Hoffmann Joachim history of the Vlasov army. The price of victory. Officers of the Vlasov army General Andrei Vlasov

ROA AND THE PRAGUE UPRISING

The march of the 1st ROA Division from the Oder Front to Bohemia corresponded to the plan developed at the last meeting of the KONR Presidium on March 28, 1945 in Carlsbad (438). Then it was decided to gather all parts of the ROA at one point in the Alps region and there unite with the 15th Cossack Cavalry Corps, which was also formally subordinate to Vlasov. The leaders of the ROA hoped in this way to demonstrate the strength and power of the army and attract the political interest of the Western powers, which were still very cool towards the Vlasov army. In case the expected break in the allied coalition did not occur in the foreseeable future, it was planned to join the Chetnik detachments of the former military minister of the Yugoslav royal government in exile, Drag Mihailović, and continue the fight in the Balkan mountains until the general situation changed (439). A very adventurous-looking plan was also discussed at KONR - to break through to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which until now had represented a significant force in the rear of the Soviet army (440). At first, Innsbruck seemed a suitable place to unite the army, since from there it was possible to leave at any moment through the Brenner Alpine crossing to the south (441). Vlasov also thought about Salzburg, but then he abandoned the idea of ​​uniting his troops in the area of ​​​​the “Alpine fortification”, preferring to stay away from the SS “Janissaries”, which, as he assumed, were there. In the second half of April, when the southern group of the ROA (army headquarters, officer school, 2nd division, reserve brigade and other units) went on a campaign, and vast areas of southern Germany were already occupied by American and French troops, the only place left for the concentration of the army was only the area between Budweis and Linz, “Bohemian forests” (442). ROA units began to gradually arrive there, but at this time the northern group (1st Division) was presented with an opportunity not provided for in the original plan - to join the national Czech uprising, which was just flaring up in the area where Russian troops had entered. The leadership of the 1st Division did not immediately decide to take this step, realizing that the Czech national uprising was poorly organized and poorly armed, and most importantly, there was no political unity within it (443). Only the communist groups that included the parachuted Soviet agents had a clear idea of ​​their goals: they sought not just national liberation, but also radical social change. That is why Bunyachenko was very cautious about attempts at rapprochement made by representatives of local partisans (444). The head of the KONR security department, Lieutenant Colonel Tenzorov, who at the end of April, accompanied by a group of armed ROA soldiers in the town of Lani, met with Czech officers (who were actually disguised Soviet agents), immediately rejected all proposals for joint actions of the ROA and the Red Army. And the regimental commander of the 1st division refused to meet with the Red Army officer who was with the Czech partisans (445). Points of contact could arise only after the formation in Prague on April 30 of the national Czech leadership of the uprising - the Alex group under the command of General Slunechko, which relied mainly on formations of government troops, gendarmerie, police, etc. and was a military unit related to the ROA. At this time, the military group "Bartosz" was also organized, which took over the actual military command of the uprising. The commander of "Bartosh" was General Kutlvashr, and the chief of staff was Lieutenant Colonel Burger. When a delegation from this group appeared in Kozoedy, where the 1st Division was stationed (apparently, this happened on May 2 (446)), with an offer to take part in the upcoming anti-German uprising, it seemed to many that this was a way out of a hopeless situation. Lieutenant Colonel Artemyev writes:

Late in the evening, a delegation of Czech officers arrived at the division, introducing themselves as representatives of the uprising headquarters. The delegates said that an uprising was being prepared in Prague, which needed help and support. The uprising cannot be postponed, because the Germans might find out about it and then it will be doomed to failure. They rely solely on the Vlasov army and the unconditional support of the “Vlasovites.” “The Czech people,” they said, “will never forget that you helped us in difficult times.”*

At the meeting convened by Bunyachenko, all regimental commanders and other division officers, including the chief of staff, lieutenant colonel. Nikolaev, spoke out for helping the rebels and for an alliance with the Czechs. The exception was again the commander of the 1st regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Arkhipov-Gordeev. Many years later, he wrote to Colonel Pozdnyakov: “I remind you once again that I was against the campaign against Prague and expressed this at the military council shortly before the campaign” * (447).

The division's participation in the Czech uprising, for which Bunyachenko clearly spoke out, meant an open break with the Germans and a violation of the KONR decision of March 28, 1945. What position did Vlasov take on this issue? The commander-in-chief, who most of all in the ROA advocated for an alliance with the Germans, and this time, it seems, did not deviate from his political line. Oberführer Kröger, who was Vlasov’s German representative and his confidant for the last six months, characterizes the general as a man “who was disgusted by all deception and betrayal,” who had a “direct character” and “stubbornly pursued the goal, without resorting to roundabout maneuvers or any - or intrigue - in a word, he was a real soldier." 11. In addition, Vlasov’s disbelief in the success of the Prague Uprising probably played an important role here.

Back on April 16, 1945, Sergei Frelikh, on behalf of Vlasov, contacted the Czech General Kletsanda to clarify the possibilities of an alliance with the Czech national movement before the arrival of American troops l(448). Theoretically, such a combination seemed quite realistic, since (and even the communist Czech author Bartošek admits this) “both the German fascists and the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition (USA and England) and the forces in Czechoslovakia, who supposedly considered themselves to be part of the anti-fascist front,” everyone wanted so that Prague will be occupied by the Americans (449). However, in early May such assumptions lost all meaning (450). Even General Kletsanda himself considered the plan futile. Knowing the psychology of Western governments, he did not hope for their support and, moreover, believed that most of the population of Czechoslovakia would, at least initially, welcome the Soviet troops as liberators. Therefore, he did not see any opportunities for joint actions with Vlasov.

All this forced Vlasov to abandon the idea of ​​a temporary alliance with the Czechs, and now he could not agree with Bunyachenko, who painted rosy prospects for him: the Czech national anti-communist government would provide political asylum to the division and would certainly achieve recognition of the Western powers, which would then simply have no other choice. way out, how to tolerate the Russian liberation movement (451). For Vlasov, the most important thing was the position of the Americans, with whom, in his opinion, it was necessary to enter into direct negotiations, without any detours. In addition, he clearly did not want to stab the Germans in the back, and not because he had sympathy for them, but most likely simply out of reluctance to shoulder the complications associated with a change of front. Obviously, until the last minute he was counting on the possibility of a joint action by the Western allies with the Germans against the advancing Soviet army (452). And it is likely that he was not the only one who thought about this. It is worth recalling at least the secret events carried out in the spring and summer of 1945 by the British government and the commander of the 21st Army Group, Field Marshal Montgomery (453). However, it is possible that the main factor that determined Vlasov’s position was his deep disappointment, and this in itself is very important (454). So, according to one version, Vlasov left the military council of the 1st ROA division with the words: “If my orders are no longer binding on you, then I have nothing to do here” * (455). According to other sources, his words were not so harsh. In any case, he was against the Prague action and, as General Aschenbrenner’s German adjutant, Senior Lieutenant Buschmann, testifies, he was depressed by the prospect of military action against the Germans (456). However, without giving Bunyachenko official consent, he eventually gave the commander of the 1st division complete freedom of action (457). According to Dr. Kroeger, in this desperate situation, the general decided not to intervene, so as not to interfere with the last, albeit largely illusory, possibility of salvation. Exhausted by illness, Vlasov settled in a small castle west of Prague and from there, based on reports, he followed the course of events (458).

On the morning of May 4, the division, with Sakharov's regiment in the rearguard, continued its march in a southeast direction. In the evening, having passed through the Berounka River, it reached the outskirts of Sukhomast, where the divisional headquarters was located. The next morning, as a result of negotiations between the division leadership and the officer delegation of the Bartosz group (apparently led by Major Mashek), an agreement on assistance was signed (459). Unfortunately, the original of this important document has been lost, but its contents can largely be reconstructed. The chief of staff of the division, Lieutenant Colonel Nikolaev, handed over the document to Major Schwenninger, translated and explained individual points (460). As Schwenninger recalled after the war, this was an agreement between Russians and Czechs on a joint struggle against “Nazism and Bolshevism.” Leaflets in Czech and Russian were written in the same tone, in which the division, upon entering Prague, called on “Czech and Russian brothers” to fight both against “National Socialist Germany” and against “Bolshevism” (461). The idea of ​​fighting against the “Bolsheviks and Germans” is also reflected in the report submitted to the Bartosh group on May 6 at 0.44 am by the Czech colonel, commandant of the city of Trebon, about negotiations, apparently with the commander of the 2nd ROA division, Major General Zverev (462). It is worth stopping at this point, because Soviet sources are trying to create the impression that only individual unorganized groups of Vlasovites, at their own peril and risk and contrary to the orders of their commanders, began to fight against the “German occupiers,” hoping to “justify themselves of their crimes against humanity” and thus thereby at least partially earning forgiveness from the Soviet regime (463). In reality, we are not talking about individual groups at all: on the basis of the Russian-Czech military agreement of May 5, 1945, the entire 1st ROA division took part in the Prague uprising. The action against the Germans did not in any way change the anti-Bolshevik sentiments of the Russian soldiers and did not at all mean rampant hostility towards the Germans. For the division command, it was only a matter of a decision related to a certain political situation, which left no room for any emotions against the former allies.

To avoid conflicts with civilians and local authorities, Bunyachenko issued strict orders even when the division was in Germany (464). Violations related to theft and other minor offenses were dealt with by officers on the spot, and victims were generously compensated for their losses. In more serious cases, severe punishments were imposed. Thus, the military court of the division sentenced to death for robbery and looting at least one soldier, who immediately after the verdict was pronounced in front of the line, so that, as Bunyachenko said, everyone saw the ROA as a highly disciplined army, so that no one, “including and our enemies, do not give a reason to reproach us. This is our honor and our salvation." Although, according to the observations of Major Schwenninger, the officers “tightly held in their hands” their people until the very end (465), after entering Bohemia there was a certain decline and deterioration in discipline in the division. The soldiers established warm relations with the Czechs and soon felt like masters of the region. Cases of violations of discipline became more frequent: the Russians began to interfere with military movements, even leading to clashes between ROA soldiers and German inspection bodies and Wehrmacht employees (466). There is information about the looting of military warehouses. In one place, soldiers stumbled upon a supply of methyl alcohol for jet engines: as a result, many died or became seriously ill. A serious clash between the Russians and the Germans occurred on May 2, 1945, when the division headquarters was still in Kozoedy. In the neighboring town of Loney, two officers - Lieutenant Semenov, a recent adjutant to the division commander, the son of a Soviet general, and Senior Lieutenant Vysotsky - in search of gasoline at the station, began on their own initiative to check the documents of soldiers in the train and take away their weapons. As a result, an indiscriminate firefight ensued, six Russians were killed, including Semenov, and four Germans, and many were wounded. The Russian and German participants in the incident were taken to division headquarters, and Vlasov immediately ordered an investigation, during which the guilt of the Russians, primarily Semenov, was irrefutably proven. Vlasov, according to many sources, was extremely outraged by the behavior of his soldiers (467). Vysotsky was saved from arrest only by the fact that the general knew him from the time he served in Vlasov’s personal guard, and even by the fact that Vysotsky distinguished himself during the offensive in February 1945 at Ney-Levin. The Germans, among whom were several officers, were immediately released by order of Vlasov, giving them reliable protection. But the conflict did not end there: the Vlasovites, having decided to take revenge, later shot several soldiers and an officer from this unit, who had nothing to do with the episode at the station.

Nevertheless, the change of front, which was decided on May 5, was carried out, at the request of the division leadership, without undue harshness. This can be judged by the relationship with the German communications group. On the morning of May 5, Major Schwenninger was greeted at division headquarters with the same cordiality as always. True, the intelligence officer Captain Olkhovnik demanded that the German major surrender his weapons, but at the same time conveyed the apology of the division commander (468). The chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Nikolaev, considered it his duty to immediately inform Schwenninger about what had happened with all accuracy and directness. He explained to the major that in view of the impending collapse of the Reich, they could no longer pin their hopes on the Germans, and on the other hand, they could not “fall into the hands of the Soviets,” and therefore the only way out for them was to meet the request of representatives of the Czech national movement for assistance, in the hope of obtaining political asylum in the new Czechoslovakia. The communications group officers were given a choice:

Either the Czechs will immediately transport them to Germany, or they can continue to remain in the division as prisoners. At the same time, Bunyachenko asked to tell Schwenninger that if he remained in the division, the general would continue to gratefully listen to his advice. Schwenninger and his staff trusted Nikolaev more than the Czechs and chose to remain with the division, but the other Germans were immediately taken out by the Czechs and ended up in Germany the next day.

On the morning of May 5, when Russian-Czech negotiations were successfully completed, an uprising spontaneously began in Prague against the German occupation authorities. Although at that moment the Germans themselves had already decided to give up power in the protectorates of Bohemia and Moravia, the uprising could, if successful, cut off the path to the retreat to the west of the forces of Army Group Center located east of Prague. Already in the first hour, the rebels, among whom there were quite a few rabble, managed to capture half of the city, and they brutally dealt with the civilian population and prisoners (469). But well-armed German units stationed in the vicinity of Prague on the morning of May 6 went on the offensive and during the day strongly pushed back the rebels. On May 5, the 1st ROA Division left the Beroun-Sukhomasti area in several columns towards Prague. They had to walk 50 kilometers. In the afternoon, a reconnaissance detachment under the command of Major Kostenko was sent to the area southwest of Prague. He was followed on the right flank by the 1st Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Arkhipov, which broke through Litten-Cornot to Radotin, southeast of the city (470). On the left flank along the Beroun-Prague highway the 3rd regiment was moving under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandrov-Rybtsov and the 4th regiment under the command of Colonel Sakharov, and in the center along the highway Suchomasti - Korno - Budnany - Morzyna - Kuharzh - Rzheporie - Jinonice the 2nd was moving. th regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Artemyev and divisional units and units. The divisional headquarters was located in Butovice on May 5, and from May 6 until the end of the Prague operation - in the suburb of Jinonice. On the evening of May 5, Russian troops entered the city. A wheeled platoon of the 2nd regiment under the command of Lieutenant Zolin (471) burst into Prague from the west, and a reconnaissance detachment from the southwest reached Radotin and moved further along the bank of the Vltava to Zbraslav (Konigzaal). Residents of Prague greeted the Vlasovites as liberators (472). On the night of May 6, the division headquarters and representatives of the Bartosh group distributed the attack targets in Prague. Since the soldiers of the 1st Division were in German uniforms, they were decided to be equipped with tricolor - white-blue-red - flags.

The fighting of the 1st Division in Prague began on the afternoon of May 6 with an attack on the Ruzine airfield, located northwest of the city. At this time, the largest of the Prague airfields, the 6th combat squadron was located, a combat formation called Hogebak, reinforced by links of several fighter squadrons with jet fighters of the Me-262 (473) type. The German command still hoped to retain the airfield and the surrounding area with barracks, and the Bartosz group attached special importance to the capture of Ruzyne - firstly, to exclude the possibility of the Germans using the airfield for Luftwaffe operations, and secondly, to provide an opportunity for landing planes of the Western powers, on whose help the rebels were still counting. Major General Bunyachenko met the wishes of the Czechs: on the morning of May 6, the 3rd regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandrov-Rybtsov turned north from the Beroun-Prague highway, in the direction of Hrashtany-Sobin-Hostivice. The battle for the airfield was preceded by several attempts at negotiations, which, however, remained fruitless and even led to tragic consequences. While on the outskirts of the airfield, the 1st Regiment came into contact through a truce with the squadron headquarters: according to German sources, in order to negotiate a truce, according to the Russians (who, it seems, are closer to the truth) - in order to achieve the immediate surrender of the airfield. After unsuccessful negotiations, the chief of staff of the 8th Air Corps, Colonel Sorge, the former chief of staff under Lieutenant General Aschenbrenner, who had just landed in Ruzin, volunteered to personally go to the Vlasov troops (474), apparently believing that yesterday’s allies had become enemies in the force of a misunderstanding, especially since, as he knew, all the ROA troops were supposed to unite at Budweiss. Stating that Vlasov was his best friend and that he would settle the whole matter in a few minutes, Sorge ordered to provide him with a car. However, soon after Sorge’s departure, his adjutant Captain Kolkhund returned alone with an ultimatum: if the airfield does not capitulate soon, the Vlasovites will shoot the colonel. And the ROA soldiers kept their promise: Sorge, who did a lot to create the ROA Air Force and achieve mutual understanding between Russians and Germans, was shot. This episode can be compared with the no less tragic story of the murder of Captain Gavrinsky by German soldiers at the station in Nuremberg. However, the details of this case remained unclear (475).

Meanwhile, the commander of the 8th Air Corps, General Seidemann, who was subordinate to the 6th Squadron (combat formation Hogebak), began to act on the German side. On May 6, Seidemann ordered the adjutant of Lieutenant General Aschenbrenner, Senior Lieutenant Bushman, who was in the units of the first ROA air regiment that left German Brod, to clarify the “misunderstanding” with the Vlasov units. After an unsuccessful attempt to meet with Vlasov, Bushman flew on a Fizel Storch plane to the area south of Ruzine, but there the plane was shot down by units of the 3rd Regiment, and Bushman was wounded without completing the mission. By order of Aleksandrov-Rybtsov, he was taken unconscious to the divisional hospital in Jinonice, where he remained until the end of the Prague operation. This was the same pilot who two days ago had offered to transport Vlasov to Spain, and during the retreat the Russians did not abandon him to his fate, but took him with them in an ambulance (476).

Aerial reconnaissance informed the Germans in advance of the entry of “the entire Vlasov army along several highways into the Prague-Ruzine region.” When attempts at negotiations failed and the advanced detachments of the “well-armed and equipped Vlasov units” were already fighting with the Germans, the squadron headquarters decided to unexpectedly attack the Russian columns with all the Me-262 aircraft at their disposal and shoot them from a strafing flight. This attack stopped the 3rd Regiment's battalions, whose tanks tried unsuccessfully to break through to the runway and who then began shelling the airfield with grenade launchers and heavy infantry guns, hesitating to move further. But by that time the airfield had lost its significance for the Germans. Combat-ready German vehicles were transferred to Saatz, and the German crews broke through the Russian encirclement the next morning. However, the 3rd ROA regiment captured the airfield only after many hours of firefight with the experienced Waffen-SS rearguard.

At this time, the reconnaissance detachment under the command of Major Kostenko was still in the Radotin-Zbraslav area, facing south. On the morning of May 6, a meeting of commanders was held at the division headquarters in Jinonice. At 10 o'clock, the commander of the reconnaissance detachment reported on the radio that he was being pressed by Waffen-SS units with six Tiger tanks and was retreating down the Vltava in the direction of the Prague suburb of Smichov (477). Bunyachenko immediately ordered Arkhipov, the commander of the 1st regiment coming from Corno, to go to the rescue of Kostenko. As a result of an unexpected attack by the 1st Regiment, the German battle group "Moldautal" (parts of the SS Division "Wallenstein"), which occupied the bank of the Vltava between Zbraslav and Huhle, was thrown back to the south to the other bank during the day (478). Lieutenant Colonel Arkhipov, whose regiment made its way through Smichov to the area of ​​the Irašek and Palacký bridges, left a company with an anti-tank gun to guard the bridges over the Vltava until the evening. On May 6, 1945, at about 11 p.m., the main forces of the 1st ROA Division occupied the line Ruzine - Brzhevnov - Smichov - the bank of the Vltava - Huhle. The 1st Regiment was in the area between Smichov and the bridges over the Vltava, the 2nd Regiment - at Huhle - Slivenets, the 3rd Regiment - at Ruzine - Brzhevnov, the 4th Regiment and reconnaissance detachment - in Smichov and north of it. The artillery regiment took up firing positions on the Tslikhov Heights, equipping forward observation posts.

How did relations between Russians and Czechs develop during these days? This question is critical to the assessment of the Prague operation. The basis for the participation of the 1st ROA Division in the Prague Uprising was the Russian-Czech military agreement signed in Suchomast on May 5. Even pro-Soviet authors admit that Vlasov’s troops entered the capital “on the initiative and at the request of Czechoslovak officers and officer groups in Prague and the provinces” and that they had authorized Czechoslovak liaison officers with them (479). But after the capture of Prague by Soviet troops, the Bartosh group, which entered into an agreement with Bunyachenko, managed to distort this obvious fact. On May 11, 1945, General Kutlvashr wrote in writing to the “command of the Red Army in Prague” that the ROA intervened in the uprising “on its own initiative” and at the instigation of Czech officers who were in the area where the division was deployed, but not at all based on the decision of the Bartos group. There is, however, irrefutable evidence of close cooperation between the Czech group and the command of the Russian division (480). So, on May 6 at 5.30 o’clock, “Bartosh” ordered General Fischer, who was in Kladno, to immediately “together with the Vlasovites” break through from the west to Prague and, first of all, to quickly occupy the Ruzine area with the airfield. Twenty minutes later, at 5.50, the Prague radio, which the rebels had taken over, for the first time turned to “officers and soldiers of the Vlasov army” with a request for help. Then these appeals were repeated several times. Captain Rendle, commandant of the president's summer residence in Lani, who asked Bunyachenko to provide assistance to the rebels, on May 6 at 13:00 received authority from the inspector general of government forces to join the Russian divisional headquarters as a liaison officer. On the same day at 17.30, Lieutenant Colonel Shklenarz from the Bartosz group reported “the approach of significant forces of our assistants,” who were marching towards Prague in three columns along three highways: 1. Radotin - Huhle - Smichov; 2. Dushniki - Motol - Kosirze; 3. Jinonice - Břevnov - Dejvice.

By order of the Bartosh group, an officer familiar with the area was sent to meet the Russians as an adviser - apparently Lieutenant Horvath. On May 6 at 17.35 a directive was issued to use the Vlasovites to strengthen defense areas (481). At the same time, several ROA officers arrived at the Bartosh group, located on Bartolomeiskaya Street. They were given a map indicating the main centers of resistance and discussed in detail the entry of the 1st Division into Prague, scheduled for May 7. In addition, "Bartosh" provided the Russians with several guides who knew the area well.

From the presentation of these events it is clear that Czech military circles - and they were the leading force in the first stage of the Prague Uprising - did not see anything reprehensible in cooperation with the army of General Vlasov. This is also confirmed by the former Colonel of the Main Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Czechoslovak People's Army, Dr. Stepanek-Stemr (482), who on the night of May 10 arrived in Prague as the head of the communications department of the 1st Czechoslovak Corps, formed in the USSR. Stepanek-Stemr says that among the officers of the corps headquarters and even among the political workers, who were overwhelmingly communists, he did not hear “a single bad word ... about inviting the Vlasovites and their acting on the side of the Czechs against the Germans in Prague.” It was not the armed forces that objected to the idea of ​​Russian-Czech cooperation, but the Czech National Council (CNC), which gradually seized the political leadership of the uprising and managed to subjugate the military command of Prague. Until the arrival of the Benes government in the city, which was located in Kosice, the Council represented government power. Communists played a significant role in it, and it sought from the very beginning to establish good relations with the Soviet Union. Therefore, the position of the Council regarding the ROA, which so unexpectedly entered the game, was very contradictory. On the one hand, the CHNS understood that the Russian forces, which had “tanks, artillery and heavy weapons,” could become a great help for the Czech rebels, who were poorly armed and could not withstand the onslaught of the Germans, and did not object to this help. On the other hand, the Council tried its best to politically distance itself from its aides. This dual position was manifested on the morning of May 7, when at 7.45 a.m. liaison officer Horvath, accompanied by ROA captain R. Antonov, sent to meet the ROA units, appeared on Bartolomeiskaya Street, at the residence of the Council, and its members were forced for the first time to determine their attitude towards the 1st Division.

The son of an officer in the Tsarist Navy, Captain Antonov was orphaned early and was a homeless child. Commanding a battery of rocket launchers ("Katyushas"), he was captured at Stalingrad, and from 1943 he was Vlasov's personal adjutant. He was probably sent to the ChNS by Vlasov himself (483), who, as we have already said, although he did not interfere in the Prague events, apparently still considered it his duty to find out the attitude of the new political organization to the ROA. In any case, on the morning of May 7, Antonov intended to convey an ultimatum in which Bunyachenko demanded that the German State Minister of Bohemia and Moravia, Frank, capitulate by 10.00, otherwise he, Bunyachenko, “would go on the offensive on Prague” (which, however, had already begun) (484). Such a decisive demand, which had serious political significance, and, what’s more, was put forward without permission, caused energetic resistance from the Council, which was extremely concerned about its own prestige.

The acting chairman of the Council, the ardent communist Smrkovsky, immediately began to argue with Captain Antonov (485), objecting to the demand for surrender and attempts to independently enter into negotiations with Frank, arguing that this was an internal Czech matter. He stated that only “the Czech people who rebelled,” that is, in other words, the CNS, have the right and authority to negotiate the surrender of the Germans. It is worth noting that Smrkovsky and other communists, such as David and Kubat, who were especially sharply opposed to the agreement between the ChNS and the Vlasov army, agreed, however, with the demand of “bourgeois” politicians to accept the help of the ROA, avoiding recognition of the army as a political force and thereby not compromising Advice(486). In any case, it was important for them to emphasize the monopoly of the CHNS in all political affairs. The necessary negotiations with the Vlasov army were thus limited to contacts with the Bartosh group, which in turn was bound by the instructions of the ChNS.

After heated debates about what position to take in relation to the ROA, Captain Antonov was summoned to the plenum of the ChNS, where General Kutlvashr, who spoke Russian, translated for him Smrkovsky's statement (487): 1. The Czech National Council, being a representative of the government, has control in the Bohemia region sole decision-making power on all military-political issues.

2. The Czech National Council thanks the troops of General Vlasov, who, heeding the request transmitted by radio, hastened to help the fighting people of Prague.

3. The troops of General Vlasov, that is, parts of the 1st ROA Division, must coordinate all their actions with the Czech military command (the Bartosh group).

4. All negotiations with the enemy are conducted by the Czech military command in agreement with the command of the Russian division.

5. The Czech military command refrains from demanding the surrender of all German forces, however, independently operating Russian units have the right to independently accept the surrender of the enemy forces opposing them.

After consultation with the division commander, Captain Antonov once again emphasized that Russian troops were not going to interfere in Czech internal affairs, they came here only to “help the Czech people” (488). On Bunyachenko's authority, he signed a preliminary agreement, so that now, in addition to the military agreement of May 5, something like a political justification for the intervention of the 1st ROA Division had also been created. The assertion that the communists from the very beginning refused to deal with the “traitor to the motherland” Vlasov, let alone enter into an agreement with him, is refuted by the simple fact that all the forces represented in the Czech National Council, including the communists, approved the statement, signed by Antonov.

The communists began to question the contents of the preliminary agreement only after Captain Antonov signed the document on the morning of May 7. The representative of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the military commission of the National Council, David, later the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, demanded not to send a short letter expressing gratitude to Vlasov on behalf of the Czechoslovak National Council, since this could “have an unforeseen impact on the position of the USSR and affect Soviet assistance.” He believed that even the mention of Vlasov’s name in connection with the uprising was enough to generate political distrust in this enterprise in Moscow and “put a shameful stain on our entire struggle of that period” (489). David recommended no longer negotiating with Vlasov and disavowing the agreement that had just been adopted, advising instead to directly contact the Vlasovites, bypassing the authorities. This advice, by the way, shows how thoroughly David studied soldier psychology and the very spirit of the ROA. In the division there may be, as he put it, either “honest soldiers”, then in any case they “will continue to fight on the side of the Czech people”, or “criminal rabble” who will follow their leadership and with whom one should not mess anyway costs. But the attempt of communist-minded factory workers to fraternize with the ROA soldiers, thereby encouraging the Vlasovites to desert, ended, as one might expect, in complete failure. The appeal addressed to the “soldiers of the so-called Vlasov army,” which spoke of the “Soviet homeland” and the “victorious Red Army,” did not evoke any response, and at the division headquarters they reacted to these machinations with undisguised disgust.

There was disappointment among the division commanders. The agreement did not seem to be violated, but at the same time the division was given the most meager rights and, although it was the most significant force on the side of the rebels, its role was reduced to a purely auxiliary function. On May 7, at 9.30 am, Prague radio broadcast a short message that the CNS had challenged the “political agreements” with the Russians and had handed over the “cooperation of military actions” against the Germans to the Czech military authorities (490). Then Bunyachenko also began to seek opportunities to address directly the population of Prague and explain what was happening.

Upon entering Prague, the 1st ROA Division showed increased interest in the radio station. According to eyewitness accounts, “one of the units” even tried to “take control of the radio station by force” (491). Indeed, the division managed to convey a message about “Vlasov’s advance to Prague” and about the intention of the Chairman of the ChNS, Professor Prazhak, and the rest of the Council members to go to Vlasov’s headquarters to negotiate with him. The head of the Prague radio station, Maivald, was aware of the previous negotiations with the “Vlasov units,” but, obviously, due to the worsening military situation, he did not object to the transmission of these messages, which incurred the wrath of the CNS. A decisive denial immediately followed, and the Council hastily placed its man at the radio station, strictly ordering him to maintain complete silence regarding the Vlasov army.

Meanwhile, negotiations between the ChNS and the 1st Division continued. Member of the ChNS Matush appeared at the division headquarters, and Bunyachenko expressed to him his dissatisfaction with the tone of the Council’s statement and bewilderment at the caution shown by the Council (492), emphasizing that the “Russian army” - and not the “Vlasov army” - entered Prague, to help the Czechs in their struggle, and he is ready at any time to withdraw his troops from the city as soon as the need for their help is no longer needed. In general, he does not care at all what form of government the Czechs choose, and he does not have the slightest desire to get involved in an armed conflict with the Red Army. Bunyachenko demanded the presence of a representative of the ChNS at his headquarters.

Meanwhile, the position of the rebels worsened, and the ChNS began to lean towards Vlasov again. As Doctor Makhotka, a member of the People's Socialist Party, recalls, “the majority of the Council members were ardently in favor of cooperation with the Vlasov army” (493). Even the communist Knap spoke out in favor of “settling the misunderstanding” with Bunyachenko. For this purpose, it was decided to send an official delegation to the headquarters in Jinonice, entrusting this mission to the communists Knap and David. Thus, the CNS clearly dissociated itself from the political line of the Czech government located in Kosice, which considered it its duty to be guided by the wishes of the Soviet Union. Thus, in a telegram from Kosice, the CNS was urged to “be careful with Vlasov.” Benes' representative in London, Minister Ripka, who tried in vain to interest Great Britain in the Prague Uprising, in a speech on the BBC called for abandoning any kind of cooperation with Vlasov (494). Of course, the British government, which, like the American government, fearing complications with the Soviet Union, refused to help the rebels, could not approve of the appeal to the anti-Soviet ROA for help, and Minister Ripka joined this position.

The CHNS delegates Knap and David, sent to the headquarters of the 1st Division, tried to limit themselves to the purely military aspect of the agreement, but during the negotiations political issues arose, which they reported to the CHNS meeting (495). Their message provides additional information about the great importance Bunyachenko attached to explaining to the Czechs the history of the ROA, its goals and motivations for participating in the Prague Uprising. He asked the CHNS emissaries to broadcast a four-page statement he had prepared on the radio in Russian and Czech. Referring to the military situation in Prague, he provided information about the equipment of his units with weapons and ammunition, about the losses of the division, and spoke about the need to concentrate forces and resources in the direction of the main attack. In order to improve military cooperation between the Czechs and Russians and coordinate attacks, he insisted on the need to second Czech liaison officers to him, in particular, to send one officer to Petrin Hill, where some of the artillery pieces from Zlichov were transferred (496). This concluded the negotiations between the ChNS and the 1st ROA Division. On the evening of May 7, at 21.00, when Knap and David told the Council about the meeting with Bunyachenko and outlined his wishes and demands, parts of the ROA had basically completed military operations in Prague and began to move westward.

How were the ROA battles in Prague on that fateful day of May 7? The combat order of the division commander, drawn up according to the presentation of the Bartosh group and issued at 1.00 am, provided for an attack on the city center in three directions (497). The main blow was to be delivered at 5.00 am by the regiment of Lieutenant Colonel Arkhipov from the Smichov area. The regiment, equipped with several tanks, artillery pieces and anti-tank guns and with experienced guides, managed to cross the bridges over the Vltava and fight its way through Vinogradi to Strašnice, and from there south to Pankrac (498). Advancing from the north, the 4th Regiment under the command of Colonel Sakharov captured important objects in the city itself, including Petrin Hill. The 3rd Regiment - under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Aleksavdrov-Rybtsov - passed through Břevnov - Stršešovice and Hradčani and, coordinating its actions with the 4th Regiment, managed to break through to the western branch of the Vltava (499). And finally, the artillery regiment of Lieutenant Colonel Zhukovsky, which took up firing positions in the morning between Kosirze and Zlikhov, but during the day moved them partially forward, in agreement with the Bartosh group, fired at German strongholds in the area of ​​the hospital, observatory, Petrin Hill and other places. The battles in the city center against units of the SS Division Wallenstein, which entered from the south, were carried out by the remaining forces of the 1st Division. The 2nd regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Artemyev, detached by the division commander on May 6 in the Huhle-Slivenets area, after a fierce battle near Lagovichki u Pragi, pushed the enemy to Zbraslav (500), and a reconnaissance detachment under the command of Major Kostenko occupied posts on the eastern bank of the Vltava in Branika area, turning to the south.

Undoubtedly, all the events of those days - the unexpected turn on May 5 of the 1st division from the Beroun-Suchomasti area in the Prague direction, the beginning of military operations on May 6 at the Ruzine airfield and southwest of Huhle and, finally, the attack on May 7 on the center of Prague along three main directions, as well as the repeated demands for surrender put forward by representatives of the ROA, including Colonel Sakharov (501), were a big surprise for the German command, and the Germans could not understand what was happening. After all, just six months ago, on November 14, 1944, in the Rudolph Gallery in Prague Burg, a solemn state act proclaimed the creation of KONR. The Minister of State of Bohemia and Moravia, Frank, received Vlasov in his palace according to protocol, made an opening speech in the Rudolf Gallery and, together with the Wehrmacht representative General Toussaint, sat as an honored guest in the front row, next to Vlasov. And now suddenly the ROA in the blink of an eye found itself in the enemy camp! General Toussaint, Minister of State Frank and SS Gruppenführer, Lieutenant General of the Waffen-SS Count Pückler, as well as General Seidemann and Colonel Sorge, considered the sudden hostility of yesterday's allies "a misunderstanding generated by an unfortunate combination of circumstances." Based on this false premise, the Germans made several attempts to negotiate a truce with Vlasov’s troops both at the airfield in Ruzyn and in Prague itself (502). On May 7, at 10 o'clock, a German envoy appeared in the advanced units of the 1st Regiment in the vicinity of Vinogrady, demanding that General Toussaint stop hostilities - which at that moment was completely unrealistic.

Lieutenant Colonel Arkhipov not only did not intend to fulfill this demand, but, on the contrary, he himself insisted on the surrender of the Germans. At noon, a German lieutenant crossed the front line for the second time with a letter from General Toussaint, in which he almost begged for an armistice. He wrote:

In this difficult hour, when you, the Vlasovites, and we, the Germans, must unite in the fight against our common enemy - Bolshevism, you have taken up arms against us. Considering this a misunderstanding, I ask you to stop hostilities against us. On the morning of May 8, Prague will be cleared of Czech rebels. General Toussaint(503).

But this call, which Lieutenant Colonel Arkhipov “immediately” conveyed to the division commander, did not make any impression.

However, as for the direct participants in the battles - the German soldiers, some of them were ready to capitulate to the Russians. On May 7 at 8 am, Prague radio reported that German units were surrendering “en masse” to the Vlasovites; according to an eyewitness, “the whole street... was a military camp of Vlasov units” (504). The 1st Regiment managed to force a strong German unit in the area of ​​Lobkowitz Square to capitulate and take 500 people prisoner - this major success immediately changed the situation in the entire city (505). By the evening of May 7, the ROA captured the main areas of the city, with the exception of the centers of German resistance in Hradcany, at the Strahov stadium and in Dejvice. In addition, the 1st Division cut Prague into two parts, thereby preventing the connection of German reserve units advancing from the north and south (506). Judging by Russian reports, by the evening of May 7, between four and ten thousand people were captured, but this figure seems to be overestimated (507). In many places, ROA soldiers had to overcome fierce enemy resistance and fight for literally every house. The Czechs, eyewitnesses of the events, left a lot of evidence of the heroism of the Vlasovites. Doctor Makhotka, for example, wrote: The Vlasovites fought courageously and selflessly, many without hiding went straight into the middle of the street and shot at the windows and hatches on the roofs from which the Germans were firing... The Vlasovites fought with a purely Eastern contempt for death... It seemed , they deliberately went to their death, just not to fall into the hands of the Red Army (508).

It is not surprising that the rebels treated the Russians as liberators and gratefully welcomed the participation of the ROA in the uprising. The attitude of the Czech population towards the ROA soldiers is described everywhere as “very good, fraternal”: “The population greeted them with delight.”

However, the political goals of the ROA's participation in the uprising were nullified even before the operation began. On May 6, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces, General Eisenhower, meeting the request of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army A.I. Antonov, on May 5, rejected the proposal of the commander of the American 3rd Army (12th Army Group), General Patton, to attack east of the Carlsbad line - Pilsen - Budweis and the capture of Prague (509). Thus, to the chagrin of Czech nationalists, hopes of capturing Prague by American troops did not materialize, and this could not but affect the mood of those who fought in Prague. The hopes of the Vlasovites and Czech nationalists that “non-communist and anti-communist forces” would prevail in the capital were crumbling. But the population of Prague enthusiastically greeted the Vlasovites, cooperation with the Bartosh group proceeded without complications, and it seemed that all the contradictions with the ChNS were left behind.

However, on May 7, bad omens appeared and began to multiply. On the morning of May 7, the ChNS dissociated itself on the radio from “the actions of General Vlasov against German troops.” Immediately after this, Lieutenant Colonel Arkhipov went in an armored car to Bartosh and demanded an explanation from the chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Burger. Assuring the ROA officer of the loyalty of the Czech military. Burger, however, explained that the military command could not act in defiance of the National Council (510). Nevertheless, he agreed to make public the statement drawn up by Arkhipov: “The heroic army of General Vlasov, which hastened to the aid of the Czech brothers, continues to clear the city of the Germans.”

At the same time, on the morning of May 7, in Prague, at the site of Lieutenant Colonel Shklenarz, the Soviet mission, abandoned by parachute, began work. The commander of the 1st Regiment, who sent a platoon to guard the radio station, at the request of the Czechs, allocated another platoon to guard this mission. The head of the mission, Captain Sokolov, called Arkhipov, and the following conversation took place between them (511):/186]

Arkhipov: The commander of the 1st regiment of the 1st division of the ROA is on the phone.
Sokolov: Hello, Comrade Colonel. I am captain Sokolov.
Arkhipov: Hello, captain.
Sokolov: Comrade Colonel, are you convinced that Prague will be cleared of SS units?
Arkhipov: Yes.
Sokolov: What is the composition of your regiment and how equipped is it? (Arkhipov gave double the number to make it sound more convincing).
Sokolov: Yes, you can fight with such a regiment. Tell me, Comrade Colonel, can I inform Moscow that the regiment is going into battle for Comrade Stalin and for Russia?
Arkhipov: For Russia - yes. Not for Comrade Stalin.
Sokolov: But you swore allegiance to Comrade Stalin and, probably, you graduated from the Military Academy in the Soviet Union.
Arkhipov: I graduated from a military school in Moscow in 1914. I never swore allegiance to Stalin. I am an officer of the ROA and I swore allegiance to General A.A. Vlasov.
Sokolov: Now everything is clear to me.

Major Kostenko from the reconnaissance detachment also talks about a similar episode. The Soviet agent conveyed to the commander of the 1st ROA division Stalin’s wish that Bunyachenko “with his entire division return to the arms of his homeland.” Major Schwenninger was present when Bunyachenko “transferred to Stalin a return invitation that could not be translated into German” (512). To top it all off, on the evening of May 7, American armored vehicles with journalists appeared at Colonel Sakharov’s site, who, in their holy simplicity, considered the ROA soldiers “allies of the Red Army,” and having learned what the matter was, they found nothing better than to say that the Russians were fighting in Prague will help them “atone for their guilt before the Soviet government for collaborating with the Germans.” This first meeting with the Americans and their amazing political naivety made a depressing impression on the ROA officers (513).

On the evening of May 7, no one at the division headquarters any longer doubted that Prague would be occupied by Soviet and not American troops. At 11 p.m., Bunyachenko, with a heavy heart, gave the order to cease hostilities and withdraw from the city. According to Schwenninger, when saying goodbye to the Czech officers who came to headquarters to report on the state of affairs, there were tears in the general’s eyes, and an expression of “deep hopelessness” was frozen on the faces of all those present. Late in the evening, the fortifications on the western bank of the Vltava, between Prague and Zbraslav, were removed, and by dawn parts of the ROA left the city. True, the 2nd Regiment on the morning of May 8 was still skirmishing in the Slivenets area southwest of Prague with Waffen-SS units. But on the same day at 12 o’clock a message was received about the withdrawal of the 1st ROA division in full force along the Prague-Beroun highway (514). Russian and German troops, who had just fought against each other, were now moving together towards American positions west of Pilsen.

(436)V. Artemyev. History of the First Russian Division, p. 19, author’s archive. B. Pluschev-Vlasenko. Wings of Freedom, p. 109, author’s archive. Letter from Schwenninger to Steenberg, May 18, 1966, VA-MA, Steenberg archive. S. Shtemenko. In the General Staff, vol. 2, p. 440.
(437)V. Pozdnyakov. Andrey Andreevich Vlasov, p. 367.
(438) Litopis Ukrainskoi Povstanskoi Annii. Bd. 8.Toronto, 1980, S. 203, 217, 240, 251. Border troops during the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Collection of documents. Moscow, 1968, p. 678.
(439)Buchardt. Manuscript 1946 (in German), p. 15, VA-MA, Steenberg archive; same, 2/27/1966, p. 4, ibid. Letter from Kröger to Steenberg, 6.5.1967, ibid.
(440)V. Pozdnyakov. Major General Fedor Ivanovich Trukhin, VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/2. Letter from Kroeger to Steenberg, no date, VA-MA, Steenberg archive. B. Pluschev-Vlasenko, decree. cit., p. 111.
(441)Detlef Brandes. Die Tschechen unter deutschem Protektorat. Bd. 2.Munchen, Wien 1975, S. 96, 105.
(442)F. Bogatyrchuk. On the issue of assessing the anti-German speech of the ROA in Prague in May 1945. VA-MA, Steenberg archive. See also "Prague", VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/8.
(443)S. Auski. Betrayal and betrayal. General Vlasov's troops in the Czech Republic. San Francisco, 1982, p. 121.
(444)V. Artemyev, op. cit., p. 37. Liberation Movement of the Peoples of Russia, p. 28, VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/26.
(445) Letter from Arkhipov to Pozdnyakov, 19.2.1960, VA-MA, Pozdnyakov’s archive 149/29.V. Pozdnyakov. Andrey Andreevich Vlasov, p. 370.
(446) Letter from Kroeger to Steenberg, no date, VA-MA, Steenberg archive.
(447)S. Auski, op. cit., pp. 130-131.
(448)Karel BartoSek. Prafeke povstani. Prag, I960, S. 205.
(449)Forrest S. Pogue. The Supreme Command. Washington, 1954, p. 503.John Ehnnann. Grand Strategy. Bd. 6: October 1944 - August 1945, p. 159.Lnd, 1956 (History of the Second World War. United Kingdom Military Series). Charles B. MacDonald. The Last Offensive. Washington, 1973, p. 467.
(450)S. Auski, op. cit., p. 138.
(451) Letter from Kroeger to Steenberg, 12/7/1966, VA-MA, Steenberg archive.
(452)G. Zhukov. Memories and reflections. Moscow, APN, 1971, p. 690.
(453)V. Artemyev, op. cit., p. 33.A. Arkhipov. Memoirs, page 19, author’s archive.
(454)V. Pozdnyakov. Last days. "Voice of the People", 1951, No. 25. Aka. Letter to the editor, VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/8. Aka. Andrey Andreevich Vlasov, p. 370.
(455)G. Schwenninger. Report..., page 21, ISI.
(456)V. Artemyev, op. cit., p. 39. Letter from Kroeger to Steenberg, 12/7/1966, VA-MA, Steenberg archive.
(457) Lieutenant G. Near Prague. "Voice of the People", No. 17(67), 27.4.1952.
(458)G. Schwenninger. Report..., page 20. Same. Supplements, p. 14, ISI. See also: Ivan Stovicek. Zapis o zasedani CNR ve dnech 4.ai 9.kvetna 1945.In: Historie a vojenstvi 1967, N 6, S. 996.
(459)G. Schwenninger. Report..., page 20. Same. Additions, p. 15. Letter from Schwenninger to Steenberg, 18.5.1966, VA-MA, Steenberg archive.
(460)K. Bartoszek, op. cit., p. 166.
(461) Ibid., p. 164.
(462)F. Titov. Oathbreakers. In: Inevitable retribution..., Moscow, 1973, p. 228.S. Shtemenko, op. cit., p. 439.
(463)V. Artemyev, op. cit., p. 29. Letter from Kleist to Dolerdt, 3.7.1954, VA-MA, Steenberg archive.
(464) Letter from Schwenninger to Steenberg, 18.5.1966, VA-MA, Steenberg archive.
(465) Schwenninger. Report..., page 17. Letter from Kroeger to Steenberg, 12/7/1966, VA-MA, Steenberg archive.
(466) Lieutenant A. Vysotsky. My memories of A. A. Vlasov, June 23, 1948, VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/48. Letter from Kroeger to Steenberg, no date, VA-MA, Steenberg archive.
(467)G. Schwenninger. Report..., page 20. Same. Additions, p. 14. Letter from Schwenninger to Steenberg, May 18, 1966, VA-MA, Steenberg archive.
(468)Horst Naude. Eriebnisse und Erkentnisse. Als politischer Beamier im Protektorat Bohmen und Mahren. Munchen, 1975, S. 180.
(469)A. Arkhipov, op. cit., p. 21.
(470)V. Pozdnyakov. First Infantry Division, sheet 20, VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/49.V. Artemyev, op. cit., p. 41.
(471)S. Auski, op. cit., p. 172.
(472) Report Hogebak, VA-MA RL 10/564.K. Bartoszek, op. cit., p. 166.
(473) Report Hogeback, VA-MA RL 10/564. Letter from Kolhund to Dollerdt, 10.8.1954, VA-MA, Steenberg archive.
(474) According to V. Pozdnyakov in a letter to the author dated September 2, 1972, the accusation against Lieutenant Colonel Artemyev put forward in this regard is completely unfounded.
(475)S. Auski, op. cit., p. 177.
(476)A. Arkhipov, op. cit., p. 21. Letter from Georgiev to Steenberg, 11/14/1968, Steenberg archive.
(477)See See also: Ceskoslovensky voensky atlas. Prag, 1965, S. 357.
(478)K. Bartoszek, op. cit., p. 164.
(479) Ibid., p. 164.M. Stepanek-Štemr. Russians in Prague (in Czech), author’s archive. D. Brandes, op. cit., p. 137.
(480)K. Bartoszek, op. cit., p. 167.
(481)M. Stepanek-Štemr, op. op., author's archive. Ludwik Svoboda. From Buzuluk to Prague. Moscow, 1969, p. 401.
(482)P. Auski, op. cit., p. 239.
(483)I. Shtovichek, op. cit., p. 995.
(484) Oh. Machotka. Pra&k6 povstani 1945. Washington, 1965, S. 39. Letter from Makhotka to Steenberg, 2.3.1969, VA-MA, Steenberg archive.
(485)See also: K. Bartoszek, op. cit., p. 171.
(486) Letter from Makhotka to Steenberg, 2.3.1969, VA-MA, Steenberg archive.
(487)I. Shtovichek, op. cit., p. 995.
(488) Ibid., p. 996. See. also: K. Bartoszek, op. cit., p. 172.
(489)D. Brandeis, op. cit., p. 137.
(490)K. Bartoszek, op. cit., p. 166.
(491)I. Shtovichek, op. cit., p. 1004.
(492) Letters from Makhotka to Steenberg, 2.3.1969, 14.3.1969, VA-MA, Steenberg archive.
(493)D. Brandeis, op. cit., pp. 72, 113, 139.F. Pog, decree. cit., p. 505.
(494)I. Shtovichek, op. cit., p. 1009.
(495)P. Auski, op. cit., p. 198.
(496)A. Arkhipov, op. cit., p. 22.
(497)V. Pozdnyakov. First Infantry Division, sheet 21...
(498)K. Bartoszek, op. cit., p. 154.
(499) Letter from Georgiev to Steenberg, 2.1.1969, VA-MA, Steenberg archive.
(500)S. Auski, op. cit., p. 189.
(501)K. Bartoszek, op. cit., p. 166. Report from Hogebak, VA-MA RL 10/564.
(502)A. Arkhipov, op. cit., p. 24.
(503)D. Brandeis, op. cit., p. 137.
(504)K. Bartoszek, op. cit., p. 166.O. Mahotka, decree. cit., p. 45.
(505)S. Auski, op. cit., p. 186.
(506)A. Arkhipov, op. cit., p. 23.V. Pozdnyakov. First Infantry..., sheet 22.
(507)Oh. Mahotka, decree. cit., p. 40.M. Stepanek-Štemr, op. op. Letter from Georgiev to Steenberg, 11/14/1968, VA-MA, Steenberg archive.
(508)John Ehnnann, ibid, p. 159.Charles B. MacDonald, ibid. pp. 458, 467, 477.Die Befreiungsmission der Sowjetstreilkrafte im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Berlin (Ost), 1973, S. 384.
(509)V. Artemyev, op. cit., p. 45.
(510)A. Arkhipov, op. cit., p. 23.
(511)G. Schwenninger. Report..., page 22.
(512)A. Arkhipov, op. cit., p. 25. See also: V. Artemyev, op. cit., p. 45.
(513)K. Bartoszek, op. cit., p. 199.

The sign * denotes quotations given in reverse translation from German.

Author: This book, which shows the origins of the Liberation Movement and the history of the Liberation Army and pays some attention to the political foundations and activities of the KONR, is written from a fundamentally new perspective. In contrast to the generally accepted interpretation, when the Vlasov army is considered as an action of German circles (the leadership of the Reich, the SS and the Wehrmacht), undertaken to prevent the defeat that threatened the Reich, in this work the Liberation Army and the Liberation Movement are considered on their own and independently. The author especially sought to highlight positive aspects in relations between Germans and Russians. The national Russian movement, to which Vlasov gave his name, is examined in the book in the context of Soviet history, while remaining part of the history of the Second World War.

Preface

Chapter 1. Basics of ROA

Chapter 2. High command and officer corps of the ROA. Separation of ROA

Chapter 3. ROA Ground Forces

Chapter 4. ROA Air Force

Chapter 5. Prisoners of war become ROA soldiers

Chapter 6. ROA on the Oder Front

Chapter 7. Campaign in Bohemia

Chapter 8. ROA and the Prague Uprising

Chapter 9. The significance of the Prague operation

Chapter 10. The end of the Southern Group of the ROA

Chapter 11. The end of the Northern Group of the ROA

Chapter 12. Issuance

Chapter 13. Soviet reaction to Vlasov

Chapter 14. The fight against the Vlasov phenomenon

Chapter 15. Historical place of the liberation movement

Afterword

Documentation

Notes

Preface

Back in the 60s, the Scientific Center for the Military History of Germany addressed the problem of volunteer units recruited from representatives of various peoples of the USSR and who served in the German Wehrmacht. In 1967, my then boss, retired Colonel Dr. von Grote, commissioned me to prepare a detailed review of all aspects of this topic. Until now, the focus of my research interests has been on the peoples of the Caucasus, and therefore I decided to first deal with volunteer formations made up of representatives of national minorities of the USSR.

In 1974, I published the work “Germans and Kalmyks,” and in 1976 the first volume of the history of the Eastern Legions was published. Both publications went through several editions, which proved the relevance of my chosen topic. However, for various reasons I had to interrupt my studies with the Eastern Legions, and the center of my scientific interests shifted. I became closely involved in the history of the Russian Liberation Army and at the end of 1982 presented the manuscript to the head of the Center for Military History, Colonel Dr. Hakl. Only after this did I return to the interrupted research.

Throughout this period, I was asked more than once how the study of volunteer associations, the discussion of the phenomenon of former Soviet soldiers serving in the ranks and on the side of the “German-fascist forces” is consistent with the principles of the so-called policy of détente. Each time I answered that a historian cannot base his work on considerations of political conjuncture and that the policy of détente hardly justifies the silence of historical truth and the cessation of polemics. I hope the reader will find that my text is written from beginning to end in the spirit of mutual understanding between the German and Russian peoples. In any case, from the Soviet point of view, this topic is undoubtedly extremely relevant, although, according to an accurate remark, it reveals the “Achilles heel” of the Soviet army, in other words, its “moral and political” weakness during the Second World War. But it is unlikely that a historian has any reason to conceal facts that are unpleasant to someone.

Interest in the Vlasov movement (and its core - the “Vlasov army”) has not dried up over time. In recent years, many interesting publications have appeared; others are still waiting in the wings. In working on this book, I used mainly German documents, as well as documents and materials of the Russian liberation movement. Among them, we should first of all mention the extensive collection of ROA Colonel Pozdnyakov, transferred through my mediation from the USA to the military archive of the Federal Republic of Germany. The work also used Soviet captured materials and publications on this topic.

This book, which shows the origins of the Liberation Movement and the history of the Liberation Army and pays some attention to the political foundations and activities of the KONR, is written from a fundamentally new perspective. In contrast to the generally accepted interpretation, when the Vlasov army is considered as an action of German circles (the leadership of the Reich, the SS and the Wehrmacht), undertaken to prevent the defeat that threatened the Reich, in this work the Liberation Army and the Liberation Movement are considered on their own and independently. The author especially sought to highlight positive aspects in relations between Germans and Russians. The national Russian movement, to which Vlasov gave his name, is examined in the book in the context of Soviet history, while remaining part of the history of the Second World War.

Basics of ROA

The attack by Germany and its allies on June 22, 1941 was a severe shock for the Soviet Union, not only militarily, but also politically. The war immediately exposed all the hitherto hidden internal contradictions of the Soviet state. In conditions of merciless surveillance and terror, these contradictions, of course, could not take the form of open opposition. But in the occupied areas, with the cessation of the activities of the NKVD apparatus, the fragility of the ideological foundations of Soviet power was immediately revealed. With all their behavior, the Soviet people demonstrated that the pompous slogans of the Bolshevik doctrine about the indissoluble unity of Soviet society, unshakable loyalty to the Communist Party and selfless “Soviet patriotism” did not withstand the first test of strength. In areas under threat of German invasion, residents resisted in every possible way the orders of the party and Soviet authorities to evacuate and destroy state property. The vast majority of the population greeted the enemy troops with obvious goodwill, or at least with expectant curiosity and without any hatred - which was completely contrary to dogma. This deviation from the rules was even more obvious in the behavior of the Red Army soldiers. They have long been taught that in battle they can only win or die, there is no third option (the Soviet Union was the only country where surrender was equated with desertion and betrayal, and a soldier who was captured was prosecuted by law). But, despite all this political drill and threats, by the end of 1941, at least 3.8 million Red Army soldiers, officers, political workers and generals were in German captivity - and in total during the war years this figure reached 5.24 million. The population that greeted the invaders friendly and openly, without hatred or hostility, the millions of Red Army soldiers who preferred captivity to death “for the Motherland, for Stalin,” all of this represented significant resources for the political war against the Soviet regime.

Joachim Hoffmann

HISTORY OF THE VLASOV ARMY

Chapter 13.

Soviet reaction to Vlasov.

After the war, the Soviet government made truly gigantic efforts to acquire the last scattered remnants of the ROA. By the persistence and consistency of these efforts, one can judge what the very existence of this army meant for the USSR. Here it is necessary to turn again to the time of the birth of the Liberation Army, since in search of an explanation for the inflexible position of the USSR on this issue, it should be understood that the high self-awareness of the Soviet army at the beginning of the German-Soviet war was shaken by the very fact of the existence of the ROA. The anniversary work on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet armed forces states: “The personnel of the Red Army and Navy are morally and politically tempered and boundlessly devoted to their socialist homeland” (687). In the Soviet Union there has always existed - and still exists - a dogma about the moral and political unity of Soviet society, about the inextricable friendship of the peoples of the USSR and about the selfless patriotism of the “Soviet people”, united around the Communist Party, to which they are infinitely devoted. This myth was undermined at the very beginning of the German-Soviet war, when, despite all measures of political influence and propaganda tricks, in the very first months 3.8 million Soviet soldiers of all ranks surrendered to German troops and their allies, including political workers (and in total During the war, 5.24 million people were captured). True, as a result of the German policy in the occupied areas and stopping the offensive and with the help of increased intimidation and propaganda measures, this fiasco was somewhat mitigated.

Since the autumn of 1941, news began to reach the Soviet leadership that former Red Army soldiers in German captivity were creating a military organization to fight against the Stalinist regime. Of course, these messages aroused some interest, but they did not foreshadow any immediate danger: recruitment into the German army was carried out in a decentralized manner, under strict control and relatively slowly. However, already in 1942, 25 field battalions of the Eastern Legions, consisting of representatives of national minorities of the USSR, appeared on the forward sectors of the front and in the rear of Army Group A, which was advancing to the Caucasus. The first attempt to form national Russian armed forces under their own command - “experimental armies”, as defined by the historian Bass (688) dates back to this time. In 1942, the following armies of this type operated in the rear of the German army in the east:

1. Russian People's National Army (RNNA), formed in Osinovka under the command of Colonel K. G. Kromiadi (Sanin), numbering 10 thousand people, in Russian uniform and with national insignia, consisting of six infantry battalions, a combat engineer battalion and an artillery battalion division. The political leader of the army was S.N. Ivanov. In August 1942, Kromiadi and Ivanov were replaced in these posts by Colonel V.I. Boyarsky and General G.N. Zhilenkov (689).

2. 120th regiment of Don Cossacks (from the end of 1942 - 600th regiment of Don Cossacks), numbering about 3 thousand people, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel I. N. Kononov, formed in Mogilev (690).

3. Eastern reserve regiment "Center", formed in Bobruisk and consisting of infantry battalions "Berezina", "Desna", "Dnepr", "Pripyat", "Volga" and several artillery batteries. Commander - Lieutenant Colonel N. G. Yanenko (691).

4. The Russian Liberation People's Army (RONA), formed in the self-governing Lokot region, numbering 20 thousand people, consisting of five infantry regiments, a sapper battalion, a tank battalion, and an anti-aircraft division. Commander - Brigadier General B. Kaminsky (692).

5. The Druzhina brigade under the command of Lieutenant Colonel V.V. Gil-Rodionov (693) was a special case. It was formed in 1943 under the auspices of the SD, but had complete independence. Its strength reached 8 thousand people, it consisted of several regiments and special units. Subsequently, the “ROA Guards Battalion” (in Pskov), the first formation that was in direct contact with Vlasov’s circle (commander - Ivanov, deputy - Colonel I.K. Sakharov, chief of staff - Colonel Kromiadi) was separated from the brigade (694).

All these formations, each in its own way, took part in the fight against Soviet partisans in the rear of the German army. And all of them, undoubtedly, had a great attractive force for the population of the occupied areas and, to some extent, for the Soviet troops. The RNNA, for example, considered its greatest achievement to be the moral victory over the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, surrounded by it at Dorogobuzh, under the command of Major General P. A. Belov: the reconnaissance department of the corps under the command of the Hero of the Soviet Union, Senior Lieutenant Knyazev, completely went over to the side of the RNNA and joined into its ranks (695). However, the “experimental armies” existed each on their own, there was no central leadership body, and Soviet propaganda dealt with them by local means (696). Only at the beginning of 1943, when news spread about the creation of the Russian Committee, a political center on the German side, did the inadequacy of these funds become apparent.

The Soviet leadership was probably extremely concerned that the head of the Russian movement on the enemy’s side was the deputy commander of the Volkhov Front, commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov, known to a wide circle of the population since the battles near Moscow. In September 1942, his first appeal to “comrade commanders” and the Soviet intelligentsia was dropped over units of the Red Army. In January 1943, the “Appeal of the Russian Committee to the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, to the entire Russian people and other peoples of the Soviet Union” followed, a 13-point political program signed by the Chairman of the Committee A. A. Vlasov and Secretary Major General V. F. Malyshkin (697). In March 1943, an open letter from Lieutenant General Vlasov appeared entitled “Why I took the path of fighting Bolshevism” (698). In April 1943, the “anti-Bolshevik conference of former commanders and soldiers of the Red Army” publicly recognized General Vlasov as the leader of the Russian liberation movement (699). The presidium of the conference included Major General Malyshkin, Zhilenkov, Major Fedorov, Lieutenant Colonel Pozdnyakov, Major Pshenichny, Lieutenant Krylov, Private Kolomatsky and others. Behind all these phenomena there had to be something more significant and concrete hidden than just propaganda events. This was also confirmed by the appearance of Vlasov in the rear of Army Groups "Center" and "North" in March - May 1943 (700). His speeches before the so-called Eastern troops and the civilian population of the occupied areas, his appeal to Russian national feeling, were, as Russian observers unanimously noted, “a huge success.” His words in Soltsy on May 5, 1943, that Germany could not win the war without Russia and that Russians could not be bought (701): “We don’t want communism,” he said, “but we also we don’t want to be a German colony,” Russia is destined for “a place of honor... in the new Europe” *.

At the same time, an operation was carried out, which was called the “silver stripe” and was paid for by the Germans. “General Order No. 13 of the Supreme High Command of the German Army” was dropped in large quantities over the front, calling on Red Army soldiers to go over to the German side. The defectors were given a period during which they could decide whether they would engage in some peaceful work in the “liberated areas” or join the “Russian Liberation Army”. This order, combined with the subsequent leaflets of the “Command of the Russian Liberation Army” (702), as well as the introduction of “Russian organizational companies” of the ROA in all German divisions of the eastern front, seemed to indicate the existence of a national army.

In reality, things were somewhat different. The “Russian Committee” was a pure propaganda fiction, and the Russian Liberation Army in 1943 was nothing more than a collective designation of all soldiers of Russian nationality organized in any form on the German side, which included members of combat and security formations, and Hiwis , now called volunteers, who were in German formations (703). The state of affairs at that time was quite accurately determined by Major General Malyshkin. In his speech in Paris on July 24, 1943, during the “Russian Days,” he expressed regret that the ROA does not yet exist, adding, however, that the accelerated organization of a real Russian liberation army is an urgent matter (704).

Colonel Boyarsky’s speech to volunteers on June 16, 1943 echoes these words. He said that at the moment the Russians do not have a liberation army, because there is no government to which they could submit. Such a Government, in his opinion, could be created in two to three months (705).

So, the ROA itself did not yet exist, but the propaganda associated with the name of Vlasov had, as Field Marshal G. von Kluge claims in a letter to the Chief of the OKH General Staff, “the strongest influence on both sides of the front,” although the flow of defectors did not increase as much as expected - probably , due to countermeasures taken by the Soviet leadership. The same effect was noted in reports from other army groups: for example, the commander of the 18th Army, Colonel General G. Lindemann, wrote that only thanks to the speeches of General Vlasov there were no longer partisans in the area he occupied and cases of sabotage had stopped (706). On the Soviet side, naturally, fear arose that the Germans had taken a new course and finally moved on to waging a political war. After messages about Vlasov penetrated into the eastern area of ​​​​operations of German troops, his leaflets and appeals began to be dropped, the Soviet side had to abandon its original method - hushing up this unpleasant phenomenon.

In the Soviet memoir literature of the post-war years, one can easily find echoes of the then perception of the Vlasov phenomenon. Lieutenant General N.K. Popel, a former member of the military council of the 1st Guards Tank Army, writes that Vlasov’s leaflets were more dangerous than German ones (707). Marshal of the Soviet Union S.A. Chuikov echoes him, saying that one Vlasov agent was more dangerous than an entire enemy tank company (708). In general, judging by the frightened and stern tone of all reports about the Vlasovites, the moral state of Soviet soldiers, even after the victory at Stalingrad, remained extremely unstable. Thus, even those who simply picked up or kept Vlasov’s leaflets were subject to severe punishment (709). In January 1943, a military tribunal sentenced several Red Army soldiers of the 48th Guards Rifle Division to death for distributing such leaflets. But, despite the prohibition of any mention of the ROA, information about its existence was disseminated in parts of the Red Army and made a strong impression. As Lieutenant General L.A. Masanov, who was captured, said on July 22, 1943, the command staff of the Red Army had accurate information about the contents of the leaflets signed by Vlasov and about the existence of the ROA, although the commanders did not discuss this topic, “fearing denunciations and subsequent repression"*. According to General Masanov, the Vlasov program had features that were extremely attractive to every Russian, and responded to the wishes of the Russian people, so that with further dissemination it would inevitably have the widest response (710). In February-March 1943, Vlasov's appeals undoubtedly contributed to the decline in morale among the troops of the Voronezh and South-Eastern fronts, encircled at Kharkov and Lozovaya. According to one officer, many of his comrades secretly carried Vlasov leaflets with them (711). In the spring of 1943, the main topic of conversation among captured Soviet officers was General Vlasov, the Russian Committee and the ROA. In the prisoner of war camp near Vladimir-Volynsky, 570 officers of all ranks, on their own initiative, signed a request for admission to the Vlasov army and addressed the general with an open letter.

At the same time, the Soviet leadership, which strictly suppressed any manifestation of interest in the Vlasov issue, realized that it was necessary to provide the units of the Red Army exposed to the massive influence of this propaganda with some kind of explanation, an official version of events. This was a difficult task, since anything that could unwittingly contribute to the popularization of Vlasov and his cause had to be carefully avoided. At first, only front-line and partisan newspapers intended for a narrow circle dared to touch on this topic, and the central Soviet press remained dead silent. At the same time, surveillance and control measures were strengthened, and a powerful propaganda campaign was launched at the front from the spring of 1943. Even on the Svir front, the command of the Finnish army recorded Soviet propaganda activities against Vlasov and the ROA (712).

On April 5, 1943, an article by E. Aleksandrov “Traders of the Motherland” appeared in the newspaper “Leningrad Partisan”; on April 29, an article by L. Kokotov “The False Russian Committee” appeared in the newspaper “For the Soviet Motherland”; on May 15, the same newspaper published an article by A. Pavlov “ Judushka Vlasov" (713). Finally, on July 4, 1943, an article “Death to the despicable traitor Vlasov, vile spy and agent of the cannibal Hitler” appeared in a number of front-line newspapers (For a Just Cause, For the Honor of the Motherland, To Defeat the Enemy, etc.), in which reflected the official position of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army (714).

Already from these first publications it is clear that Soviet counter-propaganda lacks real arguments. The confusion of the advice of the Russian leadership is expressed not so much in the accumulation of strong expressions and insults (this is to some extent understandable), but in the fact that in almost all points the Soviet authors had to resort to distortion or simply to lies. The main goal of Soviet propaganda was to morally destroy Vlasov, obviously in the hope that then the political idea he proclaimed would fail by itself. But it was not so easy: after all, the name of Vlasov was well known. At one time, the Soviet press wrote a lot about the military leadership merits of Vlasov, who commanded Soviet troops at key sectors of the front, commander of the 4th mechanized corps near Lemberg (Lvov), commander of the 37th Army near Kiev, deputy commander of the Western direction, commander of the 20th 1st Army near Moscow and 2nd Shock Army near Lyubanyo and finally - deputy commander of the Volkhov Front. To discredit such an illustrious military leader, the most convincing arguments were required. Therefore, accusations of “counter-revolutionary, Trotskyist conspiratorial activity” were again used: the same ones that had already served during the period of the “Great Terror” of 1937-38, during the liquidation of the leadership of the Red Army - not only Marshals of the Soviet Union Blucher, Egorov and Tukhachevsky, but also 35 thousand officers, half of the entire officer corps of the army, two-thirds of the political workers of the Red Army and the Navy (715).

In a statement by the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army dated July 4, 1943, Vlasov appears as an active member of the organization of enemies of the people, which at one time conducted “secret negotiations” with the Germans on the sale of Soviet Ukraine and Belarus, and with the Japanese on the sale of the Soviet Far Eastern coast and Siberia. Here the question inevitably arises: how, after the discovery of this conspiratorial activity, Vlasov managed to avoid the fate of all his comrades. It turns out that he “repented and begged for forgiveness”*, and Soviet justice not only forgave him, but also gave him the opportunity to atone for his alleged crimes by serving in the Red Army - and, moreover, as a major military leader! All this sounds completely implausible, and any sane person would easily see the absurdity of the charges brought against Vlasov. It goes on to say that Vlasov abused the trust placed in him, at the first opportunity he surrendered to the “German fascists” and went into their service as a spy and provocateur. To prove this second, “even more serious crime*, only one argument is given - that Vlasov returned from German encirclement. In those days, being encircled in the Red Army was considered a war crime; many soldiers and officers were shot simply for being surrounded encirclement (716). But in this case - and in relation to Vlasov personally - the facts are presented in a completely false light. The capital of Ukraine, by order of the Headquarters and contrary to the opinion of the commanders, was defended until the last moment, until the city was completely encircled by the Germans. Only on September 18, 1941 years, when an organized retreat was no longer possible, Vlasov received an order to surrender Kiev and retreat.(717) It was as a result of this stand in Kiev, presented in almost all Soviet military-historical works as a glorious page of the war, that Vlasov and parts of his army almost died in surroundings.

But the distortions and pile-up of absurdities do not end there either. It would be in vain for us to look in articles about Vlasov for an explanation of how this military leader, who was in the service of foreign intelligence, “again” received a high command post and at a critical moment in the battle for Moscow was thrown into a decisive sector of Soviet defense. With this logic, you are no longer surprised by the conclusion that responsibility for the death of the 2nd Shock Army lies not with Stalin or Headquarters, but only with Vlasov. Contrary to all the facts, the article claims that Vlasov deliberately drove the army entrusted to him into encirclement, brought it to death, and then ran over to his German masters and superiors, “finally exposing himself” to the Soviet people as “Hitler’s protege, traitor and murderer”* .

Soviet propaganda, in its best traditions, portrays Vlasov as a “German lackey”, crawling on all fours in front of his masters and helping “the enemies of our homeland to torture the Russian people, burn our villages, rape our women, kill our children and disgrace our national dignity”*. The unfortunate statement in Vlasov's "Open Letter" - that he will develop his ideas about the new Russia "in due time" - becomes proof of his lack of any constructive goals. Pavlov, the author of the article “Judushka Vlasov,” sneers:

In due time, Mr. General, but why not now? Since when did honest politicians hide their views from the people? But the fact of the matter is that Vlasov is not a politician, he is a sharper who is afraid to reveal his marked cards*.

Meanwhile, it is enough just to look at the 13 points of the Smolensk Appeal to understand the political goals of the Russian liberation movement. Here, among the reasons for restructuring life in Russia, the following are named: inviolability of person and home, freedom of conscience, beliefs, religion, assembly and press, free economy and social justice, national freedom of the peoples of Russia. In light of Vlasov’s accusation of serving the German invaders, the demand for an honorable peace with Germany and recognition of the Russian people as an equal member in the family of the new Europe sounds strange and directly contradicts German policy. And although the author of the article “Merchants of the Motherland” Aleksandrov was not too mistaken in calling the Russian Committee a “shop” (Colonel Boyarsky expressed himself in a similar way in one of his letters to Vlasov (718)), but in 13 points of the Smolensk appeal for the first time those demands were formulated that in detailed form eventually found expression in the Prague Manifesto on November 14, 1944.

The political theses proclaimed in the Smolensk address had such explosive power that the Soviet leadership did not even dare to engage in propaganda polemics with them. However, it was not only the Stalinist regime that was interested in concealing the appeal - the German leadership, based on similar reasons, categorically prohibited its distribution on this side of the front. In order to familiarize the residents of the occupied areas with the text of the appeal, they had to resort to a trick - the planes scattering leaflets “by mistake” went off course.

Hitler on June 8, 1943 expressed his dissatisfaction with Vlasov’s political activities and categorically refused to change his policy in the light of the theses of the Russian Committee, and also spoke out against the creation of the Russian army, because, according to him, this would mean abandoning the original goals of the war (719). The decisiveness with which Hitler paralyzed the activities of the Russian general convincingly refutes the Soviet propaganda version of Vlasov as a “fascist mercenary and a despicable sycophant.” In general, Hitler’s very attitude towards Vlasov indicates that the Russian general could not serve the interests of the Fuhrer in any way - his efforts were aimed at creating an independent national Russian “third force” - between Hitler and Stalin.

From the article in the central organ of the Main Political Directorate of the Army, the Red Army soldiers could not get the slightest idea about Vlasov’s true intentions. It is not surprising that this publication also distorts the appearance of ROA soldiers. Vlasov, the article says, with the help of the Germans, is trying to “put together several units from the same scum like himself... both by force and deception, to lure a few prisoners there”*. This dubious assertion was immediately refuted in the “Open Letter of Volunteers of the Russian Liberation Army,” distributed in the form of a leaflet, which emphasized that it was impossible to force powerful weapons into an army of thousands. By that time, we were no longer talking about thousands, but about hundreds of thousands of armed fighters against the Stalinist regime. On May 5, 1943, in addition to the “experimental armies” and several large all-Russian formations under German command (such as the 1st Cossack division, three separate Cossack regiments - “Platov”, “Jungschultz” and “5th Kubansky”) there were 90 Russian "Eastern battalions", as well as 140 smaller Russian formations, 90 field battalions and numerous individual units of the Eastern Legions and the Kalmyk Cavalry Corps. In addition, at least 400 thousand volunteers served in regular positions in German units, and 60-70 thousand worked in the public order service of the local auxiliary police of the military department (720). All these Russian soldiers sought to change the political situation in their homeland, and this, under existing conditions, was possible only by force - through civil war. And isn’t it strange that it was the Bolsheviks, who declared the civil war the only just one (while it was about establishing their power), who were now especially indignant that Vlasov wanted, in their words, to set one part of the Russian people against another and unleash fratricide? Here it should be remembered that the Russian Committee called on all Russians to fight “against hated Bolshevism” and invited all compatriots to enroll in the ranks of the Liberation Movement, regardless of their political position in the Soviet state. An exception was made only for those who voluntarily went to serve in the punitive organs of the NKVD.

One remarkable point is striking in Soviet anti-Vlasov propaganda: it was limited to calls for the defense of the homeland, Russia, the “holy right Russian cause,” not daring to use arguments about defending the cause of the Bolsheviks, the “conquests of October,” etc. The interpretation of the image was also new the Bolsheviks, who presented themselves, first of all, as the most faithful and devoted friends of both Russia itself and the Russian people. In this, too, one can see symptoms of the confusion into which the appearance of Vlasov plunged the Soviet leaders. The traditional values ​​of the Russian past were put into play, and the Orthodox Church also received a voice: during the war, the long-term offensive against it was suspended for tactical reasons. On April 12 (25), 1943, Metropolitan Alexey of Leningrad sent an Easter message to the clergy and believers of cities and villages still occupied by the enemy army, where he compared the war with the eternal struggle of good and evil, in which, as in the time of the holy Prince Alexander Nevsky, people stood on the same side in the image of the Germans there are dark devilish forces intent on enslaving the Russian people and their spiritual life, and on the other - the forces of the homeland and its heroic defenders - the soldiers of the Red Army (721). Metropolitan Alexey called everyone to a “holy war”, called on men and women to join the ranks of the partisans, to fight “for faith, for freedom, for the honor of the homeland.” This attempt to present a picture of "peaceful and joyful life in the light of the true holy faith" - in the Soviet Union, where Christianity was subjected to severe persecution! - could not but cause objections in Orthodox circles.

Outside of Soviet rule, the clergy - precisely because of their opposition to Germany's occupation policy - showed undisguised sympathy for Vlasov, thereby showing the inconsistency of Metropolitan Alexei's arguments. Metropolitan Anastassy, ​​the head of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, which broke away from the Russian Patriarchate after the congress of bishops in Karlovac, and Metropolitan Seraphim of Germany were close to the Liberation Movement. Anastasius, on his own initiative, turned to Vlasov, promising him the support of the Synod of Bishops (722). On November 19, 1944, after the promulgation of the Prague Manifesto, at a solemn prayer service in the Berlin Russian Orthodox Church, he called on believers in the name of “thousands and thousands of martyrs ... to unite around our national liberation movement” * and to contribute “to the great cause of the liberation of our homeland from the terrible evil of Bolshevism" * (723). In the spring of 1943, having heard that General Vlasov had apparently appointed Archimandrite Hermogenes, the former secretary of Seraphim and, therefore, a member of a foreign church that was considered schismatic, as protopresbyter of the ROA, the famous clergyman of the patriarchal church, Exarch of the Baltic States, Metropolitan Sergius, addressed Vlasov with a message. In his message about “religious service to the Vlasov army” (724), Metropolitan Sergius emphasized: the fact that the Russian liberation army is commanded by an emigrant general, and an emigrant bishop is placed at the head of the clergy of this army, should not affect the influence of the army on both sides of the front. Proposing the creation of a church center for the occupied regions, Sergius called, in addition, for the appointment of a protopresbyter also from the patriarchal church, explaining that this was the only way to refute Soviet rumors that the Germans wanted to lead the Russian Orthodox Church from Berlin in order to “break this bastion of the Russian national self-awareness"*. This would mean that the ROA fundamentally recognizes the authority of the Moscow Patriarchate, and exclusively in matters of faith, but not in political matters (which is fully consistent with canon law); Only such recognition made it possible to fight Bolshevik propaganda “in the church sector.” Since the Russian patriarchal church, from the point of view of Metropolitan Sergius, was in a state of captivity, he considered the political statements of the Moscow and Leningrad metropolitans “imposed or distorted by the Bolsheviks” * and therefore not binding for believers. Therefore, the struggle for the “liberation of the church” from Bolshevism became the sacred duty of the Orthodox.

The chairman of the Council of Bishops of Belarus, Metropolitan Panteleimon, also spoke in support of Vlasov (725).

The fact that Vlasov and the ROA were supported not only by the foreign church, but also by well-known clergy of the patriarchal church who were in the occupied areas, greatly worried the Soviet government. It is possible, by the way, that this was precisely the cause of the death of Metropolitan Sergius: on April 23, 1944, during a trip from Vilnius to Riga, he was killed by partisans under strange circumstances. In the post-war years, Soviet propaganda spread the version that the Metropolitan used his position for pro-Soviet propaganda and therefore was eliminated on behalf of the Germans (726). Soviet propaganda, without any reason, tried to connect Colonel Pozdnyakov, who at that time was the representative of General Vlasov and the ROA under Army Group North, with this case. However, from all available documents it follows that Metropolitan Sergius did not hide his hostility to Bolshevism and actively advocated the cooperation of the patriarchal church with the Vlasov movement (727). In the spring of 1943, he met Vlasov in Pskov and became friends with him. It is no coincidence that his secretary I. D. Grimm, a former captain of the Pavlovsk Life Guards Regiment and professor of state law at the University of Dorpat, later played a leading role in the legal department of the KONR, and his son was a propagandist in the ROA.

Since May 1943, a targeted propaganda campaign against Vlasov began in areas occupied by the Germans. Soviet anti-Vlasov leaflets were distributed here, addressed to the entire population, but especially to the peasants (in connection with the “introduction of peasant ownership of land” announced by the Germans). Here are a few names of leaflets (728):

1. “An open letter from the workers and peasants of the Pskov and Ostrov regions to the traitor General Vlasov. Answer, traitor Vlasov!”

2. “Vlasov is an agent of the German fascists.”

3. "How did Vlasov sell the peasants to the Germans?"

4. "A Russian will not be a fratricide."

5. "Death to the fascist hireling Vlasov!"

6. “Kill the traitor Vlasov” (in German)

7. Leaflet from the political department of the Northwestern Front “Who is Vlasov,” addressed to “the population of the temporarily occupied areas of the Leningrad region.”

These leaflets had the same goal as the newspaper articles: to prove that Vlasov had nothing to do with the Russian people, to present him as a degenerate, a leper, a dumb tool in the hands of the German enslavers. Thus, Soviet propaganda tried to cope with a new phenomenon: the desperate population of the occupied areas pinned their last hopes on Vlasov, and any means were suitable in the fight against this. At this stage, Soviet propagandists abandoned polemics with the socio-political program of the Smolensk Appeal, mentioning it only once in passing, and even then in a distorted context. They resorted, first of all, to denigrating Vlasov, who was portrayed as Judas, a hardened scoundrel, a fascist servant, a scarecrow in a general's uniform, a fascist parrot, a murderer, a criminal, a swindler, a scoundrel, a deceiver, a scumbag, a thug, a bastard, a nonentity. He was compared to the most unsympathetic animals, called a son of a bitch, a rootless mongrel, a bastard, an insect... The “Open Letter to the Workers and Peasants of the Pskov and Ostrov Regions” says: “But you, dog, will soon die. Just show up in Pskov - and we will We'll finish you off right away, you bastard." In other places they wrote about Vlasov that his main goal was to help the Germans “enslave the Russian people”, deceive the peasants in order to “turn them into slaves of German landowners and capitalists.” However, trying to explain to the people how such a degenerate could have found its way among the “famous Soviet generals,” the propagandists made a clear mistake. They wrote that the political department of the Red Army allegedly long ago saw through the “Trotskyist conspirator” Vlasov, who was recruited as a spy long before going over to the Germans. And then it suddenly turned out that he had been in a German concentration camp for a “long time”, that “it took almost two years of bloody work in the basements of the Gestapo to find a pathetic handful of traitors: Vlasov, Malyshkin and others”*. And, of course, to attract Soviet generals to the enemy camp required either bribery or violence. The possibility of the emergence of organized resistance to Bolshevism in the political and historical context of the German-Soviet war was not foreseen by Soviet theory.

Since June 1943, numerous appeals began to appear directly to the “soldiers and officers” of the ROA, the “volunteer army” or the “Vlasov army” (729). As was immediately noted by German counter-propaganda, Stalin had to drop leaflets in Russian over the German trenches, thereby recognizing the existence of the ROA. This agitation played a role in the events of the following months. From the propaganda materials of that period we have the following (730):

1. Leaflet from the headquarters of the partisan movement “Who is being deceived by the traitor General Vlasov.”

2. Leaflet of the district committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the city. Navli “To the soldiers of the so-called “Russian Liberation Army” and the policemen.”

3. Leaflet “Our word to you, soldiers of Vlasov!”

4. Leaflet "What is ROA?"

5. Appeal from the political department of the North-Western Front: “Russians, Ukrainians, all former Red Army soldiers who were in fascist captivity and recruited to serve in the German army.”

6. Leaflet “The decisive hour is near! Whose side are you on? To all Soviet citizens recruited to serve in the German troops and the gangs of the traitor Vlasov.”

7. Order of the Military Council of the North-Western Front dated August 15, 1943 “To all former prisoners of war, Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians and other citizens recruited to serve in the German army.”

(Leaflets 1, 2, 4 and b are only available in German translation.)

The main argument in these leaflets was the rapid deterioration of Germany's military situation and a change in the balance of power in favor of the USSR and its allies. They emphasized that the “Hitler war machine”, under the blows of the Red Army, was rocking and cracking at all the seams, Germany was suffering unheard of losses, and the creation of an “army of Russians”* now, in 1943 - and not in 1941 - was explained by the urgent need for cannon fodder . What the Germans could not achieve by force, they want to achieve by deception, using Vlasov for this. But no matter how Vlasov throws out pompous words about the new Russia, masking his betrayal, it is clear to everyone that the ROA are just accomplices of the Nazi bandits. Soviet propagandists initially denied the ROA the right to exist, and army members were assigned the role of mercenaries, “shedding the blood of Russian brothers for the most cruel and hated enemy of the Russian people... the cannibal Hitler”*. In conclusion, the ROA soldiers were once again impressed that

Day and night, from all the fascist holes, all sorts of Vlasovs, Oktans and Kaminskys bark tirelessly... The Soviet homeland long ago threw these scum away from itself, and they found temporary refuge in fascist doghouses. After all, they hire any kind of rubbish there, as long as it is ready to yelp without hesitation according to fascist demands*.

Soviet propagandists skillfully played on the fact that many volunteers, due to the changed military situation, began to increasingly think about their future fate. The leaflets asked the question: what would become of them after the inevitable defeat of Germany? Everyone who, out of meanness or out of fear, agreed to serve the Germans or Vlasov (according to the logic of the leaflets, this was equivalent) will face a shameful execution; there will be no mercy for them: “a dog’s death!”

After such threats, supported by an allusion to the custom of judicial responsibility of family members, well known to all Soviet citizens, readers of the leaflets were offered a way out. It is known that the fascist executioners drove them to despair, that for the most part they were forced to join the Vlasov army by threats, violence and deception. And although, having lost “courage and faith in the victory of the Red Army” and taking this step, they committed a crime, the Motherland is ready to forgive them and give them the opportunity to atone for their guilt.

What was required in order to escape the inevitable retribution of the Soviet state? Was it really enough just to go over, alone or with a group, to the side of the Red Army or to the partisans, as the political administration of the North-Western Front repeatedly emphasized? Nothing like this. In an order dated August 15, 1943, the military council of the Northwestern Front, consisting of the front commander, Lieutenant General P. A. Kurochkin, the chief of staff, Lieutenant General N. F. Vatutin, and Lieutenant General V. N., responsible for political work. Bogatkin, all assurances of this kind were declared false (731). In this document, “officers, non-commissioned officers and ordinary gangs of the so-called Russian liberation army”* were given an extremely strange task: they were ordered to take possession of the Pskov-Dno-Nasva region, 200 kilometers long, through an armed uprising. The Military Council of the North-Western Front demanded nothing less than the destruction of all German garrisons in Pskov, Den, Porkhov, Dedovichi, Nasva, Lokna and other points, to blow up train stations, bridges and other similar objects, blocking the routes for the delivery of reinforcements, to kill all residents, collaborated with the Germans at least to the slightest extent, and after completing all these tasks, unite with the partisans for a joint fight. The ROA units, which, according to the Soviet leaders, were already at the front, were tasked with cutting off enemy troops from their rear formations, destroying their defensive fortifications, depots, bridges, railway lines, etc., and, having established contact with the Red Army units, breaking through the front and unite with the Red Army. Life and forgiveness of the homeland were promised only to those who carried out this absolutely unrealistic order; all others faced death - as traitors to the homeland. Further proof that there was no turning back for the ROA soldiers...

Judging by the leaflets addressed to the Vlasovites, Soviet propaganda recognized the existence of the ROA. However, at the same time, she constantly tried to create the impression that Vlasov had never managed to form a real army. The leaflets stated that the ROA is not an army at all, and in any case not the Russian army, these are “Vlasov gangs”, “several companies”, “a pathetic handful”, brought together by force and deceit, which “will crumble at the first collision with our units"*. But behind this feigned confidence lay deep anxiety. In a conversation with the Polish Ambassador T. Romer in the presence of Molotov on February 26-27, 1943 in the Kremlin, in response to the ambassador’s remark that “formers of former prisoners of war of Ukrainian, Russian, Georgian, Azerbaijani, etc. origin are ready to fight against the Red Army ... , Stalin replied: “There are also Russians who serve the Germans in an exemplary manner and take their side. There is a black mark in the family” * (732).

As early as December 26, 1942, the GPU of the Red Army, in order No. 001445, warned about the possible action of the liberation army and demanded that appropriate measures be taken (733). In the area of ​​RNNA operations, as Lieutenant Colonel Bocharov reported to Vlasov on February 17, 1943, the Soviet command announced to the Red Army soldiers that these were “German troops in disguise.” To avoid contact with them, Soviet units were given orders not to interfere with the advance of these troops, not to mine highways, not to attack supply groups, and generally not to do anything that could provoke hostilities.

How dangerous Vlasov was for the Soviet regime is evidenced by attempts “by any means, at any cost” to neutralize the once famous commander, to deliver him “dead or alive to Soviet soil.” In March 1943, he was hunted by partisan groups of Grigoriev and Novozhilov. In May, the chief of the Leningrad headquarters of the partisan movement, M. N. Nikitin, radioed through the operational group at the headquarters of the North-Western Front to kill Vlasov in Dedovichi, Porkhov or Pasherevichi: obviously, the approximate location of the general was known (734). In Berlin, the assassination attempt on Vlasov was to be made by Lieutenant Augustin, an employee of the Free Germany committee created in the USSR. He was parachuted into the German rear (735), but he was arrested. On May 24, 1943, Red Army Major S.N. Kapustin appeared at German forward posts in the Yartsevo area, posing as a defector (736). He managed to gain the trust of the military authorities and get into Berlin, where he unsuccessfully tried to get to Vlasov. Major General Malyshkin, after a conversation with the “defector”, considered his version suspicious, and indeed, Kapustin was later exposed as a Soviet agent and testified. It turned out that he had to not only collect materials about the ROA, but also prepare for the liquidation of Vlasov, Malyshkin and other army leaders by October 1943.

Judging by the detailed instructions received by Kapustin, the Soviet leadership, contrary to all propaganda assurances, took very seriously both the existence of the Russian Committee and the possible imminent action of the ROA (which in fact took place only at the end of 1944, and even then to a very limited extent). scale). In the summer of 1943, Soviet military intelligence became involved in the case. The spy organization "Red Chapel", which in Moscow was considered still active, although in fact it had already been defeated by that time, received a radio mission to collect data about Vlasov's army, the number of units and personnel, location, names of officers, weapons and methods propaganda. As Soviet intelligence resident and head of the Red Chapel Leopold Trepper writes, the Center demanded the most accurate information in order to verify the data it already had in order to find out the maximum number of details (737).

Moscow imagined the ROA as a united armed force, consisting of all branches of the military, divided into armies, army corps, divisions, with a central governing body - the general staff, corresponding educational institutions such as the central military school and officer schools. The Soviet leadership tried in every possible way to find out when and on what sector of the front the ROA should be expected to appear, whether it would fight independently or together with German units. In general, by the interest that the Soviet leadership showed in the propaganda and agitation bodies of the ROA and its intelligence service, one can judge how highly they valued the propaganda impact of the ROA and how low they valued the capabilities of their own counter-propaganda.

But this was not the only thing that worried the Soviet leadership: it was also concerned about the possibility of armed uprisings within the USSR. Agent Kapustin’s assignments also included finding out which department of the Russian Committee leads the anti-Soviet partisan movement in the USSR, identifying the system of connections, methods of supplying weapons and ammunition, and in general the method of action of “underground groups and anti-Soviet partisan detachments.” In addition, the Soviet leadership did not exclude the possibility of reviving, under the leadership of the Committee, a broad anti-Soviet movement “in the cities, factories and factories” of the deep rear. Obviously, at first it was frightened by the prospect of a possible civil war: the task of Kapustin and the state security lieutenant P. Larionov sent with him, who was once convicted of bribery, can only be explained by the complete helplessness and incompetence of the tent. In addition to carrying out various espionage tasks, in order to decompose the ROA, they had to create a reliable intelligence network of army officers and “terrorist groups” in all the main bodies of the ROA, in the Russian Committee and in the General Staff and prepare their transition to the side of the Red Army.

The heightened reaction of the Soviet authorities to the appearance of Vlasov, to the imaginary creation of the Russian Committee and the emergence of the Russian Liberation Army allows us to make several general comments. For the first time during the war, the Soviet Union was forced to go on the defensive in the sphere of political propaganda. One can imagine what the effect would be if the Liberation Movement were really given the opportunity to organize itself and all technical means were put at the service of this cause! For example, if we had accepted the proposal of the head of the Department of Foreign Armies of the East at the OKH General Staff, Colonel Gehlen, dated June 13, 1943, to continue “Vlasov propaganda... with increased intensity,” “by massively dropping about a million Vlasov and ROA leaflets” over large populated centers Moscow, Leningrad, Gorky, Kuibyshev, Saratov-Engels, Penza, Voronezh, Rostov, Astrakhan, Kalinin, Kaluga, Tula, Ryazan, etc. (738). According to Gehlen, such actions would gradually force the Soviet government to enter into open polemics with Vlasov and thereby contribute to the propaganda of his ideas.

We have already talked about how optimistic Vlasov himself was about the prospects of the movement he led. On February 17, 1943, at a meeting in the Excelsior Hotel in Berlin with the participation of generals Zhilenkov, Malyshkin, Blagoveshchensky, as well as Colonel Ril and Lieutenant Colonel Bocharov from the RNNA, he noted that he would not have put his soul into the idea of ​​the Russian Liberation Army if even for a minute doubted its success. And a little later, Colonel Boyarsky even took it upon himself to declare that the Liberation Movement could successfully end the war in Russia in three months. He said: “We have powerful connections with leading military leaders of the Red Army and political figures. Entire divisions will go over to us or they will play along with us” * (739). However, Boyarsky considered the creation of the Russian National Government and the Russian Liberation Army with an exclusively Russian command and their recognition to be an indispensable prerequisite for any political or military success.

These intentions of the Russian officers coincided with the wishes of their patrons in the Wehrmacht and Reich institutions, who also began to feel the positive impact of the “Vlasov action.” The news that the Soviet military leader openly called for a fight against Stalin aroused “great interest” in April-May 1943 not only on the Eastern Front, but also abroad, in allied, neutral and hostile countries. As the former ambassador to Moscow, Count Schulenburg, reported, the opinion spread that this action “with the skillful leadership of the German side could lead to a decisive turn in the war in favor of Germany” (740).

In May-June 1943, the Swedish press vividly commented on the “Vlasov problem” (741). On May 8, Aftonbladet reported in an international review that General Vlasov met with Hitler on various occasions. On May 25-26, the main political sensation in some Stockholm newspapers was the “report on the creation of the Vlasov army.” "Dagposten" and "Nya Dagligt Allekhanda" wrote on May 25 that the Soviet Union may be facing a civil war. On May 30, Aftonbladet published an interview of its Berlin correspondent “with the adjutant of General Vlasov about the program for the national revival of the Russian people.” On June 1, Social Democrat reprinted an article from the prisoner-of-war newspaper Zarya “about the life path and political goals of Vlasov.” And finally, “Stockholm Tidningen” on the same day gave an estimate of the size of the Vlasov army - 560 thousand people!

On June 17, the German envoy in Stockholm, Hans Thomsen, reported a conversation with King Gustav V after presenting him with “the Fuehrer’s handwritten letter” (742). The Swedish king, according to Thomsen, showed great interest “in the national Russian organization of General Vlasov. He was very pleased with my words that this movement would soon take on a large scale.” German Ambassador Franz von Papen reported from Ankara that after the deployment of the Vlasov army on the German side and the creation of the Free Germany Committee on the Soviet side, the British clearly felt an increased danger of “reaching a German-Russian agreement” (743).

Influential officers of the General Staff and the Eastern Army tried to finally persuade Hitler to wage a political war in the east, that is, they wanted to direct the German-Soviet war into the direction of an anti-Soviet civil war. In various statements (744), they argued that the “Vlasov action,” which began “as a propaganda stunt, gave rise to “an entire movement that is developing according to its own laws and has assumed such proportions that it can no longer be stopped without damaging German interests. Any attempt in this direction will undermine confidence in German military propaganda throughout the world, and the national Russian movement will then turn against the Germans themselves as foreign enslavers of the Russian people. Therefore, the German side must give the Vlasov movement an official character. Leading figures from the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised as soon as possible to create a real Russian committee under Vlasov and give Vlasov the post of chief inspector of the Eastern Troops. Of course, the main goal that all circles opposed to Hitler’s eastern policy set for themselves - the recognition of the Russian government and the formation of the Russian army - was discussed here in a very veiled manner; so far only Vlasov’s participation in the management of the occupied areas and in the command of the “national forces” has been discussed. . But Hitler, to whom proposals of this kind reached him in various ways, turned out to be quite perceptive and immediately vetoed them.

On June 8, 1943, in a conversation with the Chief of Staff of the OKW, Field Marshal Keitel, and the Chief of the General Staff of the OKH, General Zeitzler, Hitler categorically and “finally” spoke out against the intensification of the Russian liberation movement and the creation of a Russian army before the end of the year (745). On July 1, 1943, he confirmed this decision at a meeting of army commanders in the East that he convened, justifying it by the fact that, as history teaches, “such national movements in moments of crisis always turn against the invading power.” As an example, he cited the failure of 1916, when they tried to put the Polish army at the service of the German-Austrian military leadership. At the same time, however, Hitler did not take into account one important point: the Poles could only expect the fulfillment of their political aspirations from an alliance with the Entente powers, and not with the powers of the Quadruple Alliance. In the Second World War, the situation was just the opposite: if the collapse of the Stalinist regime was possible at all, then nationally minded Russians could hope to achieve it only in an alliance with Germany. For Vlasov there was no turning back. Hitler, under various pretexts, refused to help him. From now on, Vlasov’s name was allowed to be used only for propaganda purposes to deceive the enemy.

Vlasov himself, because of his “harsh and incompetent statements,” was, by order of Field Marshal Keitel, put under house arrest, and Keitel threatened him that if this happened again, the Gestapo would take on the general. The artificial “cessation of the Vlasov action” and the “calm around the Vlasov army” put an end to all hopes and caused deep disappointment on the Russian and German sides (746). Even Vlasov’s loyal supporters lost heart. Indicative in this regard is the story of Major General A. E. Budykho, the former commander of the Red Army division, who replaced Colonel Boyarsky as “staff officer for the education and training of eastern troops” in the German 16th Army. Budykho succumbed to the promises of Soviet propaganda and on the night of October 13, 1943, he and his orderly went over to the partisans. After his sudden disappearance, an investigation was organized, and the commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal G. von Küchler, and the commander of the 16th Army, Field Marshal E. Busch, exchanged very irritated messages (747). However, Budykho did not manage to cheat fate: soon the Germans captured a Soviet officer who was dropped by parachute, and he said that the defector, who had the insignia of a major general of the ROA, was shot by decision of a partisan court, “which sentences all ROA soldiers to death.” 63.

To sum up, we can say that the Vlasov action of 1943 failed only because of Hitler. The point is not that, as Soviet propaganda triumphantly asserted in the summer of 1943, Vlasov, despite all his efforts, “failed” to create an army, but that, to the great chagrin of the general himself, his Russian comrades and German patrons, Essentially, they couldn’t even really take on this promising undertaking. Hitler's verdict created a political vacuum and prepared the ground on which Soviet propaganda could rely. Along with the deterioration of the military situation, this was one of the reasons for the phenomena of decomposition in volunteer formations in the second half of the year (748), after which a significant part of them were transferred to the western and southern European theaters of military operations. Contrary to popular opinion in the literature, leading figures of the ROA, for example Bunyachenko, strongly welcomed this transfer and even contributed to it, hoping that, away from Soviet influence, the formations would remain until the moment when the creation of the Liberation Movement was sanctioned and they could be reorganized. Colonel Boyarsky stated in June 1943 that events would still force Germany to recognize the Russian national government. And although in principle he was right, the favorable moment was irretrievably missed.

Notes

(687)Extracts from the diary..., 5.2., 6.2., 10.2., 12.2, 18.2.1946.VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/46.
(688) Captain V. Denisov. The story of generals Vasily Fedorovich Malyshkin, Georgy Nikolaevich Zhilenkov and a group of officers from the headquarters of the KONR Armed Forces being captured by the Americans. VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/52.
(689) Letter from Acting Secretary of State Murphy, 7/11/1945, FRUS, 1945, vol. 5, p. 1098. Joseph C. Grew later became one of the critics of the Nuremberg trials, expressed his satisfaction with the release from the Spandau military prison of Admiral Doenitz. See Doenitz at Nuremberg. In: Reprisal. War Crimes and the Military Professionals. H. K. Thompson, Jr., Henry Sturtz, co-editors. N.Y" 1976, p. 46.
(690)See also F. Titov. Oathbreakers. In: Inevitable Retribution, Moscow, 1974, pp. 228, 233.
(691) Lviv. The last days of the ROA in Courland. VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/8.
(692) Hansen. Office notes (in German), May 1, 1945, p. 217. Author's archive. It's him. Notes (in German), p. 8, ibid. Statement by the deputy head of the central department of the legal departments of the states for the investigation of Nazi crimes, Streim (Alfred Streim. Die Behandlung Sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener im "Fall Barbarossa". Heidelberg, 1981, S. 187), that the Germans killed wounded and incapacitated members of the "national formations" and "Hiwis" ", is not true. Quite the opposite - according to OKH General Staff Directive No. 8000/42 (adopted with the participation of Lieutenant Colonel von Stauffenberg in August 1942), volunteers were subject to a system of dispensary treatment and a system of providing for families. See Joachim Hoffmann. Die Ostlegionen, S. 54. (ibid., p. 146 - about the treatment of guilty volunteers). The conditions for treatment and support were specified in the order on “Monetary remuneration for members of national formations” of the OKH General Staff No. 1/14124/43 dated May 29, 1943, author’s archive. Volunteers in national formations or German units of the Wehrmacht, wounded in military service, and their relatives eventually received the same rights to treatment and provision as German soldiers and their families. In general, sanitary matters were well organized in volunteer formations, there was a “national” sanitary corps, “national” hospitals and charity homes, and in the spring of 1943 a medical scientific institute with a military hospital for training military doctors was opened in Mogilev. On sanitary matters in volunteer units, see Hans Herwarth. Zwischen Hitler und Stalin. Frankfurt am Main, 1982, S. 309.
(693)Extracts from the diary..., 5.1, 13.2.1946.VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/46.Schwenninger. Supplements (in German), p. 13, ISI.
(694)V. Strik-Strikfeldt. Against Stalin and Hitler, p. 248. Generalfeld-marschall Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb. Tagebuchaufzeichnungen und Lagebeurteilungen aus zwei Weltkriegen. Stuttgart, 1976, S. 309.
(695)50 years of the USSR Armed Forces. Moscow, 1968, p. 246. History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945, vol. 1, Moscow, 1960, p. 465. The meaninglessness of such expressions is evidenced by a sharp increase in the number of crossbows in the Red Army, especially before battles. In May 1942, the number of crossbows was twice as high as in July 1941. On the Northwestern Front in May 1942, almost nine times more crossbows were recorded than in January of the same year. As a result, the chief military prosecutor of the Red Army, Nosov, ordered the military prosecutor's offices of the fronts and individual armies to apply the death penalty in cases of crossbows. Order No. ONO, 18.7.1942, VA-MA N 20/290.
(696)Philip Buss. The Non-Germans in the German Armed Forces 1939-1945.Phil. Diss., University of Kent at Cantenbury, 1974, p. 124.
(697)V. Hansen. Office notes (in German), 9.1.1943, p. 8, author’s archive. "Motherland". Newspaper of the formation of troops of the Russian People's Army, No. 18, 10/1/1942. Captain P. Kashtanov. RNNA - Russian People's National Army. VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/3. Letter from Dashkevich to Pozdnyakov, May 2, 1961, ibid. P. Kalinin. Participation of Soviet soldiers in the partisan movement in Belarus. - "Military Historical Journal", 1962, No. 10, p. 32. Salomonovsky. Two responses. - "Russia", 1. and 3.7.1970.S. Steenberg. Vlasov. Australia, 1974, p. 66.K. Kromiadi. For the land, for freedom. San Francisco, 1980, pp. 51-103.
(698)V. Hansen, op. cit., 12.12.1942, p. 1.S. Steenberg, op. cit., p. 85.
(699)V. Hansen, op. cit., 13.12-16.12.1942, pp. 3-8. Diagram of the structure of national formations. OKH/Genshtarm/Genvostarm, No. 402/43, secret, 5.5.1943, VA-MA, RH 111, 1435. Lieutenant Colonel D. Our beginning. VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/48.
(700)S. Steenberg, op. cit., p. 91.
(701) Cap. Klimenko. The formation of Gil-Rodionov and its end. The truth about "Druzhina". VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/3.K. Domorad. Is this how war memoirs should be written? - "Military Historical Journal", 1966, No. 11, pp. 82-93.
(702)K. Kromiadi, op. cit., p. 90. Malyavin. Pskov. VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/3.
(703) Report on the meeting of Lieutenant General Vlasov, Lieutenant General Zhilenkov, Generals Malyshkin and Blagoveshchensky with Colonel Riehl and Lieutenant Colonel Bocharov at the Excelsior Hotel, Berlin, 17.2.1943 (presented by the department of foreign armies of the east to the chief of the army general staff) (on it . language). Gehlen Acts 6, Occupied Areas and Eastern Policy, No. 3, October 1942 - March 1943. Author's archive. Pskov as one of the centers of ROD, p. 20. VA-MA, Pozdnyakov’s archive 149/39. “Rodina”, VA-MA, Pozdnyakov’s archive 149/3.
(704)P. Kalinin, op. cit., pp. 33, 35.
(705) "Comrade commanders! Soviet intelligentsia!" in: Ortwin Buchbender. Das tonende Erz. Stuttgart, 1978, S. 222. Former commander of the 2nd Shock Army of the Red Army, Lieutenant General Vlasov. "Motherland", No. 26, 10/29/1942.
(706) Appeal of the Russian Committee to the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, to the entire Russian people and other peoples of the Soviet Union. In: O. Buchbender, ibid, S. 226.V. Pozdnyakov. Andrey Andreevich Vlasov. Buenos Aires/Siracusa, 1973, p. 47. Kitaev. Russian Liberation Movement, p. 42.VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/8.
(707) Why did I take the path of fighting Bolshevism? Open letter from Lieutenant General Vlasov. "Zarya", No. 17, 3.3.1943.
(708) Resolution adopted on April 12, 1943 at the 1st anti-Bolshevik conference of former commanders and soldiers of the Red Army. "Zarya", No. 30, 18.4.1943.
(709) General Vlasov’s trip to the area of ​​the 16th Army (in German). Command of the 16th Army, department 1s, 9.5.1943, VA-MA RH 58/67. General Vlasov in the Volga battalion. VA-MA, Pozdnyakov’s archive 149/48. Pskov as one of the centers of the ROD, p. 16. VA-MA, Pozdnyakov’s archive 149/39.S. V., Vlasov in Pskov. "Voice of the People", No. 13(81), 2.8.1952.
(710) A. A. Vlasov’s trip to the northwestern regions of the occupied part of the USSR. VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/48. Mikhailov. Vlasov arrives. 15.1.1948.VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/3.V. Pozdnyakov, decree. cit., p. 66. Reinhardt Gehlen. Der Dienst. Mainz, 1971, S. 110. Major General Malyshkin, in a speech in Paris, expressed the same idea as Vlasov: “The German High Command failed to convince the Russians that the German army was fighting only against communism, and not against the Russian people.. "Russia has never been a country of slaves, it has never been and will never be a colony." Speech by Major General Malyshkin in Paris on July 24, 1943 (in excerpts). VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/52.
(711) To all military personnel of the Red Army from the command of the Russian Liberation Army, leaflet No. 689/1V.43 (in German), VA R 6/38. Soldiers, commanders and political workers of the Red Army! Command of the Russian Liberation Army, leaflet No. 691/1V.43, ibid. What do you know about the Smolensk appeal of the Russian Committee? Volunteers of the Russian Liberation Army, leaflet No. 692] 1V.43, ibid. Open letter from volunteers of the Russian Liberation Army to Red Army soldiers and Soviet officers, leaflet No. 751/1V.43 (in German), ibid. Illustrated combat path, No. 5, May 1943. New path, No. 10(30), 1943.
(712) OKH/GENSHARM/GENVOSTARM/ORGOTD II, No. 5000/43, secret, 29.4.1943.VA-MA 44065/5. Conditions for replenishing an army group (in German), OKH gr. A, 1a, No../43, secret, 14.5.1943, VA-MA 65993/4.
(713) Speech by Major General Malyshkin in Paris.... Yu. Zherebkov. Russian days in Paris. VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/52.
(714) Speech by Russian Colonel Boyarsky before the volunteers of the eastern battalions during an inspection tour May 26 - June 16, 1943 (in German), VA-MA RH 58/67.
(715)Hitlers Lagebesprechungen. Stuttgart, 1962, S. 268. Letter from Hevel to the Reich Minister (in German), 9.6.1943, ADAR, series E, vol. 6, no. 92, p. 157. See. also Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, S. 263. On the great influence of propaganda carried out on behalf of Vlasov on the population of the occupied areas, on employees of the eastern troops and prisoners of war, see the note of the Army General Staff “The development and state of military propaganda in the East after the autumn of 1942 (Vlasov’s action)” (in German), ADAP, series E, vol. 6, no. 85, p. 145. See. See also: Hans von Herwarth. Zwischen Hitler und Stalin. Frankfurt am Main, 1982, S. 332.
(716)N. K. Popel. The tanks turned west. Moscow, I960, p.
(717)V. Chuikov. Guardsmen of Stalingrad are moving west. Moscow, 1972, p. 71.
(718)Druzhinin. The first leaflet of A. Vlasov. VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/8.O. Buchbender, ibid, S. 243, 331.
(719) Conversation with captured Lieutenant General Masanov, July 22, 1943. Note from embassy adviser Hilger, July 22, 1943 (in German). PA MFA, Bonn, Etzdorf Acts, vol. 24.
(720) Ivanov. About Vlasov's leaflets. VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/3.
(721) German general in Helsinki (in German), dept. 1s, No. 1731/43, secret, in OKH/Generalshtarm/Otdinarmvost II, 28.7.1943, VA-MA RH 2/v. 2727.
(722) Alexandrov. Merchants of the Motherland. "Leningrad Partisan", 5.4.1943, VA-MA RH 11h. 2727.Kokotov. False Russian Committee. “For the Soviet Motherland”, April 29, 1943, ibid. Pavlov. Judushka Vlasov, ibid., May 5, 1943. Soviet front-line newspapers about the Vlasov action (press review) (in German), June 10, 1943, ibid.
(723) Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. Death to the despicable traitor Vlasov, the vile spy and agent of the cannibal Hitler. “For a Righteous Cause”, No. 76, 4/7/1943, ibid. Soviet propaganda about the Vlasov action (press review) (in German). 18.7.1943, ibid.
(724) Joachim Hoffmann. Die Sowjetunion bis zum Vorabend des deutschen Angriffs. In: // Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Bd. 4, S. 50.
(725) Joachim Hoffmann. Die Kriegfiihrung aus der Sicht der Sowjetunion, ibid., S. 725.
(726) Ibid., p. 750.
(727) Letter from Colonel Boyarsky to General Vlasov, July 1943, acts of Gehlen b, Occupied areas and Eastern policy (in German), No. 2, June 1943 - February 1944. Author's archive.
(728) The Fuhrer’s conversation with Field Marshal Keitel and General Zeitzler on June 8, 1943. In: Hitlers Lagebesprechungen, S. 256, 260, 264.
(729) Captain Dosh. Notes on the report (in German), 2.2.1943.VA-MA RH 111.2728.Structure of national units. OKH/Genshtarm/Genvostarm, No. 402/43, secret, as of May 5, 1943, VA-MA RH 2/v. 1435.According to the head of the morality police Dalyug, the number of troops subordinate to the Reichsführer SS in 1942 increased from 33 thousand to 300 thousand people. See Helmut Krausnick, Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm. Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskriegs. Stuttgart, 1981, S. 170.
(730)Humble Alexey, Metropolitan of Leningrad. Archpastoral message to the pastors and flock in the cities and villages of the region, still occupied by enemy troops. 12/25.4.1943, VA-MA RH 2/v. 2727.
(731)K. Kromiadi, op. cit., p. 133.
(732) Word from Metropolitan Anastasy (radio recording). "The Will of the People", No. 3(4), 11/22/1944. From the archpastoral messages. Metropolitan Anastasy, ibid., No. 3 (16), 7.1.1945.K. Kromiadi. To the origins of the Liberation movement. VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/8. Kruzhin. Chronicle of KONR. 11/19/1944, VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/27.
(733)Metropolitan Sergius, head of the chancellery I. Grimm. Religious service to the Vlasov army (in German), VA NS 30/152.
(734) Chairman of the Council of Bishops of Belarus, Metropolitan Panteleimon - to the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia. "The Will of the People", No. 3(16), 7.1.1945.
(735) Khmyrov (Dolgoruky). A terrible crime. "Voice of the Motherland". VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/56.
(736)K. Kromiadi. For land, for freedom..., page 100. Sergei Frelikh. Manuscript (in German), page 11. Author's archive. Captain I.D. died Grimm. VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/48.
(737) Answer, traitor Vlasov! Vlasov is an agent of the German fascists. VA-MA RH 2/v. 2727. How did Vlasov sell the peasants to the Germans?, ibid. A Russian will not be a fratricide, Ibid. Death to the fascist hireling Vlasov!, ibid. Kill the traitor Vlasov (in German), ibid. Political Administration of the North-Western Front. Who is Vlasov?, ibid.
(738)I. I. Sergunin. Before that, we were engaged in decomposition work in the ROA. In: Defense of Leningrad 1941-1944. Memoirs and diaries of participants. Lenin-»rad, 1968, p. 351.
(739)Who is being deceived by the traitor General Vlasov (in English), VA-MA RH 2/v. 2727.To the soldiers of the so-called “Russian Liberation Army” and policemen<Га нем. яз.), там же. К вам наше слово, солдаты Власова!, там же. Что такое РОА? (на нем. яз.), там же. Политуправление Северо-Западного фронта. Русские, украинцы, все бывшие красноармейцы, находящиеся в фашистском плену и завербованные на службу в немецкую армию!, там же. Решающий час близок! На чьей вы стороне?, там же. Военный совет Северо-Западного фронта. Ко всем бывшим военнопленным, русским, украинцам, белоруссам и другим гражданам, завербованным на службу в германскую армию, 15.8.1943, там же.
(740)On the Northwestern Front 1941-1943.Moscow, 1969, p. 5.
(741) Minutes of Ambassador Romer's conversation with President Stalin and "Molotov, 26/27.2.1943. Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations. London, 1967, v. 1, ^ 295, p. 490.
(742) To the homeland (in German). VA-MA, Pozdnyakov archive 149/3."
(743)Tasks to fight Vlasov’s gang. According to the partisan defector Yetrov, who defected on April 27, 1943 (in German). VA-MA RH 2/v. 2727.Tasks of Soviet agents in the fight against Vlasov (in German), 31.5.1943 (including radio interceptions No. 18 and 22 of the head of the operational group at the headquarters of the North-Western Front), ibid. See also: Defense of Leningrad..., p. 778.
(744)Karl-Heinz Frieser. Krieg hinter Stacheldraht. Mainz, 1981, p. 92.
(745) Results of interrogations of spy Semyon Nikolaevich Kapustin (in German). Otdinarmvost (III), translation, No. 23/43, 22.7.1943, VA-MA RH 2/v. 2727. Interrogation of the spy Kapustin, among whose tasks was the creation of terrorist groups with the aim of killing Vlasov. Note from Embassy Counselor Hilger (in German), 7/27/1943, PA MFA, Bonn, Acts of Etzdorf, vol. 24. According to Kromiadi, Vlasov asked for pardon for Kapustin (K. Kromiadi, op. cit., p. 130 ).
(746)Leopold Trepper. Die Wahrheit. Munchen, 1975, S. 218.
(747) Proposals to strengthen the Vlasov action. Memo (in German). VA-MA RH 2/v. 2727.
(748) Report on the inspection trip of the commander of the eastern special forces, accompanied by the Russian colonel Boyarsky 25.5 - 16.6.1943 (in German), No. 17/43, secret, 24.6.1943, VA-MA RH 58/67. Notes about the statements of the Russian Colonel Boyarsky (in German), 22.5.1943, ibid. Sonderfuehrer Treigut. Statements by the Russian Colonel Boyarsky about the political situation and prospects, which I heard in private conversations (in German), ibid. Moods in Russian volunteer battalions (my personal impressions) (in German), ibid.

Hoffmann Joachim

History of the Vlasov army

Hoffmann Joachim

History of the Vlasov army

The sign * denotes quotations given in reverse translation from German.

Author: This book, which shows the origins of the Liberation Movement and the history of the Liberation Army and pays some attention to the political foundations and activities of the KONR, is written from a fundamentally new perspective. In contrast to the generally accepted interpretation, when the Vlasov army is considered as an action of German circles (the leadership of the Reich, the SS and the Wehrmacht), undertaken to prevent the defeat that threatened the Reich, in this work the Liberation Army and the Liberation Movement are considered on their own and independently. The author especially sought to highlight positive aspects in relations between Germans and Russians. The national Russian movement, to which Vlasov gave his name, is examined in the book in the context of Soviet history, while remaining part of the history of the Second World War.

Content

Preface

Chapter 1. Basics of ROA

Chapter 2. High command and officer corps of the ROA. Separation of ROA

Chapter 3. ROA Ground Forces

Chapter 4. ROA Air Force

Chapter 5. Prisoners of war become ROA soldiers

Chapter 6. ROA on the Oder Front

Chapter 7. Campaign in Bohemia

Chapter 8. ROA and the Prague Uprising

Chapter 9. The significance of the Prague operation

Chapter 10. The end of the Southern Group of the ROA

Chapter 11. The end of the Northern Group of the ROA

Chapter 12. Issuance

Chapter 13. Soviet reaction to Vlasov

Chapter 14. The fight against the Vlasov phenomenon

Chapter 15. Historical place of the liberation movement

Afterword

Documentation

Notes

Preface

Back in the 60s, the Scientific Center for the Military History of Germany addressed the problem of volunteer units recruited from representatives of various peoples of the USSR and who served in the German Wehrmacht. In 1967, my then boss, retired Colonel Dr. von Grote, commissioned me to prepare a detailed review of all aspects of this topic. Until now, the focus of my research interests has been on the peoples of the Caucasus, and therefore I decided to first deal with volunteer formations made up of representatives of national minorities of the USSR.

In 1974 I published the work “Germans and Kalmyks”; in 1976 the first volume of the history of the Eastern Legions was published. Both publications went through several editions, which proved the relevance of my chosen topic. However, for various reasons I had to interrupt my studies with the Eastern Legions, and the center of my scientific interests shifted. I became closely involved in the history of the Russian Liberation Army and at the end of 1982 presented the manuscript to the head of the Center for Military History, Colonel Dr. Hakl. Only after this did I return to the interrupted research.

Throughout this period, I was asked more than once how the study of volunteer associations and the discussion of the phenomenon of former Soviet soldiers serving in the ranks and on the side of the “German-fascist forces” fit in with the principles of the so-called policy of détente. Each time I answered that a historian cannot base his work on considerations of political conjuncture and that the policy of détente hardly justifies the silence of historical truth and the cessation of polemics. I hope the reader will find that my text is written from beginning to end in the spirit of mutual understanding between the German and Russian peoples. In any case, from the Soviet point of view, this topic is undoubtedly extremely relevant, although, according to an accurate remark, it reveals the “Achilles heel” of the Soviet army, in other words, its “moral and political” weakness during the Second World War. But it is unlikely that a historian has any reason to conceal facts that are unpleasant to someone.

Interest in the Vlasov movement (and its core - the “Vlasov army”) has not dried up over time. In recent years, many interesting publications have appeared; others are still waiting in the wings. In working on this book, I used mainly German documents, as well as documents and materials of the Russian liberation movement. Among them, we should first of all mention the extensive collection of ROA Colonel Pozdnyakov, transferred through my mediation from the USA to the military archive of the Federal Republic of Germany. The work also used Soviet captured materials and publications on this topic.

This book, which shows the origins of the Liberation Movement and the history of the Liberation Army and pays some attention to the political foundations and activities of the KONR, is written from a fundamentally new perspective. In contrast to the generally accepted interpretation, when the Vlasov army is considered as an action of German circles (the leadership of the Reich, the SS and the Wehrmacht), undertaken to prevent the defeat that threatened the Reich, in this work the Liberation Army and the Liberation Movement are considered on their own and independently. The author especially sought to highlight positive aspects in relations between Germans and Russians. The national Russian movement, to which Vlasov gave his name, is examined in the book in the context of Soviet history, while remaining part of the history of the Second World War.

An incredible number of myths and stereotypes are associated with the history of the Vlasov army, as well as with the personality of General Vlasov. Unfortunately, in recent years their number has seriously progressed. However, the problem is that the phrase “Vlasov movement” itself, if we mean it as a kind of political phenomenon, is, of course, much broader than what is called the “Vlasov army”. The fact is that not only military personnel, but also civilians who had nothing to do with military service at all can be considered participants in the Vlasov movement. For example, members of the “assistance groups” of the KONR, which arose in the guest worker camps after November 1944: these are civil servants of the Committee and its institutions, divisions, several thousand people - all of them can be considered participants in the Vlasov movement, but not military personnel of the Vlasov army.

Most often, when we hear the phrase “Vlasov army,” we have the following association: the Russian Liberation Army (ROA). But in reality, the ROA was a fiction; it never existed as an operational association. This was purely a propaganda stamp that appeared at the end of March - beginning of April 1943. And all the so-called (or almost all) Russian “volunteers” who served in the German armed forces: freiwilliger, partly Khiwi - they all wore this chevron and were considered members of an army that never existed. In fact, they were members of the German armed forces, the Wehrmacht in the first place. Until October 1944, the only unit that was subordinate to Vlasov was a security company scattered in Dabendorf and Dahlen, where the general was effectively under house arrest. That is, there was no Vlasov army. And only in November 1944, or more correctly in October, did a truly quite serious, qualified headquarters begin to be created.

By the way, it must be said that Vlasov performed more representative functions in his army. Its true organizer, a man who managed to achieve a lot over the last six months, was Fyodor Ivanovich Trukhin - a professional general staff officer, former head of the operational department of the North-Western Front, deputy chief of staff of the North-Western Front, who was captured in the last days of June 1941 . Actually, it was General Trukhin who was the real creator of the Vlasov army. He was Vlasov's deputy for Committee affairs, military affairs, and deputy head of the military department.

The true creator of the Vlasov army was General Fedor Trukhin

If we talk about the structure of the Vlasov army, it developed as follows: firstly, Vlasov and Trukhin counted on the fact that the Germans would transfer all existing Russian units, subunits, and formations under their command. However, looking ahead, this never happened.

In April 1945, the Vlasov army de jure included two Cossack corps: in the Separate Cossack Corps in Northern Italy there were 18.5 thousand combat ranks, and in the 15th Cossack Corps of von Pannwitz without German personnel there were approximately 30 thousand people. On January 30, 1945, Vlasov was joined by the Russian Corps, which was not very large in number, about 6 thousand people, but consisted of fairly professional personnel. Thus, as of April 20-22, 1945, approximately 124 thousand people were subordinate to General Vlasov. If we single out Russians separately (without Ukrainians and Belarusians), then about 450 - 480 thousand people passed through the Vlasov army. Of these, 120 - 125 thousand people (as of April 1945) can be considered Vlasov military personnel.

The certification of military personnel arriving in the officer reserve was carried out by a qualification commission under the leadership of Major Arseny Demsky. The commission assessed the knowledge, training, and professional suitability of former Soviet officers. As a rule, the serviceman retained his old military rank, especially if documents or a prisoner of war card were preserved, where this was recorded, but sometimes he was assigned a higher rank. For example, in the Main Directorate of Propaganda, Vlasov served as a military engineer of the second rank, Alexey Ivanovich Spiridonov - he was immediately accepted into the ROA as a colonel, although his military rank did not correspond to this rank. Andrei Nikitich Sevastyanov, head of the logistics department of the Central Headquarters, generally a unique person in Russian history (we’ll say a few words about him below), received the rank of major general in the ROA.

KONR meeting in Berlin, November 1944

The fate of Andrei Nikitich Sevastyanov has almost never been the subject of attention of historians and researchers. He was the son of a Moscow clerk or even a merchant of the second guild (versions differ). He graduated from a commercial school in Moscow, after which he studied for some time at the Higher Technical School. Before the revolution, he served on active duty in the Imperial Army and was released with the rank of reserve ensign. The First World War began. Sevastyanov immediately went to the front, ending the war in the fall of 1917 with the rank of staff captain. In principle, there is nothing to be surprised here. However, we note that during these three years of war, our hero received seven Russian military awards, including the St. George Cross of the 4th degree and the Order of St. Vladimir with swords. As far as is known, this is the only case in the history of the First World War when a non-career officer (Sevastyanov was from the reserve) received seven military orders, including the two highest. At the same time, he also received a serious wound: during an attack by the Austrian cavalry, Sevastyanov was wounded by a blade in the head and spent almost the entire 1917 in the hospital.

In 1918, Sevastyanov enlisted in the Red Army, from where he was dismissed for anti-Soviet views. For twenty years he was in and out of jail. And so, in 1941, near Kiev, according to one version, he went over to the enemy’s side himself, according to another, he was captured.

In the Red Army, Sevastyanov underwent certification, his card was in the file cabinet of the command staff, but he was never awarded a military rank. Apparently he was waiting. According to one version, he should have been given the rank of captain, which corresponded to staff captain, but for some reason the chief of artillery of the 21st Army ordered Sevastyanov to wear one diamond in his buttonholes. It turns out that Andrei Nikitich was captured with the rank of brigade commander, a rank that no longer existed in September 1941. And on the basis of this entry, the ROA certified Sevastyanov as a major general.

In February 1945, Andrei Sevastyanov, together with ROA generals Mikhail Meandrov and Vladimir Artsezo, who served under Vlasov under the pseudonym “Iceberg,” was extradited by the Americans to Soviet representatives. In 1947, according to the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, he was shot.

In April 1945, approximately 124 thousand people were subordinate to General Vlasov

If we estimate the size of the officer corps of the Vlasov army, then as of April 1945 it ranged from 4 to 5 thousand people in ranks from second lieutenant to general, including, of course, white emigrants who joined Vlasov in a fairly compact group. These were mainly officers of the Russian Corps. For example, military personnel under the leadership of Lieutenant General Boris Aleksandrovich Shteifon, hero of the Battle of Erzurum in 1916, commandant of the Gallipoli camp, participant in the White movement. It is worth noting that almost all White emigrant officers occupied separate, quite important posts in Vlasov’s army.

If we compare the number of Soviet officers who were captured with the number of White emigrants who joined the Vlasov army, then the ratio will be somewhere around 1:5 or 1:6. At the same time, we note that the latter compared favorably with the commanders of the Red Army. One can even say that the officers of the Russian Corps were more ready for rapprochement with the Vlasovites than the Red Army soldiers.

How can this be explained? Partly because the appearance of General Vlasov was psychologically justified in the eyes of white emigrants. In the 30s, all the magazines of the white military emigration (“Chasovoy” and a number of others) wrote with delight (the theory of “Comor Sidorchuk” was very popular) that there would be some popular commander of the Red Army who would lead the people’s struggle against the authorities, and then we will definitely support this corps commander, even if he opposed us during the Civil War. And when Vlasov appeared (Vlasov’s first meeting with Major General of the General Staff Alexei von Lampe took place on May 19, 1943 in the house of the former vice-director of the Department of Agriculture Fyodor Schlippe, Stolypin’s comrade-in-arms on agrarian reform), he made a very good impression.

Thus, let us emphasize this once again, there were much more White emigrants in the ranks of the Vlasov army than participated in the resistance movement. If you look at the numbers objectively, about 20 thousand Russian white emigrants fought on the side of the enemy during the Second World War.

Soldiers of the Russian Liberation Army, 1944

The “baptism of fire” of the ROA, not counting the active hostilities that the formations carried out before they entered Vlasov’s army, took place on February 9, 1945. The strike group under the command of Colonel Igor Sakharov, formed from Soviet citizens, volunteers who served in the Vlasov army, and several White emigrants, together with German troops, took part in battles with the 230th Infantry Division of the Red Army, which took up defensive positions in the Oder region. It must be said that the actions of the ROA were quite effective. In his diary, Goebbels noted “the outstanding achievements of General Vlasov’s troops.”

> The second episode with the participation of the ROA, much more serious, took place on April 13, 1945 - the so-called Operation “April Weather”. This was an attack on the bridgehead of the Soviet fortification, the Erlenhof bridgehead, south of Fürstenberg, which was defended by the 415th separate machine-gun and artillery battalion, which was part of the 119th fortified area of ​​the Soviet 33rd Army. And Sergei Kuzmich Bunyachenko, a former colonel of the Red Army, major general of the ROA, brought two of his infantry regiments into action. However, the terrain there was so unfavorable, and the front of the attack was only 504 meters, and the attackers exposed themselves from the flank to the strong barrage of Soviet artillery of the 119th UR that success (advance 500 meters, capture the first line of trenches and hold out on it until the next day) only the 2nd regiment achieved. The 3rd regiment under the command of Georgy Petrovich Ryabtsev, who served under the pseudonym "Alexandrov", a former major in the Red Army, lieutenant colonel of the Vlasov army, was defeated.

By the way, the fate of Ryabtsev, who shot himself on the demarcation line in the Czech Republic after the Prague Uprising, is very interesting. During the First World War, he was captured by the Germans and fled, as a non-commissioned officer in the Russian army, to the allies, the French. He fought in the Foreign Legion, then returned to Russia. He served in the Red Army, in 1941 he was the commander of the 539th regiment. He was captured by the Germans for the second time, spent two years in a camp, submitted a report to the ROA and was enrolled in the inspectorate of Major General Blagoveshchensky.

In the eyes of the White emigrants, Vlasov’s appearance was psychologically justified

The 2nd Regiment was led by Lieutenant Colonel Vyacheslav Pavlovich Artemyev, a career cavalryman, by the way, also a very interesting character. He was captured by the Germans in September 1943. At home he was considered dead and was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Banner. After the war, Artemyev avoided forced extradition to the Soviet administration. Died in Germany in the 60s.

But the life story of General Ivan Nikitich Kononov could easily become the basis for a cinematic film or detective story. A former Red Army soldier, commander of the 436th regiment of the 155th Infantry Division, Kononov on August 22, 1941, with a fairly large group of soldiers and commanders, went over to the enemy’s side, immediately proposing to create a Cossack unit. During interrogation by the Germans, Kononov stated that he was one of the repressed Cossacks, his father was hanged in 1919, two brothers died in 1934. And, interestingly, the Germans retained the rank of major assigned to Kononov in the Red Army; in 1942 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel, in 1944 to colonel of the Wehrmacht, and in 1945 he became major general of the KONR. During his years of service in the Wehrmacht, Kononov received twelve military awards - this is in addition to the Order of the Red Star, acquired at home.

As for the fate of the Red Army Colonel, Major General KONR Sergei Kuzmich Bunyachenko, there are many ambiguities in it. Bunyachenko was born into a poor Ukrainian family, more than half of which died from the Holodomor. In 1937, at a party meeting, he criticized collectivization, for which he was immediately expelled from the party. The expulsion was later, however, replaced by a severe reprimand. In 1942, Bunyachenko commanded the 389th Infantry Division on the Transcaucasian Front and, following the orders of General Maslennikov, blew up the bridge on the Mozdok-Chervlenoe section before some of the Red Army units had time to cross it. Bunyachenko was made a scapegoat, sent to a military tribunal, sentenced to death, which was then replaced by ten years of forced labor camps with departure after the end of the war. In October 1942, Bunyachenko took command of the 59th separate rifle brigade, seriously weakened, having lost previous battles, more than 35% of the personnel. In mid-October, in fierce defensive battles, the brigade suffered new losses, and in November it was practically destroyed. Bunyachenko was also accused of this defeat and was threatened with a new arrest. And then there are two versions of the development of events: according to one of them, Bunyachenko was captured by a reconnaissance group of the 2nd Romanian Infantry Division, according to another, he himself went over to the side of the Germans in December 1942 (however, the problem in this case is that that the Germans sent defectors to special camps, and Bunyachenko was in a regular camp until May 1943).

After the Prague Uprising, having disbanded the division on the orders of Vlasov and removed his insignia, Bunyachenko went in a headquarters column to the headquarters of the 3rd American Army. On May 15, 1945, he, together with the chief of staff of the division, Lieutenant Colonel KONR Nikolaev and the head of divisional counterintelligence, Captain KONR Olkhovik, were transferred by American patrols to the command of the 25th Soviet Tank Corps. Nikolaev and Olkhovik were shot separately, and Bunyachenko was included in the group of officers and generals who were involved in the Vlasov case - he was hanged along with the commander-in-chief of the ROA. At the same time, there is reason to believe that it was Bunyachenko who was subjected to torture during the investigation: the interrogation, judging by the entry in the protocol, took 6–7 hours. Sergei Kuzmich was a principled man, rude, boorish, but collectivization made a very terrible impression on him. In general, it is worth noting that this was the main reason why the Vlasov movement arose.

General Vlasov inspecting ROA soldiers, 1944

Let's say a few words about the aviation of the Vlasov army. It is known that among the general’s “falcons” there were three Heroes of the Soviet Union: Bronislav Romanovich Antilevsky, Semyon Trofimovich Bychkov and Ivan Ivanovich Tennikov, whose biography is the least studied.

A career pilot, Tatar by nationality, Tennikov, carrying out a combat mission to cover Stalingrad on September 15, 1942 over Zaikovsky Island, fought with enemy fighters, rammed a German Messerschmitt-110, shot it down and survived. There is a version that for this feat he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, but his name is not on the list of people who were deprived of this title. Tennikov served in Soviet aviation until the fall of 1943, when he was shot down and considered missing. While in a prisoner of war camp, he entered the service of German intelligence and was then transferred to the Vlasov army. Due to health reasons, he was unable to fly and served as a propaganda officer. Nothing is known about Tennikov’s further fate after April 1945. According to documents from the Main Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, he is still listed as missing.

White emigrant pilots also served with Vlasov: Sergei Konstantinovich Shabalin - one of the best aviators of the First World War, Leonid Ivanovich Baidak, who in June 1920 laid the foundation for the defeat of the 1st Cavalry Corps of Dmitry Zhlob, Mikhail Vasilyevich Tarnovsky - the son of a famous Russian gunsmith, Colonel Russian army, hero of the Russo-Japanese War Vasily Tarnovsky. At the age of 13, Mikhail and his family left their homeland. He lived first in France, then in Czechoslovakia, graduated from flight school there, becoming a professional pilot. In 1941, Tarnovsky entered the service of German propaganda agencies. He was the announcer and editor of a number of programs on the Vineta radio station, developed scripts and hosted radio programs of an anti-Stalinist and anti-Soviet nature. In the spring of 1943, in May, he submitted an application to join the ROA. He served near Pskov in the Guards Shock Battalion, and then transferred to an Air Force unit, where he commanded a training squadron.

Why do we focus on Tarnovsky? The fact is that, having surrendered to the Americans, he, as a subject of the Czechoslovak Republic, was not subject to extradition to the Soviet occupation zone. However, Tarkovsky expressed a desire to share the fate of his subordinates and follow them into the Soviet zone. On December 26, he was sentenced to death by a military tribunal. Shot on January 18, 1946 in Potsdam. In 1999 he was rehabilitated by the St. Petersburg prosecutor's office.

The third Hero of the Soviet Union in the ROA was pilot Ivan Tennikov

And finally, a few words regarding the ideological component of the Vlasov movement. Let us briefly outline the theses - draw your own conclusions. Contrary to very common stereotypes and myths, most of the Vlasov officers began collaborating with the enemy after Stalingrad, that is, in 1943, and some joined the general’s army in 1944 and even in 1945. In a word, a person’s life risks, if he enlisted in the ROA after 1943, did not decrease, but increased: the situation in the camps had changed so much compared to the first months of the war that only a suicide could join the Vlasov army during these years.

It is known that Vlasov had completely different people not only in military ranks, but also in political views. Therefore, if during such a terrible war such a massive betrayal of captured generals and officers to their own state and oath occurs, it is still necessary to look for social reasons. During the First World War, thousands of officers of the Russian Army were captured by the enemy, but there was nothing like this, not a single defector officer (except for Ensign Ermolenko) was even close. Not to mention the situation in the 19th century.

As for the trial of General Vlasov and other leaders of the ROA, at first the leadership of the USSR planned to hold a public trial in the October Hall of the House of Unions. However, this intention was later abandoned. Perhaps the reason was that some of the accused could express views at the trial that could objectively coincide with the sentiments of a certain part of the population dissatisfied with the Soviet regime.

On July 23, 1946, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks passed a decision on the death sentence. On August 1, General Vlasov and his followers were hanged.