, Workers' and Peasants' Russia cannot remain silent" (4).

On January 14, 1923, Seeckt, on his own initiative, met with Radek, who had “returned” from Norway to Berlin, and Hasse and Krestinsky were present. Seeckt pointed out the seriousness of the situation in connection with the occupation of the Ruhr region. He believed that this could lead to military clashes, and did not exclude the possibility of “some kind of action on the part of the Poles.” Therefore, without prejudging “the political issue of any joint political and military actions of Russia and Germany, he, as a military man, considered it his duty to speed up those steps to bring our military departments closer together, which were already discussed.”

In view of these events, Hasse's trip to Moscow could not take place at that moment, since, as the chief of the general staff, he had to be on the spot. Seeckt asked the USSR Military Department to urgently send its responsible representatives to Berlin for mutual information. Radek and Krestinsky promised this. In a letter to Moscow dated January 15, 1923, Krestinsky concluded that “a couple of responsible people should be sent here to continue conversations about the military industry and for other military conversations,” and asked to “urgently resolve” the issue of sending a delegation to Berlin (or “ commission,” as they said then. - S. G.). In those days, A.P. Rosengolts was in Berlin. He was "in constant contact" with Hasse. Rosengoltz agreed with the opinions of Radek and Krestinsky and on January 15 wrote a letter to Trotsky, nominating the most suitable, in his opinion, candidates for the trip.

Sect and Hasse familiarized Radek and Krestinsky with the “information they had about the situation near Memel and the mobilization activities of the Poles,” pointing to the mobilization of one Polish corps on the border with East Prussia.

“We agreed to keep each other informed about available<...>information of this kind"(5).

The capture of the Ruhr and Rhineland increased the danger of a new war. Military preparations began in Poland and Czechoslovakia, whose ruling circles were not averse to following France. January 20, 1923 Polish Foreign Minister A. Skrzynski said:

“If France called us to joint action, we would undoubtedly give our consent.”

On February 6, speaking in the Sejm, he threatened Germany with war and stated that if Germany continues to ignore the reparation problem, Poland will be more willing to fulfill its duty towards France (6).

The Soviet Union appealed to the governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia to remain neutral in the Ruhr conflict and warned that it would not tolerate their military actions against Germany.

In the report of the NKID to the Second Congress of Soviets of the USSR, Moscow’s position was defined as follows:

“The only thing that could force us to break away from peaceful labor and take up arms was precisely Poland’s intervention in the revolutionary affairs of Germany” (7).

The Ruhr crisis, which caused aggravation of contradictions between France, England and the United States, continued until the London Conference of 1924. Only after the adoption of the “Dauwes Plan”, which provided for the easing of reparation payments and the return of occupied territories and property to Germany, did French troops by August 1925 completely cleared the Ruhr region.

At the end of January 1923, a Soviet delegation led by Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR Sklyansky arrived in Berlin in order to place orders for arms supplies. Zect tried to encourage the Soviet side to give clear guarantees in furtherance of the statement of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of January 13, 1923 about solidarity with Germany and in the event of a conflict with France and Poland to take its side. Sklyansky, however, made it clear that discussion of this issue was possible only after the Germans guaranteed military supplies. But since the German side rejected the application of the Soviet representatives for a loan of 300 million marks due to the fact that the entire secret weapons fund of the Reichswehr was approximately equal to this amount, the negotiations were interrupted and had to be resumed two weeks later in Moscow (8).

On February 22 - 28, 1923, negotiations between Soviet and German representatives continued in Moscow, where the “German Professor Geller Commission” arrived, consisting of seven people: professor-geodesist O. Geller (General O. Hasse), trigonometer W. Probst (Major W. Freiherr von Ploto), chemist Professor Kast (real name), director P. Wolf (captain 1st rank P. Wülfing (9)), surveyor W. Morsbach (Lieutenant Colonel W. Menzel (10)), engineer K. Seebach (Captain K. Student), merchant F. Teichmann (Major F. Tschunke (11)). They were received by Sklyansky, who was replacing Trotsky, who was then ill. The negotiations from the Soviet side included the Chief of Staff of the Red Army P. P. Lebedev, B. M. Shaposhnikov, Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council and Head of the Main Directorate of Military Industry (GUVP) Bogdanov, as well as Chicherin, Rosengolts.

When discussing operational issues, the Germans insisted on fixing the size of troops in the event of an offensive and joint actions against Poland using Lithuania as an ally. At the same time, Hasse spoke about a great “war of liberation” in the next three to five years. The German side tried to link its arms supplies with operational cooperation. Sklyansky insisted on resolving, first of all, the issue of German military supplies, followed by their payment in jewelry from the tsarist treasury and financial assistance, leaving the issue of agreements on a military alliance to the discretion of politicians. Bogdanov proposed that German specialists undertake the restoration of military factories existing on the territory of the USSR, and the Reichswehr placed orders for the supply of ammunition. Menzel, however, expressed doubt that the Reichswehr would be able to place orders and finance them. Wülfing proposed providing German captains to lead the Soviet fleet. For the Soviet side, the issue of armaments remained, however, the main, “cardinal point”, and it considered these negotiations as a “touchstone” of the seriousness of German intentions.

When did it become clear that

a) the German side is not able to provide significant assistance with weapons and

b) the Reichswehr is poorly armed, Lebedev, and then Rosengoltz, abandoned the statements obliging the Soviet side on joint operations against Poland. On February 28, leaving Moscow, the “German Professor Geller Commission” believed that these negotiations marked the beginning of operational cooperation and that the Soviet side was ready for it in the event of German concessions on the issue of arms supplies (12). On March 6, 1923, Chicherin, in a conversation with Rantzau, expressed deep disappointment that the Germans had completely abandoned the arms supplies they had promised. “The mountain gave birth to a mouse” - this is how Chicherin roughly put it.

In response to Rantzau’s probing on the results of negotiations regarding whether Soviet Russia would help Germany in its fight against France if Poland did not take any active action against Germany, Chicherin assured that Russia would not negotiate with France at the expense of Germany (13).

The last hope in case of continuation of “passive resistance,” as it seemed, was to be the resumption of Soviet-German military negotiations after Hasse’s letter to Rosengoltz dated March 25, 1923, in which he promised the Red Army assistance with military equipment and again mentioned the upcoming “war of liberation” . Chicherin convinced the German ambassador of approximately the same thing at the end of March and Radek in April. By mid-April 1923, the German Cuno government had virtually no control over the situation. In this situation, Seeckt, in his memorandum of April 16, addressed to the political leadership of Germany, again insisted on preparing Germany for a defensive war (14).

April 27 - 30, 1923: “Professor Geller’s commission” arrived in Moscow for the second time. It consisted of six people, headed by the head of the ground forces weapons department, Lieutenant Colonel V. Menzel. Again, everyone was under fictitious names: the merchant F. Teichmann (Major Tschunke), trigonometer W. Probst (Major W. F. von Ploto) and three industrialists: H. Stolzenberg (chemical factory "Stolzenberg"), director G. Thiele (" Rhine-metal") and director P. Schmerse ("Gutehoffnungshütte") (15). From the Soviet side, Sklyansky, Rosengoltz, members of the Supreme Economic Council M.S. Mikhailov-Ivanov and I.S. Smirnov, Lebedev, Shaposhnikov, and commander of the Smolensk division V.K. Putna took part in the negotiations. (16)

Negotiations at first, however, were slow and moved only after Menzel recorded on paper a promise to provide 35 million marks as Germany's financial contribution to the establishment of arms production in Russia. After this, German military experts were given the opportunity to inspect Soviet military factories for three weeks: the gunpowder factory in Shlisselburg, weapons factories in Petrograd (Putilov factories), Tula and Bryansk. To the surprise of the experts, they were in good condition, but needed financial support and orders. The German order list consisted mainly of hand grenades, cannons and ammunition. Rosengoltz sought its expansion with orders for aircraft engines, gas masks and poisonous gases.

During the negotiations, the issue was raised about the immediate delivery of 100 thousand rifles promised by Seeckt in the spring of 1922, but for the German side, the implementation of such a deal due to the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty turned out to be impossible; The parties refused to purchase Russian jewelry in third countries due to the high political risk. The Soviet side announced its intention to place orders in Germany for equipment worth 35 million gold rubles and expressed a wish to send officers of the German General Staff to the USSR to train the command staff of the Red Army. However, apparently, after tensions with France eased, the German side rejected these Soviet wishes (17).

Ultimately, during the April negotiations and after inspecting the relevant enterprises, two agreements were prepared, and on May 14, 1923, one of them was signed in Moscow - an agreement on the construction of a chemical plant for the production of toxic substances (Bersol Joint Stock Company). The text of the second agreement on the reconstruction of military factories in the USSR and the supply of artillery shells to the Reichswehr was also prepared.

In parallel with these negotiations, on the recommendation of Zecht, the head of the company Wenkhaus and Co., Brown, was in Moscow in order to explore the possibility of creating an enterprise for the production of weapons. It is interesting that the bank led by Brown was the German founder of “Rustransit” (Russian-German transit and trading society, German name - “Derutra”), formed on April 10, 1922. This society, according to the German researcher R. D. Muller, was called upon carry out important strategic tasks. In May - June 1922, the head of maritime transport of the German fleet, Captain 1st Rank V. Loman, in development of agreements with the RVS (Trotsky) on the return of German ships confiscated during the First World War, probed in Moscow the possibility of building submarines in Soviet shipyards . The fact is that Sklyansky told Ambassador Brockdorff-Rantzau that shipyards on the territory of the USSR could build submarines without foreign help, but they needed financial support (18).

However, due to the disorganization of Germany's finances and the difficult situation within the country, the ratification by the German government of the treaties reached in Moscow was delayed. Therefore, in mid-June, Chicherin pointed out this delay to the German ambassador and stated that military negotiations were “crucial for the future development of relations between Russia and Germany” (19). Then Brockdorff-Rantzau initiated an invitation to the Soviet delegation to Germany. He even went to Berlin for this and convinced Chancellor Cuno of this.

“It was Rantzau,” said Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov to Plenipotentiary Representative Krestinsky on July 4, 1923, “who approached us with a proposal to send representatives to Berlin. He even gave Comrade Chicherin a personal letter from Cuno with the same proposal” (20).

Convincing Cuno of the need to hold negotiations in Berlin, Rantzau, however, was guided by the following considerations. He believed that in order to continue negotiations, the Soviet delegation should come to Berlin, since if the German “commission” traveled to Moscow for the third time in a row (which the German military insisted on), this would purely outwardly put the German side in the position of a supplicant. He proposed using the delay in Berlin to confirm the agreements reached in Moscow as a means of putting pressure on the Soviet side.

In mid-July 1923, Brockdorff-Rantzau came to Berlin to agree with Seeckt on a line of conduct for negotiations with Rosenholtz. By this time, Cuno had decided to take a firm line in the Ruhr conflict. Since it was impossible to delay the confirmation of the Moscow agreements, at the suggestion of Rantzau, at a meeting before negotiations with Rosengoltz, it was decided to promise an increase in financial assistance to Russia to 60, and then to 200 million marks in gold (21). The German side nevertheless tried to make its signing of treaties dependent on political concessions from Moscow.

She sought:

1) the German monopoly in the production of weapons in Russia, meaning the prohibition of any access of third countries to Soviet military factories (especially aviation ones) that were being restored with German assistance;

2) statements from Moscow about assistance in case of complications with Poland.

From July 23 to July 30, 1923 Rosengoltz (under the pseudonym Rashin) was in Berlin. Krestinsky, employees of the embassy I. S. Yakubovich and A. M. Ustinov took part in the negotiations. In a conversation on July 30, 1923, German Chancellor Cuno confirmed his intention to allocate 35 million marks, but made any further assistance conditional on the USSR fulfilling both conditions. Rosengoltz took note of the condition of the German monopoly, and with regard to the unilateral binding statement of German support in actions against Poland, he cited Sklyansky’s argument about the need to first obtain a sufficient number of weapons. Rosengoltz indicated that both sides have a strong air force and submarine fleet as a priority. Therefore, for now, they say, there is no need to rush. He proposed continuing military-political negotiations in Moscow. They were dissatisfied with the results of Rosenholtz's Berlin negotiations.

On this occasion, Radek, in his characteristic cynical and unceremonious manner, told the German ambassador in September 1923:

“You can’t think that for those lousy millions that you give us, we will unilaterally bind ourselves politically, and as for the monopoly that you claim for German industry, we are completely far from agreeing with this ; on the contrary, we take everything that can be useful to us militarily, and wherever we can find it. So, we bought airplanes in France, and we will also receive (military - S.G.) supplies from England” (22).

As a result of the negotiations, two previously prepared agreements were initialed on the production in the USSR (Zlatoust, Tula, Petrograd) of ammunition and military equipment and the supply of military materials to the Reichswehr, as well as on the construction of a chemical plant. The leadership of the Reichswehr announced its readiness to create a gold fund of 2 million marks to fulfill its financial obligations (23). Krestinsky informed Chicherin that the results “remain within the limits of the two agreements that were prepared in Moscow” (24). Taking into account the results of this series of German-Soviet negotiations, the leaders of the Reichswehr were ready to continue resistance in the Ruhr region while maintaining internal order in the country and at the same time seek economic assistance from England.

However, Cuno, under the influence of the aggravated internal situation caused by his policy of “passive resistance” and the threat of a general strike, resigned. August 13, 1923 G. Stresemann formed a grand coalition government with the participation of the SPD and set a course for changing foreign policy - abandoning the unilateral “Eastern orientation” and searching for a modus vivendi with France.

On September 15, 1923, President Ebert and Chancellor Stresemann unequivocally stated to Brockdorff-Rantzau that they were against the continuation of negotiations between Reichswehr representatives in Moscow, demanding that assistance in supplies to the Soviet defense industry be limited and that they try to direct it on a purely economic basis. However, despite the “cheerful” reports from Brockdorff-Rantzau in October 1923 that he had already succeeded, it was not so easy, if not impossible. It is no coincidence that Rantzau himself considered as a success the mere fact that he managed to achieve the cancellation of correspondence between the German War Ministry and the GEFU, initially carried out through Soviet diplomatic couriers and the NKID, and subsequently conduct it through the German embassy in Moscow (25).

After the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr and the actual capture of Memel by Lithuania, as well as in view of the weakness of Germany, the leaders of the USSR feared that France could capture Germany and come close to the Soviet borders. Then, it was believed in Moscow, there would be a threat of a new Entente campaign to the East. Therefore, when Stresemann’s cabinet announced a rejection of the policy of the previous cabinet, Moscow also began to look for another way, namely, to stimulate the revolution in Germany.

The Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) Zinoviev at the end of July - beginning of August 1923 simply broke Stalin and Kamenev, imposing on them in his letters from Kislovodsk - where he was with a group of other members of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) (Trotsky, Bukharin, Voroshilov , Frunze, etc.) was on vacation, - his ideas about the events taking place in Germany.

“In Germ. historical events and decisions are looming.”

“The crisis in Germany is brewing very quickly. A new chapter begins ( German) revolution. This will soon pose enormous challenges for us; the NEP will enter a new perspective. For now, the minimum that is needed is to raise the question

1) about the supply of it. communists with weapons in large numbers;

2) about the gradual mobilization of people. 50 of our best fighters to gradually send them to Germany. The time of enormous events in Germany is approaching. "(26) .

Stalin, based on the reports of Radek, who traveled throughout half of Germany in May 1923 (27), was much more realistic.

«<...>Should the communists strive (at this stage) to seize power without p. etc., whether they are already ripe for this - this, in my opinion, is the question.<...>If power in Germany now falls, so to speak, and the communists take it up, they will fail miserably. This is the “best” case. And in the worst case, they will be smashed to pieces and thrown back.<-. . >In my opinion, the Germans should be restrained, not encouraged” (28).

At the same time, in August 1923, a delegation of the KKE arrived in Moscow for negotiations with the Executive Committee of the Comintern and the leaders of the RCP (b).

And although even then there was a split in the “core” of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), Stalin eventually agreed with Zinoviev’s proposal. It was decided to help, and 300 million gold rubles were allocated from the Soviet budget (29). Lenin was already terminally ill at that time and was in Gorki. “Ilyich is gone,” Zinoviev stated in a letter to Stalin dated August 10, 1923 (30). It seems that they wanted to give a “gift” to the dying leader.

In August-September 1923, a “group of comrades” with extensive experience in revolutionary work was sent to Berlin. Under false names in Germany were Radek, Tukhachevsky, Unschlicht, Vatsetis, Hirschfeld, Menzhinsky, Trilisser, Yagoda, Skoblevsky (Rose), Stasova, Reisner, Pyatakov. Skoblevsky became the organizer of the “German Cheka” and the “German Red Army”, together with Hirschfeld he developed a plan for a series of uprisings in the industrial centers of Germany (31). Graduates and senior students of the Military Academy of the Red Army, sent to Germany, laid down bases with weapons and acted as instructors in the emerging fighting squads of the KKE (32). I. S. Unshlikht, F. E. Dzerzhinsky’s deputy in the OGPU, in letter No. 004 dated September 2, 1923, informed Dzerzhinsky that events were developing rapidly and “all (German - S. G.) comrades are talking about the imminent moment of capture authorities". Aware of the proximity of the moment, “they, however, swam with the flow,” without showing will and determination.

In this regard, Unschlicht wrote:

“Help is needed, but in a very cautious form, from people<...>those who know how to obey." He asked “for three weeks several of our people who know German<...>, Zalin in particular will be useful.”

On September 20, 1923, he again insisted on sending “Zalin and others” to Berlin, since “the matter is very urgent.”

“The situation is becoming more and more aggravated,” Unschlicht reported.<...>The catastrophic decline of the brand and the unprecedented rise in prices for basic necessities create a situation from which there is only one way out. That's what it's all about. We must help our comrades and prevent those mistakes and mistakes that we made at one time” (33).

The Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, Trotsky, would be included in the Russian section of the ECCI; on his orders, the territorial units of the Red Army, primarily the cavalry corps, began to advance to the western borders of the USSR, in order to, on the first order, move to the aid of the German proletariat and begin a campaign against Western Europe. The final stage was timed to coincide with a performance in Berlin on November 7, 1923, the 6th anniversary of the October Revolution in Russia (34).

On October 10 and 16, 1923, left-wing coalition governments (SPD and KPD) constitutionally came to power in the two states of Saxony and Thuringia.

Stalin’s letter to one of the leaders of the KKE, A. Talgenmer, published on October 10, 1923 in the KKE newspaper Rote Fahne, said:

“The approaching German revolution is one of the most important events of our days<...>. The victory of the German proletariat will undoubtedly transfer the center of the world revolution from Moscow to Berlin” (35).

However, at the decisive moment, the Chairman of the ECCI, Zinoviev, showed hesitation and indecision; mutually exclusive directives and instructions were sent from Moscow to Germany (36). Reichswehr units sent by order of President Ebert entered Saxony on October 21 and Thuringia on November 2. By Ebert's decree of October 29, the socialist government of Saxony was dissolved. The workers' government of Thuringia suffered the same fate. The power of the military administration was temporarily established there. The armed uprising that began on October 22, 1923 under the leadership of the KPD in Hamburg was suppressed by October 25. The “October Revolution” did not take place in Germany (37). Skoblevsky was arrested in Germany by the police at the beginning of 1924.

On November 9, 1923, the notorious “Beer Hall Putsch” of A. Hitler was organized in Munich. This was the first attempt by the Nazis and reactionary generals (E. Ludendorff) to come to power through a coup d'etat. However, then the Weimar Republic managed to survive. On the same day, executive power in Germany was transferred to Seeckt. It seemed that he was destined to become the next Chancellor of Germany. The German archives preserved a draft of his government statement, in which the line on relations with Moscow was formulated as follows:

“Development of economic and political (military) relations with Russia” (38).

However, it was not Seeckt, but W. Marx who replaced Stresemann as Chancellor of the Weimar Republic.

In December 1923, in Germany, Ruth Fischer published documents demonstrating the scale of Moscow’s “help” in organizing the “German October”. The Germans then demanded the expulsion of the military agent of the USSR Embassy in Berlin, M. Petrov, who had organized the purchase of weapons for the KKE with Soviet money - allegedly for the Red Army (39). The “Petrov case” and then the “Skoblevsky case,” the trial of which took place in Leipzig in the spring of 1925 (the famous “Cheka case” (40)), were a response to the attempt to blow up Germany with the help of revolution. The German government used them as an additional, but effective reason to change its policy towards a gradual departure from the unilateral “Eastern orientation” and a careful balancing between the West and the East, using the USSR as a support in relations with the Entente. Berlin took into account that too much cooling in relations with the USSR would be to the advantage of the Entente. Thus, in the future, “Eastern orientation” remained a relevant direction, especially since not only Brockdorff-Rantzau and Seeckt, but also in government circles and in the bourgeois parties of Germany, the negative attitude towards a turn to the West was very strong.

The Versailles agreements put Germany in an extremely difficult situation. The country's armed forces were sharply limited. The German colonies were divided among themselves by the victors, and the bloodless German economy could henceforth rely only on those raw materials that were available on its greatly reduced territory. The country had to pay large reparations.

On January 30, 1921, a conference of the Entente countries and Germany concluded in Paris, establishing the total amount of German reparations at 226 billion gold marks, which must be paid over 42 years. On March 3, the corresponding ultimatum was handed to the German Foreign Minister. It contained a requirement to fulfill its conditions within 4 days. On March 8, having received no response to the ultimatum, Entente troops occupied Duisburg, Ruhrort and Düsseldorf; At the same time, economic sanctions were introduced against Germany.

On May 5, the Entente countries presented Germany with a new ultimatum demanding that they accept all new proposals from the reparation commission within 6 days (to pay 132 billion marks over 66 years, including 1 billion immediately) and fulfill all the terms of the Versailles Treaty on disarmament and the extradition of the perpetrators of the world war. wars; otherwise, the Allied forces threatened to completely occupy the Ruhr area. On May 11, 1921, the office of Reich Chancellor Wirth, two hours before the expiration of the ultimatum, accepted the terms of the Allies. But only on September 30, French troops were withdrawn from the Ruhr. However, Paris never stopped thinking about this rich region.

The volume of reparations was beyond Germany's strength. Already in the fall of 1922, the German government turned to the Allies with a request for a moratorium on the payment of reparations. But the French government, headed by Poincaré, refused. In December, the head of the Rhine-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, Stinnes, refused to carry out reparations deliveries, even under the threat of Entente troops occupying the Ruhr. On January 11, 1923, a 100,000-strong Franco-Belgian contingent occupied the Ruhr Basin and the Rhineland.

The Ruhr (after Upper Silesia was taken away from Germany under the Treaty of Versailles) provided the country with about 80% of its coal, and more than half of German metallurgy was concentrated here. The struggle for the Ruhr region united the German nation. The government called for passive resistance, which, however, began without any calls. In the Ruhr, enterprises stopped working, transport and postal services did not work, and taxes were not paid. With the support of the army, guerrilla actions and sabotage began. The French responded with arrests, deportations and even death sentences. But this did not change the situation.

The loss of the Ruhr led to a worsening economic crisis throughout the country. Due to the lack of raw materials, thousands of enterprises stopped working, unemployment increased, wages fell, and inflation increased: by November 1923, 1 gold mark was worth 100 billion paper. The Weimar Republic was shaking. On September 26, Chancellor Stresemann announced the end of passive resistance in the Ruhr area and the resumption of German reparations payments. On the same day, a state of emergency was declared. The refusal to resist the French activated right- and left-wing extremists, as well as separatists, in many areas of Germany. The communists blamed the government for the occupation of the Ruhr and called for civil disobedience and a general strike. With the help of the Reichswehr, the uprisings were suppressed in the bud, although there was blood: in Hamburg it came to barricade battles. In November 1923, the Communist Party was officially banned. On November 8–9, 1923, a coup attempt took place in Munich, organized by a previously little-known right-wing organization, the NSDAP.

From September 26, 1923 to February 1924, the Minister of Defense Gessler and the head of the Reichswehr ground forces, General von Seeckt, were given exceptional powers in Germany in accordance with the state of emergency. These powers in practice made the general and the army dictators of the Reich.

Great Britain and the United States were dissatisfied with France's intransigent position and insisted on negotiating to establish a more realistic amount of reparations. On November 29 in London, the reparations commission created two expert committees to study the issue of stabilizing the German economy and ensuring that it pays reparations. On August 16, 1924, a conference of European countries, the USA and Japan concluded its work there and adopted a new reparation plan by the American banker Charles Dawes.

In accordance with the Dawes Plan, France and Belgium evacuated troops from the Ruhr area (they began to do this on August 18, 1924 and finished a year later). A sliding schedule of payments was established (which gradually increased from 1 billion marks in 1924 to 2.5 billion in 1928–1929). The main source of covering reparations was supposed to be state budget revenues through high indirect taxes on consumer goods, transport and customs duties. The plan made the German economy dependent on American capital. The country was provided with 800 million marks as a loan from the United States to stabilize the currency. The plan was designed for German industrialists and traders to transfer their foreign economic activities to Eastern Europe. The adoption of the plan indicated the strengthening of US influence in Europe and the failure of France’s attempt to establish its hegemony.

Payment of reparations was to be made both in goods and in cash in foreign currency. To ensure payments, it was planned to establish Allied control over the German state budget, money circulation and credit, and railways. Control was carried out by a special committee of experts, headed by the general agent for reparations. Charles Dawes was called the savior of Europe, and in 1925 he received the Nobel Peace Prize.

On October 16, 1925, an international conference concluded in the Swiss city of Locarno, in which representatives of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia participated. The conference adopted the Rhine Pact, which ensured the integrity of the borders between France, Belgium and Germany. The latter finally renounced its claims to Alsace and Lorraine, and France - its claims to the Ruhr region. The provision of the Treaty of Versailles on the demilitarization of the Rhineland was confirmed and the Dawes Plan was approved. By the way, the eastern German borders did not fall under the system of guarantees developed at Locarno, which was part of the anti-Soviet policy of the powers.

The settlement of the reparation issue and the liquidation of the Ruhr conflict created favorable conditions for the influx of foreign capital into Germany. By September 1930, the amount of foreign, mainly American, capital investment in Germany amounted to 26–27 billion marks, and the total amount of German reparation payments for the same period was slightly more than 10 billion marks. These capitals contributed to the restoration of industrial production in Germany, which already reached pre-war levels in 1927.