First Division of the Roa. Roa divisions. I am a company - economic

VYACHESLAV PAVLOVICH ARTEMIEV

FIRST DIVISION ROA

Materials on the history of the liberation movement of the peoples of Russia

(1941–1945)

PREFACE

The work of V.P. Artemyev - 1st Division of the ROA, in an expanded format, written in 1971.

In many respects, this is an interesting work, since V.P. Artemyev took a direct part in the Liberation Movement.

Vyacheslav Pavlovich Artemyev was born in Moscow on August 27, 1903. From a young age, he entered the Soviet army and, devoting himself to military service, graduated from a military school, a higher officer school and the Frunze Military Academy. He directed his life's path towards military affairs, going through all its stages from an ordinary soldier to a regiment commander.

V.P. Artemyev participated in the Second World War and received distinctions for military services. In September 1943, commanding a guards cavalry regiment in the central sector of the Soviet-German front, with an operational breakthrough group, he entered the German rear with the task of disrupting communications and preventing the approach of enemy reserves. In a battle with overwhelming enemy forces, he was captured by German troops.

Until June 1944 he was in a Special Interrogation Camp at the headquarters of the Eastern Front in the city of Loetzew in East Prussia.

In June 1944, V.P. Artemyev joined the Russian Liberation Movement and in November, with the beginning of the formation of the First Division of the ROA, he was appointed commander of the Second Regiment by General Vlasov. After the end of the war, he worked with the US Army in Europe in the field of research and analytics. Since 1950, he has been in the service of the US Army Institute of Advanced Specialization for the Study of Russian and East European Issues, as a professor of military sciences.

V.P. Artemyev has numerous works published in the USA and Europe, as well as manuscripts and consultations stored in various research institutes and international organizations of the University.

The work of V.P. Artemyev “1st Division of the ROA” is the first detailed description of the epic of the 1st Division.

Considering the fact that the majority of the surviving privates and officers of the 1st Division fell into the hands of Soviet military units and were subsequently extradited to the Special Camps of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, at present to restore all the exact facts of the incidents in the last days of the 1st Division.

Based on the testimony of several exiled officers of the 1st Division of the ROA, as well as some archival documents, SBORN Publishing House believes that the work of V.P. Artemyev is one of the most factual and complete descriptions of the events of that time.

Publishing house SBONR

My dear friend Vyacheslav!

I read your FIRST DIVISION with great interest and with full satisfaction of the patriotic duty you conscientiously performed. Written vividly and truthfully. It feels like you put not only a lot of work into your story, but also your soul. Thanks to this, reading the events you describe, one is completely transported into the past, into that difficult and complex situation of the long-past war years, during which our movement was created and, finally, its last tragic act.

I am more than sure that your work will be serious material when studying the history of the Russian Liberation Movement. Let this book serve as a wreath on the graves of our comrades who died in the name of liberating their homeland.

Konstantin Kromiadi

Kromiadi, Konstantin Grigorievich. Colonel. Former head of the office of General Vlasov.

Dear and dear Vyacheslav Pavlovich!

I read your First Division without stopping and please do not take it as flattery; I consider it extremely interesting and valuable. The main advantage of the work is dryness and clarity: that’s how it was, period. Reading your story, I again experienced all the tragedy of that crazy time, which I still cannot look back on without inner excitement. Everything from the first to the last chapter is very well presented. It is very clear that you know everything that happened in the First Division absolutely precisely.

Sincerely yours R. Redlich

Doctor Redlikh Roman Nikolaevich. Radio station Free Russia.

To Mr. V.P. Artemyev:

My late husband, General A.I. Denikin, and I spent all the years of the German occupation of France in a remote village in the south of the country. There we first met the Vlasovites.

And so, completely unexpectedly, this acquaintance almost immediately turned into a mutual warm feeling. Some kind of irresistible heartfelt attraction connected us, elderly people of another era, with these young Russian guys...

Your book, THE FIRST DIVISION, again revived these unforgettable meetings in my memory and the pain in my soul... I perceived your tragedy as our own.

Both we and you went to die for the salvation of Russia. And if we did not win, then not only many circumstances are to blame for this, but also people who still do not understand what the world drama is. I believe that impartial history will examine and pay tribute to the selfless sons of Russia who went into battle against world evil.

Ksenia Denikina

Denikin, Anton Ivanovich. Lieutenant General. Former commander-in-chief of the united armed forces of the White Movement during the Russian Civil War (1918–1922)

Dear Vyacheslav!

I read your FIRST DIVISION. Well presented. Briefly and clearly. I didn’t find anything fictitious or distorted. I offer you my sincere gratitude for the book you wrote. For me personally, this book will serve as a guide to the past and a reference book for the future. Thank you very much again, dear friend.

A.D. Arkhipov

Arkhipov (Gordeev), Andrey Dmitrievich. Colonel. Former commander of the 1st regiment of the 1st division of the ROA.

Translation from English

Dear Vyacheslav Pavlovich:

Based on seventeen years of close contact with various former Soviet officers and veterans of the Vlasov movement, and as an interested student of the Russian Liberation Army in World War II, I must nevertheless say that I have never before encountered a more accurate and significant description by an eyewitness of the fundamentals, philosophy, actions and consequences of this one-of-a-kind military-political organization.

History of creation

On January 17, 1945, the organizational department of the OKH General Staff gave the order to form the 2nd Russian division (650th infantry) at the training ground in Heuberg (Württemberg). The 427th, 600th and 642nd East were placed at the disposal of the division headquarters. battalions from the Western Front, 667th eastern battalion and 111th battalion of the 714th Russian Grenadier Regiment from Denmark, 851st engineer-construction battalion, etc. To equip l/s and artillery materiel The division's regiment served as the 621st Eastern Artillery Division. The military personnel were replenished from prisoners of war, and the officer corps was replenished from graduates of the ROA officer school. 13,000 people

On April 19, without completing its formation, the 2nd Division left the Heuberg training ground in Wüttemberg to move to the gathering area of ​​all ROA forces, in Bohemia. The rifle regiments received neither guns nor mortars, and were not even fully equipped with machine guns.

The 2nd ROA division under the command of Zverev, together with Maltsev’s air corps and other reserve formations (about 22 thousand people in total), reached Fürstenfeldbruck, west of Munich. From here they were sent by train to Lienz and moved north to converge on Prague. By May 4, Zverev's troops were on the way to Prague, between Badweiss and Strakonice. The closest enemy troops were not the Red Army, which was still quite far to the east, in Slovakia, but the American 3rd Army of General Patton, already standing on the borders of the Czech Republic.

At the end of April, Zverev and his division left Linz north to Prague. With him was Fyodor Trukhin, chief of the Vlasov headquarters. None of them knew about Bunyachenko’s intentions to help the Czechs, and on May 5 they began negotiations with the Americans about surrender. The Americans gave them thirty-six hours to come to the appointed place and lay down their arms.

General Zverev with the advanced detachments was in Kaplitsa, far from the division. Despair reigned among the Vlasovites. The eldest of the remaining officers of the division, General Meandrov, decided that he could not violate the deadline set by the Americans, and led all the detachments across the front to surrender. Zverev was unable to make decisions: his front-line wife had committed suicide, and he refused to move away from her body. He and his men were eventually captured by Soviet troops and Zverev was taken to Moscow. Only one regiment of the division managed to escape, having managed to move west and join Meandrov.

Division structure

Formation NS: Major Korberg

1. Commander: Colonel (from 02.1945 Major General) G. A. Zverev, captured in March 1943 near Kharkov.

2. NS: Colonel A. S. Bogdanov

Colonel Funtikov

3. Deputy head of the recruitment department of the division headquarters: Lieutenant M. Salnikov

4. Chief of the combat department: Lieutenant Romanian

5. Head of the operational department: Lieutenant Colonel I. Leshchenko

supply regiment

4 companies and a separate two-platoon detachment of combat and operational security (field gendarmerie)

1. commander: Major V.M. Rushnikov

Lieutenant Colonel B. Vlasov

Lieutenant Colonel S. I. Vlasenko

2. NS: Major P.N. Paliy.

1st company - economic

Commander: Captain Vasenkov.

2nd company - transport

Commander: Lieutenant Kislichenko P.

3rd company - sanitary

And about. commander: Mamchenko.

4th company - combat support

Commander: Captain Baranov K.

Combat security detachment

Commander: Captain Levitsky (before the appointment of Major Paliya to the position of NSh, acting NSh).

separate engineer battalion

separate communications battalion

anti-tank anti-aircraft division

training battalion

mounted Cossack division

sanitary company

1st Regiment (1651st Infantry Regiment) (Russian)

commander: Colonel M. D. Baryshev

2nd Regiment (1652nd Infantry Regiment) (Russian)

commander: Major Kossovsky

3rd Regiment (1653rd Infantry Regiment (Russian)

commander: Lieutenant Colonel M. I. Golovinkin

artillery regiment

Commander: Lieutenant Colonel N.

Links

• RUSSIAN LIBERATION ARMY (ROA)

18,000 people, 12 heavy and 42 light field howitzers, 6 heavy and 29 light infantry guns, 31 75 mm anti-tank guns, 10 37 mm anti-aircraft guns, 79 mortars, 536 heavy and light machine guns, 20 flamethrowers. Instead of the standard 14 assault guns, as of April 10, 1945, the division had 10 Hetzer self-propelled anti-tank guns and 9 T-34 tanks from the Kaminsky brigade. Bunyachenko testified at the trial: "Essentially the division I commanded was better armed than the German divisions." The formation of the division began according to the order of November 23, 1944 at the training site in Munsingen (Württenberg). The basis was the 29th division of the SS "RONA" troops, its l / s consisted of the backbone of the 2nd regiment, a tank company and a heavy squadron of the divisional reconnaissance detachment, the commander of which was appointed b. Head of the intelligence department of the RONA headquarters, Major Kostenko. The division was given all the equipment of the RONA. As a result, 25% of the personnel were soldiers of the 29th SS Division. The remnants of the 30th Grenadier Division of the SS troops, the 308, 601, 605, 618, 628, 630, 654, 663, 666, 675 and 681st Eastern battalions, the 582nd and 752nd Eastern artillery divisions, and a number of small units were transferred for formation from the Western Front. Volunteers recruited directly from prisoner of war camps made up a small percentage of the total number. The division was formed on the model of the People's Grenadier Division, with some deviations - instead of assault guns, there were 10 Jagdpanzer 38 self-propelled anti-tank guns and 9 T-34 tanks. On May 13-14, the 25th Soviet Tank Corps captured 11,000 men, 5 tanks, 5 self-propelled guns, 2 armored personnel carriers, 3 armored vehicles, 38 cars, 64 trucks and 1,378 horses.

1. NS formation: Colonel H. Guerre, former NS of the eastern troops

3. NS: Major Nikolai Petr. Nikolaev, chief of operations. departments of the headquarters of the 12th Red Army, major of the Red Army. 08/10/41 in the region of Uman, while leaving the encirclement, he was wounded in the leg and captured. 09.41 escaped from the camp hospital, hid in Kyiv, then near Tula. In the region of Zubtsov he was captured again. He was in the Rzhevsky, Vyazemsky and Smolensky (“dulag-126”) camps. Commander of the 635th Eastern Battalion of the 721st Eastern Special Purpose Regiment. Bronze medal “For Bravery” with swords, 2nd class (03.43) - “for the successful fight against gangs in Belarus.” Bronze medal 2nd class (09.43) for an operation in the Mogilev region. Silver medal 1st class and Bronze Cross “For Merit” with swords for the formation of the 1st Infantry Division of the ROA (02.45).

4. adjutant to the division commander: second lieutenant Semenov

5. German liaison officer at the division: Major Helmut Schweiniger

6. Divisional Quartermaster: Captain Palamarchuk

7. translator: Stanislav Auski

8. divisional priest: abbot Fr. Job

Headquarters order on appointment to division command positions dated February 3, 1945.(No. 02-K).

Major Shaggy Arkhip Stepanovich - surgeon of the Sanitary Company;

Major Vasily Ivanovich Romanov - commander of the AP self-propelled gun division;

Combat training program in accordance with division order No. 030 dated December 14, 1944.

1. Tactical training of fighters and units. The main task was to teach fighters how to act in close combat, the interaction of fire with movement and maneuver as part of a unit. Particular attention was paid to training units to perform independent combat missions, primarily at night (20% of training time);

2. Fire training. The task is to study the material part of the assigned weapon and teach the soldier and officer excellent use of it in battle. The order noted that in the process of practicing fire missions, it is necessary to identify the best shooters and, arming them with sniper rifles, create sniper teams;

3. Drill training. The goal of the training is “to develop a fit fighter with precise execution of drill techniques. To bring the execution of techniques to the point of automatism. To practice the formation of a squad, platoon, company and battalion.”

It was ordered to complete training: single - by 01/06/45; preparation of the department - by 01/20/45; Time was allotted for the formation of units: Platoon until January 27, 1945; Companies until 02/10/45; Battalion until 02/17/45; Regiment until 02/24/45. For training the following were used: BUP tactics, parts 1 and 2 - Red Army (1942 edition); weapon materiel - translations from German regulations; drill training - extracts from the drill regulations; statutory training - Temporary Manuals on guard duty, internal service and disciplinary regulations of the KONR Armed Forces; topography - textbooks and manuals of the Red Army; engineering training - translations from German regulations and textbooks of the Red Army. According to the “Calculation of time for infantry combat training,” 378 hours were allocated for personnel training (with a reserve time of 14 hours), including: Combat training - 66 hours; Bayonet combat - 30 hours; Tactics - 190 hours; Charters - 6 hours; Political training - 21 hours.

According to the "Calculation for loading by echelons of units of the 650th Infantry Division." l/s included: 11865 people; horse composition - 583 goals; carts - 170 units; cars - 3 units; weapons - 49 units.

On March 6, the division entered the area of ​​​​operations of the 9th Army of General Busse to the Erlenhof bridgehead. Along the way, she was joined by prisoners and about 5,000 Soviet citizens sent to work in Germany. By the 20th of March, the division reached the outskirts of Nuremberg. The Germans decided that it was better for the division to move further by rail. On March 22, the division unloaded at the Liberose training ground. It fell to her to storm the Erlenhof bridgehead. Before the Vlasovites, the Germans unsuccessfully stormed it twice.

On March 23, 1945, Hitler stated that the existence of the 1st Division was justified only if it was considered as a regular division of the Wehrmacht. Before the battle, Vlasov visited the division. He spoke in each battalion, talked with his soldiers in positions, and took the oath of recruits who came along the way.

On April 13 at 5:15, after powerful artillery bombardment and air strikes, the 2nd and 3rd regiments attacked the positions of the 119th fortified area of ​​the 33rd Red Army south of Furstenberg. The attack of the 3rd regiment from the south, after a stubborn battle that turned into hand-to-hand combat, was repulsed by mid-day with heavy losses for the attackers. After a short respite, the attack was repeated, but again failed. The units retreated to their original positions. More successful were the actions of the 2nd Regiment, which attacked the bridgehead from the north with the support of 12 tanks and several self-propelled guns. Here we managed to advance 500 m, capture the first line of trenches and hold out on it until the next day. The casualties were 370 people. Bunyachenko took the division to the rear and moved towards the Czech Republic. During the three weeks that the division was at the front and in the front-line zone, not a single one of its soldiers defected to the Reds.

Reserve battalion

On December 8, 1944, formation began under the command of Colonel Semenov (from February 15, 1945 - Major Ivanov Pavel Pav.). Training company for training non-commissioned officers riflemen from 4 platoons of 30 people each. Total - 120 people. Training company for the training of specialist non-commissioned officers: platoon of machine gunners - 40 people; mortar platoon - 40 people; platoon of sappers - 20 people; anti-tank platoon - 20 people. Total - 120 people. In addition, it was planned to form a platoon of teenagers no older than 16 years old.

Reconnaissance Battalion

It was formed according to order No. 18 of December 8, 1944. from a tank battalion and a cavalry squadron according to the staff of the KONR Armed Forces.

1. Commander: Major Kostenko

2. NSh: major (later lieutenant colonel) Nikolaev N.P.

3. 1st adjutant: Lieutenant Colonel Rudenko

4. headquarters company commander: lieutenant (from 02.02.45 captain) Ogurtsov

5. Head of the combat department: Lieutenant Masherov (until 12/31/44)

lieutenant (from 2.02.45 captain) Rosalion-Soshalsky V.V. (from January 1, 1945);

5. Head of the encryption department - second lieutenant (from February 2, 1945) Lieutenant Agafonov Yu.P.

6. translator officer: second lieutenant Ryabovichev

head of the operational department: Major Frolov, later Major Sinitsky

Head of the Supply Department (Commander of the Supply Regiment): Colonel Gerasimchuk

head of the intelligence department: lieutenant (from 02.02.1945 captain Olkhovik P.S.

commander of the propaganda platoon - Lieutenant Noreikis B.A. (until April 14, 1945),

Assistant Lieutenant Aprilsky

Second Lieutenant Mozheev (from April 14, 1945) Later, the position of commander of the division’s propaganda platoon was taken by Captain I.S. Bozhenko, who simultaneously became deputy. division commander for propaganda;

Not to mention that Himmler’s order to send the First and only armed division of the ROA to the front contradicted the agreement between Himmler and Vlasov, it was also an insidious trick in relation to the Liberation Movement in general. With this order, the Nazi leadership apparently decided to send the division to slaughter and thereby close the last page of the Vlasov movement. The fact that the division was sent for extermination could not give rise to doubt, because by that time the German army had retreated from the Volga to the Oder and from Warsaw to the shores of the Black Sea and had completely lost its combat capability. Consequently, in such a situation, the ROA division on the eastern front faced two dead ends - either to be exterminated in battles against the Reds, or to be exterminated in Stalin’s captivity, and this provided that the participation of the division in the battles of the German army would not in any way alleviate its situation could. By that time, Hitler and Himmler had already finished off their army to the end. In such a degree of defeat, no division can play any role.

I am writing all this to emphasize the meaninglessness of this order from the point of view of military, common sense and Himmler’s immoral and inhumane attitude towards Vlasov and the Russian liberation idea in general. Hitler and Himmler, who allowed the arrival of tens of millions of Red Army soldiers, the victors, tried at the same time to eliminate the Vlasovites by the roots, as if they were the main enemies of Germany. And it is not surprising that Vlasov, having weighed the state of things, did everything he could, everything in his power, to save his people from extermination. For Vlasov, these people were not only his close associates who believed in his idea and entrusted their fate to him, but also a small force on which he pinned his hopes and made his future plans.

This was the background to the events that unfolded on the Oder between the commander of the ROA division and the local German command. General Bunyachenko, in this difficult and seemingly hopeless situation, turned out to be not only an excellent division commander, but also a brave and decisive officer. Carrying out, basically, the will of the Commander-in-Chief, General Vlasov, more than once in the most difficult cases he showed his own initiative and saved his division and brought it to Prague.

Bunyachenko is not to blame for the further tragedy of the division and, in general, of the entire Vlasov movement. He fulfilled the task entrusted to him with honor and is completely clean not only before the Liberation Movement of the Peoples of Russia, but also before history.

But let us return to the events that took place on the spot, on the Oder, at least in their schematic presentation. The campaign of the First Division of the ROA was described talentedly and thoroughly by the commander of the Second Regiment of the same division, Lieutenant Colonel V. Artemyev, in his book under the same title.

Bunyachenko's division arrived at the front near Frankfurt on the Oder and was integrated into the 9th German Army. General Busse, the army commander, first left the division on the second line, and on April 6 ordered Bunyachenko to prepare the division for an attack on the Soviet bridgehead and eliminate it. Bunyachenko refused to accept the order, citing the fact that his direct superior, whose orders he carries out, is General Vlasov, and besides, the division is waiting for the arrival of other ROA troops - the Second Division, the Reserve Brigade of General Koida and the Officer School of General Meandrov. In addition, General Vlasov promised to come to the division before the start of operations. Busse was outraged by Bunyachenko's excuses, but there was nothing to do.

Having learned that the division had received an order to attack, the soldiers and officers began to ask where their Commander-in-Chief was and why they were commanded and given orders by a German general, and not General Vlasov. Finally, Vlasov arrived at the division and confirmed the order of General Busse. Bunyachenko obeyed the order and began to prepare the division for the offensive, studied the terrain, the situation and drew up an offensive plan. Two days later, Vlasov left the division and went to Carlsbad. Bunyachenko seemed to resign himself and set about carrying out Busse’s order, but this task stood in the way of his throat. The fact is that the Soviet bridgehead fortification was located on the German left bank of the Oder, in the most remote place of the arc that the river makes in this place. It is impossible to bring an entire division into battle, the front is too narrow, and sending it in parts is disastrous. In addition, between the bridgehead and the advancing units, the river flooded a space two kilometers wide and two meters deep along the entire front line, through which the attackers must pass. The worst thing was that the attackers simultaneously came under frontal and flank (both flanks) enemy fire, with the complete impossibility of maneuvering. Bunyachenko had something to think about. The division was sent for extermination. It should be noted that before this, the Germans themselves tried several times to eliminate this bridgehead and were unable to do so.

On April 11, Bunyachenko gave the order to begin artillery preparation and, following this, the two designated regiments to begin an offensive. And Bunyachenko’s fears came true; The terrain is swampy and flat, as in the palm of your hand, and the enemy’s machine-gun and mortar fire is devastating. The offensive stalled. Each new attempt to develop an offensive caused a new barrage of Soviet fire. Seeing the aimless extermination of people, Bunyachenko gave the order to the regiments to retreat and get out from under Soviet fire. General Busse became furious and demanded an immediate offensive.

But before making a decision, Bunyachenko gathered the regiment commanders for a meeting, and everyone spoke out in favor of refusing to launch a senseless offensive again, especially since this task had nothing to do with the idea for which they took up arms. Bunyachenko brought the decision of the regiment commanders to the attention of Busse. Busse demanded Bunyachenko to come to him. Bunyachenko did not show up under the pretext of illness. Enraged, Busse threatened to shoot Vlasov and Bunyachenko himself. Bunyachenko, for his part, threatened Bussa that if anything happened to General Vlasov, he would not be responsible for the consequences, and at the same time said that he and his division would move south and asked for orders not to touch him. However, Busse ordered not to release equipment, food, gasoline and fodder to the division, but Bunyachenko warned Busse not to force him to resort to self-supply measures, and the supply of the division was continued. Here it is necessary to mention that at one of the transitions of Bunyachenko’s division to the south, Colonel Sakharov’s regiment joined it, and the division grew to twenty thousand well-armed soldiers, which forced itself to be taken into account.

The question is, can one of them be blamed for this scandal that arose between Busse and Bunyachenko? After all, each of them in his post was right in his demands. At the front, in the most difficult times, a division is assigned to Busse, but it refuses to carry out his orders. According to the laws of any country, such a division commander is court-martialed and shot. But what was Bunyachenko to do when he and his people became part of the ROA division in the name of the idea of ​​liberating their homeland from the dictatorship of the communists? The head of government promises KONR and thereby all the participants who have joined him a whole series of rights and advantages, and suddenly everything promised and given is ignored and, in a fraudulent way, having lured 20,000 people under arms, he turns them into ordinary cannon fodder, and even unconditional obedience is required of them . Here you inevitably put your life on the line, which is what Bunyachenko did. And if Busse and other military leaders related to the First Division of the ROA did not shoot Bunyachenko, it was only because in this situation Bunyachenko would not have remained in debt, and it is still unknown who would have shot whom. Those for whom honor and promise were an empty phrase are to blame for this tragic matter. These people, in all their practice, considered only naked force and this time they miscalculated.

On April 15, with the onset of darkness, Bunyachenko gave the division the order, observing precautions and setting up a marching guard, to move south in a forced march. In an atmosphere of threats and dangers, the division pulled itself up and acted like a priest, carrying out the orders of its commander. Along the route, the oncoming German units of the division did not touch, and the division was attentive to the local civilian population. Two days later, having traveled more than a hundred kilometers, the division began to rest in the town of Klettwitz.

The next morning, several officers from the headquarters of the commander of the North group, General Weiss, arrived at the division headquarters with an order from Commander Bunyachenko to take a position on a new sector of the front.

Bunyachenko received them, invited his staff officers and addressed the visitors with a detailed and accusatory speech. He listed to them the deceptions and bullying of both Vlasov and all the Russians who honestly extended their hand to fight together, and their government mocked and mocked them, trying to enslave their homeland with their own hands. Himmler himself invited Vlasov and allowed him to launch the Liberation Movement, and when he had 40,000 people under arms, he decided to use them for his own purposes, like cannon fodder. “Understand that your Fuhrer has already ruined you and your further sacrifices are in vain, but we have our own task, our duty to our homeland, and now we will go our own way. I do not accept General Weiss’ order and ask that it be returned to the general,” he said. In parting, Bunyachenko warned the visitors not to touch our people who were in their captivity, not to touch Vlasov, so as not to cause unnecessary bloodshed, and with these words he left the premises. The delegation was escorted by Colonel Nikolaev. One of the visitors embarrassedly told him that if your commander continues to disobey, he will be shot. When Nikolaev conveyed these words to Bunyachenko, he calmly said: as long as the First Division is intact, don’t worry.

The next day in the evening, the division, having replenished its supplies from local warehouses, set out on a campaign and, having covered 120 kilometers in two days, stopped on April 23 to rest near Dresden. This was the Middle Section of the Front, the area of ​​Field Marshal Scherner. The field marshal, an expansive, decisive and strict man, was already informed about the First Division of the ROA and, with its appearance in his area, sent his officer to Bunyachenko with the order to go to the front and take a position. In response to this, Bunyachenko turned to him with a written request to give him permission to move further south. No permission was given, but the division moved south and, with Bunyachenko’s cunning, crossed the already mined bridge across the Elbe and stopped in the Noeberg-Badenbach area. She had run out of all her supplies and could not move further. The next day, Field Marshal Scherner announced that he would come to Bunyachenko’s headquarters, but his chief of staff came instead. Before this, two SS divisions were sent to disarm the First Division, but Bunyachenko deftly escaped their encirclement and reached Noeberg-Badenbach.

Scherner's chief of staff, General von Natzmer, brought a categorical order from Field Marshal Bunyachenko to go on the offensive against Soviet troops in the Brno area to avoid reprisals. Bunyachenko was pressed into a corner and was forced to give his consent. After this, General von Natzmer wrote an order to release full supplies to the division and flew back, and Bunyachenko invited the unit commanders and explained the situation to them. It was clear to everyone that going to the front meant abandoning their direct mission, for the sake of which, starting from the Oder, they had suffered so much to save the division. And now we have arrived at the same starting position. The picture is clear. The Germans cannot withstand the Soviet offensive and retreat to the west to capitulate to the Americans, and we must cover their retreat by sacrificing ourselves. Having thoroughly discussed the current situation, the unit commanders spoke in favor of continuing the movement further south.

Here I will allow myself to draw the reader’s attention to the following: the commander of a division that broke from obedience, withdrew from the front and made a campaign, starting from Frankfurt on the Oder and all the way to the Czech border, of course, walked on the edge of a knife, and this required colossal endurance. But I would like to draw the reader's attention to the spirit and determination of 20,000 of his soldiers and officers, who, supporting the decision of their commander, performed miracles. Where has it been seen that a division covered 100 and 120 kilometers in marching order in two days? Such campaigns in the history of leading troops are exemplary. Moreover, these 20,000 soldiers in total in Germany experienced a lot of grief, but when Bunyachenko gave a strict order not to touch the local population, they did not touch him, even if they were starving. The honor of the liberation army must remain unsullied, Bunyachenko wrote in the order, and it remained unsullied. The division held the ROA banner high to the end.

Either in 1964 or 1965, Field Marshal Scherner called me and expressed a desire to meet with me and talk about the Vlasov movement. To his proposal, I replied that if the field marshal agreed to have dinner with us, my wife and I would be very happy. The field marshal readily agreed and visited us on the appointed day. At the table, recalling the past, Scherner paid tribute to Bunyachenko as an intelligent and decisive commander. He said that he was very sorry for Vlasov, and Bunyachenko, and everyone who died with them, but asked to understand him in his then situation: “Germany was dying, and I saved it. Until I found out the details about the Vlasov division, I did not destroy it only because I did not have aviation, and when I found out what was going on, I preferred to turn a blind eye to what Bunyachenko was doing.” As a farewell, in memory of the past, he left me his handwritten business card.

Bunyachenko decided to cross the Czech border and find out the situation. Having covered 120 kilometers in two days, the division settled down to rest in the Czech Republic, in the Laun-Šlena-Rakonice region. Field Marshal Scherner and General Vlasov arrived here from different directions, accompanied by a number of German officers. The field marshal tore and tore at Bunyachenko, but that day he received Colonel Kreger, who informed the field marshal about the whole tragedy of Vlasov and his movement, as well as the hope to continue the fight against communism together with the British and Americans. For Scherner, everything Kroeger said was a revelation. The next day he met with Bunyachenko in the presence of Vlasov, and his accusations against Bunyachenko were purely formal, and the field marshal, having canceled his order to disarm the division and confirmed its further supply, left the division. General Vlasov remained with the division.

At this meeting, Andrei Andreevich sometimes joined the accusations made by Scherner against Bunyachenko, but the next day, in the presence of all the senior officers of the division, he thanked Bunyachenko for such a brilliantly completed task and at the same time made it clear that his responsibilities went far beyond the scope of the First Division. She is armed and in the coming terrible days of pre-capitulation chaos she can defend herself. “But millions of our unarmed and homeless compatriots are in great danger, and I am obliged to take care of them,” Vlasov said.

With the arrival of the division in the Czech Republic, the local partisan movement raised its head; information reached it that the Vlasovites who had arrived wanted to fight against the Germans. The Czechs became worried and begged the Vlasovites to help them. Partisan representatives came to Bunyachenko’s headquarters several times every day to ask for weapons or equipment. Bunyachenko asked Vlasov, and Vlasov stated that we did not need to interfere in German-Czech affairs. However, anti-German sentiment among the soldiers and officers in the division was intensifying, and it looked as if an explosion would automatically occur. The Czechs persuaded Bunyachenko to support their upcoming uprising against the Germans, and they would provide them with shelter. They even offered Vlasov (he categorically refused to meet with the Czechs) to lead their uprising. Vlasov rejected the offer. Moreover, until the last moment Vlasov assured the Germans that the division would not act against them. And, despite the fact that the political situation in the Czech Republic was about to reach the boiling point, Bunyachenko still had a German liaison officer, Major of the General Staff Schweninger, and Vlasov was still surrounded by German officers who accompanied him everywhere. The explosion occurred automatically, and no one could prevent it.

The fact was that in the Czech Republic, Bunyachenko’s division began to set up its posts and patrols both for self-protection and to maintain order in the area where they were located. One of the posts signaled a passing car to stop, but it drove past. The guard opened fire and pierced the body and tire. A German officer jumped out of the car and, taking out a revolver, shot at the guard. He opened fire from a machine gun and killed the officer. Before this matter could be sorted out, a shootout broke out at the station between a group of SS men and Vlasov men; several people were killed and wounded on both sides. The Vlasovites disarmed the remaining SS men and brought them to Bunyachenko’s headquarters, where Vlasov lived and where a general meeting took place together with German officers. The latter were horrified at the sight of their own and did not know how to react to such a challenge. Vlasov was the first to come to his senses and ordered the SS men to return their weapons. However, they refused the weapons and asked to be delivered to the German border, which was done. This was the beginning, after which no one could guarantee that there would be no such excesses in the future. The Vlasovites have accumulated too much grief and resentment. Apparently, the German officers accompanying Vlasov also understood this, and they asked to be taken to the German border. They parted with Vlasov amicably, without any reproaches, and what could he be reproached for when he was faced with the task of saving his undertaking and his people.

From that moment on, Vlasov’s relationship with the Germans ended. On May 4, a Czech uprising against the Germans began in Prague. The rebels at first acted quite successfully, but then they had a bad time, and the Central Partisan Headquarters, which organized and led the uprising, turned to Vlasov and Bunyachenko with a request to provide assistance against the Germans, while simultaneously promising the division shelter in a free Czech Republic. But neither Vlasov nor Bunyachenko could make a decision; it was difficult for them to step over the boundaries of what was permissible. And the Czechs, begging, asked for help, and for them the world became a wedge. For the last time, Bunyachenko, after consulting with Vlasov, gave the order to the division to attack Prague. The fighting lasted all day, and the city was cleared of the Germans, but there was still fighting on the outskirts. The local population rejoiced, thanked the Vlasovites, showered them with flowers, treated the Vlasovites to whatever they could, and invited them to visit as liberators.

The next day, the provisional Czech government met in Prague, and Vlasov sent several of his officers there for information, including Captain Antonov. There, members of the government (Rada) - communists met the Vlasovites with hostility, with the words: “What do you need here, who called you? We are waiting for the Russians, but not for you - the German mercenaries. We advise you to remove your command and join the Red Army.”

The Czech nationalists, who loved and welcomed the Vlasovites, did not defend them. Apparently they were afraid of reprisals from the approaching Red Army. Having learned about what had happened, the Central Partisan Headquarters apologized to Vlasov and Bunyachenko with a request to continue the fight against them further, but Bunyachenko ordered the regiments to withdraw from their positions and move towards the Americans. Ironically, the division had to go to where the Germans were leaving and retreating. There was no other way left.

In connection with the departure of the ROA division, the Czech Central Partisan Headquarters turned to the Red Army for help, but Konev was in no hurry to move to Prague. The advisers lowered parachutist instructors for the partisan detachments, but they were slow to move forward. One must assume that near Prague they were going to repeat the Warsaw example - that is, let the Germans crush the uprising, kill the Czech national forces of patriots and thereby ensure the seizure of power by local communists. If so, then the First Division, by intervening in this matter, violated the Bolshevik plan, and only in 1968, with the next capture of Prague, did they make up for the lost opportunity. The fact is that although the Soviet instructors parachuted into the communist detachments organized them well, in comparison with the nationalist partisans they were in a significant minority and could not compete with them.

Here I must note that, knowing the moral character of Vlasov and his views on things and despite all the hardships experienced by him and his entourage in Germany, I can say with confidence that only an extremely hopeless situation could force Vlasov to agree to speak out in Prague against Germans. He needed to cross the Rubicon with his troops, and then the Red Army was on his heels and could intercept them before meeting the Americans. And yet it was already too late.

On May 9, the First Division, moving across the Czech Republic, reached the Rosenthal-Boishin area. Here she entered the area of ​​reconnaissance tanks of the 3rd American Army, and the next day met with its advanced units. Ordinary American officers could not understand what kind of Russians they were, when the Russians were their allies, and for some reason these were fighting on the side of the Germans! They ordered three times to lay down their arms and go to their rear, but Bunyachenko refused and sought negotiations with the senior authorities. However, having learned that General Vlasov and his subordinates rose up to fight solely in order to liberate their homeland and their people from the unbearable communist tyranny, they changed their attitude and tried, within the framework of their rights and capabilities, to help them in any way they could, until the authorities from above they received clearly opposite directives. So it was in Pilsen, so it was in Schlüsselburg. And yet, many officers from the line tried to ease the fate of Vlasov and his people. Particular attention in this regard was shown by the commandant of Shlusselburg, Captain Donahue, who tried to help Vlasov to the end, repeatedly offering him to take him to the rear; in addition, he defended the division from being captured by a Soviet tank brigade. Nevertheless, the division was issued by order from above.

Here we come to a very complex web of events, and in order to remain in the future in the position of correct and accurate coverage of the facts, I prefer to give the floor to eyewitnesses and participants in the events of that time - General Vlasov’s adjutant, Captain Antonov, and Lieutenant Viktor Ressler. Both of them were then in the immediate possession of the general until his extradition; As for Lieutenant V. Ressler, he voluntarily went into captivity with his general.

This is how the fate of Lieutenant General Vlasov and his First Division was decided. Very few people survived from it, that is, were saved. The commanders and soldiers, despite their critical situation, continued to remain in their places and waited for orders from their superiors. But the Americans delayed their response and only at the very last moment, when the Soviet tank brigade was already in charge of the ROA units, they told Vlasov that they could not guarantee that the division would not be handed over. Only after this Bunyachenko declared the division disbanded, but few were able to escape from the Reds. And the Americans themselves began to prevent people from going to their rear. And the First Division, almost entirely, with its head raised and with a curse on its lips addressed to the Western democrats, went to meet new challenges.

In fact, the division was already a division of the KONR Armed Forces.