Kolchak's interrogations. Memoirs of comrades and contemporaries about Admiral A.V. Kolchak. Minutes of the meetings of the emergency investigative commission on the Kolchak case (Transcript report)

Admiral Kolchak - the “naked king” of the White Cause

In 1918, Admiral Alexander Vasilyevich Kolchak (1874-1920) was proclaimed “Supreme Ruler of Russia” and “Supreme Commander-in-Chief.” Loud titles make it difficult to understand the true role of this man in the history of the Civil War. For most of our contemporaries, Kolchak is either a “bloody executioner of the working people” or a “noble fighter against Soviet slavery.” The main criterion for such assessments is not Kolchak’s specific activities, but the current attitude of people towards Soviet power. This is a purely party approach that ignores the specific activities of a living person...
The objective truth about Kolchak can be learned from the memoirs of his comrades and subordinates, originally published abroad, and now available to domestic readers.
Lieutenant General of the Russian Empire Baron Alexey Pavlovich Budberg (1869-1945) in 1919 served first as the chief supply officer of the Siberian Army, and then as manager of the military ministry of the Kolchak government. His diary entries for 1919 are known as “The Diary of a White Guard.”
Russian legal scholar Georgy Konstantinovich Gins (1887-1971) was one of those people who formally elected Kolchak as the “Supreme Ruler of Russia” on November 18, 1918. He held various positions in the Kolchak government, and in exile already in 1921 he published detailed memoirs “Siberia, Allies and Kolchak.”
Lieutenant General Anton Ivanovich Denikin (1872-1947) needs no introduction. Unlike Budberg and Gins, he was not personally acquainted with Kolchak, but exchanged letters and telegrams with him, and on May 30, 1919, he officially declared his submission to the “Supreme Ruler.” Denikin writes about Kolchak in the last volume of his famous “Essays on Russian Troubles.”
*****
In various sources you can find statements that Kolchak was a monarchist. This mistake is made by both apologists and opponents of the admiral. Few people know that the “Supreme Ruler” has dissociated himself from the monarchical idea at the international level. Denikin writes about this:
“On May 14, Clemenceau addressed Admiral Kolchak on behalf of the “allied and adjacent powers” ​​with an official statement that the powers, with the goal of establishing peace in Russia and having become convinced of the futility of negotiations with the Soviet authorities, are ready to provide material support to Admiral Kolchak and “those who adheres to him”, to create all-Russian power, but under the conditions... [The following is a list of 6 points. – Approx. A.L.]
Admiral Kolchak sent an answer on May 22: The Constituent Assembly “legally elected” will have sovereign rights, but not the Assembly of 1917, “elected under the regime of Bolshevik violence, the majority of whose members are in the ranks of the Bolsheviks.” (...) The admiral assured... the powers of the liberal direction of his government’s activities and that “there can be no return to the regime that existed in Russia before February 1917.”
Informing me by telegraph of the contents of his note, Admiral Kolchak expressed his desire to “ensure the unity of state statements.”
There were many sincere monarchists in Kolchak’s army, at least among people who fought voluntarily and not under duress, so such “state statements” were not intended for “internal use”...
*****
Both Budberg and Gins speak very highly of Kolchak’s moral qualities... Unfortunately, these reviews are not confirmed by specific examples, but there are examples of a completely different kind. For example, Gins recalls one “special case from the practice of the Irkutsk province”:
“Some officer demanded that those arrested be handed over to him from prison and shot them. The judicial authorities could not get this officer at their disposal. The admiral ordered the necessary orders to be made on his own behalf.
Imagine my surprise when, two or three weeks later, I learned from Telberg that, to the indignation of the judicial authorities, the officer they had arrested had been released by order of the Supreme Ruler...”
Budberg is outraged by the awarding of Kolchak with the Order of George, 3rd degree, for the capture of Perm:
“I didn’t know this award and, seeing George’s neck on the admiral, I thought that he received it in the fleet in the last war; Therefore, when Lebedev in the admiral’s carriage started talking about awarding St. George’s Crosses for some battle, I, without mincing words, expressed my view on the shamefulness of such an award during the Civil War. Only later, when they explained to me what was happening, did I understand the stunned looks and desperate gestures of those present, made to me from the table next to the admiral’s.
How low must be the ideology of those who thought of presenting to the supreme ruler and persuading him to accept the highest military award for success in an internecine war.
(...)
The weak-willed admiral did not find the will and breadth of vision to order to forget even such offerings - and accepted the cross.”
But it’s not just weakness of will and character that is manifested here... “A grouch and a pessimist” Budberg understands the fundamental depravity of the civil war, and “a pure idealist, a convinced slave of duty and service to the idea and Russia” Kolchak does not see any difference between a war with external enemies and civil war...
*****
In their assessments of the admiral’s professional qualities as the “Supreme Ruler and Supreme Commander-in-Chief,” Budberg and Gins are unanimous and these assessments are not seriously disputed by anyone.
Having served for about six months in the “admiral’s team,” Budberg draws disappointing conclusions about his boss:
“He does not know life in its harsh, practical implementation and lives in mirages and imposed ideas. He does not have his own plans, his own system, his own will, and in this regard he is soft wax, from which advisers and associates mold anything, taking advantage of the fact that it is enough to put something in the form of a necessity caused by the good of Russia and the benefit of the matter in order to have secured consent of the Admiral.
The absence of firm views and a strong will gives rise to almost abnormal instability of decisions and eternal fluctuations in the general course of government activity, which, as a result, becomes a slave to various trends that arise in the circle of people ruling over the will of the Admiral. (...)
He doesn’t know military affairs at all, even worse, because he only grasped generalities and acquired some theoretical information that gives the appearance of knowledge, but is extremely dangerous in practical application. In this respect, he is a true sailor of the type, dozens of examples of which I saw during my Vladivostok service; I knew many admirals who were in close contact with our land life and were completely ignorant of the foundations of our organization; there were those who knew well the difference between the hierarchical positions of the corps commander and the chief of the division (for this determined the order of visits and the number of salute shots), but had a very vague idea of ​​\u200b\u200bwhat a corps and a division were...”
In October 1919, Gins accompanies Kolchak, who traveled from Omsk to Tobolsk:
“We spent ten days on the same ship, in close proximity to the cabins and at the same wardroom table. I saw with what pleasure the admiral went to his cabin to read books, and I realized that he was, first of all, a sailor by habit. The leader of the army and the leader of the navy are completely different people. Bonoparte cannot appear among the sailors.
The ship fosters the habit of comfort and privacy of the cabin. In the cabin, thoughts are born, plans are made, decisions are hatched, and knowledge is enriched. The admiral commands the fleet from his cabin, not feeling the people, playing with ships.
Now the admiral became the commander on land. Armies, like ships, had to flank, turn, stand still, and the admiral was sincerely surprised when a ship like the Cossack Corps suddenly turned in the wrong direction, or stood still for longer than it should have. He felt completely helpless in these ground operations of the Civil War, where psychology mattered more than anything else. (...)
And when the admiral, explaining to us the Tobolsk operation, wondered why it failed, and dutifully listened to the report of General Redko, who removed the hero of the Votkinsk plant, Colonel Yuryev, for winning without permission - I realized that there was no Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
What did the admiral read? He took a lot of books with him. I noticed among them the "Historical Messenger". He read it, apparently with enthusiasm. But he was especially interested in the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” on this trip. He literally read them. Several times he returned to them in general conversations, and his head was full of anti-Masonic sentiments. He was already ready to see Masons among those around him, in the Directory, and among members of foreign missions.
Another feature was revealed in this immediacy of perception of a new book. The admiral was a politically naive man. He did not understand the complexity of the political system, the role of political parties, the game of ambition, as factors in state life. The relationship between individual governing bodies was completely inaccessible and alien to him, and therefore he introduced chaos and confusion into their activities, entrusting the same thing to one or the other. Suffice it to say that correspondence with Denikin on political issues was carried out in three institutions at once: headquarters, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Administration. Alas! I have to say that we didn’t even have a Supreme Ruler...”
Budberg and Gins were not friends or close friends. Gins could not read Budberg's diary entries while working on his memoirs. “The Diary of a White Guard” was published a little later than Gins’ book. Budberg is a “military bone”, Gins is a purely civilian man, and the conclusions are the same. And these are the conclusions of people who treat Kolchak very kindly...
*****
Kolchak's power extended mainly to Siberia. How did the Siberians feel about the “Supreme Ruler”?
Gins, who was aware of personal responsibility for Kolchak’s rise to power, writes:
“The election of the Supreme Ruler turned out to be a forced act, a consequence of party struggle and a military conspiracy. History knows a dictatorship whose strength rests on popular election - this did not happen in Omsk. The idea of ​​dictatorship was put forward by a small group of the population. Admiral Kolchak had to win universal recognition for himself. (...) Admiral Kolchak had a glorious name, it helped him strengthen, but his name was alien to wide popular circles, and he had to create popular popularity for himself.”
But Kolchak failed to win recognition and respect even among his officers. Gins reports essentially anecdotal facts:
“Admiral Kolchak issued an order ordering that nothing be taken from the population without payment. When in one village where the detachment was stationed, the headman posted this order and, by the way, perhaps out of irony, on the wall of the hut where the head of the detachment lived, the latter became angry and ordered it to be torn down and the headman to be flogged for “disrespect” for the authorities. The admiral ordered to check this case and severely punish the culprit.
In another place, where it was pointed out to the officer that the admiral’s order prohibited flogging and beating, the officer gave the classic answer: “An order is an order, Kolchak is Kolchak, and the muzzle is muzzle.” This phrase was taken from a priest’s letter illustrated at headquarters...”
The prohibition of robbery, vice and massacres is, of course, a good thing... But Gins does not mention whether the order was executed or the punishment of the aforementioned detachment commander. Both Budberg and Gins do not mention at all the facts when such correct prohibitions were at least somehow implemented in practice...
Budberg testifies:
“The bad thing was that the power turned out to be, so to speak, shallow; it sat far from the population, did not bring them any real benefit, was not based on the indigenous, kond population of Siberia; she did not improve his living conditions and did not satisfy his immediate needs; she was powerless to protect him from the abuses and violence of her local agents; Instead of the expected benefactor and healer, she turned out to be a monster, imposing new burdens and old, hated scorpions on the population exhausted by the general devastation.
The Siberian indigenous population, original, Siberian-style, conservative, and very, very bourgeois in wealth, could not help but support the government if it came as a strong, firm, fair defender for all from various misfortunes. But such power did not come.
When the authorities needed to be strong in order to protect the population from violence, they did not see it, and only in vain cried out for intercession and punishment for the guilty; when the population wanted energetic, managerial and caring power, it did not have it. (...)
The Omsk revolution gave Siberia a flabby and powerless power, resulting in narrow Omsk forms and unpopular, unable to give the population law, order and a noticeable improvement in the difficult conditions of their life. Such a power turned out to be unable to rise to the height of the task life presented to it and do something lasting and effective in recreating the destroyed Statehood in improved, reasonable and updated forms of human, social and state coexistence.
Power turned out to be only a form without content; ministries can be compared to huge and impressive-looking mills, anxiously and quickly flapping their wings, but without millstones inside and with damaged and missing parts of the main working mechanism.”
And it is not surprising that the Siberian peasants refused to recognize Kolchak’s power as legitimate and did not want to serve in Kolchak’s army. But Kolchak ordered mobilizations... A war began between the Kolchakites and the peasantry.
Gins talks about the “practice of pacification” of rebellious peasants in Tara district:
“There was a punitive expedition. The peasants were flogged, robbed, their civil dignity was insulted, and they were ruined. Among the hundred punished and offended, perhaps there was one guilty person. But after the expedition passed, everyone without exception became enemies of the Omsk Government.”
The events in Tara district were not something special. Gins states:
“Peasant uprisings spread throughout Siberia like a continuous sea. The more pacifications there were, the more widely they spread throughout the country. They approached Omsk itself from the Slavgorod and Tarsk districts, from the southeast and northwest, interrupting the Semipalatinsk-Barnaul communication lines, and captured most of Altai and large areas of the Yenisei province. Even the local pacifiers finally became clear that punitive expeditions could not extinguish these uprisings, that it was necessary to approach the village differently. The idea of ​​peace negotiations with the rebels arose, since many joined the movement without realizing at all who they were fighting against.”
Unfortunately, the idea of ​​negotiations with the rebels was not embodied in the actions of the “Supreme Ruler”... Some current apologists of Kolchak claim that the admiral “did not know about the massacres that were taking place.” But is it possible to believe that both Gins and Budberg “knew”, and their immediate superior Kolchak “knew nothing”?
Some pages from Budberg's diary are a genuine cry from the heart:
“The boys think that if they killed and tortured several hundreds and thousands of Bolsheviks and put to death a number of commissars, then they did a great job, dealt a decisive blow to Bolshevism and brought closer the restoration of the old order of things. The usual psychology of every ambitious platoon leader who believes that he decided the outcome of the battle and the entire war. But the boys do not understand that if they indiscriminately and indiscriminately rape, flog, rob, torture and kill, then by doing so they instill such hatred of the power they represent that the Bolsheviks can only rejoice at the presence of such diligent, valuable and beneficial employees for them.” .
“The state cannot be restored with atamans and punitive detachments; “You can’t outweigh or flog all those who are dissatisfied and rebel against violence—there aren’t enough arms, and your arms are short.”...
*****
On February 7, 1920, in Irkutsk, Kolchak was shot by the Bolsheviks. Modern admirers of Kolchak argue that this was an ordinary political murder and the admiral must be legally rehabilitated. These people do not know that Kolchak was executed according to the “law”, which he himself recognized and considered absolutely correct. As Supreme Ruler, he clearly stated his “legal credo” in one of his conversations with Gins:
“A civil war must be merciless. I order the unit commanders to shoot all captured communists. Either we shoot them, or they shoot us. This is how it was in England during the Wars of the Roses, and this is how it must inevitably be with us, and in any civil war.”
Kolchak was sentenced to death according to a simple universal law: “As it comes around, so it will respond...”
Some residents of Omsk really want a monument to Admiral Kolchak to be erected in our city... Instead of commenting, I will quote another statement from His Excellency Baron Budberg:
“The eternal tale of the naked king is repeated; he is naked and helpless, and everyone is pretending, and some sincerely believe that the king is both dressed and powerful...”

Brief bibliography:

Budberg A.P. Diary of a White Guard / Book on the website: http://militera.lib.ru/db/budberg/index.html
Gins G.K. Siberia, allies and Kolchak. A turning point in Russian history. 1918-1920 – M.: Iris-press, 2013. – 672 p.
Denikin A.I. Essays on Russian Troubles: Armed Forces of the South of Russia. The final period of the struggle. January 1919 – March 1920. – Minsk: Harvest, 2002. –464 p.

ADDENDUM FROM 12/20/2014

From the memoirs of Lieutenant General, Ataman G.M. Semenov, successor of A.V. Kolchak, about the activities of units of the Czechoslovak corps that controlled the railway with the sanction of the Supreme Ruler:
“The robbery of civilians and government institutions along the route of the Czechs reached absolutely incredible levels. The looted property was delivered in military trains to Harbin, where it was sold completely openly by the Czechs, who rented the local circus building for this purpose and set up a store out of it, which sold household items taken from Siberia, such as: samovars, sewing machines, icons, silver dishes, carriages, agricultural tools, even copper ingots and machines taken from the factories of the Urals.”
From the memoirs of General K.V. Sakharov, commander of one of Kolchak’s armies, about the fight of the Kolchakites against the partisan movement:
“The inept leaders of the fight against these gangs used the easiest and most unfair method: they blamed the damage to the railway on the local population. Executions of villages and entire volosts were carried out. After the end of the struggle at the front, when the remnants of our army went east, we had to see several large villages burned almost to the ground by these detachments as punishment for not capturing the Bolshevik robbers... Huge villages stretching for several miles were complete ruins with sticking out here and there charred, half-burnt houses. The peasant population of such villages scattered and was doomed to poverty, hunger and death.”

NOTES: The memoirs of Ataman Semenov “About myself: Memories, thoughts and conclusions” are quite well known. The book was published in Moscow at least 2 times, there are electronic versions on the Internet.
The memoirs of Konstantin Sakharov “White Siberia” were first published in 1923. Published with abbreviations in the collection “The Case Did Not Receive God’s Blessing” (Khabarovsk: Book Publishing House, 1992. 368 pp.)

Reviews

Hello Andrey Ivanovich. Let it be your way. But it seemed to me that Gins condemns Kolchak for reading in general: “We spent ten days on the same ship, in close proximity in cabins and at the same wardroom table. I saw with what pleasure the admiral went to his cabin to read books, and I realized that he is, first of all, a sailor by habit. The leader of the army and the leader of the fleet are completely different people. Bonoparte cannot appear among sailors.
The ship fosters the habit of comfort and privacy of the cabin. In the cabin, thoughts are born, plans are made, decisions are hatched, and knowledge is enriched. The admiral commands the fleet from his cabin, not feeling the people, playing with ships." Kolchak read not only the Protocols, although I don’t see anything wrong with that either. I haven’t heard that he was an anti-Semite.
Why did I express myself so harshly? Once serving in the army, I myself went in my free time to the library in the reading room and was met there by the regiment commander. I still remember his kind words and praise addressed to me. Well, I brought up parallels.

Interrogation of Kolchak

Transcripts

Preface

I had to participate in the interrogations of Kolchak, carried out by the Extraordinary Investigative Commission in Irkutsk. Created by the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik “Political Center”, this commission was then, with the transfer of power to the Revolutionary Committee, reorganized into the Provincial Extraordinary Commission; the composition of the Commission that interrogated Kolchak remained unchanged until the very last day of the interrogation... The Revolutionary Committee quite deliberately retained it, despite the fact that this composition included the Menshevik Denike and two right-wing Socialist-Revolutionaries - Lukyanchikov and Alekseevsky. All these persons were useful for interrogation because they were closely familiar with the work of the Kolchak government and, moreover, directly or indirectly participated in the preparation of the Irkutsk uprising against him, in delivering the final blow to him, the results of which were already predetermined by the entry of the Red Army into Siberia and Kolchak's capture of his capital - Omsk. With the presence of these persons in the Investigative Commission, Kolchak’s tongue loosened more: he did not see in them his decisive and consistent enemies. The very interrogation of Kolchak, who was arrested or, rather, handed over to the “Political Center” from hand to hand by the Czecho-Slovaks - if I’m not mistaken - on January 17, 1920, began on the eve of the transfer of power from the “Political Center” to the Revolutionary Committee, and, consequently, all interrogations, counting the second, were carried out on behalf of the Soviet, and not the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik government.

The commission conducted the interrogation according to a predetermined plan. She decided to give through this interrogation the history of not only the Kolchak movement itself in the testimony of its supreme leader, but also the autobiography of Kolchak himself, in order to more fully describe this “leader” of the counter-revolutionary attack on the young Soviet Republic. The idea was correct, but its implementation was not completed. Events on the Civil War Front that had not yet been liquidated, and the threat of a temporary seizure of the city hanging over Irkutsk for several days by the remnants of Kolchak’s gangs that had arrived in time, forced the Revolutionary Committee to shoot Kolchak on the night of February 6-7 instead of the supposed sending him after the investigation to trial in Moscow. The interrogation therefore ended where its most significant part began - Kolchakism in the proper sense, the period of the dictatorship of Kolchak as the “supreme ruler”. Thus, the circumstances were such that the historical and biographical nature of the interrogation, due to random circumstances, led to negative results. The interrogation, undoubtedly, gave a pretty good self-portrait of Kolchak, gave a self-history of the emergence of the Kolchak dictatorship, gave a number of the most characteristic features of the Kolchakism, but did not give a complete, exhaustive history and picture of the Kolchakism itself.

The last interrogation took place on February 6, the day when Kolchak’s execution, essentially speaking, had already been decided, although the final verdict had not yet been pronounced. Kolchak knew that the remnants of his gangs were near Irkutsk. Kolchak also knew that the command staff of these gangs presented an ultimatum to Irkutsk to hand over him, Kolchak, and his Prime Minister Pepelyaev, and he foresaw the inevitable consequences of this ultimatum for him. Just these days, during a search in the prison, his note to his wife Timireva, who was sitting there in the same solitary building with him, was seized. In response to Timireva’s question, how is Kolchak? refers to the ultimatum of his generals, Kolchak replied in his note that he “looks at this ultimatum with skepticism and thinks that this will only speed up the inevitable denouement.” Thus, Kolchak foresaw the possibility of his execution. This was reflected in the last interrogation. Kolchak was in a nervous mood; the usual calmness and restraint that distinguished his behavior during interrogations abandoned him. The interrogators themselves were somewhat nervous. They were nervous and in a hurry. It was necessary, on the one hand, to end a certain period in the history of the Kolchak movement, the establishment of the Kolchak dictatorship, and on the other hand, to give several vivid manifestations of this dictatorship recorded by interrogation in its fight against its enemies not only of the revolutionary, but also of the right-wing socialist camp - the camp of those who created this dictatorship prepared. This, significantly jumping ahead from this stage of the issue, was done, but it was done in a very crumpled form. [V]

At this last interrogation, Kolchak. being very nervous, he nevertheless showed great caution in his testimony; he was wary of the slightest possibility of providing material for the accusation of individuals who had already fallen or could still fall into the hands of the restored Soviet power, and of the slightest possibility of discovering that his power, aimed at fighting the fiend of hell - the Bolsheviks, breathing only violence and tyranny, she herself could act outside of any law, he was afraid that his interrogation would help pull off the veil from this power with which he tried to cover it throughout all his testimony - the veil of a steady desire for law and order.

V.I. Lenin, in his speech about deceiving the people with the slogans of freedom and equality, said:

“It is rather foolish to blame Kolchak just because he committed violence against workers and even flogged teachers because they sympathized with the Bolsheviks. This is a vulgar defense of democracy, these are Kolchak’s stupid accusations. Kolchak acts in the ways that he finds.”

The commission, finding out some striking facts from the field of violence carried out by Kolchak and the Kolchak military, undoubtedly, to some extent, fell into the tone of such a “rather stupid censure of Kolchak.” But this violence and persecution was felt too vividly in Siberia at that time for it to be possible to talk about them with Kolchak, maintaining the attitude towards him that V.I. Lenin recommends to us. What is important, however, is not this feature of the interrogations, but what is important is the attitude that the bearer of the military, typically fascist counter-revolutionary dictatorship himself shows towards acts of violence. If the commission was inclined to “rather foolishly blame Kolchak for them,” then Kolchak himself constantly reveals a desire to either gloss over these acts, or blame them on the excesses of individual lindens and groups against the will of the dictator and his government, or find a legal justification for them. Quite frankly, portraying himself as an unconditional supporter and promoter of the idea of ​​opposing the White Guard military dictatorship to the dictatorship of the Bolsheviks, he does not want, does not have the courage to accept full responsibility for all the consequences of this dictatorship, for those methods of its implementation that were both inevitable and unique for it. possible.

The White Guard military dictatorship (this is clearly evident from Kolchak’s testimony) turned from a centralized dictatorship into a dictatorship of individual generals and Cossack atamans, from violence firmly directed from a single center into violence over Siberia by individual gangs that escaped subordination to the “supreme ruler” and his government . But it was still a single dictatorship, from top to bottom, built on the same model, operating with the same methods. And there was only one difference between the top and the bottom of this dictatorship: the top tried to bashfully cover up in the eyes of its leaders - the imperialist powers of the Entente - what the bottom and their counter-powers were developing in their “work” completely freely, openly, without any hint of modesty. reconnaissance and guard detachments; with their Volkovs, Krasilnikovs and Annenkovs.

This difference was reflected in Kolchak’s testimony. He gave them not so much for the authorities who interrogated him, but for the bourgeois world. He knew what awaited him. He did not need to hide anything to save himself. He did not expect salvation, could not wait, and did not try to grasp at any straws for its sake. But he needed to show himself, in the face of the bourgeois world, to act against the enemies of this world, against the proletarian revolution, firmly, decisively, but at the same time within the framework of bourgeois legality. He had little knowledge of the bourgeois world that the Anglo-French imperialists had put forward to defend. He did not know that the dictatorship that he headed in Siberia and which he so unsuccessfully sought to spread throughout the country was a model and similarity of Western European fascism, a fascist dictatorship put forward by the bourgeois world itself, before which he “wants to show himself as a bearer of the rule of law.” and order, smugly and stupidly blaming the Semenovs, Kalmykovs, etc., etc. because they, without any legality and without any order, raped the workers, shot, flogged, etc.

The same stupid modesty in front of the bourgeois world forces Kolchak to be modest in another respect: he in no way, even in relation to the distant past, does not want to admit that he is a monarchist. And he covers up his monarchism, the monarchical goals of his entire struggle against Bolshevism with a veil of democratic aspirations - again for the sake of the bourgeois world and thanks to his poor understanding of this world.

Protocols of interrogation of Admiral A.V. Kolchak - this is a unique document of the era, a kind of dying confession. It was first published in 1925 in Leningrad.

Here's what the editor's note said:

“The minutes of the meetings of the Extraordinary Investigative Commission in the Kolchak case published by the Central Archives are reproduced from a stenographic recording certified by the Deputy Chairman of the Investigative Commission, K.A. Popov, and stored in the Archives of the October Revolution (Foundation LXXV, arch. No. 51). Some parts of the transcript and individual words that could not be read were omitted from the original and ellipses were placed in their place. There are few such omissions, and they do not have any significant significance. The protocols are reproduced by us with all the features of the original, and only some grammatical inaccuracies that interfered with the understanding of the meaning of what was being presented have been corrected by us <…>The text of the testimony we publish is the only accurate and reliable reproduction of the original interrogation protocols of Kolchak» .

The 1925 edition is preceded by a foreword by K.A. Popov, where he writes the following:

« He gave them[testimony - S.Z.] not so much for the authorities who interrogated him, but for the bourgeois world. He knew what awaited him. He did not need to hide anything to save himself. He did not expect salvation, could not wait, and did not try to grasp at any straws for its sake. But he needed to show himself, in the face of the bourgeois world, to act against the enemies of this world, against the proletarian revolution, firmly, decisively, but at the same time within the framework of bourgeois legality.<…>The same stupid modesty in front of the bourgeois world forces Kolchak to be modest in another respect: he in no way, even in relation to the distant past, does not want to admit that he is a monarchist. And he covers up his monarchism, the monarchical goals of his entire struggle against Bolshevism with a veil of democratic aspirations - again for the sake of the bourgeois world and thanks to his poor understanding of this world.
If we exclude these characteristic features of Kolchak’s testimony and remember our already noted fear of him providing material for the accusation of his employees, assistants and servants, then we should admit that Kolchak’s testimony, in general, is quite frank.
How did he behave during interrogations? He behaved like a prisoner of war commander of an army that had lost the campaign, and from this point of view he behaved with complete dignity. In this he differed sharply from most of his ministers with whom I had to deal as an investigator in the case of the Kolchak government. There was, with rare exceptions, cowardice, a desire to present themselves as unwitting participants in a dirty story started by someone else, even to portray themselves as almost fighters against these others, a transformation from yesterday’s rulers into today’s slaves before the victorious enemy. There was nothing of this in Kolchak’s behavior.” .

Actually, when reading this text, the dignity and frankness of the admiral are very clearly visible. He talks about his life, his activities, his service. In the note to the publication of these protocols on the Militera website, the following note is made:

“Admiral Alexander Vasilyevich Kolchak did not leave any memoirs. These transcripts of interrogations can serve as something like: the questions concerned almost the entire period of his life, the admiral answered the questions extensively and honestly, realizing that he most likely would not have another opportunity to sum up his life.” .

And this is indeed so - this text is worth reading precisely as such a unique memoir of one of the outstanding figures of the White movement. In them you can find many very interesting moments for the reader and those especially interested in the history of Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century and the White movement. Kolchak talked about how he planned the operation to capture the Straits in 1917 (its implementation was prevented by the February Revolution), about how the war was fought in the Baltic, about the 1917 revolution, about a trip abroad, about events in the Far East in 1918 and the events of the civil war in Siberia, the Urals and the Volga region. Kolchak never had a chance to finish this story - on February 6th there was the last interrogation, and already on the night of the 7th he and Pepelyaev were shot and thrown into an ice hole in the Angara.

The republication of these protocols was carried out as part of the series “Nikolai Starikov recommends reading” in the St. Petersburg publishing house PITER. Books in this series are sold in the St. Petersburg book supermarket chain “Bukvoed”, so if you have such an opportunity, look for such books there. Overall, I highly recommend this series. Extremely valuable and useful sources and books are published there. I have already written about books from this series earlier: in the collection “White Russia” and.

I won’t write much about the book; I will only note some particularly interesting points. For example, during his trip abroad in the summer of 1917, in Washington he met with future US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt:

“Upon arrival in Washington, I first of all made a visit to our ambassador Bakhmetyev and to the Minister of the Navy, to his assistant , the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of War, in a word, all those persons with whom I later had to deal" .

Franklin Delano Roosevelt at that moment was deputy to the US Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, as I mentioned in due time.
Reading the episode about Kolchak’s visit to Britain, I noticed that in addition to the First Sea Lord (not to be confused with the First Lord of the Admiralty - PML is the position of 1st Deputy Minister of the Navy, which is occupied by the Navy, and PLA is the Minister of the Navy, civilian position) Jellicoe, he met in London with "Chief of the Naval General Staff, General Hall" . I was never able to determine exactly who it was and I would venture to guess that it was the beginning nickname of British naval intelligence Rear Admiral W.R. Hall. Then many interesting questions arise.
While waiting for a ship to America, Kolchak was forced to spend two weeks in London. He decided not to waste this time: “I asked Jellicoe’s permission to get acquainted with naval aviation and the establishment of naval aviation stations in England in order to illuminate this issue for myself. For this purpose, I traveled to various factories and stations, flew reconnaissance at sea, and so waited until the moment when an auxiliary cruiser was sent from Glasgow to the mouth of the St. Lawrence, Halifax.” .

It is also interesting to look at Kolchak’s political preferences and sympathies. This question aroused great interest among those who conducted the interrogation. Kolchak noted that in his service he was out of politics and was a monarchist in the sense that he was loyal to the monarchy to which he swore allegiance. He was among the first to re-swear allegiance to the Provisional Government because it was determined to continue the war until victory. However, Kolchak resolutely refused to serve the Bolsheviks, who concluded the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty and refused to continue the war, and this led him to the camp of the fighters against Bolshevism. During the interrogation, he spoke quite positively about a number of figures in the Provisional Government - Milyukov, Guchkov, Rodzianko, with whom he had contacts when they were deputies of the State Duma, and he was a naval officer and took part in the re-equipment and improvement of the Russian fleet. Hespoke of the leaders of the Cadets and Octobrists with sympathy, considering them intelligent people, patriots of Russia and suitable specialists for governing the country, and he considered the removal of Guchkov and Milyukov from power and their replacement by Kerensky almost a tragedy.Curious detail: autumn 1917In absentia, Kolchak was nominated (with his consent) as a candidate from the Cadet Party for the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet to the Constituent Assembly.

I recommend reading this unique document for a better acquaintance with the history of your Fatherland. This is a story about time and about oneself from the first person - the person of a person who directly took part in the creation of history, in the historical events of those difficult days.

Each of the four White Leaders made a strong impression on people in their own way. Kornilov, a spring-like man, captivated people with his indomitable energy and indestructible will. Denikin attracted people with the simplicity, kindness and openness of the nature of a real Russian person. Wrangel (like a dashing cavalry general straight out of a picture) attracted everyone with his calm courage, intelligence and management. But perhaps no one made such a deep impression on others as Kolchak.

A few excerpts about Alexander Vasilyevich Kolchak from the memoirs of his comrades and contemporaries:

1. Prime Minister P.V. Vologodsky: “The Admiral captivates with his nobility and sincerity” (Vologodsky P.V. In power and in exile. - Ryazan, 2006. - P. 120).

2. Manager of the Council of Ministers G.K. Gins: “As a person, the admiral captivated with his sincerity, honesty and directness... An intelligent, educated man, he shone in intimate conversations with his wit and varied knowledge and could, without at all trying to, charm his interlocutor... His immaculate reputation served as a guarantee of the integrity of the movement, and all opponents of Bolshevism stood under his banner” (Gins G.K. Siberia, allies and Kolchak. - M., 2008. - P. 10, 12).
The same Gins recalled him this way during the most critical, dramatic days on the eve of the evacuation of Omsk: “The admiral was completely lost in his own eyes. His eyes looked past his interlocutors, large, burning, bottomless, and were directed towards the front” (Ibid. - p. 495).

3. Manager of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I.I. Sukin: “He did not suffer from vanity, grandeur, or pathos; on the contrary, he had the gift of concentration and confident treatment of employees, firm and clear orders to subordinates and full of dignity in conversation with foreigners. The entire appearance, corresponding to the title of Supreme Ruler, was perceived by him with instinctive ease and sensitivity" (Notes of I.I. Sukin about the Kolchak government. - In the book: Behind Kolchak / Edited by A.V. Kvakin. - M. , 2005. - P. 349). “His political worldview boiled down to very few, but sharply defined convictions, in which he firmly believed to the end... No considerations or arguments of political expediency could force him, for example, to agree to the separation of one or another of its outskirts from Russia” (ibid. , p. 451).

4. Minister of War General Baron A.V. Budberg “There is hardly another person in Rus' who so disinterestedly, sincerely, confidently, soulfully and chivalrously serves the idea of ​​​​restoring the United Great and Indivisible Russia” (Budberg A.V. Diary of a White Guard. - In the book: Gul R. Ice March . Denikin A. The campaign and death of General Kornilov. Budberg A. Diary. - M., 1990.. - P. 305).

5. Minister of the Navy Admiral M.I. Smirnov: “An excellent military speaker, with a short, figurative speech he penetrated the hearts of his listeners... His rule, as an active military sailor, was to attack the enemy, but he always knew how to weigh the chances of success... If the revolution had not happened, Kolchak would have hoisted the Russian flag on the Bosporus... Bely color is a sign of purity of intentions, honesty of life, sincerity of the soul. The name White Leader suits no one else as well as Admiral Kolchak” (Smirnov M.I. Admiral A.V. Kolchak. - Paris, 1930. - P. 60).

6. Minister of Labor Menshevik L.I. Shumilovsky, who was subsequently arrested and shot by the Bolsheviks, even at his trial had the courage to say: “I considered him an impeccably honest person. And during the entire subsequent period I was not able to find out a single fact that would have shattered my faith in him” (Trial of Kolchak’s ministers. May 1920: Collection of documents. - M., 2003. - P. 113).

7. Minister of Supply, one of the leaders of the Siberian regionalists I.I. Serebrennikov: “The admiral could at times speak well and forcefully, influencing the listeners with the conviction and sincerity of his words” (Serebrennikov I.I. Civil War in Russia. The Great Departure. T. 1. - M., 2003. - P. 432). “The most honest and sincere Russian patriot in the best sense of the word and a man of crystal spiritual purity” (Ibid., p. 451). “In the most terrible, last minute of his life, A.V. Kolchak did not give his enemies a malicious triumph... He died the same way he lived, preserving his pride and honest courage, which distinguished his entire glorious life path” (Ibid., p. 66).

8. The head of the British military mission, General A. Knox: “He has two qualities unusual for a Russian: a temper that instills awe in his subordinates, and a reluctance to talk just for the sake of chatting” (Quoted from the book: Fleming P. The fate of Admiral Kolchak. Translation from English - M., 2006. - P. 100).

9. One of the leaders of the cadets, later the ideologist of the “Smenovekhovites”, Professor N.V. Ustryalov: “A sober, nervous mind, sensitive, complicated. Nobility, the greatest simplicity, the absence of any pose” (Ustryalov N.V. In the struggle for Russia. - In the book: Ustryalov N.V. National Bolshevism. - M., 2003. - P. 120).

10. One of the leaders of the cadets L.A. Krol: “Kolchak was undoubtedly a sincere person... an undoubted patriot, a wonderful person and an excellent sailor” (Krol L.A. For three years (memories, impressions and meetings). - Vladivostok, 1921. - P. 167).

11. Commander of the 3rd (Western) Army, General K.V. Sakharov: “The personality of the Supreme Ruler emerges as exceptionally bright, knightly pure and direct; he was a great Russian patriot, a man of great intelligence and education, a scientist-traveler and an outstanding sailor-naval commander... The direct, deeply penetrating gaze of burning eyes knew how to subjugate the will of others, as if hypnotizing them with the power of a multifaceted soul" (Sakharov K.V. White Siberia . - Munich, 1923. - P. 34).

12. General D.V. Filatiev: “A knight without fear or reproach, who never sought anything for himself personally and gave himself all to serving the Motherland... Until the end of his days, he remained a pure idealist and a convinced slave of duty and service to Great Russia” (D.V. Filatiev, Bely’s Catastrophe movements in Siberia. - Paris, 1985. - P. 13).

This “Political Center”, which the allies, who guaranteed Kolchak’s immunity and protection, were so “scared” of, lasted only two and a half weeks, and then dissolved, giving power into the hands of the Bolsheviks. Kolchak was betrayed and doomed. The Czechs, under the command of General Janen, divided the gold reserves with the Bolsheviks and took their share through Vladivostok to Czechoslovakia, which, thanks to Russian gold, had the most stable currency until the occupation by Hitler.

Kolchak was arrested along with his beloved Anna Timireva. The fake Political Center created an Extraordinary Investigative Commission, headed by K. A. Popov, who was later replaced by the Revolutionary Committee by S. Chudnovsky.

The interrogations began. Admiral Kolchak understood perfectly well what awaited him, and therefore used the last opportunity to turn to history, to his descendants, to Russia. Alexander Vasilyevich spoke about his whole life, spoke in sufficient detail. The Kolchak interrogation protocols are a poignant document of the era. This is a first person conversation. In general, little is known about their existence. Even very educated people interested in history do not know that there is such a document, there is such a book.

The texts of the interrogations were first published in Berlin in the early 1920s in the Archives of the Russian Revolution No. 10. However, the publication had many errors and typos due to the illegibility of the text, so in 1925 in Leningrad the Bolsheviks released a “clean” version with a preface Konstantin Popov, who led the investigation at the beginning. During interrogations, Admiral Kolchak behaved with dignity. Even Popov was forced to admit this: “How did he behave during interrogations? He behaved like a prisoner of war commander of an army that had lost the campaign and, from this point of view, he behaved with complete dignity. In this he differed sharply from his ministers with whom I had to deal as an investigator in the case of the Kolchak government. There was, with rare exceptions, cowardice, a desire to present themselves as unwitting participants in someone else’s dirty story, even to portray themselves as almost fighters against these others, the transformation from yesterday’s rulers into today’s slaves before the victorious enemy. There was nothing of this in Kolchak’s behavior.”

But what is the consequence? There was no trial of Kolchak. He was simply shot. Moreover, reading the transcript of the interrogations, you will be convinced that they were shot “very on time.” The version that there was a threat to his release does not stand up to criticism. The white units, the same ones that crossed the taiga in the cold, approached Irkutsk, but were unable to take it by storm and moved on.

On the night of February 6-7, 1920, A.V. Kolchak was shot along with Prime Minister Pepelyaev, and their bodies were thrown into an ice hole in the Angara River.

Kolchak took the secret of gold with him. No one knows how much there was initially, how much was paid for military supplies to the “allies,” how many of these supplies there were, and what was never delivered.

There were many white leaders. Only Kolchak was handed over for execution. Why? Because there was no “Denikin’s gold”, there was no “Wrangel’s gold”.

And Kolchak’s gold was...

Minutes of the meetings of the emergency investigative commission on the Kolchak case
(Transcript report)

Meeting of the emergency investigative commission
January 21, 1920

Popov. You are present before the Investigative Commission, consisting of its chairman: K. A. Popov, deputy chairman V. P. Denike, commission members: G. G. Lukyanchikov and N. A. Alekseevsky, for questioning about your detention. Are you Admiral Kolchak?

Kolchak. Yes, I am Admiral Kolchak.

Popov. We warn you that you have the right, like every person interrogated by the Extraordinary Investigative Commission, not to give answers to certain questions and not to give answers at all. How old are you?

Kolchak. I was born in 1873, I am now 46 years old. I was born in Petrograd, at the Obukhov plant. I am legally married and have one son aged 9 years.

Popov. Were you the Supreme Ruler?

Kolchak. I was the Supreme Ruler of the Russian Government in Omsk - he was called All-Russian, but I personally did not use this term. My wife Sofya Fedorovna used to be in Sevastopol, and is now in France. I corresponded with her through the embassy. My son Rostislav is with her.

Kolchak. She is my old good friend; she was in Omsk, where she worked in my workshop sewing linen and distributing it to military ranks - the sick and wounded. She remained in Omsk until the last days, and then, when I had to leave due to military circumstances, she went with me on the train. She arrived here on this train until the time when I was detained by the Czechs. When I came here, she wanted to share the fate with me.

Popov. Tell me, Admiral, is she not your common-law wife? We don't have the right to record this?

Kolchak. No.

Alekseevsky. Tell us your wife's last name.

Kolchak. Sofya Fedorovna Omirova. I got married in 1904 here in Irkutsk, in March. My wife is a native of Kamenets-Podolsk province. Her father was a judicial investigator or a member of the Kamenets-Podolsk court. He died a long time ago; I didn’t see him and didn’t know him. My father, Vasily Ivanovich Kolchak. served in the naval artillery. Like all naval gunners, he took a course at the Mining Institute, then he was at the Ural Zlatoust plant, after which he was a receiver for the naval department at the Obukhov plant. When he retired with the rank of major general, he remained at this plant as an engineer or mining technician. That's where I was born. My mother is Olga Ilyinichna, nee Posokhova. Her father comes from the nobles of the Kherson province. My mother is a native of Odessa and also from a noble family. Both my parents died. They had no fortune. My father was a serving officer. After the Sevastopol War, he was captured by the French and upon returning from captivity, he married, and then served in the artillery and at the Mining Institute. My father’s entire family was supported solely by his earnings. I am Orthodox; Before entering school, he received a family education under the guidance of his father and mother. I have one sister - Ekaterina; There was another little sister - Lyubov, but she died in childhood. My sister Ekaterina is married. Her last name is Kryzhanovskaya. She remained in Russia; where she is currently, I don't know. She lived in Petrograd, but I have not had any information about her since I left Russia.

I began my education at the 6th Petrograd classical gymnasium, where I stayed until the 3rd grade; then in 1888 I entered the naval corps and completed my education there in 1894. I transferred to the naval corps both at my own request and at the request of my father. I was a sergeant major, I was always first or second in my graduation, changing with my comrade with whom I entered the corps. He left the corps second and received the Admiral Ricord Award. I was 19 years old then. The corps established a whole series of bonuses for the first five or six to leave, and they were awarded according to seniority.

Upon leaving the corps in 1894, I joined the Petrograd 7th naval crew; stayed there for several months, until the spring of 1895, when he was appointed assistant watch chief on the armored cruiser Rurik, which had just completed construction and was preparing to depart abroad. Then I went on my first overseas voyage. The cruiser "Rurik" went east, and here, in Vladivostok, I went to another cruiser "Cruiser", as a watch commander, at the end of 1896. I sailed on it in the waters of the Pacific Ocean until 1899, when this cruiser returned back to Kronstadt. This was my first big voyage. In 1900 I was promoted to lieutenant and returned from this voyage as a watch commander. During my first voyage, the main task was often combat on the ship, but, in addition, I specifically worked on oceanography and hydrology. From that time on I began to engage in scientific work. I was preparing for a south polar expedition, but I did it in my free time; wrote notes, studied the south polar countries. I had a dream of finding the south pole; but I never got to sail the southern ocean.

Alekseevsky. How was your service upon your return? Have you entered the Academy?

Kolchak. No, I couldn't do that. When I returned to Petrograd in May 1899, I then went east again in December, already on a battleship, the battleship Petropavlovsk. He spent the summer in the naval cadet corps on the cruiser "Prince Pozharsky" and went to the Far East.

When I returned to Kronstadt in 1899, I met there with Admiral Makarov, who sailed on the Ermak on his first polar expedition. I asked to take me with him, but due to official circumstances he could not do this and “Ermak” left without me. Then I decided to go to the Far East again, believing that maybe I would be able to get on some kind of expedition - I was very interested in the northern part of the Pacific Ocean from a hydrological point of view. I wanted to get on some ship that goes to protect the seal fishery on the Commander Islands, the Bering Sea, and Kamchatka. I got to know Admiral Makarov very closely these days, since he himself worked a lot on oceanography.